TO LEAN OR NOT TO LEAN AGAINST AN ASSET PRICE BUBBLE? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Since the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, economists are reconsidering the appropriate role of monetary policy towards equity bubbles. This paper contributes to these deliberations by estimating the response of the stock market to monetary policy tightening by using a Bayesian time-varying VAR model. By introducing the cyclically adjusted price/earnings ratio, we propose a method that estimates its fundamental and bubble components. We find that asset prices will initially fall and eventually rise again but without the risk of feeding the bubble. Counterfactual policy experiments provide additional evidence that monetary policy can lean against equity and housing prices. (JEL E50, E52, E58)     

The credit channel of monetary policy transmission: evidence from stock returns

This paper offers a novel test of the credit view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism using stock market returns. We identify Fed policy shocks using newspaper accounts and track daily stock prices immediately following the shocks. If the credit channel is important, then firms that are dependent on bank credit and internal funds should receive a relatively greater benefit (loss) from a Fed easing (tightening) than firms with access to nonbank credit at favorable terms. We identify ten policy shocks during the expansion of 1993-94 and the 'credit crunch' period of the 1990-91 recession and find little evidence supportive of an operative credit channel.     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE,MONETARY POLICY,AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: EVIDENCE FROM A FAVAR MODEL

This paper examines the effects of exchange rate depreciation to the U.S. economy in a factor‐augmented vector autoregression model using monthly data of 148 variables for the post–Bretton Woods period of 1973–2017. Exchange rate shock is identified to reflect exogenous disturbances to the foreign exchange market, and movements in exchange rate that are not accounted for by changes in the U.S. monetary policy. We find that depreciation is expansionary and inflationary to the broad U.S. economy, the current account improves over time conforming to the J‐curve theory, and monetary policy is leaning against the wind. (JEL E3, E5, F31, F32, F41)     

FINANCIAL MARKET VARIABLES DO NOT PREDICT REAL ACTIVITY

The past decade has seen an extensive empirical reassessment of the information content of financial market variables sensitive to monetary policy. Particularly provocative are recent papers suggesting that some interest rates and interest rate spreads contain more information about economic activity than monetary aggregates. This paper reviews important methodological pitfalls in these studies. We then show that none of the commonly employed measures of monetary policy contain incremental information useful in forecasting real economic activity. Two conclusions are possible. Either monetary policy innovations have no significant real effects, or we (collectively) have failed in our efforts to measure monetary policy. ( JEL E52)     

LEANING AGAINST WINDY BANK LENDING

Using an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides evidence that monetary policy reacted to bank loan growth in the United States during the Great Moderation. It then shows that the optimized simple interest‐rate rule features no response to the growth of bank credit. However, the welfare loss associated to the empirical responsiveness is small. The sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial in determining whether a “leaning‐against‐the‐wind” policy is optimal or not. In fact, the predominant role of supply shocks in the model gives rise to a trade‐off between inflation and financial stabilization. (JEL E32, E44, E52)     

MONETARY POLICY AND ENDOWMENT RISK IN A LIMITED PARTICIPATION MODEL

A limited participation model is constructed to study the risk‐sharing role of monetary policy. A fraction of households exchange money for interest‐bearing government nominal bonds in the asset market and the government injects money through open market operations. In equilibrium, money is nonneutral and monetary policy redistributes consumption across households. Without idiosyncratic endowment risk, monetary policy becomes a perfect risk‐sharing tool, but with idiosyncratic endowment risk, it is not. The Friedman rule is not optimal in general. (JEL E4, E5)     

GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES,STRATEGIC SAVINGS,AND THE DOT‐COM BOOM AND BUST

Data from the dot‐com boom‐bust episode suggest that growth opportunities played an important role in explaining firms' financing strategy during this understudied episode. The low leverage of this sector was mainly driven by high growth firms which increased their leverage following the crash despite suffering a much larger fall in their market value. We present a parsimonious dynamic firm financing model where growth opportunities alone can generate the heterogeneous patterns in the financing and performance between high and low growth information technology firms prior to and following the market crash. The calibrated model also sheds light on the role played by monetary policy during that episode. (JEL G32, E22, E5)     

LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION AND THE EURO AREA CRISIS: AN EMPIRICAL DSGE MODEL

We estimate a medium‐scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the Euro area with limited asset market participation (LAMP). Our results suggest that in the recent European Monetary Union years LAMP is particularly sizable (39% during 1993–2012) and important to understand business cycle features. The Bayes factor and the forecasting performance show that the LAMP model is preferred to its representative household counterpart. In the representative agent model the risk premium shock is the main driver of output volatility in order to match consumption correlation with output. In the LAMP model this role is played by the investment‐specific shock, because non‐Ricardian households introduce a Keynesian multiplier effect and raise the correlation between consumption and investments. We also detect the contractionary role of monetary policy shocks during the post‐2007 years. In this period consumption of non‐Ricardian households fell dramatically, but this outcome might have been avoided by a more aggressive policy stance. (JEL C11, C13, C32, E21, E32, E37)     

2011年：宽松货币政策实施与退出的“滞胀”效应——来自2002～2010年货币存量变动研究的见解

通过对2002～2010年我国货币存量、价格波动与产出增长关系的实证研究,有两个重要的发现：一是一个高的货币存量增长率会带来物价上涨的趋势,而抑制物价上涨的根本之策是降低货币增长率;二是2009～2010年实施的宽松货币政策对产出增长的短期效应开始消褪,而价格则进入了一个上升通道,＂滞胀＂风险已经出现,因而中央银行转向降低通胀的一个明确的货币政策规则应是优选的政策目标。     

QUANTITATIVE EASING AND THE UK STOCK MARKET: DOES THE BANK OF ENGLAND INFORMATION DISSEMINATION STRATEGY MATTER?

We use intraday aggregate stock market data and an event‐study framework to assess the UK's equity market reaction to the unexpected element of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee's (MPC) asset purchase announcements for the 2009–2017 period. We assess the reactions of equity returns and their volatility over various time frames, both preceding and following the MPC announcements. Our results show that the UK unconventional monetary policy shocks have a significant impact on domestic equity returns and volatilities. The strength of this impact depends on the Bank's information dissemination through inflation reports and the publication of the MPC's voting records. (JEL G14, E44, E52)     

MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS,EXPECTATIONS, AND INFORMATION RIGIDITIES

This paper contributes to the literature by assessing expectation effects from monetary policy for G7 economies. We rely on expectation data from Consensus Economics and a panel vector autoregression framework, which accounts for international spillovers and time‐variation. We analyze whether monetary policy has changed the degree of information rigidity after the emergence of the subprime crisis and estimate effects of interest rate changes on expectations, disagreements, and forecast errors. We find strong evidence for information rigidities and identify higher forecast errors by professionals after monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that the international transmission of monetary policy shocks introduces noisy information and partly increases disagreement among forecasters. (JEL E31, E52)     

THE IMPACT OF STOCK MARKET FLUCTUATIONS ON THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL WELL‐BEING OF CHILDREN

The stock market crash of 2008 caused a severe impact to households. Earlier research has explored the impacts of a stock market crash on life well‐being, psychological stress, and adult health behaviors. We extend this literature by documenting impacts of stock market fluctuations on a range of child outcomes; including effects on both mental and physical health. We show a negative effect of a market crash on hospitalizations, child reported health status, sick days from school, and an aggregate health index measure. Both graphical and regression‐based analysis reveal that our results are not driven by a preexisting trend of declining child health before the market crash and extensive sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the results are robust to multiple empirical specifications. (JEL I15, E32, J13)     

LIMITED ASSET MARKET PARTICIPATION,STICKY WAGES,AND MONETARY POLICY

A small amount of nominal wage stickiness makes limited asset market participation (LAMP) irrelevant for the design of monetary policy. Recent research argues that LAMP could invert the slope of the IS curve in otherwise standard New Keynesian models. This, in turn, implies that optimal monetary policy rules should be passive. We show that the so‐called inverted aggregate demand logic (IADL) relies on nominal wage flexibility. Outside of extreme parameterizations, wage stickiness prevents the inversion of the slope of the IS curve. Hence, LAMP does not generally alter the trade‐offs faced by a welfare maximizing Central Bank, and for this reason it does not fundamentally affect the design of optimal simple rules and optimal monetary policy. (JEL E21, E52)     

CENTRAL BANK SECRECY, INTEREST RATES, AND MONETARY CONTROL

We construct a dynamic rational expectations model of the federal funds and deposit market that provides a rationale for central bank secrecy about current monetary aggregate objectives. In this analysis, the Trading Desk values secrecy because it reduces the influence of monetary control policy on interest rates. We then examine actual U.S. experience with monetary control and determine that the reserve bias predicted by the model is present in the data from 1978 to 1985. Finally, we demonstrate that central bank secrecy may not lower the value of commercial banks.     

VELOCITY FUTURES MARKETS: DOES THE FED NEED A STRUCTURAL MODEL?

Previous proposals suggesting monetary policy makers target private-sector forecasts have been shown to be problematic. As policy becomes more effective, private-sector forecasts become less informative. Under perfect stabilization private-sector forecasts provide no useful guidance to monetary policy makers about economic shocks. We illustrate a way around this circularity problem by creating a policy futures market linked to the ratio of the (realization of the) policy goal for next period and the current instrument setting. The implication is that extensive information gathering is unnecessary, weakening the argument that central banks need a structural model to conduct policy. (JEL E52, E44, E42 )     

FOREIGN BANKS AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL

We provide new evidence on bank ownership and transmission of monetary policy using bank‐level data on 453 banks in Central and Eastern European economies between 1998 and 2012. Only domestic banks adjust loans to changes in monetary policy, while foreign banks do not. Conventional wisdom says that this is because foreign banks can rely on parent banks' funding to insulate against monetary policy shocks. In this paper we document an alternative explanation. Deposits in foreign banks do not react to monetary policy, hence the bank lending channel is only triggered in domestic banks. (JEL E50, F36, G21)     

THE U.S. EMBARGO ACT OF 1807: ITS IMPACT ON NEW ENGLAND MONEY, BANKING, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

For half a century economists have debuted the impact of the Embargo Act of 1807 on the U.S. economy. Using New England bank statistics and the weekly prices of financial assets traded in the Boston market, hypotheses generated by a real business cycle model are tested. The study concludes that the embargo significantly fnfected the levels of real and nominal bunk loans, the real and nominal money stock, and current financial asset yields. Also, increased monetary und banking activity in Maine during the period supports the long-standing hypothesis that the embargo caused an increase in smuggling activity.     

EFFICIENT INFORMATION PROCESSING IN OUTPUT MARKETS: TESTS AND IMPLICATIONS

If goods markets efficiently process information, much of received macro doctrine seems of little relevance. Neither unemployment nor the money stock should be leading indicators of inflation. Countercyclical monetary policy will have little effect on inflation. Restrictive monetary policy can have severe effects on real variables if the public is unconvinced the authorities are committed to reducing inflation. When proper account is taken of mean shifts in the stochastic process generating CPI inflation rates, there is little remaining autocorrelation indicative of inefficiency, and filter rule experiments similarly support the hypothesis of goods market efficiency.     

IDENTIFYING THE ROLE OF RISK SHOCKS IN THE BUSINESS CYCLE USING STOCK PRICE DATA

I analyze the sources of U.S. business cycle fluctuations in an estimated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with a rich set of nominal and real rigidities and various exogenous disturbances. The model includes a shock to the expected risk‐premium, which introduces a time‐varying wedge between the policy rate set by the central bank and the cost‐of‐capital of firms. In the aggregate data, most U.S. corporations finance their investment using internal funds, and stock prices reveal the opportunity cost of this type of financing. I therefore use corporate market value and dividend data in the Bayesian estimation of the model to identify risk shocks. Variance decomposition exercises show that these shocks account for a substantial part of the variation in the stock market, as well as the variation in output and investment, especially at short forecast horizons. The variation of these variables at longer forecast horizons are mainly captured by shocks to investment‐specific technological change. Historical decomposition points to the important role played by risk shocks in the run up of stock prices and output in the late 90s, and in the reversal of these variables in the early 2000s and during the recent recession. (JEL E32, E44)     

Central Bank Autonomy without Monetary Policy

The autonomy of a country’s central bank from political authorities has been advocated both as a remedy against the inflationary bias that would otherwise be present in the conduct of the government’s monetary policy and, more recently, on the basis of empirical evidence. However, both theoretical arguments and empirical findings have associated central bank autonomy with the conduct of monetary policy, while often failing to pay attention to those institutional cases where a central bank is in place but is not responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. These cases are particularly relevant for those countries which do not possess their own currency, or where extreme monetary regimes such as dollarization, currency boards, or monetary unions are present. These institutional settings, where a central bank exists, but there is no monetary policy to be conducted, raise the issue of central bank autonomy in a framework where the inflation bias is no longer pertinent. In other words: Is central bank autonomy still a relevant objective when a country does not run its own monetary policy? The present paper addresses this question, discusses dimensions of autonomy and accountability and maintains that central bank autonomy still does matter, particularly if the central bank is responsible for bank supervision and financial regulation.