Risk‐Based Decision Making for Reoccupation of Contaminated Areas Following a Wide‐Area Anthrax Release

This article presents an analysis of postattack response strategies to mitigate the risks of reoccupying contaminated areas following a release of Bacillus anthracis spores (the bacterium responsible for causing anthrax) in an urban setting. The analysis is based on a hypothetical attack scenario in which individuals are exposed to B. anthracis spores during an initial aerosol release and then placed on prophylactic antibiotics that successfully protect them against the initial aerosol exposure. The risk from reoccupying buildings contaminated with spores due to their reaerosolization and inhalation is then evaluated. The response options considered include: decontamination of the buildings, vaccination of individuals reoccupying the buildings, extended evacuation of individuals from the contaminated buildings, and combinations of these options. The study uses a decision tree to estimate the costs and benefits of alternative response strategies across a range of exposure risks. Results for best estimates of model inputs suggest that the most cost‐effective response for high‐risk scenarios (individual chance of infection exceeding 11%) consists of evacuation and building decontamination. For infection risks between 4% and 11%, the preferred option is to evacuate for a short period, vaccinate, and then reoccupy once the vaccine has taken effect. For risks between 0.003% and 4%, the preferred option is to vaccinate only. For risks below 0.003%, none of the mitigation actions have positive expected monetary benefits. A sensitivity analysis indicates that for high‐infection‐likelihood scenarios, vaccination is recommended in the case where decontamination efficacy is less than 99.99%.     

Mechanistic Modeling of Emergency Events: Assessing the Impact of Hypothetical Releases of Anthrax

A modular system for source-to-dose-to-effect modeling analysis has been developed based on the modeling environment for total risk studies (MENTOR),^{( 1 )} and applied to study the impacts of hypothetical atmospheric releases of anthrax spores. The system, MENTOR-2E (MENTOR for Emergency Events), provides mechanistically consistent analysis of inhalation exposures for various release scenarios, while allowing consideration of specific susceptible subpopulations (such as the elderly) at the resolution of individual census tracts. The MENTOR-2E application presented here includes atmospheric dispersion modeling, statistically representative samples of individuals along with corresponding activity patterns, and population-based dosimetry modeling that accounts for activity and physiological variability. Two hypothetical release scenarios were simulated: a 100 g release of weaponized B. anthracis over a period of (a) one hour and (b) 10 hours, and the impact of these releases on population in the State of New Jersey was studied. Results were compared with those from simplified modeling of population dynamics (location, activities, etc.), and atmospheric dispersion of anthrax spores. The comparisons showed that in the two release scenarios simulated, each major approximation resulted in an overestimation of the number of probable infections by a factor of 5 to 10; these overestimations can have significant public health implications when preparing for and responding effectively to an actual release. This is in addition to uncertainties in dose-response modeling, which result in an additional factor of 5 to 10 variation in estimated casualties. The MENTOR-2E system has been developed in a modular fashion so that improvements in individual modules can be readily made without impacting the other modules, and provides a first step toward the development of models that can be used in supporting real-time decision making.     

Dose‐Response Modeling for Inhalational Anthrax in Rabbits Following Single or Multiple Exposures

There is a need to advance our ability to characterize the risk of inhalational anthrax following a low‐dose exposure. The exposure scenario most often considered is a single exposure that occurs during an attack. However, long‐term daily low‐dose exposures also represent a realistic exposure scenario, such as what may be encountered by people occupying areas for longer periods. Given this, the objective of the current work was to model two rabbit inhalational anthrax dose‐response data sets. One data set was from single exposures to aerosolized Bacillus anthracis Ames spores. The second data set exposed rabbits repeatedly to aerosols of B. anthracis Ames spores. For the multiple exposure data the cumulative dose (i.e., the sum of the individual daily doses) was used for the model. Lethality was the response for both. Modeling was performed using Benchmark Dose Software evaluating six models: logprobit, loglogistic, Weibull, exponential, gamma, and dichotomous‐Hill. All models produced acceptable fits to either data set. The exponential model was identified as the best fitting model for both data sets. Statistical tests suggested there was no significant difference between the single exposure exponential model results and the multiple exposure exponential model results, which suggests the risk of disease is similar between the two data sets. The dose expected to cause 10% lethality was 15,600 inhaled spores and 18,200 inhaled spores for the single exposure and multiple exposure exponential dose‐response model, respectively, and the 95% lower confidence intervals were 9,800 inhaled spores and 9,200 inhaled spores, respectively.     

Intelligent Adversary Risk Analysis: A Bioterrorism Risk Management Model

The tragic events of 9/11 and the concerns about the potential for a terrorist or hostile state attack with weapons of mass destruction have led to an increased emphasis on risk analysis for homeland security. Uncertain hazards (natural and engineering) have been successfully analyzed using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Unlike uncertain hazards, terrorists and hostile states are intelligent adversaries who can observe our vulnerabilities and dynamically adapt their plans and actions to achieve their objectives. This article compares uncertain hazard risk analysis with intelligent adversary risk analysis, describes the intelligent adversary risk analysis challenges, and presents a probabilistic defender–attacker–defender model to evaluate the baseline risk and the potential risk reduction provided by defender investments. The model includes defender decisions prior to an attack; attacker decisions during the attack; defender actions after an attack; and the uncertainties of attack implementation, detection, and consequences. The risk management model is demonstrated with an illustrative bioterrorism problem with notional data.     

Smallpox vaccine policy: the national debate

As a result of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the U.S. government is trying to forge a plan to handle something much worse: an outbreak of smallpox due to terrorist activity. Here's a look at where the debate stands today.     

Modeling Rabbit Responses to Single and Multiple Aerosol Exposures of Bacillus anthracis Spores

Survival models are developed to predict response and time‐to‐response for mortality in rabbits following exposures to single or multiple aerosol doses of Bacillus anthracis spores. Hazard function models were developed for a multiple‐dose data set to predict the probability of death through specifying functions of dose response and the time between exposure and the time‐to‐death (TTD). Among the models developed, the best‐fitting survival model (baseline model) is an exponential dose–response model with a Weibull TTD distribution. Alternative models assessed use different underlying dose–response functions and use the assumption that, in a multiple‐dose scenario, earlier doses affect the hazard functions of each subsequent dose. In addition, published mechanistic models are analyzed and compared with models developed in this article. None of the alternative models that were assessed provided a statistically significant improvement in fit over the baseline model. The general approach utilizes simple empirical data analysis to develop parsimonious models with limited reliance on mechanistic assumptions. The baseline model predicts TTDs consistent with reported results from three independent high‐dose rabbit data sets. More accurate survival models depend upon future development of dose–response data sets specifically designed to assess potential multiple‐dose effects on response and time‐to‐response. The process used in this article to develop the best‐fitting survival model for exposure of rabbits to multiple aerosol doses of B. anthracis spores should have broad applicability to other host–pathogen systems and dosing schedules because the empirical modeling approach is based upon pathogen‐specific empirically‐derived parameters.     

Chemical and biological agent incident response and decision process for civilian and public sector facilities.

In the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophic release involving potential chemical and/or biological warfare agents, decisionmakers will need to make timely and informed choices about whether, or how, to respond. The objective of this article is to provide a decision framework to specify initial and follow-up actions, including possible decontamination, and to address long-term health and environmental issues. This decision framework consists of four phases, beginning with the identification of an incident and ending with verification that cleanup and remediation criteria have been met. The flowchart takes into account both differences and similarities among potential agents or toxins at key points in the decision-making process. Risk evaluation and communication of information to the public must be done throughout the process to ensure a successful effort.     

Informing Ex Ante Event Studies with Macro‐Econometric Evidence on the Structural and Policy Impacts of Terrorism

Economic consequence analysis is one of many inputs to terrorism contingency planning. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are being used more frequently in these analyses, in part because of their capacity to accommodate high levels of event‐specific detail. In modeling the potential economic effects of a hypothetical terrorist event, two broad sets of shocks are required: (1) physical impacts on observable variables (e.g., asset damage); (2) behavioral impacts on unobservable variables (e.g., investor uncertainty). Assembling shocks describing the physical impacts of a terrorist incident is relatively straightforward, since estimates are either readily available or plausibly inferred. However, assembling shocks describing behavioral impacts is more difficult. Values for behavioral variables (e.g., required rates of return) are typically inferred or estimated by indirect means. Generally, this has been achieved via reference to extraneous literature or ex ante surveys. This article explores a new method. We elucidate the magnitude of CGE‐relevant structural shifts implicit in econometric evidence on terrorist incidents, with a view to informing future ex ante event assessments. Ex post econometric studies of terrorism by Blomberg et al . yield macro econometric equations that describe the response of observable economic variables (e.g., GDP growth) to terrorist incidents. We use these equations to determine estimates for relevant (unobservable) structural and policy variables impacted by terrorist incidents, using a CGE model of the United States. This allows us to: (i) compare values for these shifts with input assumptions in earlier ex ante CGE studies; and (ii) discuss how future ex ante studies can be informed by our analysis.     

Chlorine Truck Attack Consequences and Mitigation

We develop and apply an integrated modeling system to estimate fatalities from intentional release of 17 tons of chlorine from a tank truck in a generic urban area. A public response model specifies locations and actions of the populace. A chemical source term model predicts initial characteristics of the chlorine vapor and aerosol cloud. An atmospheric dispersion model predicts cloud spreading and movement. A building air exchange model simulates movement of chlorine from outdoors into buildings at each location. A dose‐response model translates chlorine exposures into predicted fatalities. Important parameters outside defender control include wind speed, atmospheric stability class, amount of chlorine released, and dose‐response model parameters. Without fast and effective defense response, with 2.5 m/sec wind and stability class F, we estimate approximately 4,000 (half within ～10 minutes) to 30,000 fatalities (half within ～20 minutes), depending on dose‐response model. Although we assume 7% of the population was outdoors, they represent 60–90% of fatalities. Changing weather conditions result in approximately 50–90% lower total fatalities. Measures such as sheltering in place, evacuation, and use of security barriers and cryogenic storage can reduce fatalities, sometimes by 50% or more, depending on response speed and other factors.     

Dose–Response Modeling: Extrapolating From Experimental Data to Real‐World Populations

Dose–response modeling of biological agents has traditionally focused on describing laboratory‐derived experimental data. Limited consideration has been given to understanding those factors that are controlled in a laboratory, but are likely to occur in real‐world scenarios. In this study, a probabilistic framework is developed that extends Brookmeyer's competing‐risks dose–response model to allow for variation in factors such as dose‐dispersion, dose‐deposition, and other within‐host parameters. With data sets drawn from dose–response experiments of inhalational anthrax, plague, and tularemia, we illustrate how for certain cases, there is the potential for overestimation of infection numbers arising from models that consider only the experimental data in isolation.     

Setting Risk‐Informed Environmental Standards for Bacillus Anthracis Spores

In many cases, human health risk from biological agents is associated with aerosol exposures. Because air concentrations decline rapidly after a release, it may be necessary to use concentrations found in other environmental media to infer future or past aerosol exposures. This article presents an approach for linking environmental concentrations of Bacillus. anthracis (B. anthracis) spores on walls, floors, ventilation system filters, and in human nasal passages with human health risk from exposure to B. anthracis spores. This approach is then used to calculate example values of risk‐informed concentration standards for both retrospective risk mitigation (e.g., prophylactic antibiotics) and prospective risk mitigation (e.g., environmental clean up and reoccupancy). A large number of assumptions are required to calculate these values, and the resulting values have large uncertainties associated with them. The values calculated here suggest that documenting compliance with risks in the range of 10^?4 to 10^?6 would be challenging for small diameter (respirable) spore particles. For less stringent risk targets and for releases of larger diameter particles (which are less respirable and hence less hazardous), environmental sampling would be more promising.     

Adversarial risk analysis for counterterrorism modeling

Recent large-scale terrorist attacks have raised interest in models for resource allocation against terrorist threats. The unifying theme in this area is the need to develop methods for the analysis of allocation decisions when risks stem from the intentional actions of intelligent adversaries. Most approaches to these problems have a game-theoretic flavor although there are also several interesting decision-analytic-based proposals. One of them is the recently introduced framework for adversarial risk analysis, which deals with decision-making problems that involve intelligent opponents and uncertain outcomes. We explore how adversarial risk analysis addresses some standard counterterrorism models: simultaneous defend-attack models, sequential defend-attack-defend models, and sequential defend-attack models with private information. For each model, we first assess critically what would be a typical game-theoretic approach and then provide the corresponding solution proposed by the adversarial risk analysis framework, emphasizing how to coherently assess a predictive probability model of the adversary's actions, in a context in which we aim at supporting decisions of a defender versus an attacker. This illustrates the application of adversarial risk analysis to basic counterterrorism models that may be used as basic building blocks for more complex risk analysis of counterterrorism problems.     

Terrorist Population Dynamics Model

A system that includes a number of terrorist cells is considered. The cells can consist of one or more terrorists. The current number of terrorist cells is further denoted by N(t), where t is a current time counted from any appropriate origin. The objective is to find the evolution of the system in terms of N(t) and some interpretable parameters, such as the initial number of the terrorist cells N0=N(0), the cell disabling rate constant lambda (or the cell half-life t1/2), and the rate of formation of new cells P. The cost-effectiveness analysis, performed in the framework of the model, reveals that the effectiveness of disabling a terrorist cell is getting worse after 2-3 half-lives of a cell, which shows that if the anti-terrorist actions have not reached their goal during that time, the respective policy should be considered for revision, using the risk assessment consideration. Another important issue raised concerns balancing the efforts related to counterterrorism actions inside the system and the efforts protecting its borders. The respective data analysis is suggested and illustrated using simulated data.     

Decision Making During Nuclear Power Plant Incidents—A New Approach to the Evaluation of Precursor Events

Renewed interest in precursor analysis has shown that the evaluation of near misses is an interdisciplinary effort, fundamental within the life of an organization for reducing operational risks and enabling accident prevention. The practice of precursor analysis has been a part of nuclear power plant regulation in the United States for over 25 years. During this time, the models used in the analysis have evolved from simple risk equations to quite complex probabilistic risk assessments. But, one item that has remained constant over this time is that the focus of the analysis has been on modeling the scenario using the risk model (regardless of the model sophistication) and then using the results of the model to determine the severity of the precursor incident. We believe that evaluating precursors in this fashion could be a shortcoming since decision making during the incident is not formally investigated. Consequently, we present the idea for an evaluation procedure that enables one to integrate current practice with the evaluation of decisions made during the precursor event. The methodology borrows from technologies both in the risk analysis and the decision analysis realms. We demonstrate this new methodology via an evaluation of a U.S. precursor incident. Specifically, the course of the incident is represented by the integration of a probabilistic risk assessment model (i.e., the risk analysis tool) with an influence diagram and the corresponding decision tree (i.e., the decision analysis tools). The results and insights from the application of this new methodology are discussed.     

A Perspective: Risk Analysis as a Tool for Reducing the Risks of Terrorism

The destruction by terrorists of the twin towers of the World Trade Center and major damage wrought to the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, followed closely by the bioterrorist anthrax attacks via the mails raised the question of whether risk analysis might have a place in defending the United States against terrorist attacks. After first reviewing the multifaceted nature of terrorism and the reasons it is likely to become endemic in world society in the long term, just as other areas of crime are endemic, this article surveys several fields of risk analysis, finding possible short- and long-term uses of risk analysis. The areas chiefly considered are: risk communication and chemical, biological, and technological risk analysis. Broad policy and other uses are also considered. The author finds that risk analysis has already played some role, perhaps informally, but he sees the possibility for a much larger, formal one, a role that is centrally important for the present and future of the United States and the world.     

Adaptive Management: A Paradigm for Remediation of Public Facilities Following a Terrorist Attack

Terrorist actions are aimed at maximizing harm (health, psychological, economical, and political) through the combined physical impacts of the act and fear. Immediate and effective response to a terrorist act is critical to limit human and environmental harm, effectively restore facility function, and maintain public confidence. Though there have been terrorist attacks in public facilities that we have learned from, overall our experiences in restoration of public facilities following a terrorist attack are limited. Restoration of public facilities following a release of a hazardous material is inherently far more complex than in industrial settings and has many unique technical, economic, social, and political challenges. For example, there may be a great need to quickly restore the facility to full operation and allow public access even though it was not designed for easy or rapid restoration, and critical information is needed for quantitative risk assessment and effective restoration must be anticipated to be incomplete and uncertain. Whereas present planning documents have substantial linearity in their organization, the “adaptive management” paradigm provides a constructive parallel paradigm for restoration of public facilities that anticipates and plans for uncertainty, inefficiencies, and stakeholder participation. Adaptive management grew out of the need to manage and restore natural resources in highly complex and changing environments with limited knowledge about causal relationships and responses to restoration actions. Similarities between natural resource management and restoration of a public facility after a terrorist attack suggest that integration of adaptive management principles explicitly into restoration processes will result in substantially enhanced and flexible responses necessary to meet the uncertainties of potential terrorist attacks.     

基于双层规划的反恐应急设施选址模型及算法

恐怖袭击常以人流密集地区的平民作为袭击目标，并存在突发性和随机性等特点，极易造成严重的袭击后果。通过反恐应急设施的合理布局可以缩短救援人员和物资的到达时间，从而减轻袭击后果。首先，对反恐应急设施选址问题进行描述，并将其构造为一类离散双层规划模型。其中，上层规划是关于政府选址的0-1规划问题，下层规划则是关于恐怖分子袭击目标选择的0-1规划问题。其次，结合模型和问题的特征设计算法，利用分支定界算法实现上层选址变量的隐枚举，同时通过下层问题的求解来确定上下界并判断是否满足分枝或剪枝的条件。最后，结合南疆地区的交通拓扑网络进行算例分析，结果证明有效的选址方案可以大大降低袭击损失。     

Team Dispersion,Information Technology,and Project Performance

The impact of information technology (IT) on the performance of distributed projects is not well understood. Although prior research has documented that dispersion among project teams has an adverse effect on project performance, the role of IT as an enabler of communication to bridge the spatial distance among team members in distributed networks has not been empirically studied. We focus on the role of IT as a moderator of the relationship between team dispersion and project performance using projects as the unit of analysis. We find that IT mitigates the negative effect of team dispersion on project performance, especially in high information volume projects. Our central contribution is the development of an empirically tested model to improve the understanding of the operational impact of IT as a vehicle to bridge spatial dispersion among distributed teams that are engaged in knowledge‐intensive work.     

Bayesian Development of a Dose‐Response Model for Aspergillus fumigatus and Invasive Aspergillosis

Invasive aspergillosis (IA) is a major cause of mortality in immunocompromized hosts, most often consecutive to the inhalation of spores of Aspergillus. However, the relationship between Aspergillus concentration in the air and probability of IA is not quantitatively known. In this study, this relationship was examined in a murine model of IA. Immunosuppressed Balb/c mice were exposed for 60 minutes at day 0 to an aerosol of A. fumigatus spores (Af293 strain). At day 10, IA was assessed in mice by quantitative culture of the lungs and galactomannan dosage. Fifteen separate nebulizations with varying spore concentrations were performed. Rates of IA ranged from 0% to 100% according to spore concentrations. The dose‐response relationship between probability of infection and spore exposure was approximated using the exponential model and the more flexible beta‐Poisson model. Prior distributions of the parameters of the models were proposed then updated with data in a Bayesian framework. Both models yielded close median dose‐responses of the posterior distributions for the main parameter of the model, but with different dispersions, either when the exposure dose was the concentration in the nebulized suspension or was the estimated quantity of spores inhaled by a mouse during the experiment. The median quantity of inhaled spores that infected 50% of mice was estimated at 1.8 × 10⁴ and 3.2 × 10⁴ viable spores in the exponential and beta‐Poisson models, respectively. This study provides dose‐response parameters for quantitative assessment of the relationship between airborne exposure to the reference A. fumigatus strain and probability of IA in immunocompromized hosts.     

A New Approach to Hazardous Materials Transportation Risk Analysis: Decision Modeling to Identify Critical Variables

We take a novel approach to analyzing hazardous materials transportation risk in this research. Previous studies analyzed this risk from an operations research (OR) or quantitative risk assessment (QRA) perspective by minimizing or calculating risk along a transport route. Further, even though the majority of incidents occur when containers are unloaded, the research has not focused on transportation-related activities, including container loading and unloading. In this work, we developed a decision model of a hazardous materials release during unloading using actual data and an exploratory data modeling approach. Previous studies have had a theoretical perspective in terms of identifying and advancing the key variables related to this risk, and there has not been a focus on probability and statistics-based approaches for doing this. Our decision model empirically identifies the critical variables using an exploratory methodology for a large, highly categorical database involving latent class analysis (LCA), loglinear modeling, and Bayesian networking. Our model identified the most influential variables and countermeasures for two consequences of a hazmat incident, dollar loss and release quantity , and is one of the first models to do this. The most influential variables were found to be related to the failure of the container. In addition to analyzing hazmat risk, our methodology can be used to develop data-driven models for strategic decision making in other domains involving risk.