Seat Biases in Proportional Representation Systems with Thresholds

In proportional representation systems, apportionment methods are used to convert the number of votes of a party into the number of seats allocated to this party. An interesting characteristic of any such method are the seat biases, that is, the expected differences between the actual seat allocation and the ideal share of seats, separately for each party, when parties are ordered from largest to smallest. For electoral systems with a threshold, that is, with a minimum percentage of votes that parties must reach in order to be eligible to participate in the apportionment process, we show that seat biases decrease from their maximum to zero, as the threshold increases from zero to its maximum, and that all seat biases decrease linearly.     

Working-Class Authoritarianism und Die Wahl Rechtspopulistischer Parteien

May the often stated over-representation of workers in the electorates of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe be explained by the so-called “working-class authoritarianism”-thesis by S.M. Lipset? Following this thesis, there are specific socialisation and deprivation experiences in the social situation of the working-class, favouring the development of authoritarian traits and making class-members more susceptible to authoritarian parties. On the basis of the European Social Survey of 2002 the thesis is tested empirically by using the Goldthorpe class scheme and two measures of authoritarianism. It is shown that workers are more inclined to vote for right-wing populist parties and have higher levels of authoritarianism. Furthermore, persons with high levels of authoritarianism are more likely to vote for such parties. The authors conclude that disproportionately high shares of votes for right-wing populist parties from the working-class are, indeed, mediated by authoritarianism. In addition to this, class affiliation has an independent effect on voting behaviour. Finally, it is found that authoritarianism has an even stronger impact on the vote for right-wing populist parties in the service class and the class of routine non-manual workers, though being less frequent there.     

Competition for popular support: a valence model of elections in Turkey

Models of elections tend to predict that parties will maximize votes by converging to an electoral center. There is no empirical support for this prediction. In order to account for the phenomenon of political divergence, this paper offers a stochastic electoral model where party leaders or candidates are differentiated by differing valences??the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. If valence is simply intrinsic, then it can be shown that there is a ??convergence coefficient??, defined in terms of the empirical parameters, that must be bounded above by the dimension of the space, in order for the electoral mean to be a Nash equilibrium. This model is applied to elections in Turkey in 1999 and 2002. The idea of valence is then extended to include the possibility that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, must balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. We estimate pure spatial models and models with sociodemographic valences, and use simulations to compare the equilibrium predictions with the estimated party positions.     

Midwives,Marginality, and Public Identity Work

Because midwifery in the United States is an occupation at the margins of medicine, midwives must frequently negotiate competing identity claims. This article examines the public identity work of a group of midwives by focusing on two important tools they use to accomplish this work: boundary negotiation and impression management. Drawing on data from in‐depth interviews with twenty‐six licensed, nurse, and empirical midwives in the state of Florida, this article illustrates the ways in which midwives frame their identities in relation to history and media representations and manage public identities through boundary negotiation and impression management. I argue that the marginality of this occupation lends itself to competing categories of identity that midwives must negotiate. These categories become salient when midwives confront historical and media representations of childbirth and midwifery as well as the perceptions of the general public, consumers, lawmakers, and medical professionals.     

The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population

Palfrey (A mathematical proof of Duvergers law, 1989) shows that in large electorates with deterministic voter population, the expected equilibrium vote share of the weakest party tends to zero asymptotically. We extend this result to the uncertain case where the number of valid votes is a random variable satisfying a mild condition. Special cases include the degenerate, Poisson, binomial, and negative binomial distributions. In particular, we demonstrate that no matter how the number of valid votes fluctuates, as the probability of having a large number of valid votes approaches one, the expected equilibrium vote shares of the weak parties are asymptotically negligible.     

LOGROLLING IN THE U.S. CONGRESS

Does exchange, i.e., vote trading, occur in legislatures?!f so, is it quantitatively important or optimal? How important are political parties for the organization of logrolling coalitions? To address these questions, this paper investigates a broad range of votes where logrolling has been reported among interests favoring subsidies for urban, labor, and farm interests. The findings suggest that logrolling agreements are widespread, that many Democratic congressmen changed votes because of logrolling agreements, and that the Democratic party served to facilitate logrolling between its members. Furthermore, logrolling coalitions exhibited a strong degree if stability.     

Repeated electoral competition over nonlinear income tax schedules

We consider a repeated electoral competition game between two parties, each representing a constituent with a given income level. Parties are unable to commit to a policy before the election; they choose a nonlinear income tax schedule once elected. In each period, citizens cast a vote either for the incumbent or for the challenger. We first show that there exist (pure strategy) subgame perfect equilibria where both parties choose the most-preferred tax schedule of their constituent, subject to the constraint that they are reelected. We characterize a specific class of these BPR (Best Policy with Reelection) equilibria in which one of the parties plays its constituent’s unconstrained optimal tax function. Equilibrium tax schedules are always piecewise linear. Depending on the income levels of the two parties’ constituents, we obtain either classical left-vs-right equilibria (where the poor vote for one party and the rich for the other one) or ends-against-the-middle equilibria (where both poor and rich vote for one party while the middle class votes for the other party). In both types of equilibria, both parties propose the same tax schedule to a subset of the population.     

On competing rewards standards—an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining

In the tradition of earlier experimental studies, this paper introduces competing reward standards by letting parties bargain over the distribution of chips. The monetary equivalents of a chip for the bargaining parties can be equal (no competing rewards) or different (competing rewards). The ultimatum game is used as a tool to learn about reward standards in an asymmetric procedure. A major effect of different monetary chip equivalents is observed only when the proposer has a higher chip value. Results are compared to those reported in [Games Econ. Behav. 13 (1966) 100], who used a different experimental design.     

Paths of Local Development: Culture, Context, Power, and the Role of Nongovernmental Organizations

This article challenges the perception that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are immune from attributes commonly associated with political parties, such as clientelism. Through a case study of an NGO and a political party in semi-urban Argentina, this article demonstrates that despite associational differences with local political party network, these two associational networks produced similar social outcomes??such as, dependency, exclusivity, and paternalism??a phenomenon traced to the NGO??s and political parties?? similar structures and tactics. Contrary to the prevailing positive view of the NGO, held by scholars, the media, and development practitioners, it was guided by financial interests and a continual focus on locating external funding sources to facilitate its goals. Not surprisingly, the political party was dominated by politically oriented interests and an ever-present focus on obtaining votes. However, these seemingly different associations had a similar objective, i.e., the continual effort to obtain sources of support thus demonstrating how powerful structures can still dominate poor communities even when forms change.     

Election Predictions: An Empirical Assessment

Examination of 155 poll forecasts in 68 national elections since1949 shows that errors average nearly twice what statisticaltheory would indicate. Polls predict the division of vote betweenmajor parties better than individual party percentages, leadingto 85 percent success in picking the winner. The worst failuresoccurred in a few elections where most polls went wrong. Liberalparty votes are correctly forecast, conservatives slightly underestimated.Improved polling methods have not led to better forecasts.     

A spatial model of political competition and proportional representation

 A spatial model of party competition is studied in which: (i) Parties are supposed to have ideology. By this we mean that their goal is to maximize the welfare of their constituencies. (ii) The policy implemented after the election does not need to coincide with the one proposed by the winner. The policy implemented should be a compromise that considers the proposals made by the different parties. In the case of proportional representation this compromise is modeled as a convex combination of the proposed policies with weights proportional to the number of votes obtained by each party. We provide some existence theorems and compare the equilibrium in our model with the equilibrium that exists under some probabilistic models. It is also shown that proportional representation will create incentives for the parties to announce radical platforms. Received: 17 May 1994/Accepted: 5 March 1996     

Shaping the Political Arena: A Comparative Approach Between American Lobby and Euro-Groups

Nowadays, interest groups are regarded as the efficient alternative to political parties, due to the pejorative image acquired through the process of ‘politicization’ of the latter. However, the efficacy of these representative institutions depends on the political system in which they activate. Therefore, a comprehensive difference should be noticed between the European pressure groups and the American ones. The most significant distinction is given both by the influencing environment and the strategic pathways followed in the lobby process. This article also analyses the similarities between the two political actors, focusing on the legitimacy in the name of which the interest groups formulate and implement their lobbying strategies.      

Campaign Finance and Policymaking: PACs,Campaign Contributions,and Interest Group Influence in Congress

The general public is skeptical of our current system of campaign finance and feels that members of Congress are corrupt. Although the scholarly literature on campaign contribution influence is mixed, there is growing consensus that Political Action Committees (PACs) and interest groups do, indeed, have a powerful influence on policymaking in Congress. In this article, the author reviews this literature and discusses how influence occurs. Findings reveal that influence is only very rarely an explicit quid pro quo exchange. Instead, it is typically an ongoing, implicit, reciprocal exchange that impacts multiple stages of the legislative process and yields contributors many dividends, such as softer regulations, lower taxes, and lucrative contracts – none of which are explicitly promised (except in rare cases of full‐blown bribery) but are, nonetheless, regularly granted. The social relationships between contributors and lawmakers are central to this process, as is the ability to get legislators to sway their colleagues.     

Brahmin Left versus Merchant Right? Education,class, multiparty competition,and redistribution in Western Europe

In this article, we revisit the main claims of Part Four of Thomas Piketty's Capital and Ideology and especially the changing support coalitions for parties of the left. Piketty's core argument in this part of the book is that the left now represents the highly educated and that, as a result, the redistributive preferences of the working class do not find representation in today's party systems. We address these claims building on existing political science research that has investigated the transformation of politics in advanced capitalist societies. We argue, first, that the educational divide cannot be adequately analyzed by looking at a left and a right bloc, but crucially needs to pay attention to the rise of green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties. Second, we contend that the new middle classes that support parties of the left are largely in favor of economic redistribution. Analyzing data from the European Social Survey in 11 West European countries from 2002 to 2018, we show that the effect of education on voting left or right is indeed largely driven by green/left‐libertarian and radical right parties, while there is little empirical evidence that social democratic parties represent the educational elite. We also find that redistributive preferences remain at the heart of voting behavior and that, especially for educated voters, these preferences determine whether someone votes for a party of the left rather than the right.     

A 'Rave' Review: Conceptual Interests and Analytical Shifts in Research on Rave Culture

Raves have historically referred to grassroots organized, antiestablishment and unlicensed all-night dance parties, featuring electronically produced dance music, such as techno, house, trance and drum and bass. Since their late-1980s origins in the UK, raves have gained widespread popularity and transformed dramatically. Consequently, their many cultural traits and behaviors have garnered much sociological interest, which mostly falls into two competing perspectives: cultural studies and public health. In this paper, we review what raves look like today compared to their high point in the 1990s. We then discuss how the cultural studies and public health perspectives define raves and have studied them over time, focusing on the 'pet' sociological concepts each has sought to advance. Our analysis of these literatures reveals important differences in rave research by country and over time. We end by discussing the politics associated with the shift in rave research.     

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF APARTHEID

Apartheid is a regulatory system designed to effect redistributions in favor of white workers and farmers at the expense of black workers and white capitalists. This paper uses a competitive interest group theory of the apartheid state to formulize a collective choice analysis of apartheid as endogenous policy. The "level" of apartheid is conceived as a continuous variable that is determined by the relative influence of competing interest groups within the white polity and by the costs of maintaining and defending apartheid institutions. Some empirical implications of this approach are explored.     

Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee

Same parliaments, to form a committee of size $q$ , use a voting process like the following: every parliamentary member votes for one out of a fixed set of candidates, and those $q$ candidates receiving more votes are elected for the committee. Assuming total discipline of vote, this is a game form in which players are the parliamentary groups. We investigate, according to some natural hypotheses about preferences, the likely distribution of the members of this committee. The main results are: (a) when fractional votes are allowed, there is a complete agreement between the distribution among the groups of the elected candidates that are outcomes of a Nash equilibrium and the distribution that, according to the size of the groups, would compute the Jefferson-d’Hondt allocation rule, and (b) when fractional votes are not allowed, there is a near agreement for a majority of situations.     

German parliamentary elections 2009 from the viewpoint of direct democracy

The mathematical theory of democracy is applied to analyze the German Bundestag elections 2009 and to evaluate five German leading parties and their coalitions from the viewpoint of direct democracy. For this purpose, the positions of the parties on over 30 topical issues are compared with results of public opinion polls. The outcomes are summarized in the party indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency of representing a majority). It is shown that the election winner 2009, the conservative party CDU/CSU, has a quite low representativeness (ranked fourth), whereas the most representative is the left party die Linke which received only 11.9% votes. It is concluded that voters are not very consistent with their own political profiles, disregard party manifestos, and are likely driven by political traditions, even if outdated, or by personal images of politicians. To bridge approaches of representative and direct democracy, some modifications to the election procedure are proposed, which, among other things, complicate vote manipulations.     

A theorem connecting Shapley-Owen power scores and the radius of the yolk in two dimensions

Conclusions The link derived in Theorem 1 between centrality (relative to the yolk) and power (defined in Shapley-Owen terms) has important political implications. For example, if the policy is composed of interest groups, then any interest group whose ideal point falls far from the political center (defined as the center of the yolk) can have very little power in Shapley-Owen terms. Power is not only a function of the number of votes an interest group has, but it is also a function of its position. Centrally located interest groups have more power than peripheral ones.In terms of policy positions, Shapley-Owen power refers to the power to move an outcome from one median line to another-shifts that are not likely to make much difference to the actor who is pivotal. However, if an actor can exact rents for being the pivotal actor, then these differences are important, and centrally located actors may be in the best position to derive non-policy benefits from having this ability to shift outcomes by a shift of their vote.     

Ideological versus Downsian political competition

We analyze a one-dimensional model of spatial political competition with two parties and uncertainty on the distribution of voters' types. We assume that parties are formed by regular members and professional politicians; members care about the policy enacted, while professional politicians, on the contrary, care only about winning the election. We consider two possibilities: that members choose the political platforms and that professional politicians are the ones who choose such platforms. The expected utility for party members is analyzed under these two cases. We find that when professional politicians have no informational advantage, it is on the interest of both parties to let professional politicians choose the platforms. Only in the case in which professional politicians have much better information than the members of the party about voters is it possible that party members obtain a greater expected utility choosing the platforms themselves rather than letting the professional politicians choose. Received: 31 May 1999/Accepted: 1 March 2001