派自己人监督:上级股东与公司的代理成本

本文在细分出公司中与终极控制人关系最为密切的三类股东并将其界定为上级股东的基础上,集中考察了上级股东在降低第一类代理问题方面的治理功能。研究发现,更高的代理冲突下,公司对上级股东的参与有着更高的需求,而上级股东的介入也能够降低公司的代理成本。进一步的研究还表明,上级股东的上述监督行为符合收益最大化的理性行为框架。并且,如果按传统股权制衡研究的范式将所有非第一大股东视为一个整体,并不能观测到上述结果。     

Regulatory intervention and the effect of changes in corporate governance on firm decisions and market reactions

This paper investigates whether Italian companies that cross-list in the United States between 1993 and 2005 show (1) a change in their internal policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis, (2) an increase in market value, or (3) an increase in the access to capital funds. We use the unique environment created by the 1998 Draghi reform which significantly improved the protection of Italian listed companies’ minority shareholders and we further examine the impact of legislated changes in corporate governance in Italy on the decision of Italian companies to cross-list in the United States. Our results indicate that following the Draghi reform (1) firms that cross-list in the United States modify their dividend and cash policies as anticipated by the bonding hypothesis. Contrary to prior research, (2) we do not find evidence that cross-listing serves to enhance shareholder value or (3) is used as a vehicle to more easily access capital funds either before or after the domestic corporate governance is improved. The results of this study provide evidence that country level legislative innovations intended to enhance a weak corporate governance system can be a valid and effective substitute to the bonding mechanism by providing an alternative signal of a firm’s quality.     

股权质押与市值管理:基于中国沪深股市A股上市公司的实证检验

本文以沪深两市上市公司为研究对象,基于2012-2016年的样本数据,运用STATA14探讨了上市公司发生股权质押后,相较不存在股权质押的公司是否会更有可能进行市值管理,以及股权质押、股权激励和市值管理三者之间的传导机制。基于相关数据的实证结果显示,控股股东在发生股权质押行为后,为了避免股价发生异常波动或者持续下跌从而引发公司治理层面的风险,相较不存在控股股东股权质押情形的公司的确更有可能进行市值管理;进一步分析发现,股权质押后,控股股东会通过股权激励这种手段来进行市值管理。     

从委托理财收益率看上市公司委托代理问题

本文将委托理财收益率作为研究对象,考察了上市公司的委托代理问题.通过研究发现,"可操控现金"与委托理财收益率显著负相关;若给定"可操控现金",大股东持股比例越高的公司其委托理财收益率越高.这一结果说明,"可操控现金"越多,上市公司的委托代理问题越严重;大股东的持股比例越高,其对管理层代理问题的约束力越强.研究还发现国外同类研究常用的"自由现金流"变量不能捕捉这一现象.     

高管股权激励与大股东掏空抑制研究:大股东异质特征和制度情境的调节效应

在引入合谋薪酬的委托代理模型中,探究高管股权激励对大股东掏空的作用机制,通过数值模拟与规范分析,从收入效应、风险效应以及身份转换效应三个层面阐释高管股权激励对大股东掏空的影响路径,并以我国沪深A股2009年至2013年实施股权激励计划的上市公司为研究对象,运用面板回归分析发现:高管股权激励存在抑制大股东掏空程度的作用;在股权集中度低、控股层级高和两权分离度大,以及市场化程度低、国有性质和集团控股的公司中,高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用显著,成为有助于投资者保护的内部治理机制;准自然实验的PSM-DID方法稳健性检验也支持了研究假设,并且高管股权激励对大股东掏空在滞后两年的抑制效应显著。研究揭示了高管股权激励对大股东掏空的抑制作用及情境差异,这为从公司内外部治理机制提出抑制大股东掏空的政策提供了启示。     

大股东性质与企业绩效——国有股减持的一个经验证据

以我国上市公司为样本,研究了大股东所有权性质变更对公司绩效的影响。所选样本在样本区间的实证结果表明,从总体上看,企业由政府直接控制型公司转变为非政府直接控制型公司后,仅表现出显著的盈余管理,公司盈利能力没有发生变化。进一步分析发现,其中发生了高层管理人员更换(简称“高层更换”)的公司,短期盈利能力显著提高;面临激烈市场竞争的企业,盈利能力得到了根本改善。研究结果为国有股减持和股权多元化提供了经验证据,论证了引入市场导向的大股东、健全经营者任免机制和加强市场竞争对深化企业改革的意义。     

控股股东、代理问题与关联交易:对中国上市公司的实证研究

本文分析控股股东是否通过关联交易,转移上市公司资源、侵占小股东利益.对中国上市公司1999-2001年的关联交易的实证检验结果发现:由控股股东控制的公司,其关联交易显著高于无控股股东控制的公司;控股股东担任高级管理者的公司,其关联交易显著高于控股股东不担任高级管理者的公司;控股股东持股比例和控股股东在董事会中的席位比例越高,关联交易越多,这意味着控股股东确实能够借助关联交易转移公司资源、侵占小股东利益.     

上市公司资本结构影响因素经验研究

本文结合我国上市公司的融资条件、产业演进阶段及独特的股东结构建立了资本结构的三个研究假说并对其进行了检验。研究发现,股权融资与负债之间既有“互补作用”,又有“替代作用”;产业演进和公司战略对长期借款和贸易应付款有显著影响,对短期借款水平没有显著影响;国有股比例和流通股比例对上市公司资本结构和负债期限几乎没有影响,而第一大股东持股比例对短期借款率和总负债率有显著的负向影响。     

股利政策的股东财富效应:来自中国股市的经验证据

国内现有文献关于上市公司股利政策的研究,主要集中在股利政策的信号传递理论、代理成本理论和影响因素三个方面,对上市公司通过股利分配实现股东高回报率的股东财富效应研究较少,而国外从税收政策变化和税负差异的角度研究股利政策财富效应并不适合中国的情况。为此,本文基于我国上市公司股权分置的特殊治理结构,以2003-2004年所有分配股利的上市公司为样本,实证检验了我国上市公司股利政策的股东财富效应。研究表明,分配现金股利使非流通股股东实现高回报率,流通股股东获得股票股利的较高短期收益率。     

Corporate governance convergence in Germany through shareholder activism: Impact of the Deutsche Boerse bid for London Stock Exchange

This case study examines the shareholder revolt initiated by a small activist shareholder, which eventually thwarted a takeover bid by Deutsche Boerse for the London Stock Exchange and forced the resignation of two of its highest profile board members. Primarily the case marks the emergence of the Anglo-American style shareholder rights movement in a country that offers only limited power to the shareholders of corporations. In the process it illustrates the mechanisms by which functional convergence of corporate governance regimes can occur long before the legal framework catches up. In Germany, the corporate governance regime requires stakeholder interests to be maximised rather than the sole interests of shareholders. This paper chronicles the shareholder actions that forced the takeover bid to be abandoned and seeks to provide an understanding of the motivations behind the activists’ campaign and the process by which they were able to overcome difficult odds and win their campaign. In this respect, it provides a useful insight into the processes used by relatively small investors to exercise their rights to thwart a takeover offer and topple some powerful corporate executives. Furthermore, the case illustrates how a single issue such as the strategic logic or the value creation potential of a takeover bid can rapidly spiral to become a wider campaign over deeply rooted governance concerns at targeted companies. Event study analysis reveals the stock market reaction to the activists’ intervention. Thirdly, the case sheds light on the importance of communication between management and shareholders especially when corporate decisions of great strategic import, such as a takeover, are being implemented. The globalisation of stock markets is empowering shareholders to assert their rights and their activism is driving corporate governance regimes towards greater convergence and recognition of the primacy of shareholder interests. Overall, the case raises a number of important issues regarding the corporate governance regime in Germany, the challenges posed by overseas investors, and the international convergence of corporate governance regimes. The case further suggests an additional mechanism by which international governance systems can converge functionally towards a common theme even if the form of national regimes remains largely unaltered. Our results are consistent with the institutional theory perspective of coercive isomorphism in adopting the shareholder value paradigm by Deutsche Boerse.     

终极控制权与资本结构决策

以2004～2008年我国上市公司为研究对象,从终极控制人的视角实证检验了终极控制股东特征对公司资本结构的影响。研究表明,负债融资扩大了终极控制股东可控制的资源,便利了其攫取行为,且不会导致控制权的稀释,终极控制股东两权分离程度与资本结构显著正相关。较高的现金流权能够有效制约终极控制股东通过扩大负债融资获取私有收益的行为,终极控制股东现金流权对其两权分离程度与资本结构间的关系具有显著的调节作用。与非国有控制公司相比,国有终极控制股东通过扩大负债融资获取私有收益的动机相对较弱,其两权分离程度对资本结构的正向影响也相对较小。     

次大股东对过度投资影响研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

以我国2010年上市公司为研究对象,从次大股东的视角研究了次大股东对公司过度投资的作用。通过实证研究发现:在绝对控股股权结构下,次大股东不能对控股股东的投资行为发挥有效的监督作用;当次大股东为机构投资者时,不能减缓公司的过度投资现象。将负债分为高低2组,在高负债率组中,次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资行为;在低负债率组中,次大股东能促进公司的过度投资行为。由此,我国上市公司的次大股东不能减缓公司的过度投资,其治理作用未能发挥。     

Are Friendly Acquisitions Too Bad for Shareholders and Managers? Long‐Term Value Creation and Top Management Turnover in Hostile and Friendly Acquirers

The well‐documented failure of the majority of acquisitions to create value is often identified in popular discussion with hostile acquisitions, whereas friendly acquirers seem to get a friendly press. The relative performance of friendly and hostile acquirers therefore warrants a rigorous empirical investigation. Clear evidence of superior value creation in hostile over friendly acquisitions allows us to judge the efficacy of the market for corporate control. In this article we examine the long‐term shareholder wealth performance of four types of acquirers – friendly bidder, hostile bidder, white knight and hostile bidder facing a white knight or another hostile bidder. For a sample of 519 acquisitions of UK target firms during 1983–1995, we estimated the three‐year post‐acquisition gains to acquirer shareholders and found that hostile acquirers deliver significantly higher shareholder value than friendly acquirers. We found that friendly acquirers with high stock‐market ratings destroyed more value than hostile acquirers with a similar rating. Friendly acquirer top managers suffered greater job losses than those of hostile acquirers, perhaps paying the price for their inferior value‐creation performance. Our study provides evidence of the superior value‐creation performance of hostile acquirers and makes the case against takeover regulatory rules that may impede hostile takeovers.     

Kapitalmarktreaktionen auf Personalabbauprogramme: Welchen Einfluss haben Motiv,Umfang und Freiwilligkeit?

This study examines the effects of layoff announcements on the market value of German listed companies. Analyzing 136 announcements being published between 2000 and 2009, the results show marginal abnormal returns but high variance indicating that the market reaction might depend on specific characteristics. As potential determinants we particularly discuss the reasons for layoff, the size of layoff and the voluntariness of layoff. We find that reactive reasons like plant closures have a negative impact on shareholder value whilst active reasons like cost improvements enhance shareholder value. The size of layoff tends to induce negative effects. A voluntary layoff announcement however increases the value of a firm. Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between abnormal returns and human capital intensity and a negative one with both the manufacturing industry membership and financial leverage. In addition, the regression model extends prior literature since its coefficient of determination exceeds those in Anglo-American studies.     

投资者保护公益组织与股东诉讼在中国的实践——基于中证投服证券支持诉讼的多案例研究

以2016~2017年间中证中小投资者服务中心(以下简称"中证投服")提起的4例证券支持诉讼为研究对象,本文深入分析了该组织在证券支持诉讼中的作用实现机理及其在中小投资者利益保护方面所产生的直接经济后果和溢出效应。本文发现:中证投服提起的证券支持诉讼在很大程度上改善了虚假陈述案件的赔偿机制,主要体现为赔付主体更加合理化,赔偿金额的计算更加科学,赔付比例有明显提升,赔偿款项的执行力度得以加强;在作用实现机理方面,中证投服作为投资者保护公益组织向中小股东提供了公益服务,同时又具备政府弹性监管的色彩,与我国现行的司法制度形成互补;更为重要的是,中证投服参与证券支持诉讼产生了显著的溢出效应,在唤醒中小股东维权意识的同时,明显提升了民间律师团体的活跃程度,进而从整体上极大地带动了民间股东诉讼的兴起。     

Dual class shares,board of directors’ effectiveness and firm’s market value: an empirical study

This study aims to identify whether a relationship exists between the controlling shareholders’ voting power and outside directors’ effectiveness in maximizing firms’ financial performance. We analyze a panel data with 3057 observations for the 2000–2012 period using a random effects model, logit and probit regressions, and the two-stage model of Heckman in the Brazilian stock market. Our findings show that firms whose controlling shareholders use dual class shares to leverage their voting power have less independence from the board and worse financial performance and market value. Further, the percentage of outside directors tends to be ineffective in increasing the firm’s value, and in changing the firm’s chief executive officer (CEO) when (1) the controlling shareholder’s voting power is leveraged, or (2) when the CEO assumes a position on the board of directors simultaneously. We interpreted that these results are in line with the arguments in favor of the existence of a new agency cost, which is related to the undue obedience of board members to authority, such as the largest controlling shareholder or the CEO in Brazilian listed firms.     

产品市场竞争、控股股东倾向和公司现金股利政策

利用我国沪深两市的4093个公司年非平衡面板数据,实证检查了公司产品市场竞争程度、控股股东现金股利分配倾向与公司现金股利政策之间的关系。结果表明,控股股东具有偏好现金股利的显著倾向,并且这种倾向不受股东性质的显著影响。进一步的研究发现,控股股东偏好现金股利的倾向在高产品市场竞争的环境下更加显著,控股股东要求支付更多现金股利的倾向随产品市场竞争程度的增加而增加。通过运用代理成本理论和股利"掏空"理论对结论进行分析,表明产品市场竞争起到了良好的外部治理机制作用,可以较好地抑制经理层的道德风险和控股股东通过其他方式对公司进行"掏空"。     

终极控制人、金字塔控制与控股股东的"掏空"行为研究

以我国上市公司2004～2007年相关数据为基础,从终极控制人的股权属性、金字塔控制结构、控制权和现金流权的分离3个维度对上市公司纵向股权结构与控股股东的“掏空”行为进行了实证研究。结果发现：中央政府控制的上市公司被控股股东“掏空”的总程度最小,地方政府和自然人控制的上市公司被控股股东“掏空”的总程度没有显著差异;政府控制的控股股东更多地通过生产性经营来“掏空”上市公司,自然人控制的股东则更多地通过非经营性方式来“掏空”上市公司;自然人对上市公司的金字塔控制层级越多,控制权和现金流权的分离程度越大,控股股东对上市公司的“掏空”行为越严重;在中央政府控制的上市公司中,金字塔控制层级越少,控制股东的“掏空”行为越严重,控制权和现金流权有分离的上市公司被控股股东占用的资金高于控制权和现金流权没有分离的公司。     

股东价值取向差异与股东利益最大化实践问题——佛山照明案例分析

本文比较分析了业务发展策略、投资行为和红利政策截然不同的2家同行企业上市以来,短期及长期股票投资收益,长期经营业绩和行业竞争地位。在短期投机交易获利偏好主导股票市场的环境下,佛山照明坚持基于增强主业产品市场持续竞争优势的业务发展策略和高派现政策,嘉宝集团采取迎合股票市场短期投机交易偏好的业务发展策略及高股票股利政策。分析结果表明,佛山照明没有给部分短期投机交易的A股股东创造资本高收益,但为大多数长期股东创造了价值。嘉宝集团则相反。本文进一步讨论了“股东价值最大化”在实践中面临的问题。我们认为,股票市场投资者及上市公司控股股东的价值取向都会多样化,股东价值最大化是股东细分市场上的目标股东价值最大化,而不是笼统的所有不同风险偏好的股东价值最大化。本文结果对上市公司股东价值最大化实践、正确运用金融经济学实证研究方法等有启示意义。     

Shareholders’ Voting at General Meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands

We study annual general meetings of shareholders in the Netherlands. The Dutch corporate governance system is characterized by relatively concentrated shareholdings and large stakes owned by pension funds, banks and insurance companies. The legal protection of shareholders is poor due to the presence of takeover defenses, such as certificates, which deprive shareholders from their voting rights. An analysis of the minutes of 245 general meetings in the period 1998–2002 reveals that on average 30% of the equity capital is represented at the meeting. All proposals at the meeting are sponsored by the management and only 9 out of 1,583 proposals are rejected or withdrawn. Our analyses show that pension funds are the most active and critical shareholders at the meetings, while certificates effectively restrict shareholder rights. Our main conclusion is that the general meetings do not provide shareholders in the Netherlands any significant influence on management.