基于标准作业成本的转移定价方法研究

转移价格同时具有业绩衡量和引导决策的作用,因而在分权管理中占有重要地位,但基于传统成本核算方法的转移定价方法具有很大缺陷.以模型化方法定量研究了作业生产能力约束下的标准作业成本基础转移定价方法,可实现对企业内各分部生产采购决策的有效引导.数值算例分析表明该方法能够较公正地衡量分部业绩,促使分部制定有利于企业整体利益的决策,同时能够提高企业的价值链管理水平.     

控制权转移与企业业绩

本文利用1997-2001年发生控制权转移的企业为样本,运用因子分析方法,研究了控制权转移与企业业绩之间的关系,创新性地对企业业绩从盈利性和增长性两方面进行分解评价,并进一步辨识了并购行为的特征。研究结论:(1)与市场整体水平相比,控制权转移企业中业绩较好的企业占27%,业绩较差的占22%,业绩中等的占51%;(2)控制权转移虽然能短暂地提升业绩,但并不能长久提升;业绩短暂提升是通过业绩增长实现的,而企业盈利能力始终没有提升;(3)控制权转移的财务性并购特征高于战略性并购特征。     

信息不对称条件下的企业集团转移定价研究

本文研究了信息不对称条件下企业集团的转移定价决策问题,提出了歧视转移定价法。即在信息不对称条件下,当上游子企业对中间产品具有完全垄断能力时,企业集团将转移定价决策权下放给上游子企业,上游子企业根据内外部市场需求的差异,采用差别定价策略。通过与市场基础转移定价和边际成本转移定价相比较,得出歧视转移定价可以增加企业集团的整体利润。     

关联企业转移定价研究综述

分别从考虑税收因素和不考虑税收因素两方面出发,对国内外关于关联企业内部交易 转移定价的研究现状作了比较详细的综述,论述了每一种转移定价策略的缺陷和不足,并结合 现实企业的实际情况,提出了进一步的研究方向。最后就转移定价的最新研究动态及今后的 发展趋势进行了分析     

试论关联方交易转移定价规范

从税务、会计和公司治理三个方面论述了转移定价的规范.转移定价是关联方交易中的核心问题,是企业的战略问题,恰当的转移定价具有一定积极作用,但是过分偏离公平交易的转移定价也会带来一系列的问题,因此各国往往对关联交易转移定价进行严格规范.在我国,上市公司往往利用不公平的转移定价进行盈余管理,控股股东也利用它从上市公司抽取利益,这损害了上市公司尤其是中小股东的利益,造成资源错误配置.转移定价的规范,从税务上来讲,税务部门应根据"公平交易原则"进行纳税调整;从会计上来讲,应当加强转移定价要素的信息披露;从公司治理上来讲,应引进外部董事等制度,防止控股股东利用转移定价损害上市公司和股东的利益.     

外企转移定价规避所得税的表现及诱因

我国外商投资企业的贸易方式、贸易增幅及差额、贸易的商品构成、投资方式、以及经营效益表明,在华跨国公司普遍存在利用转移定价减少缴纳所得税的行为。其原因是我国外资企业税收优惠政策对跨国公司转让定价有诱导作用、我国税制对跨国公司转让定价的制约措施不够完善、以及地方政府税收调整干预为跨国公司转移定价避税提供了庇护。     

带有转移成本寡头垄断的二次定价及仿真

寡头垄断企业往往通过二次定价或价格歧视来获取更多的利润,尤其是后入者经常采用先低价抢占市场,再高价获取利润的策略.研究了两个寡头垄断企业二次定价的竞争.证明了定价及总利润与转移成本负相关,第一阶段实行低价策略的寡头企业会在第二阶段定价中失去部分第一阶段获取的超额市场.将第一次定价产生的转移成本看作新产品投放市场广告或市场推广等成本效果,进一步讨论了产品在毗邻位置竞争的情况,指出寡头垄断的利润主要来自转移成本.     

影响被赞助活动和赞助品牌间形象转移的因素——基于蒙牛酸酸乳赞助超级女声的实证研究

企业赞助一项活动的主要目的之一是将活动的某些形象通过赞助这种方式转移到企业或者产品品牌的形象上来,并借此达到塑造品牌形象的目的。本文以蒙牛酸酸乳对具有较大社会影响的超级女声活动的赞助作为研究对象,来分析影响形象转移的因素。结果发现消费者感知的赞助活动的质量以及赞助活动和赞助品牌之间的拟合度是影响形象转移的关键因素。而消费者介入活动的程度和感知的活动曝光度只会影响其对活动本身的评价。本文最后讨论了研究结果的理论意义以及对活动组织者与赞助商的启示。     

基于交货期库存协调的供应链转移定价研究

在将缺货成本和延期惩罚成本纳入决策模型的前提下,对供应商—制造商两阶供应链在转移定价、安全库存,以及总成本之间的相互作用进行了探讨:首先探讨基于 Stackelberg 收益共享定价机制的最优决策;然后,以一体化供应链为参照系,探讨对供应链各成员的行为进行优化的两部制(two-part scheme)收益共享转移定价决策在实践中的运用;最后,探讨模型中部分变量变化对最优决策所产生的影响.通过分析发现,承诺的交货期、延期惩罚成本与缺货成本将会影响供应链的总成本和转移定价决策,进而影响供应商的最优库存决策,而制造商则可以通过适当的激励机制设计,激励供应商按照供应链整体最优的方式进行转移定价、安全库存及相关决策.     

转移定价法律规制新论

本文以非法避税发生后的定价惩罚制度的建立为核心,对跨国公司转移定价的法律规制提出了新的观点。即建立以可比非受控价格法为理论基础的"定价比较惩罚制度"并提倡与一般的调整办法和预约定价协议一起,组成三位一体的护税体系,目的是为了给完善东道国包括我国在内的转移定价法律制度提供参考。     

基于讨价还价模型的持股型供应链最优订货与定价策略研究

论文分析了风险规避型供应商和制造商组成的供应链系统，为了降低供应的不确定等因素，通过制造商投资供应商并持股的方式降低供应链的整体风险。构造均值-方差模型刻画制造商和供应商的风险偏好特征，并通过构建纳什讨价还价模型分析供应商和制造商的交易谈判过程。论文证明了纳什讨价还价模型存在唯一的均衡合同，并对均衡合同进行了比较静态分析，提出了可供实践企业参考的管理启示。     

Strategic transfer pricing in a marketing–operations interface with quality level and advertising dependent goodwill

Determining an appropriate transfer price is of importance to a firm composed of divisional profit centers since it significantly affects decision-makings of each profit center and then the firm׳s profit. In this paper, we investigate the effects of negotiated and administered transfer pricing on the profits of each center and the firm based on a differential game involving an operations department and a marketing department within a firm. The operations department is responsible for the quality improvement of a particular product and sells this product to end customers through the marketing department who controls the retail price and advertising effort. Our results suggest that compared with the administered transfer price, the negotiation between the operations department and the marketing department leads to a higher transfer price, and then a higher retail price, lower advertising effort and higher quality improvement effort. What׳s more, the decentralized departments can be coordinated by a committed dynamic transfer price of the operations department, and both departments and the firm can benefit from this coordination.     

A Review of the Contemporary Transfer Pricing Literature with Recommendations for Future Research

A transfer price is a value placed on the goods or services which are traded between divisions of an organization. This paper attempts to make the subject of transfer pricing accessible to researchers and others interested in managerial problems so that a very real managerial problem can be studied in a broader managerial context. The not insubstantial literature that has grown up in the transfer pricing area is reviewed and, in particular, a critical evaluation of recent writings in the field is provided. It is shown that little which is unequivocal is known about transfer pricing and that the choices made by managers with regard to transfer pricing are little understood, both with regard to the factors which drive choice and the differences between choice in practice and theoretical interpretations. It is suggested that progress in the area will require a richer understanding of the realities confronting practising managers. Research by means of field studies, particularly case studies, is recommended to provide this. A series of hypotheses and issues, representing the dilemmas facing managers, is provided as a theoretical grounding for such research.     

NEGOTIATED TRANSFER PRICING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN ORGANIZATIONS

An experiment was conducted to test hypotheses about conflict related to negotiated transfer pricing. A business game with repeated decision periods was used to simulate transfer pricing negotiations between corporate divisions. When the evaluation of division executives emphasized corporate profits rather than divisional profits, there was more smoothing and integrative problem solving and less aggressive-competitive behavior, relations between the divisions were better, and more cooperation was observed to occur in other decisions unrelated to the transfer pricing. Moreover, corporate profits from the transfer product and its derivative product tended to be larger. All of these effects were most pronounced when the transfer product was important to both divisions as a source of profits.     

无外部市场条件下中间产品转移价格的博弈分析与决策

本文首先用反例证明了文^[1]中在各分厂成本函数和最终产品需求函数已知的条件下,给出的中间产品最优转移价格的两个计算公式并不总是成立的,给出了这两个计算公式成立的充要条件,并分析了公司关于中间产品转移价格决策的动态一致性问题。接着,利用完全信息动态博弈对中间产品转移价格的确定问题做了进一步的分析研究。最后,针对文^[1]中给出的中间产品最优转移价格的两个计算公式不成立的情况,讨论了中间产品转移价格的确定问题。     

Transfer pricing—A survey using discriminant analysis

There is a considerable literature on transfer pricing. One strand of this literature is empirical and is concerned with the extent to which companies use the various transfer pricing methods. The other strand is strongly normative being directed to devising transfer pricing methods and defining the circumstances under which it is appropriate to use them. This study attempts to address both these questions by using discriminant analysis methods to predict which approach a company will use to determine transfer prices given its weightings of certain ‘determinants’ which theory suggests should be relevant to the decision. Domestic and international transfer pricing are considered separately. Discriminant analysis is shown to be quite successful in predicting the transfer pricing systems adopted by the UK companies surveyed.     

基于收益分成的多受让方两部技术转移定价策略研究

首先,从一般需求函数出发,得出两部技术转移定价法的一般解析表达式。然后,以线性需求函数为例,通过数值计算,对比分析了收益分成比例、最终产品价格、研发企业利润和受让方企业利润随着转让方和受让方股权比例的不同而变化的趋势。最后,分析得出,通过采用前期固定费用加后期收益分成的两部转移定价方法,不仅可以使研发企业的利润最优,同时还可以缓解技术受让方在单一定价方法下的一次性支出所带来的巨大资金压力和较高风险水平,并且将研发企业的利润与受让方的未来收益紧密联系,实现了双方的收益共享和风险共担。     

软件外包项目复杂性下的交互记忆系统与知识转移

针对软件外包项目团队中如何有效知识转移问题,构建交互记忆系统、项目复杂性和知识转移绩效之间关系的概念模型,基于25家软件外包承接企业中107个软件外包团队的问卷调查数据,运用偏最小二乘法对数据进行分析。研究结果表明,专长度和可信度对团队知识转移绩效和协调度有显著的正向影响,软件外包项目结构复杂性对专长度与知识转移绩效的关系有显著的正向调节作用,软件外包项目动态复杂性对专长度与知识转移绩效的关系有显著的负向调节作用。研究结果揭示了项目复杂性条件下交互记忆系统与知识转移绩效之间的作用机理,推进了软件外包知识转移理论发展,并为软件外包团队有效地进行知识转移提供管理启示。     

新兴智能回收下制造商转移定价决策

针对新兴智能回收,从闭环供应链渠道设计和回收定价角度,分别构建了单一回收渠道和双回收渠道下制造商一致和差异化转移定价决策模型,研究在制造商主导的闭环供应链中制造商的转移定价和最优利润决策问题。研究表明,相对于单一回收渠道,双回收渠道增加了产品回收率和供应链各成员利润;相对于差异化转移定价决策,制造商采取一致转移定价决策,能实现自身利润和智能回收商利润最大化,但会损害传统回收商利润,且不利于供应链其他成员利润的增长;当制造商采取差异化转移定价决策,虽不能实现自身利润最大,但相对于单一回收渠道,其利润也有所增长,也不会损害传统回收商利润,供应链其他成员的利润也会增长。     

Transfer Pricing and Sourcing Strategies for Multinational Firms

Taking advantage of low tax rates using transfer pricing and taking advantage of low production costs using offshoring are two strategies multinational firms (MNFs) use to increase profits. We identify an important trade‐off that MNFs face in setting their transfer prices: the conflict between (i) the incentive role and (ii) the tax role of the transfer price. For MNFs, we find the profit‐maximizing transfer‐pricing strategies that motivate divisional management to (i) make good sourcing decisions and (ii) take advantage of favorable tax rates. We quantify the absolute and relative maximum inefficiency in terms of the after‐tax MNF's profit change from using a single transfer‐pricing system as compared to the dual transfer‐pricing system. We show that the highest relative loss is attained when the average sourcing cost and the tax differential are high. We demonstrate that the highest absolute loss is attained when the average outsourcing cost is approximately equal to the offshoring cost. We extend our results to two practical variations in MNF structures: an MNF that faces operational constraints on its offshoring capacity and an MNF that uses compensation contracts linked to after‐tax firm‐wide profits. Our insights help MNFs' managers identify when to use single and dual transfer‐pricing systems.