Second and third party punishment under costly monitoring

In a laboratory experiment we study how costly punishment behavior of second and third parties in a social dilemma situation is affected by monitoring costs. Subjects have to pay a fee over and above punishment costs if they wish to condition punishments on previous play, which is equivalent to a binary choice between the acquisition of perfect information on the target subject’s behavior and no information at all. When monitoring is costly both second and third party punishment is weaker and less discriminate and hence generates weaker incentives for cooperation than when monitoring is free. There are subtle differences between second and third parties: The presence of monitoring costs leads subjects to withhold sanctioning more often as second parties than as third parties, and to punish indiscriminately more often as third parties than as second parties. The results contribute to the understanding of peer-enforcement of cooperation in social dilemmas and whether there is a common motivational structure underpinning second and third party punishment.     

VOTING, PUNISHMENT, AND PUBLIC GOODS

Researchers have found that voting can help increase voluntary contributions to a public good—provided enforcement through a third party. Not all collective agreements, however, guarantee third-party enforcement. We design an experiment to explore whether a voting rule with and without endogenous punishment increases contributions to a public good. Our results suggest that voting by itself does not increase cooperation, but if voters can punish violators, contributions increase significantly. While costly punishment increases contributions at the price of lower efficiency, overall efficiency for a voting-with-punishment rule still exceeds the level observed for a voting-without-punishment rule. ( JEL C92, D72, H41)     

Normative Innovationen und die Distinktion sozialen Handelns

Where do new norms come from in the social world? The existing theories do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. The economic research program explains how the norms contribute to the problem of collective action. However, this applies only to norm standards which are used instrumentally to satisfy predetermined interests, but not to standards, for which there are no preferences at the time they of their emergence. This essay will explain the emergence of norms not by cooperation, but by distinction of the competitive players. Rational actors are normatively innovative if the existing criteria do not discriminate between them in the satisfactory way.     

Motivating teammates: The leader’s choice between positive and negative incentives

Team leaders often provide incentives for cooperation. A challenging question is how different incentive schemes and their actual choice by the leader shape the team’s culture and contribute to the team’s success. To shed light on this issue we investigate how a leader chooses between rewards or punishment in an experimental team setting and how teammates’ contributions are influenced by this choice. Leaders show a clear initial preference for rewards, which diminishes over time in some teams. Leaders who observe more free-riders in their teams tend to switch to punishment incentives. A change from rewards to negative incentives results in an immediate and enduring increase in contributions. On the other hand, contributions show a decreasing trend in teams with a leader who sticks to rewards.     

Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups

Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate the cooperative behavior of group members. Nonetheless, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has only received little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by examining whether social identity affects individuals’ willingness to sanction deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses, we employ one-shot public good games in a strategy method with punishment opportunity and induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity-homogeneous groups are prone to reveal less negative reciprocity than identity-heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions much more strongly influence punishment behavior when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity-homogenous groups. These findings contribute to an increased understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists’ ability to predict behavior while taking emotions into consideration.     

Common fate motivates cooperation: The influence of risks on contributions to public goods

In order to study whether common fate induced by shared risk can promote cooperation, I introduce two types of risks into a public goods game: risk that is common among all group members (the COM treatment), and risk that is independent across individuals (the IND treatment). In both treatments, zero contributions is the only equilibrium. In contrast to the equilibrium analysis, contributions to the public goods in the experiment approach zero under the independent risk but remain at high levels when the common risk is present. Analysis of the data reveals that different reactions to beliefs are fundamental to this treatment effect. While beliefs and contributions in the first periods, as well as the belief formation processes, are similar across treatments, subjects in the IND treatment are significantly less cooperative than those in the COM treatment with the same beliefs. A large variation in group contributions is observed in the COM treatment. Further analysis shows that initial beliefs can explain most of the variation in the long-run contribution level, implying the importance of beliefs in shaping the players’ experience and establishing group norms.     

LINKING WEALTH AND PUNISHMENT EFFECTIVENESS: PUNISHMENT AND COOPERATION UNDER CONGRUENT HETEROGENEITIES

Global and local cooperation in supplying global public goods is often insufficient. In this respect, laboratory experiments show that peer punishment is an effective cooperation-enhancing instrument. However, it is unclear whether peer punishment would facilitate cooperation and public good provision even under congruent heterogeneities in wealth and punishment effectiveness. To this end, we experimentally study the effect of peer punishment under joint heterogeneities, where either the richest or the poorest member is also the most effective punisher. We compare these joint heterogeneities to treatments with single heterogeneities in either endowment or punishment effectiveness and to a baseline symmetry treatment with homogeneous parties. We find that heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness does not matter for cooperation, whereas endowment heterogeneity reduces cooperation compared to symmetry. This is because rich members contribute a lower portion of their endowment to the public good than their poorer counterparts. We also observe that cooperation is higher under joint heterogeneities in endowment and punishment effectiveness than under endowment heterogeneity (with no differences than under symmetry). This holds even when the rich party gains less from cooperation and is the most effective punisher. (JEL C92, D74, H41)     

THREAT AND PUNISHMENT IN PUBLIC GOOD EXPERIMENTS

Experimental studies of social dilemmas have shown that while the existence of a sanctioning institution improves cooperation within groups, it also has a detrimental impact on group earnings in the short run. Could the introduction of pre‐play threats to punish have enough of a beneficial impact on cooperation, while not incurring the cost associated with actual punishment, so that they increase overall welfare? We report an experiment in which players can issue non‐binding threats to punish others based on their contribution levels to a public good. After observing others' actual contributions, they choose their actual punishment level. We find that threats increase the level of contributions significantly. Efficiency is improved, but only in the latter periods. However, the possibility of sanctioning differences between threatened and actual punishment leads to lower threats, cooperation, and welfare, restoring them to levels equal to or below the levels attained in the absence of threats. (JEL C92, H41, D63)     

Metanorms and antisocial punishment

Contributions to public goods benefit all group members, yet research shows that generous group members are sometimes punished. We argue that when such antisocial punishment efforts are public, the consistency of group member contributions will encourage individuals to punish atypically generous group members. Similarly, when behavior of group members is consistent, the publicness of punishment will increase antisocial punishment. Both of these effects will be weaker for individuals who are interested in getting to know the generous deviant. We test our hypotheses in a public goods experiment and find support. Our findings contribute to the norms literature, in particular, to understanding of antisocial punishment.     

Norm formation in social influence networks

I propose a mechanism of norm formation and maintenance that combines classical theory in social psychology on attitudes and social comparisons with a formal network theory of social influence. Underlying the formation of norms is the ubiquitous belief that there is a correct response for every situation and an abiding interest for persons to base their responses on these correct foundations. Given such a belief, a normative evaluation of a feeling, thought or action is likely to arise when persons perceive that their positive or negative attitudinal evaluation is shared by one or more influential others. If interpersonal agreements validate attitudes and transform attitudes into norms, then the development of a theory of norm formation may draw on extant “combinatorial” theories of consensus production that describe how shared attitudes are produced and maintained in groups. The network theory of social influence that I employ is one such combinatorial approach. An important sociological implication of this network theory is that the content of norms must be consistent with the social stratification (or more general pattern of inequality) of interpersonal influences in a group. I illustrate the theory with an analysis of Roethlisberger and Dickson’s (1939) classic observations on the Bank Wiring Observation Room.     

Eighteen‐Month‐Old Infants Correct Non‐Conforming Actions by Others

At around their third birthday, children begin to enforce social norms on others impersonally, often using generic normative language, but little is known about the developmental building blocks of this abstract norm understanding. Here, we investigate whether even toddlers show signs of enforcing on others interpersonally how “we” do things. In an initial dyad, 18‐month‐old infants learnt a simple game‐like action from an adult. In two experiments, the adult either engaged infants in a normative interactive activity (stressing that this is the way “we” do it) or, as a non‐normative control, marked the same action as idiosyncratic, based on individual preference. In a test dyad, infants had the opportunity to spontaneously intervene when a puppet partner performed an alternative action. Infants intervened, corrected, and directed the puppet more in the normative than in the non‐normative conditions. These findings suggest that, during the second year of life, infants develop second‐personal normative expectations about their partner's behavior (“You should do X!”) in social interactions, thus making an important step toward understanding the normative structure of human cultural activities. These simple normative expectations will later be scaled up to group‐minded and abstract social norms.     

COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS, CONSTITUENT PREFERENCES, AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

We model the behavior of a vote-maximizing legislator in order to predict interest group campaign contributions to incumbent politicians. We show that committee assignments and voter preferences affect the price a legislator requires to produce policies for any interest group. An econometric analysis of actual interest group contributions shows that these groups make significantly larger contributions to legislators on committees with jurisdiction over especially relevant policy issues and to incumbents with non-hostile constituencies. These results support our theory; interest groups act as if committees matter in the determination of policy and voters' interests constrain interest group behavior.     

“It’s Give and Take”: Australian Families’ Experiences of Negotiating Financial and Domestic Contributions When Young Adults Return Home

Young adults are increasingly reliant on parental support, with co-residence as a result of a return home increasingly common. Despite this, little is known about how family members negotiate financial and domestic contributions post-return. This qualitative study used a phenomenological methodology to explore the experiences of Australian parents and young adults who returned to co-residence in terms of the younger family members’ contributions to their household. Findings revealed that the young adults acknowledged the need to contribute but often varied in how much assistance they offered. For the most part, the extent of this contribution reflected their parents’ actions; the tendency not to ask for assistance and undertake tasks themselves meant offspring were not given incentives to contribute. While this at times resulted in unmet expectations and frustration among parents, they continued to act in ways that favourably accommodated their offspring. These findings highlight the importance of understanding the negotiation between parents and young adults in regards to household contributions, and the need for further qualitative investigation in this area.     

Conceptualizing the role of consent in the definition of rape at the international criminal court: a norm transfer perspective

Over the past three decades, international criminal legal standards on sexual and gender-based violence have developed rapidly, sparking debate within feminist circles over the extent to which these developments might be relevant to domestic contexts in a process termed “norm transfer.” Indeed, non-governmental organizations and feminist scholars have called for domestic adoption of the International Criminal Court (ICC) definition of rape due to its omission of the element of the absence of consent. However, the place of consent in an international criminal definition of rape is a hotly contested topic, with disagreement as to whether rape in conflict should be considered “exceptional” or a continuation of everyday violence against women. This article provides a new lens through which to explore these questions by situating the feminist strategy of norm transfer within the complementarity-based system of the ICC. It uncovers a number of gaps within the ICC definition that raise questions not only about the status of the definition as a candidate for norm transfer but also about the robustness of the definition itself. The article concludes by considering the role of consent as an implicit element within the ICC definition and its operation as a defense.     

Shared or separate? Money management and changing norms of gender equality among Norwegian couples

Over the last generation the male breadwinner/housewife family has gradually become outdated as the dominant normative model for family households. The new ideal has become the adult worker family model, where gender equality defined as economic independence and sharing of household work and childcare between spouses/partners is the norm. The Nordic countries are the frontrunners of this development, and the Nordic welfare model is assumed to be well adapted to this new ideal. However, this ideal does not hold clear norms of how money should be managed and shared in family households, and Nordic families have to establish their own systems. Norwegian survey data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in 1994 and 2002 are used to analyse patterns of money management in family households. Our study indicates that, even if sharing of economic resources and responsibility remains the most common pattern, a greater number of families are choosing separate and independent systems of financial allocation. This increase in divided systems of money management may lead to new gender inequalities because of the lack of recognition of the value of domestic labour and family care as part of the common provision.     

Social signals as design interventions for enhancing citizen science contributions*

Despite the scientific potential and increasing popularity of web-based citizen science, low contribution from volunteers is often a major hurdle. Studies have shown that individual behavior could be altered through targeted design interventions, but little is known about the specific factors that modulate volunteers’ contributions. A particularly elusive question entails the role of social feedback, in the form of targeted notifications about the contribution of other volunteers. Based on social comparison theory, we hypothesized that (1) volunteers increase contribution when presented with information about a high-performing peer or group, and (2) volunteers conform more strongly to a group rather than to a single peer. To test whether volunteers’ contributions change due to the exposure to the contribution of a peer or group norm, we systematically varied the information presented to participants in an environmental monitoring citizen science project. Volunteers increased their contributions when they were presented with the contribution of a high-performing peer and norm, but they were not influenced by a low-performing peer or norm. Further, we found that volunteers were more likely to match the contributions of a group than that of a peer. However, when volunteers were simultaneously exposed to information about a peer and a group, the effect depended on the respective performance of the peer and group. A theoretical model was developed to explain volunteers’ response and dissect the specific role of social comparison. Our findings offer the possibility of increasing volunteers’ contributions through design interventions.     

Troubling constructions of Canada as a ‘land of opportunity’ for immigrants: a critical disability lens

This article presents the findings of a critical discourse analysis study of the constructions of people with disabilities within the Canadian immigration system and how this shapes the immigration experiences of people with disabilities, especially those from countries in the Global South. Findings suggest that dominant discourses of opportunities not only construct Canada as a ‘land of dreams’ for immigrants and newcomers but are also used to hide, justify, normalize and facilitate the operation of ableist, racist and colonial discourses that immigrants and newcomers with disabilities experience during their immigration. Recommendations for settlement workers involved in facilitating the settlement and integration process for immigrants and newcomers with disabilities are also presented. The article concludes by emphasizing the actual and potential contributions of postcolonial and critical disability lenses for a social justice-oriented practice at the intersection of disability and immigration.     

Ethnic minorities' reactions to newcomers in East London: Symbolic boundaries and convivial labor

In much public discourse on immigrants in Western Europe, perceptions towards newcomers are discussed in relation to what white national majorities think. However, today, new migrants often move into places which are already settled by previous migrants. This article investigates the local experiences, perceptions, and attitudes towards newcomers among long-established ethnic minorities in an area which they have made their home, and where they predominate not just in numbers but also by way of shops, religious sites, school population, and so on. Based on ethnographic fieldwork in East London (UK), it looks at long-established ethnic minority residents’ attitudes towards newcomers from Eastern Europe, and how these are shaped by their own histories of exclusion. By bringing together theories on symbolic boundary making with the concept of “convivial labor,” it shows how experiences of stigmatization impact on perceptions of white newcomers, and how these perceptions are characterized by a combination of empathy and resentment.     

Small Disagreements: Character Contests and Working Consensus in Informal Talk

This article is an analysis of a single conversational episode. A disagreement about the significance of a shared event between two participants in a conversation leads to what Goffman calls a character contest. It is resolved by three others present to achieve a new working consensus. The analysis is about character contests and examines face threat, accounts, and working consensus as constituents of the interaction order which operates to maintain face and self presentation. Gender and role are part of the institutional context of this dispute. They provide ideological resources which contribute first to the conflict and later to a new working consensus. The analysis explores how the interactional and institutional orders are intertwined in informal talk.     

PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: ELECTORAL DELEGATION AND COOPERATION

This study experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects one delegate who can freely decide on each group member's contribution to the global public goods. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions for our delegation mechanism, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the selfish benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by theory. It is driven by conditional cooperation of delegates across groups. Since one of the potential sources of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other‐regarding preferences, we use the term P‐inefficiency to describe our finding. (JEL C92, D72, H41)