How the market responds to dynamically inconsistent preferences

This paper responds to the ‘soft paternalist’ argument that the findings of behavioural economics make traditional objections to paternalism incoherent. We show that there is a normatively significant sense in which, even if individuals lack coherent preferences, competitive markets are efficient in providing them with opportunities to get what they want. Extending earlier analysis by Sugden, we model a multi-period ‘storage economy’ and explore the implications of dynamically inconsistent preferences. We show that, despite apparent conflicts of judgement between an individual’s ‘selves’, competitive markets provide maximal opportunity, and that they do so by facilitating voluntary exchanges between selves.     

Informed desire and the ambitions of libertarian paternalism

Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘libertarian paternalism’ (LP) is inspired by the findings of behavioural economics. Its ambitious policy agenda promotes interference which does not block free choice when agents fall short of fully informed and rational choice. Their implicit version of the informed desire view of welfare either provides no, or potentially erroneous, guidance to planners. LP thus faces significant implementation problems. To address these LP might adopt a weaker version of the information requirement on desires or an alternative view of welfare. Nonetheless, informational and bounded rationality considerations suggest that LP should be rethought and its level of ambition reduced.     

An Examination of ‘Irregular Competition’ between Corporations and NGOs

The purpose of this article is to develop a theory which frames the demands of civil society in such a way as to better enable corporate subjects to manage and navigate ‘irregular’ engagement from activist organizations. Activist NGOs engage in advocacy at times by mounting, facilitating or encouraging popular social campaigns and actions against targeted corporations. In many cases, radical ‘direct action’ tactics are adopted, taking such approaches, NGOs may capitalise on the broader, more ethically diverse strategic possibilities open to them than are available to their corporate adversaries. We employ institutional theory to map out this asymmetric distribution of strategic possibility. We theorise NGOs and corporate subjects as effectively ‘competing’ with one another to maximise their own strategic possibilities and to minimise those of their opponents, in the perennial battle for hearts and minds that plays out between NGOs, corporate subjects, and broader civil society actors who ultimately determine boundary rules for NGO-corporate conflict. Within this context we explore the normative challenge arising from the possibility that corporate subjects might seek to tip the competitive balance by learning from how the military has adapted to successfully engage with ‘irregular’ adversaries through what is often termed ‘asymmetric’ or ‘irregular’ warfare. Should corporations follow a similar adaptive process, by mirroring the ‘irregular’ strategies of activist groups? Drawing evidence from the military experience, we suggest—perhaps counter intuitively—that such adaptations can create new opportunities for conflict resolution and for building sustainable cooperation between former adversaries.     

Antipolitics and Counterpolitics in Nepal’s Civil Society: The Case of Nepal’s Citizens’ Movement

This article considers the relationship of civil society to the domain of the political from the actors’ perspectives. It explores the attempt by a citizens’ movement (CMDP) in Nepal to construct new political realities in the context of the autocratic regime of king Gyanendra and then during the democratic transition. This was, paradoxically, to be achieved through the construction of an apolitical space. Theoretically, this production of apoliticality by civil society actors shows that civil society is not only implicated in the expansion of what is understood as ‘political’ but also in setting its boundaries. The broader aims of the article are to contribute to the ethnography of civil society and to add to current understandings of the relationship of actually existing civil societies to the political domain. Practically, it argues that debates over whether civil society is or is not political in the Nepal case and normative positions within development circles that it should not be political are misconceived since civil society is a site for the production of both politicality and apoliticality.     

W. H. Hutt and The economics of the colour bar

Conclusion Long before the international climate of opinion made South Africa’s system of legalized racial discrimination untenable, it was under attack from within. A tiny part of that struggle was waged on moral grounds by decent South Africans both white and nonwhite. The much larger part of the war was waged not on moral grounds but on the economic battlefield where the stakes were profit and losses. As W. H. Hutt so aptly points out, the major disadvantages of apartheid were borne by South Africa’s nonwhite population, but the disadvantage was shared by whites as well. As such it produced widespread tensions leading to resistance, evasion, contravention, and modi-fication of apartheid law. Often evasion and contravention of apartheid law was led by the very people who shared the ideology of white supremacy. The final abolition of apartheid law may indeed reflect a change in heart by South African whites but the coup de grace was, as Hutt put it, the liberating forces “released by what is variously called the ‘free market system,’ the ‘capitalist system,’ or the ‘profit system.’”     

General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures

Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log likelihood ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (“Epistemic Monotonicity”) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be a vote for an alternative; it may be any type of input, for instance a subjective degree of belief or probability of the correctness of one of the alternatives. The case of a profile of subjective degrees of belief is particularly appealing, since no parameters such as competence parameters need to be known here.     

Living with unfairness: The limits of equal opportunity in a market economy

Equality of opportunity is often presented as a criterion which reconciles egalitarianism with principles of freedom and responsibility. This paper distinguishes between the principle of starting-line equality, which requires that everyones initial opportunities, assessed in relation to what is publicly known ex ante, are equal, and the principle that equal efforts should yield equal ex post rewards. It argues that the first principle is compatible with allocation of resources through markets but, because of the division of knowledge, the second is not. If we want the opportunities which markets give us, we have to accept ex post unfairness. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at a workshop on the measurement of freedom at the London School of Economics, and at a conference on non-welfarist issues in normative economics at the University of Caen. I thank participants at those meetings, and particularly Tania Burchardt, Marco Mariotti and Franz Prettenthaler, for comments. My work on this paper was supported by the Leverhulme Trust.     

The Chairman’s Paradox Revisited

This paper re-examines the so-called ‘chairman’s paradox‘ that was first noticed by Farquharson in his path breaking tract on sophisticated voting, Theory of Voting (1969). The Chairman’s paradox is concerned with the case of a three member committee in which a particular player who has a regular and a tie-breaking vote – the ‘chairman’ – not only will do worse in specific instances under the plurality procedure for three alternatives than if he did not have such a vote, but will also do worse overall. That is, the chairman’s a priori probability of success (‘getting what one wants’) for all possible games with linear (strict) preference orders is lower than that of the two regular members. It is demonstrated that this result, which comes about if voters act strategically rather than sincerely, is not as robust as it has been thought to be. By merely replacing the standard assumption of linear preference orders with weak preference orders, which allow for indifference, we can escape from the paradox for the canonical case of three players and three alternatives. With weak preference orders, the a priori success of the chairman is now greater than that of the other two players. We also point to a new paradox of sophisticated voting.     

Relationships between Borda voting and Zermelo ranking

There are many situations wherein a group of individuals (e.g., voters, experts, sports writers) must produce an ordered list of ‘best’ alternatives selected from a given group of alternatives (e.g., candidates, proposals, sports teams). Two long established mechanisms that have been used for this task are ‘Zermelo’s Ranking Method’ (1929) and ‘Borda’s Voting Scheme’ (1781). The main purpose of this paper is to point out that they are, under certain common circumstances, identical. We then show that Zermelo’s Method can be used in situations that Borda’s Method is not designed to handle.     

Pensions and the uses of ignorance by unions and firms

Pensions are contingent claims contracts that are often fashioned by collective bargaining under conditions of asymmetric information and market power. Pensions are not an employer’s or a union’s optimal contract; they represent compromise. Employers use pensions to minimize labor costs and to adjust to market changes. Pensions help unions improve and protect their members’ work lives and help unions to survive as institutions. When workers’ estimations of their pensions differ from their employers’ estimations a moral hazard can exist. Less mobile workers and those with less influence subsidize the pension benefits of other workers or reduce an employer’s costs. Econometric results based on data from the President’s Commission on Pension Policy show that certain workers, namely women, overvalue their plans, which provides an opportunity to lower labor costs and redistribute benefits. Unions have a contradictory effect on information. The author thanks participants in the Cornell University Collective Bargaining workshop and the Harvard Labor Economics workshop. I especially thank James Medoff for his comments.     

Education Assistance to Africa: We Can Do More and Better

Based on the problems of Global Education Assistance to Africa (GEAA), and combined with China’s rationale and practice of Education Assistance to Africa, this paper proposes a vision and assumption to improve the GEAA, that is, using the assistance rationale of ‘Africa-based’, ‘equal-relationship’, and ‘mutual-benefits’, through ‘multi-stakeholders cooperation’, ‘multi-modes operation’, and ‘multi-goals achievement’ to build one ‘harmonious world’.     

‘Non-interference’ implies equality

We propose a new principle of ‘non-interference’ applied to social welfare orderings. The principle, together with two other standard requirements, implies a strong egalitarian conclusion: the ordering must lexicographically maximize the welfare of the worst off. The first version of this paper was written when Mariotti was visiting Bocconi University. Their generous hospitality and financial support through a Research Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. A previous version of this paper written by Mariotti alone was circulated with the title ‘Liberalism implies equality’. We thank Ken Binmore, Paola Manzini, Juan Moreno Ternero and two referees for helpful comments. The responsibility for any error is our own.     

Consistency between tastes and values: A universalization approach

The object of this paper is to propose a consistency test for an individual involved in collective choice process. Collective choice processes considered in the paper are those that transform individuals ‘tastes’– which reflect the self-interested view point of the individuals – into (social) ranking of alternatives. In addition to her tastes, an individual has values about the way by which collective decision should be made. We distinguish two categories of such values. First, there are end-values that restrict the class of social rankings that the individual considers ethically acceptable. Second there are aggregation-values that specify the way by which the social ranking should depend upon the individuals tastes. The consistency test stands on an hypothetical operation of universalization of the individual tastes to everyone. Five illustrations of the potential usefulness of our approach for interpreting social choice theory and welfare economics are proposed. These illustrations deal with utilitarian aggregation in the presence of income inequality aversion, the so-called ‘ethics of responsibility’ and the aggregation of individual ranking of opportunity sets based on their freedom of choice. A discussion of the relevance of the consistency test for addressing the problem of ‘laundering’ individual preferences is also provided. Received: 25 June 1998/Accepted: 16 March 1999     

Geometric models of consistent judgement aggregation

Given a set of propositions with unknown truth values, a ‘judgement aggregation function’ is a way to aggregate the personal truth-valuations of a group of voters into some ‘collective’ truth valuation. We introduce the class of ‘quasimajoritarian’ judgement aggregation functions, which includes majority vote, but also includes some functions which use different voting schemes to decide the truth of different propositions. We show that if the profile of individual beliefs satisfies a condition called ‘value restriction’, then the output of any quasimajoritarian function is logically consistent; this directly generalizes the recent work of Dietrich and List (Majority voting on restricted domains. Presented at SCW08; see , 2007b). We then provide two sufficient conditions for value-restriction, defined geometrically in terms of a lattice ordering or a metric structure on the set of individuals and propositions. Finally, we introduce another sufficient condition for consistent majoritarian judgement aggregation, called ‘convexity’. We show that convexity is not logically related to value-restriction.     

On scale and scope and the history of the non-profit sector in the United Kingdom

This article argues that Alfred Chandler's analysis of the British firm cannot be transposed to the very different context of non-profit organisations in Britain. Both in relation to charitable non-profit organisations and mutual benefit organisations, Chandler's theory of the development of firms does not help explain organisational development. The main thrust of the argument is that the explanation for the smaller size of charitable non-profits in Britain than in America is largely institutional and partly socio-cultural; the explanation does not lie in any failure in Britain to adopt new techniques of management and organisation. With mutual benefit non-profits, a rather different account is presented. ‘Mutuals’ which had a strong fraternal element were relatively more successful in Britain than in America, although there is less difference between the two countries with regard to ‘non-fraternal’ mutuals. Once again, it is argued that institutional and socio-cultural factors—rather than the factors identified by Chandler—account for this. I wish to thank Desmond King for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.     

Community and anti-poverty targeting

The standard theory of anti-poverty targeting assumes individual incomes cannot be observed, but statistical properties of income distribution in broadly defined groups are known. ‘Indicator targeting’ rules are then derived for the forms of transfers conditioned on group membership of individuals. In this literature the motivating notion of a ‘group’ is purely statistical, even when it is groups such as localities and ethnicities. We focus instead on groups which are ‘communities’, meaning thereby collections of individuals who have access to community-specific public goods, from which non-members are excluded. Such differential access constitutes a source of inequality among poor individuals belonging to different communities, which is not captured by monetary earnings. We show that this formulation of what constitutes a group changes many of the basic results of the indicator targeting literature. Optimal targeting for poverty alleviation leads to seemingly paradoxical rules, such as targeting transfers to the community that is richer. Total wealth of non-poor members of a community and its distribution both become relevant for specifying optimal indicator targeting rules. In addition, a poverty measure that is sensitive to the community identities of poor individuals, yet defined on nominal incomes, may be incompatible with some of the basic axioms in the standard literature on poverty measurement.     

From government to grass-roots reform: the Ford Foundation's population programmes in South Asia, 1959–1981

This article traces the history of Ford's involvement in population work in South Asia from the 1950s to the mid-1980s. The primary focus is on the transition from large-scale technical assistance programmes rooted in government and academe, to work with grass-roots women's groups and community-based non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In the process, the Foundation also moved from quantitative efforts designed primarily to distribute contraceptives, to a more holistic approach focusing on maternal and child health. The article concludes by relating these trends to a larger shift from a belief in the power of ‘disinterested expertise’ and university-based policymaking that marked the efforts of the major American foundations since the Progressive era, to a new emphasis on ‘self-interested expertise’ and grass-roots social activist and development NGOs that emerged in the 1970s. Changing development paradigms, political trends and a growing disillusionment with large-scale technical assistance all contributed to this transition.     

Much ado about Goffman

“The claim that all the world’s a stage is sufficiently commonplace for readers to be familiar with its limitations and tolerant of its presentation.” (Goffman 1959, 72, 254) “Given that the logic of privatization....now odiously shapes archetypes of citizenship, [and] manages our perceptions of what constitute the ‘good society’....it stands to reason that new ethnographic research approaches must take global capitalism not as an end point of analysis, but as a starting point.” (Kincheloe and McLaren 2000, 304) “My abhorrence of neoliberalism helps to explain my legitimate anger when I speak of the injustices to which the ragpickers among humanity are condemned. It also explains my total lack of interest in any pretension of impartiality, I am not impartial, or objective...[this] does not prevent me from holding always a rigorously ethical position.” (Freire 1998, 22)     

Sociology’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Suicide</Emphasis>: A Forensic Autopsy?

For decades Durkheim’s theory of suicide has been tested and found wanting. Yet, rather than being consigned to the dust-bin of history, it lives on and is pointed to as an exemplar of the powers of sociological theory and research. If this rationalizing and/or dismissal of so many falsifications of the theory were an isolated phenomenon, it might be evidence of some lemming-like propensity for suicide or a disciplinary death-wish, among a few sociologists. But it appears to be a much more widespread and common occurrence. In this paper we explore some possible explanations of this ‘falsification denial’—‘The Social Misconstruction of Reality’ (Hamilton 1996), ‘When Prophecy Fails’ (Festinger et al. 1956), ‘Underdetermination’ (Duhem 1954; Quine Journal of Philosophy 67:178–183, 1970, Erkenntnis 9:313–328, 1975; Lakatos 1970), and ‘Boundary Maintenance’ (Erikson 1966), and we outline some of the more important and pernicious consequences of this falsification denial for the discipline and future of sociology.