产品伤害危机预期下的最优动态广告策略

企业在实际经营过程中不可避免的会遭遇产品伤害危机(Product-Harm Crisis)，危机的发生会使商誉受到折损。因此，本文旨在研究当企业预期到可能会发生产品伤害危机时的动态广告策略。为此，首先利用随机到达过程刻画危机的发生，并在此基础上建立危机影响下的动态广告模型。其次运用贝尔曼动态规划原理得到了制造商和零售商在集中、分散以及成本分担决策模式下的最优广告和成本分担策略。最后通过对结果的研究分析可以发现：产品伤害危机的预期会改变供应链成员的时间偏好，使供应链成员更重视当前而不是未来的利润；当危机发生率以及商誉折损率增大时，制造商应减少危机前的广告投入；危机发生率以及商誉折损率会影响零售商危机前的成本分担策略，但影响的结果取决于双方危机前后边际利润的情况；成本分担策略依然能够提高供应链双方的广告投入，从而提高商誉、市场需求和双方的利润，最终实现帕累托改进。     

基于巴斯模型的消费者推荐奖励和广告投入动态定价决策

本文从新产品扩散的过程出发，构建了同时考虑口碑效应和广告效应的产品扩散模型，研究企业推荐奖励和广告投入的动态定价问题。利用汉密尔顿函数和最大值原理得到最优解，并结合多个关键参数对最优解进行了敏感性分析。研究发现：最优推荐奖励呈先减少后增加趋势，最优广告投入则是逐渐减少；对于高价值产品，企业应采取高价格高奖励的策略；企业的推荐奖励策略和广告投入策略会受到推荐奖励效率、广告效率、自发购买比率和传统口碑效的影响。本文的研究结论对企业的推荐奖励和广告策略设计有一定的理论指导意义。     

A Two-Period Repeated Game Advertising Investment Model for Oligopolistic Markets with an Application to the Beer Industry*

This paper proposes a simple analytical model of advertising competition in oligopoly markets. The widely used log-log sales response function underlies the model specification. Advertising carryover effects are assumed to persist for one period following the period in which the expenditure occurs. Firms are assumed to be engaged in a repeated competitive game in which in every period advertising levels are set such that they maximize current and next period (i.e., two-period) profits. A Nash equilibrium solution is sought for the game. Compared with previous empirical studies of advertising competition in a game theoretic framework, the proposed model offers the following advantages: (1) oligopoly, not duopoly, markets are analyzed; (2) industry sales is allowed to vary over time as a function of advertising expenditures; (3) non-zero discount rates are used for the players. An empirical application is provided using data from the beer market on sales and advertising expenditures of Anheuser-Busch and Miller Brewing. Comparisons are provided with policies that ignore the dependence of next period profits on current advertising levels, reaction function strategies and spending levels obtained from a market share game. Extension of the model formulation to multiple marketing instruments is briefly discussed.     

Determining Optimal Advertising Strategies: A Markov Decision Model Approach*

This study falls in the class of models in which advertising wearout and the differences between the learning and forgetting of advertisements are explicitly included. A discrete time Markov decision modeling approach is used to obtain optimal control limit policies, and an algorithm is provided to identify these policies. A control limit policy specifies whether or not to advertise in a specific time period on the basis of the level of awareness in that time period. Thus, the duration for which advertising is not done is determined endogenously, and the algorithm helps determine this duration for a given set of parameters. This is a particularly desirable feature, since advertising practitioners are interested in determining the optimal duration of advertising pulses. Computational experience suggests that the algorithm is very fast and easy to implement. Also, conditions on model parameters indicating the relative efficacy of pulsing versus uniform advertising are provided.     

考虑延时效应的供应链动态合作广告策略研究

广告的延时效应是供应链广告过程中的普遍现象,对供应链合作广告策略的制定具有重要影响.文章研究当产品品牌信誉受广告延时效应影响时供应链的合作广告策略问题,建立了含有时间延迟的品牌信誉动态模型和考虑品牌信誉的产品销售量模型.运用极大值原理,得到了制造商和零售商在分散式决策和集中式决策下的最优广告投入、品牌信誉和利润,以及分散式决策下制造商的最优合作广告参与率.研究发现:在集中式决策下制造商和零售商的最优广告投入和产品销售量均高于分散式决策下的相应值;延迟时间存在一个阈值,当延迟时间低于该阈值时,集中式决策下的供应链利润较高,反之则分散式决策下的供应链利润较高.研究结果为供应链合作广告策略的制定及供应链决策机制的选择提供了一定的参考.最后,通过数值算例分析了广告延迟时间对供应链最优广告策略及决策机制的影响.     

考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策模型研究

具有需求信息优势的企业常常将广告投入作为市场需求信号,有选择地向其互补品生产企业传递需求信息,以刺激其增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获取更大收益。针对这一问题,本文建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,分析了均衡状态下企业的最优广告决策和收益,讨论了企业的广告策略选择。结果表明,分离均衡下,具有信息优势的制造商无法利用广告投入信号刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入。混同均衡下,只有当市场需求为低时,具有信息优势的制造商能够利用广告投入信号,刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获得更大收益。最后,通过一个数值算例验证了有关结论的有效性。     

Dynamic programming for spatial allocation of advertising expenditure

The paper deals with optimal allocation of a given amount of advertising expenditure among various sales districts. It applies dynamic programming to arrive at the optimal policy regarding such allocation. The basic model is that of Zentler and Ryde which heretofore has been solved using a graphical method. The optimal solution is illustrated with an example.     

A Mobile Platform's In‐App Advertising Contract Under Agency Pricing for App Sales

Unlike advertising in traditional media, a mobile platform's in‐app advertising market exhibits two unique features—split structure of the mobile platform with a platform owner and an app developer jointly provisioning in‐app advertising, and agency pricing for app sales. We develop a two‐sided market model to analyze the role of these two unique features in determining the platform owner's optimal advertising revenue‐sharing contract. Our results reveal an interesting N‐shaped dynamic regarding the platform owner's optimal choice of her ad revenue share with respect to the overall advertisers’ valuation of in‐app ads. We identify a between‐agent subsidization strategy for the platform owner, where she finds it optimal to subsidize the developer via the advertising channel, leading to greater profits for both of them. We find that the advertising revenue‐sharing contract under agency pricing for app sales leads to a higher app price than would be offered by the integrated platform found in traditional advertising. However, the ad price is coordinated under the platform owner's optimal choice of ad revenue share when she obtains revenue from both the advertising and app sales channels, leading to an alignment of her interest with the app developer's on ad level.     

Supply chain coordination through cooperative advertising with reference price effect

Cooperative advertising, which usually occurs in a vertical supply chain, is typically a cost sharing and promotion mechanism for the manufacturer to affect retail performance. Research in the literature, however, rarely considers the important phenomenon that advertising has a positive effect on the consumer's reference price. In fact, when a consumer makes a decision to buy a product or not, a reference price is usually in his mind and plays a determinant role. Taking into account the impact of advertising on the reference price, this paper proposes a dynamic cooperative advertising model for a manufacturer–retailer supply chain and analyzes how the reference price effect would influence the decisions of all the channel members. In our model, both the consumer's goodwill and reference price for the product are assumed to be influenced by the advertising and are modeled in differential dynamic equations. In addition, the advertising level, the consumer's goodwill and the reference price are all assumed to have positive effect on sales. Utilizing differential game theory, this paper formulates the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer in two different game scenarios: Stackelberg game and cooperative game. Also, this paper proposes a new mechanism to coordinate the supply chain in which both the manufacturer and the retailer share each other's advertising costs.     

广告竞争模型中的混沌同步特性分析

提出一个基于V - W销售广告反应模型的二维离散广告竞争动态模型. 在两家卖主竞 争的市场中,企业可以生产相互替代的商品,运用广告促销吸引顾客,提高销量. 在V - W模型 的基础上,把广告投入作为控制量,采用线性反馈控制,通过数学分析和数值计算,得出模型中 两个状态变量在一定参数下混沌同步. 并且对混沌同步的稳定性进行了分析     

IMPLICATIONS OF A MODAL-DELAYED DISTRIBUTED LAG RESPONSE TO ADVERTISING EXPENDITURE*

This paper reviews a generalized optimal theoretic advertising model with the flexibility to account for a modal-delayed (inverted V), distributed lag response to advertising expenditure. Three econometric techniques are used in a general test of this model. Conclusions show that models constrained to a simple exponential lag overspecify the optimal level of advertising.     

Decentralized planning with an interdependent marketing-production system

An interdependent marketing-production planning model based on control theory is described. The interdependent model is a composition of the Vidale-Wolfe model relating advertising rates to sales rates, and the Holt, Modigliani, Muth & Simon (HMMS) production inventory planning model. An overall optimal marketing-production plan is identified using the interdependent model. This overall optimal plan (resulting from centralized planning) is then used as a reference point to measure the effectiveness of decentralized planning approaches. It is found that in some cases almost no coordination is necessary, in some cases the use of a transfer price leads to good decentralized planning, and in other cases centralized planning must be employed to achieve good results. Several examples are presented to illustrate the cases in which decentralized planning does and does not work well.     

ADVERTISING DECISION RULES FOR MARKET SHARE MODELS

This paper develops rules for setting advertising budgets when long term effects of advertising and competitive promotional spending are considered in a market share model. In both deterministic and probabilistic cases, a firm's optimal advertising budget is shown to be relatively insensitive to the level of competitive advertising. The key determinant of the advertising level is long run expected profit, and the budgeting rule developed is to spend a constant percentage of long run profit on advertising. Reasons for this result are explored.     

节目试看对网络视频运营商市场策略影响研究

随着网络视频运营商收费节目试看的兴起，而节目试看对网络视频运营商诸如市场规模，利润等市场策略的影响所知甚少。本文在考虑网络用户情绪效用情况下，通过构建高质量视频运营商首播节目与后来跟进的低质量视频运营商播出该节目的博弈模型，研究高质量视频运营商首播节目之前提供节目试看对两个运营商收费模式下的节目最优收费价格和免费模式下的最优嵌入广告量以及视频节目提供模式选择的影响。研究表明，高质量视频运营商在节目首播之前提供节目充分试看能够实现节目最优收费价格最高，利润最大，因此节目充分试看是其最优策略；并且低质量运营商在其单位广告收益与用户单位广告"成本"满足一定条件下，高质量运营商提供的节目的充分试看能够减少低质量运营商总利润，因此避免低质量视频运营商搭乘节目试看的顺风车；高质量视频运营商提供节目充分试看情况下，高质量视频运营商只采取收费模式为其最优市场策略，低质量视频运营商采取免费模式为其最优市场策略。本文的研究成果对网络视频运营商日常运营有一定的管理学启示与应用价值。     

具广告效应的闭环供应链协调性能研究

构建了一个具广告效应的闭环供应链博弈模型,研究广告效应对闭环供应链节点企业决策,以及闭环供应链协调性能的影响。首先,在集中决策、分散决策和广告合作决策三种决策模式下,分别探讨了节点企业的广告投入量、回收率和广告分担率决策,然后,分析了广告效应对各决策变量和利润的影响,最后,运用数值方法,从渠道效率和制造商/零售商收益分配比两方面考察了广告合作对闭环供应链的协调性能。主要结论为:1)广告合作可以增加广告投入量、回收率和节点企业的利润,从而实现闭环供应链的协调;2)节点企业的最优广告投入量、广告分担率、回收率和利润均与广告效应正相关;3)广告合作策略极大地提升了闭环供应链的渠道运作效率,降低了制造商/零售商的收益分配比。随着广告效应的增大,渠道运作效率会逐渐降低,而制造商/和零售商的收益分配比会逐渐升高。     

基于混合定向方式的移动定向广告投放策略研究

以移动广告为研究背景,研究地理定向和消费者产品偏好定向相结合的混合定向方式下企业的定向广告投放策略,同时通过对比企业投放定向广告与大众广告,研究企业的广告策略选择问题。研究发现,企业运用定向广告策略应针对不同的消费者群体提供差异化较大的营销策略:对属于企业近距离范围且偏好企业产品的优势市场,企业应加大广告投放力度并实行高价;为了争取部分远端劣势市场的收益,企业应向其投放一定力度的广告并实行低价;对属于双方的竞争市场,企业应选择中等程度的广告和价格。同时,通过与企业投放大众广告相比较,发现竞争企业使用定向广告策略反而不如使用大众广告策略。     

Cooperative Advertising and Pricing in a Dynamic Stochastic Supply Chain: Feedback Stackelberg Strategies

Cooperative (co‐op) advertising is an important instrument for aligning manufacturer and retailer decisions in supply chains. In this, the manufacturer announces a co‐op advertising policy, i.e., a participation rate that specifies the percentage of the retailer's advertising expenditure that it will provide. In addition, it also announces the wholesale price. In response, the retailer chooses its optimal advertising and pricing policies. We model this supply chain problem as a stochastic Stackelberg differential game whose dynamics follows Sethi's stochastic sales‐advertising model. We obtain the condition when offering co‐op advertising is optimal for the manufacturer. We provide in feedback form the optimal advertising and pricing policies for the manufacturer and the retailer. We contrast the results with the advertising and price decisions of the vertically integrated channel, and suggest a method for coordinating the channel.     

竞争中的参考价格效应及承诺

消费者的社会感知会影响其对产品和品牌的评价。当消费者进行购买选择时,经常会受到参考价格效应的影响。而广告和价格不仅是企业经常要考虑的重要决策,还会对参考价格产生重要影响。为此,一个值得研究的的问题是：在考虑参考价格效应的情况下,企业该怎样确定其动态广告和价格策略？
为了研究该问题,本文构建了一个广告和价格的动态模型,来研究一个双寡头市场环境下两个寡头企业的价格和广告决策,并以此分析参考价格效应的作用。具体而言,我们假定企业可以采用广告承诺和价格承诺中的一种,其中前者承诺其在一段时间内的广告投入量恒定不变,而后者确保价格不变。两种策略不仅会影响消费者的购买决策,也会影响竞争对手的选择。在上述假定下,我们探讨了两个寡头企业在都采用广告承诺、都采用价格承诺及一个企业采用广告承诺而另一个企业采用价格承诺等三种不同情形下的最优广告和价格决策,并以此分析了三种情形下参考价格效应对最优的广告投入及定价策略的影响。最后,通过数值分析,探讨了不同情形下企业的最优策略选择。     

Pot Noodles,Placements and Peer Regard: Creative Career Trajectories and Communities of Practice in the British Advertising Industry

The increasingly unpredictable, individualized and short‐term nature of the labour market is evident in the careers of advertising creatives. We explore the career trajectories of 48 creative professionals in the British advertising industry, using theories of situated learning and communities of practice to illustrate how the collective remains important to individuals' career prospects. Creatives learn their craft by becoming immersed in the multiple, inter‐related communities that constitute the advertising world during the demanding ‘pre‐peripheral’ and ‘peripheral’ stages of their career. Learning through immersion continues throughout the journey from the periphery to the centre, since creatives participate in a competitive, tight‐knit creative community, actively engaged in social networking and constantly monitoring each others' creative output. Creatives' legitimacy (and power) is earned by winning peer regard for their work. The nature of the learning required changes as each stage of the creative trajectory brings different motivations and pressures, but the processes of learning, the mutual shaping of individual and community, and the identity work involved are evident throughout creative career trajectories.     

考虑广告影响下的新产品垄断动态定价研究

针对垄断零售商的新产品定价问题,提出了一个新产品动态定价策略。在顾客对以往的价格和广告具有"学习"能力的条件下,提出了具有"学习"功能的需求函数。在给定各周期广告水平下,给出了零售商最优的动态定价策略,分析了零售商定价规律,发现其定价规律具有"振荡"性,并趋近于一定值。在零售商要同时决策零售价格和广告水平的条件下,给出了各周期最优的零售价格和广告水平。在一定条件下,当周期数趋近无穷大时零售价格趋近于顾客的保留价格或者单位成本。