The global “war for talent”

In this paper we examine the “global war for talent,” the factors that impact it, and organizations' responses to it. Using a comprehensive search of more than 400 contemporary academic and business press articles, the paper reviews relevant research and reassesses the “talent war.” We posit that the dominant approaches to the “talent war” based on a scarcity state of mind and action, often characterized by a tactical and exclusive top talent or “star” focus, are being challenged by the emergence of a more evolutionary paradigm. This new paradigm adopts more strategic, innovative, cooperative and generative approaches which we describe as creative ‘talent solutions.’ The paper also highlights implications for future research, teaching and development in the field.     

On “Black Swans” and “Perfect Storms”: Risk Analysis and Management When Statistics Are Not Enough

Two images, “black swans” and “perfect storms,” have struck the public's imagination and are used—at times indiscriminately—to describe the unthinkable or the extremely unlikely. These metaphors have been used as excuses to wait for an accident to happen before taking risk management measures, both in industry and government. These two images represent two distinct types of uncertainties (epistemic and aleatory). Existing statistics are often insufficient to support risk management because the sample may be too small and the system may have changed. Rationality as defined by the von Neumann axioms leads to a combination of both types of uncertainties into a single probability measure—Bayesian probability—and accounts only for risk aversion. Yet, the decisionmaker may also want to be ambiguity averse. This article presents an engineering risk analysis perspective on the problem, using all available information in support of proactive risk management decisions and considering both types of uncertainty. These measures involve monitoring of signals, precursors, and near‐misses, as well as reinforcement of the system and a thoughtful response strategy. It also involves careful examination of organizational factors such as the incentive system, which shape human performance and affect the risk of errors. In all cases, including rare events, risk quantification does not allow “prediction” of accidents and catastrophes. Instead, it is meant to support effective risk management rather than simply reacting to the latest events and headlines.     

Response to “Revisiting ISO 14000 Diffusion: A New ”Look“ at the Drivers of Certification”

In Corbett and Kirsch (2001), we used a simple regression in an exploratory investigation of drivers of global diffusion of ISO 14000 certification. We found that ISO 9000 certification levels, environmental treaties ratified, and exports as a proportion of GDP were the main significant variables, where the environmental measure may be moderated by GDP per capita. In his replication study, Vastag (2004, in this issue) analyzes the same data using more visual techniques, specifically regression trees, and finds support for the significance of ISO 9000 certification levels and environmental treaties ratified, but not for export‐propensity. Vastag raises a number of relevant methodological issues, to which we add some perspectives here.     

Note on “The Backroom Effect in Retail Operations”

Eroglu et al. (2013) study a retailer with limited shelf capacity and a backroom. They study a continuous review (r, q) ordering policy with a known order quantity, q. Assuming that backorders can be satisfied from the backroom inventory (if available), they find the expression for the optimal reorder level, r. Our work builds on Eroglu et al. (2013). We correct an erroneous derivation of the expected overflow term, as well as derive an exact expression for the expected cost function, and hence optimal reorder level, instead of the approximate one used by Eroglu et al. (2013).     

Prescription Drug Labeling and “Over‐Warning”: The Disturbing Case of Diana Levine and Wyeth Pharmaceutical

In April of 2000, Diana Levine went to a clinic in Vermont suffering from a migraine headache. She was given the drug Demerol for the migraine symptoms and Phenergan for nausea. Complications with the administration of Phenergan ultimately resulted in Ms. Levine contracting gangrene, necessitating the amputation of her right arm. Ms. Levine sued the drug maker, Wyeth Pharmaceutical, in state court and prevailed. The lower court's decision was appealed by Wyeth to the state supreme court where the ruling was confirmed. Wyeth next appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which, to the surprise of many observers, affirmed the judgment of the state supreme court. At issue was the fundamental question of the ability of consumers to obtain redress against negligent manufacturers in state courts. Wyeth's arguments to the Court were based upon preemption: Foodand Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug (and its labeling) preempts the ability of injured consumers like Ms. Levine to recover in state courts despite years of precedent to the contrary. Ability to recover damages in state courts represents, perhaps, the most important safety net available to consumers injured by defective products. A ruling by the Supreme Court that FDA‐approved labeling of pharmaceuticals preempts the reach of the state courts would have severely compromised the balance of power between consumers and producers.     

THE TIMING OF LABOR TRANSFERS IN DUAL RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED SYSTEMS: “PUSH” VS. “PULL” RULES*

Altough the dual resource-constrained (DRC) system has been studied, the decision rule used to determine when workers are eligible for transfer largely has been ignored. Some earlier studies examined the impact of this rule [5] [12] [15] but did not include labor-transfer times in their models. Gunther [6] incorporated labour-transfer times into his model, but the model involved only one worker and two machines. No previous study has examined decision rules that initiate labor transfers based on labor needs (“pull” rules). Labor transfers always have been initiated based on lack of need (“push” rules). This study examines three “pull” variations of the “When” labor-assignment decision rule. It compares their performances to the performances of two “push” rules and a comparable machine-limited system. A nonparametric statistical test, Jonckheere's S statistic, is used to test for significance of the rankings of the rules: a robust parametric multiple-comparison statistical test, Tukey's B statistic, is used to test the differences. One “pull” and one “push” decision rule provide similar performances and top the rankings consistently. Decision rules for determining when labor should be transferred from one work area to another are valuable aids for managers. This especially is true for the ever-increasing number of managers operating in organizations that recognize the benefits of a cross-trained work force. Recently there has been much interest in cross-training workers, perhaps because one of the mechanisms used in just-in-time systems to handle unbalanced work loads is to have cross-trained workers who can be shifted as demand dictates [8]. If management is to take full advantage of a cross-trained work force, it need to know when to transfer workers.     

A Reply to Williamson's “Outsourcing …”

A recent article by Oliver Williamson essentially comprises a critique of supply chain management (SCM) from the perspective of his own field, transaction‐cost economics. Here is one reader's response. SCM can indeed be faulted for inflated rhetoric, among other sins. I believe, however, that the two fields have much to learn from each other.     

Cognitive Limitations and Investment “Myopia”*

Optimization of investment decisions in an uncertain and dynamically evolving environment is difficult due to the limitations of the decision-maker's cognitive capacity. Thus, actual investment decisions may deviate from the dynamically optimal decision rule. This paper investigates how a potential investment rule bias affects the expected payoff from a project that has an uncertain development time and an uncertain completion cost. The result shows that the presence of a potential bias in the adopted decision rule dissipates project value and that the dissipating effect is greater for a longer term project if the completion cost is an increasing function of the time to completion.     

Note on “many-sided shadow prices”

It has been previously shown, with the aid of a simple example, that linear programmes may have two different non-negative marginal values at the optimum if the solution is degenerate. It is demonstrated in this note that other marginal values exist which may take negative values.