An Ethical Interpretation of the Nash Choice Rule

This paper provides an ethical intepretation of the Nash choice rule. In a setting in which (cardinal) utilities are interpersonally comparable, this procedure is characterised by an impartiality requirement and by the assumption that choices are not responsive to the agents' relative ability to convert resources into utility.     

An axiomatic analysis of the Nash equilibrium concept

The purpose of this paper is to analyze axiomatically the Nash equilibrium concept. The class of games under study is a (relatively large) subclass of n-person normal form games. Solutions are correspondences which associate to each game a non empty set of strategy vectors of this game. It is shown that if a solution satisfies the axioms Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Individual rationality (IR), then all the strategy vectors in this solution are Nash equilibria. This result holds good also if IR is replaced by Strong individual monotonicity (SIM) or Weak principle of fair compromise (WPFC).     

Nash Equilibrium with Lower Probabilities

We generalize the concept of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for strategic form games to allow for ambiguity in the players' expectations. In contrast to other contributions, we model ambiguity by means of so-called lower probability measures or belief functions, which makes it possible to distinguish between a player's assessment of ambiguity and his attitude towards ambiguity. We also generalize the concept of trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Finally, we demonstrate that for certain attitudes towards ambiguity it is possible to explain cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma in a way that is in accordance with some recent experimental findings.     

Simple Characterizations of the Nash and Kalai/smorodinsky Solutions

In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively.     

Nash Bargaining Theory,Nonconvex Problems and Social Welfare Orderings

In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.     

Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: A critique

Rational play of Noncooperative Games is investigated under the assumptions that a particular form of Best Reply Principle holds, each player has at least one rational strategy and all strategies are either rational or irrational. These assumptions are shown to imply that (a) some weakly dominated strategies are rational (b) recursive reasoning can be misleading (c) only a Strict Nash Equilibrium can be a solution. A Supplementary Best Reply Principle is formulated. It sheds further light on which games have solutions and on rational play in games without them. The relationship between these results and those of other authors is discussed.     

On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games

Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition strong rationalizability), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a Nash equilibrium; (2) in a normal-form game a strategy profile is strongly rationalizable if and only if it belongs to C , the set of profiles that survive the iterative deletion of inferior profiles.     

Divide the Dollar: Three solutions and extensions

Divide the Dollar (DD) is a game in which two players independently bid up to 100 cents for a dollar. Each player receives his or her bid if the sum of the bids does not exceed a dollar; otherwise they receive nothing. This game has multiple Nash equilibria, including the egalitarian division of (50, 50), but this division is not compelling except for its symmetry and presumed fairness.This division is easy to induce, however, by punishing — more severely than does DD — deviations from it, but these solutions are not reasonable. By altering the rules of DD, however, one can induce an egalitarian division (by successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies), but no reasonable payoff scheme produces this division with egalitarian bids of 50.Three alternatives to DD are analyzed. DD1, which rewards lowest bidders first, shows how an egalitarian outcome can be induced with equal but nonegalitarian bids. DD2, which adds a second stage that provides the players with new information yet restricts their choices at the same time, is used to introduce dominance inducibility. DD3 combines the features of DD1 and DD2, is reasonable (like DD1), makes calculations transparent (like DD2), and induces egalitarian bids as well as the egalitarian outcome. The possible application of the different procedures to a real-world allocation problem (setting of salaries by a team), in which there may be entitlements, is described.     

The primary-goods indexation problem in Rawls's theory of justice

Rawls's Difference Principle holds that basic social institutions are just if they maximize the worst-off individual's potential welfare, which depends on the vector of amounts of primary goods. As Rawls recognized, the multiplicity of primary goods poses an index number problem. This paper uses the machinery of social choice to characterize the class of procedures for aggregating quantities of several primary goods into a composite ordinal index that are consistent with Rawls's analysis. Only very simple and unattractive aggregation methods in which the various primary goods play roles of radically different magnitudes are compatible with Rawls's argument.     

“《罗尔斯篇》”与古今之争的得失——试论斯特劳斯派对现代性学问的挑战

斯特劳斯派所代表的古典政治哲学在中外学术界受到人们越来越多的关注.他们对现代性以及现代性学术范式的批评也受到了不同的回应和评价.斯特劳斯的主要弟子布鲁姆对当代政治哲学的代表人物罗尔斯的批评集中体现了两大学术范式的冲突的焦点.作者用虚拟的"<罗尔斯篇>"展开双方的冲突,并运用"强者政治学和弱者政治学"的解释模式对它们各自的得失进行分析和反思.     

Uncertainty in moral theory: An epistemic defense of rule-utilitarian liberties

The purpose of this essay is to defend utilitarianism from the popular objection that it makes moral theory depend improperly upon uncertain factual information and calculations which may produce violations of individual rights or liberties. This objection is a more subtle variant of the general Kantian complaint that utilitarianism makes morality improperly contingent upon empirical facts about historical, socioeconomic circumstances, the consequences of actions, institutions, etc., thereby allowing individual liberties to be sacrificed in order to maximize the collective welfare. Three main arguments connected with the uncertainty-objection are delineated in Rawls' work, and are seen to be fallacious. It is concluded that a suitably sophisticated form of rule-utilitarianism need not base liberty on any impermissible kind of uncertainty in moral theory. This analysis is contrary not only to what Rawlsians and other Kantians nowadays typically argue or assume in criticizing utilitarianism, but also to what some of the leading critics of Rawls have said about his anti-utilitarian stance.     

马克思主义公正观的基本向度及方法论原则(英文)

在社会公正问题的大讨论中,罗尔斯、诺齐克、哈耶克、麦金泰尔等当代西方思想家的论述被反复引用和申说,而将马克思恩格斯等经典作家的观点置于一种被忽视甚至被忘却的状态。形成这种状态的原因是多方面的。对历史背景和语境不作具体的分析,就难以把握马克思恩格斯对于社会公正问题的真实态度和精神实质,甚至会得出他们不仅没有关于社会公正的理论,而且反对和拒斥从社会公正角度讨论问题的结论。马克思主义作为无产阶级认识和改造世界、求得自身解放和人类解放的世界观和方法论,是真理与价值相统一的理论,也只有从科学向度与价值向度辩证统一的角度,才可能对作为价值之一种表现的公正问题作出合理的理解。公正既是一种价值观念,具有评价标准的功能,也是实际的价值（包括利益、机会、权利等）分配的一种状态,其中会涉及自由与平等的矛盾、形式公正与实质公正的矛盾、一般与特殊的差别、平等与效率的抵牾、公正与不公正的对立,等等,只有运用辩证思维的方法,才能对其复杂性获得正确的认识。     

The Marxist View of Equity: Basic Dimensions and Methodological Principles

在社会公正问题的大讨论中﹐ 罗尔斯、诺齐克、哈耶克、麦金泰尔等当代西方思 想家的论述被反复引用和申说﹐ 而将马克思恩格斯等经典作家的观点置于一种被忽视 甚至被忘却的状态。形成这种状态的原因是多方面的。对历史背景和语境不作具体的 分析﹐就难以把握马克思恩格斯对于社会公正问题的真实态度和精神实质﹐ 甚至会 得出他们不仅没有关于社会公正的理论﹐ 而且反对和拒斥从社会公正角度讨论问题 的结论。马克思主义作为无产阶级认识和改造世界、求得自身解放和人类解放的世 界观和方法论﹐ 是真理与价值相统一的理论﹐ 也只有从科学向度与价值向度辩证统 一的角度﹐ 才可能对作为价值之一种表现的公正问题作出合理的理解。公正既是一 种价值观念﹐ 具有评价标准的功能﹐ 也是实际的价值(包括利益、机会、权利等)分 配的一种状态﹐ 其中会涉及自由与平等的矛盾、形式公正与实质公正的矛盾、一般 与特殊的差别、平等与效率的抵牾、公正与不公正的对立﹐ 等等﹐ 只有运用辩证思 维的方法﹐ 才能对其复杂性获得正确的认识。

关键词: 社会公正 公正观 价值立场

In the wide ranging discussion of social equity issues, the theories of contemporary Western thinkers such as Rawls, Nozick, Hayek and MacIntyre are repeatedly cited and expounded. By contrast, for various reasons, classical writers like Marx and Engels have been overlooked or even forgotten. Without a concrete analysis of their historical background and context, it is hard to grasp the true attitude and spiritual essence of the views of Marx and Engels on social equity. We might even conclude not only that they had no theory of social equity but that they opposed and rejected approaching questions from this angle. As a world view and methodology enabling the proletariat to know and transform the world and liberate themselves and mankind, Marxism is a theory that unites truth and value. A rational understanding of the issue of equity as an expression of value is only possible when the dimensions of science and value are dialectically combined. On the one hand, equity is a value concept that functions as a standard for evaluation; on the other, it refers to an actual state of values distribution (including interests, opportunities and rights) that inevitably involves the contradiction between freedom and equality and between formal and substantive equity, the difference between the general and the specific, the conflict between equality and efficiency, the opposition between equity and inequity and so on. Only a dialectical mode of thinking can ensure a correct understanding of the complexity of social equity issues.     

小企业融资缺口分析及对策研究

小企业在发展中通常会遇到市场难以解决的融资缺口问题 ,即借贷资金缺口与资本缺口。由于小企业规模较小 ,融资成本相对较高、信用担保机制缺乏以及企业自身“存活性”差等条件约束 ,引致小企业在有组织金融市场上的局部市场失效 ,市场融资难以有效形成 ,从而产生小企业的融资缺口。针对小企业存在融资功能的缺陷 ,应强化弥补融资缺口的金融支持政策 ,从法律法规层面加大对小企业的支持力度 ;建立完善的信用担保体系 ,形成小企业融资担保机制 ;规范小企业金融机构 ,构筑小企业融资体系 ;开发资本市场 ,加大对小企业的金融支持     

试论环境资源法之法律目的产生的伦理思想基础

每个国家在特定的历史阶段都有其特有的法律理念,法律理念的实现有赖于构成该国法律体系的各个法律部门的分工和协作,因此,必须将法律理念具体细化成作为各个法律部门统率的部门法之法律目的。环境资源法的法律目的有其产生的环境伦理思想基础,通过比较中国古代的环境资源保护思想、源于西方的可持续发展思想和非人类中心主义伦理思想,我们应当将已被发展了的以"代内公平"、"代际公平"和"权利公平"为主要内容的可持续发展思想,作为我国环境资源法之法律目的形成的主要伦理思想基础。     

A Contractarian Approach to Pareto Efficiency in Teams: A Note

We show that if identical members first decide on the sharing technology (stage I) taking into account their subsequent effort supply (stage II) decisions, the resulting contractarian sharing technology (constitution) channels individual self-seeking towards team (Pareto) optimum. Voting with one's feet and open entry can ensure symmetry and majoritarian decision making in the real world teams. The model helps explain the differential performance of the Israeli Kibbutz and the Russian Kolkhoz.     

A Note on Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Miyagawa (Games and Economics Behavior 41(2), 292–308 [2002]) provides a simple extensive game form that implements a large class of two-agent bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. This class includes all of the Nash, Kalai–Smorodinsky, and relative utilitarian solutions. This note extends Miyagawa’s result to multi-agent bargaining problems.     

Self enforceable paths in extensive form games

This paper explores the idea of forward induction for extensive games. It interprets this idea as a general behavioral principle the technical details of which have to be worked out in each specific case. Because of its cooperative ingredient, this approach should be contrasted with the usual approaches of non-cooperative game theory which are rooted in individual rationality.     

Gender equity and women's contraception use

Gender equity describes the distribution between men and women of social and material resources and decision‐making powers. Women's experiences of gender equity are likely to influence their contraceptive use. Multilevel analysis of two databases: the National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles from the United Kingdom and the United Nations' Fertility and Family Surveys, was undertaken to explore the association between gender equity measured at two spatial scales (small areas and countries) and women's contraception use. Results suggest that the spatial scale at which gender equity is considered is important. Gender equity was associated with contraception use at a local level, but not at the country level. Further, gender equity (at a local level) benefited women with less education in terms of increasing their likelihood of contraception use compared with more highly educated women. Results suggest gender equity is a potential pathway to reducing socio‐economic inequalities in health in developed settings.     

经济公平的经济学三原则——十七大报告中分配政策的基础理论支持研究

经济公平是社会公平最根本的内容,要实现经济公平,从经济学的角度讲,就是要坚持三个相关的经济学原则：一是等量活劳动投入获得等量活劳动收入的原则;二是等量死劳动投入获得等量死劳动收入的原则;三是等量活劳动投入与等量死劳动投入获得等量社会纯收入的原则。剥削是死劳动投入者对活劳动投入者活劳动收入的占有。经济公平具有绝对性和相对性。