Forecasting births in Greater London: An application of the easterlin hypothesis

Summary A model for forecasting fertility is proposed in which an attempt is made to represent the cyclical fluctuations in fertility typical of developed societies. R. A. Easterlin has put forward the hypothesis that relative affluence, i.e. tension between material aspirations and resources, is an important determinant of fertility behaviour. Relative cohort size in turn affects relative affluence, because the size of a cohort influences its competitive position in the labour market. However, predictions based on relative cohort size alone neglect other sources of periodic fluctuations in fertility, such as those arising from generational cycles. A periodic component which expresses fertility variations as a direct function of time is, therefore, included in this model. A time series of age-specific fertility rates and population estimates for England and Wales and for Greater London is used to assess the relationship between fertility, relative cohort size, and the periodic time function. There is evidence of significant cyclic effects and some support for the Easterlin hypothesis in that the fertility of younger age groups is inversely related to the relative size of older cohorts. Projections are made of the future trend in total fertility assuming a continuation of the observed relationship. Use of different assumed periodicities permits the generation of variant projections of fertility.     

The Easterlin hypothesis in the recent experience of higher-income OECD countries: A panel-data approach

The Easterlin hypothesis emphasizes the effect of relative cohort size on fertility. Models based on the Easterlin hypothesis have performed well in explaining time series fertility data, although these results have been for long historical time series and have typically been restricted to single country studies. These models are not adequate to determine if the hypothesis still holds and if the success of the Easterlin hypothesis is an artifact of the time period chosen. We use panel data analysis and temporal causality tests to see of the Easterlin hypothesis holds for higher-income OECD countries. The results support the Easterlin hypothesis.All correspondence to Yongil Jeon. An earlier version, The Easterlin hypothesis in OECD countries, was presented at the annual conference of the European society for population economics, Bilbao, Spain, June 2002. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Responsible editor: Junsen Zhang.     

Men's influence on the onset and progress of fertility decline in Ghana, 1988-98

While lower fertility is commonly associated with women's reproductive autonomy, we demonstrate that the influence of men's education on reproductive decision-making increased during the first decade of rapid fertility decline in Ghana. Husband's education exerts a stronger influence on wife's fertility intentions than does her own education, and the magnitude of the effect of his education increased significantly from 1988 to 1998. Lower fertility in Ghana seems to be associated more with men's declining fertility desires than with women's increasing reproductive autonomy. Nevertheless, there is some indication that women's education may play a relatively greater role in reproductive decision-making as fertility decline progresses still further.     

An economist's non-linear model of self-generated fertility waves

Summary Standard one-sex linear models of Lotka or Bernardelli always approach asymptotically an exponential growth mode with stable age distribution. Realistic non-linear models need not possess this property. The present analysis uncovers a possibly realistic ease where an existent mode of balanced growth is 'unstable', giving way when slightly perturbed to an asymptotic every-other generation limit cycle of determinable amplitude, and which is stable. The nonlinear model utilizes the hypothesis of R. A. Easterlin that age-specific fertility will tend to be lower for age classes that are relatively swollen in total number. By virtue of the law of diminishing returns, wages and feeling of security will tend to be low for such swollen groups. A possible rebound in fertility in the 1980s is implicit in the Easterlin hypothesis.     

Fertility and land availability in rural Brazil

Differences between the marital fertility of the agricultural frontier and that of the more settled rural areas of southern Brazil are analyzed in this paper. Fertility rates derived from 1970 census data appear to decrease as the degree of settlement increases, suggesting an experience parallel to the decline in U.S. rural fertility in the late nineteenth century, which Easterlin and others have attributed to increased scarcity of land for starting new farm households. Multivariate analysis of the Brazilian data shows parallels between the two situations but also reveals that the importance of literacy, child survival, and access to land is relatively greater than that of the availability of land for explaining fertility differentials in Brazil.     

Time series analysis of fertility and female labor market behavior

Cointegration methods are employed to investigate relations among total fertility, female wages, labor force participation, educational attainment, and male relative cohort size. Two long run relations among the series are found, and these are identified as a fertility and a labor supply equation. All covariates enter into these relations with significant coefficients and theoretically plausible signs. Innovation analysis shows that both fertility and female labor force participation respond to changes in relative cohort size in directions consistent with the Easterlin hypothesis. Female labor force participation responds significantly to fertility shocks, but reverse effects are insignificant.All correspondence to Robert McNown. The authors wish to thank Cristobal Ridao-Cano, Kenneth Land, Alessandro Cigno, and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno.     

The formal dynamics of controlled populations and the echo,the boom and the bust

This paper analyzes the pattern of fluctuations of births in an age-structured population whose growth is subject to environmental or economic constraint. It synthesizes the traditional demographic analysis of age-structured renewal with constant vital rates and the economic analysis which treats population change endogenously. When cohort fertility depends on relative cohort size, or when period fertility depends on labor force size, fluctuations of forty or more years replace the traditional "echo" or generation-length cycle. Twentieth-century U. S. fertility change agrees well with the theory, as the "Easterlin Hypothesis" suggests; but the period model fits better than the cohort model.     

A test of the Easterlin fertility model using income

An important dimension of Easterlin's seminal work on fertility is the hypothesis of intergenerational taste formation, or the relative income hypothesis. Previous estimates have not had data on income in two generations, so the estimated own-income effects may have had a downward bias. This article uses data with income from two generations to estimate the Easterlin model directly. Own income is still not positively significant. A simple single-equation test is developed to distinguish this model from a Becker intergenerational serially correlated endowments model that he claims is observationally equivalent. The test results favor the Becker formulation.     

Cointegration modeling of fertility in the United States

This paper presents estimates of a multiple time series model of fertility, female labor force participation, women's wages, and the relative cohort size of younger to older adult males. Cointegration methods permit modeling of these nonstationary variables, yielding estimates of the long-run relation among the variables, and the dynamic response of each variable to displacements from the steady state. The estimated steady state relation between fertility and the other variables is consistent with economic models of fertility, with fertility negatively related to female wages and male relative cohort size. Fertility responds to cohort size in a manner that is consistent with Easterlin's relative income model of household behavior. Finally, both female labor market variables adjust significantly to departures from the steady state relation, implying that they cannot be treated as exogenous in time series models of fertility.     

Fertility and the Easterlin hypothesis: an assessment of the literature

Focusing just on the fertility aspects of the Easterlin hypothesis, this paper offers a critical assessment – rather than just a selective citation – of the extensive fertility literature generated by Easterlin, and a complete inventory of data and methodologies in seventy-six published analyses. With an equal number of micro- and macro-level analyses using North American data (twenty-two), the „track record” of the hypothesis is the same in both venues, with fifteen providing significant support in each case. The literature suggests unequivocal support for the relativity of the income concept in fertility, but is less clear regarding the source(s) of differences in material aspirations, and suggests that the observed relationship between fertility and cohort size has varied across countries and time periods due to the effects of additional factors not included in most models. Received: 16 July 1996 / Accepted: 26 September 1997     

Total fertility rate,women's education,and women's work: What are the relationships?

This paper presents the results of a statistical study, using cross-national data, on the relationships between total fertility rate and women's level of education and women's labor participation. Aggregate data on seventy-one countries were collected from numerous sources. Eight variables related to women's fertility, mortality, economic status, labor participation, and education are analyzed using multivariate linear regression analyses. Two models are considered. The first model regresses five variables on total fertility rate: per capita Cross National Product (GNP), percentage of women ages 15 to 19 who are married, female life expectancy at birth, calories available as a percentage of need, and percentage of married couples using contraception. The second model includes two additional regressors: the average number of years of schooling for women, and the percentage of women in the labor force. These seven variables are regressed on total fertility rate. Although the data are crude, the results of the analyses suggest that the model which incorporates women's level of education and women's labor participation captures the data better than the smaller model. The full model suggests that the percentage of women in the labor force is directly related to total fertility rate, whereas the average number of years of education for women is indirectly related to total fertility rate.     

Relative cohort size: source of a unifying theory of global fertility transition

Using United Nations estimates of age structure and vital rates for 184 countries at five‐year intervals from 1950 through 1995, this article demonstrates how changes in relative cohort size appear to have affected patterns of fertility across countries since 1950—not just in developed countries, but perhaps even more importantly in developing countries as they pass through the demographic transition. The increase in relative cohort size (defined as the proportion of males aged 15–24 relative to males aged 25–59), which occurs as a result of declining mortality rates among infants, children, and young adults during the demographic transition, appears to act as the mechanism that determines when the fertility portion of the transition begins. As hypothesized by Richard Easterlin, the increasing proportion of young adults generates a downward pressure on young men's relative wages (or on the size of landhold‐ings passed on from parent to child), which in turn causes young adults to accept a tradeoff between family size and material wellbeing, setting in motion a “cascade” or “snowball” effect in which total fertility rates tumble as social norms regarding acceptable family sizes begin to change.     

Social change,population policies,and fertility decline in Colombia and Venezuela

This paper takes a comparative case-study approach to examine the social and policy correlates of fertility decline. The analysis compares fertility behavior across a mature and young cohort of women in Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that experienced rapid demographic change under dissimilar socioeconomic and population policy conditions. Based on the distinction between birth-spacing and birth-stopping behavior the analysis tests several propositions derived from the adaptation and innovation explanations of fertility decline. Results show that fertility regulation at low parities was largely absent among mature women in both countries, representing an innovative behavior among younger women. The introduction of fertility control, however, was highly dependent on women's socioeconomic position, particularly their educational and occupational characteristics. The strong family planning programs in Colombia resulted in a more rapid extension of contraceptive use, particularly female sterilization, and stopping behavior after two children relative to Venezuela. Results highlight the diversity of conditions under which fertility can decline in developing countries and the importance of family planning and other policy initiatives to understanding the different pathways towards lower fertility.     

World fertility and the women's situation]

In 1981, total number of childbearing women in the world reached 9.8 hundred million. Their socioeconomic status and fertility level are very important data for the study of women's liberation and population control. Facing limited natural resources and a constant growing demand, many nations are studying how to control the population growth and achieve a "zero population growth." In nations with a high GNP, such as Switzerland, West Germany, and France, fertility is low. On the contrary, countries in central and south Asia and most parts of Africa are the poorest economically, and their fertility rate has remained very high. Another factor which is related to the fertility level is the degree of women's participation in the labor market. In Europe and North America, the percentage of women's participation in economic activities is high, and fertility is low. In Latin America and Africa, fertility is high, and the percentage of women's participation in economic labor is low. From the above, we may conclude that promotion of women's participation in the labor market and better employment conditions will reduce fertility. Another 2 factors related to fertility are marriage age and birth control rate. Late marriage and the extensive use of birth control measures are effective methods for reducing fertility. All the above mentioned factors are closely related to the woman's educational background. If women receive a better education and find better employment opportunities, delay their marriage age, and take birth control measures, fertility will be reduced and the population growth will be under control.     

Implications of economic reform and spatial mobility for fertility in Vietnam

Vietnam has registered a dramatic decline in fertility during the last decades. While the causes of such a sustained decline are still not well documented, many observers believe that government policies adopted in the 1980s have contributed to lower fertility. This article focuses on the implications of the Doi Moi program of market reforms on fertility, taking into account the influences of migration and population policy. The analysis is based on a sequential logit model of birth histories of ever married women interviewed in Vietnam in 1997. The results show a substantial decline in fertility since the Doi Moi program was introduced. The disruptive effects of migration are less pronounced, although migrants generally exhibit lower childbearingrates, and a somewhat different pattern of parity progression. We argue that the economic reforms of 1986, and the two-child policy initiated two years later, have reinforcedVietnamese women's desire for smaller families.     

Gender differences in the marriage and cohabitation income premium*

Using data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I identify causal effects of marriage and cohabitation on total family income. My goals are to compare men's and women's changes in financial status upon entering unions and to assess the relative contributions of adjustments in own income, income pooling, and changes in family size. Changes in own income that are due to intrahousehold specialization prove to be minor for both men and women relative to the effects of adding another adult's income to the family total. Women gain roughly 55% in needs-adjusted, total family income, regardless of whether they cohabit or marry, whereas men's needs-adjusted income levels remain unchanged when men make these same transitions.     

Reporting of fertility events by men and women in rural Gambia

We conducted a survey of male and female fertility in rural villages in The Gambia and compared men and women's reports of recent pregnancy events in the aggregate and of children ever born for matched couples. Despite widespread polygyny and sex differences in fertility, men's and women's reports were similar. Small sex differences in reports of recent stillbirths and neonatal deaths were found. For matched couples, husbands reported 0.23 more children ever born than their wives on average, but discordant reporting had little effect on recent marital fertility rates. Modeling of discordant reports indicates that fertility reports are more likely to be underestimated by both men and women for their earliest marriages. Reliable fertility data can be collected from men in this population.     

Birth control and regional differentials in the Soviet Union

Abstract Following the territorial division pointed out by Urlanis into those parts of the Soviet Union where birth control is practised and where it is not as widespread, it is possible to ascertain the importance of different factors bearing on fertility within each region. This study was based on data obtained from the 1959 USSR Census of Population including information on social and demographic characteristics of the urban and rural populations for over 150 political-administrative areas. In Central Asia, Azerbaidjan and Armenia, outside the region of birth control, the level of fertility depends mainly on the proportion of women who are married and also on their social position measured by the discrepancy in the educational status of men and women. In contrast, the birth control region of a relatively low level of fertility in urban areas, for example, displays the characteristic of women's educational achievement most strongly associated with the child-woman ratio. Except for the rural areas in this region, the present study fails to support the popular hypothesis that economic dependency of women is directly related to fertility.     

A comparison and latent variable test of two fertile ideas

Perhaps the two most important recent strands in the economics of fertility have been developed by Becker and Easterlin. Both suggest possible biases due to unobserved variables. Becker earlier emphasized changing shadow prices for child quantity and quality and, more recently, intergenerational serially-correlated endowments, all with given preferences. Easterlin has focused on intergenerational serially-correlated preferences. Some demographers have suggested that the Becker and Easterlin approaches are converging and may not be identified from each other.We demonstrate that while the Becker endowment and Easterlin taste models can be expressed in terms of the same variables, it is possible to identify each of the models because of different signs in a latent variable system that uses information from individuals, siblings, and cousins. Estimates of this model are consistent with the Easterlin, but not the Becker formulation. But neither model results in significant income coefficient estimates.The authors thank NIH for research support and Alan Mathios for excellent research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Economic recession and fertility in the developed world

This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession—including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.