The Spirit of Blumer's Method as a Guide to Sociological Discovery

Herbert Blumer did not offer textbook-style instructions for how to do research. What he offered, in his classic 1969 essay “The Methodological Position of Symbolic Interactionism,” is a broad account of what research must entail to accord with symbolic interactionist premises that human social life depends on meanings, interpretation, and interaction. Blumer's essay also voices a spirit of research that is ardently empirical, sociological, and creative. It is this spirit, I argue, that holds great value for guiding sociological research toward fresh discoveries. I make this argument by reviewing what Blumer meant by exploration and inspection, and then drawing out five Blumerian principles of inquiry. By embracing these principles we can avoid the problems of inadvertent theorizing, unreflective mesearch, analytic foreclosure, excessive subjectivism, and aprocessuality. I also suggest how we can enhance the sociological value of Blumer's method by paying more attention to power, inequality, and our own institutional biases. Embracing the spirit of Blumer's method, I conclude, can help a new generation of symbolic interactionists do more imaginative and insightful work.     

Structure,Agency, and Social Reality in Blumerian Symbolic Interactionism: The Influence of Georg Simmel

Mead no doubt had a manifest influence on Blumer's thinking, and Blumer's acknowledgment of his indebtedness to Mead is a central feature of Blumer's writing. While I do not presume to question the importance Blumer assigns to the role played by Mead in the development of Blumerian symbolic interactionism, I argue that the perspective also owes much to the insights of Georg Simmel. In particular, a Simmelian flavor is evident in how Blumer addresses the core sociological issues of the nature of social reality, the nature of the relationship between the individual and society, and the nature of social action.     

Mind,Self, and Human-Animal Joint Action

Abstract

Because Herbert Blumer maintained that symbolic interactionism was useful in examining all realms of social behavior, and advocated what Martin Hammersley refers to as “critical commonsensism,” this paper focuses on one of the most common contemporary social relationships—that between people and companion animals. I first examine the basis for Blumer's (like Mead before him and many interactionist scholars today) exclusion of nonhuman animals from consideration as “authentic” social actors. Primarily employing the recent work of interactionists Eugene Myers, Leslie Irvine, Janet and Steven Alger, and Clinton Sanders, this paper advocates the reasonableness of regarding nonhuman animals as “minded,” in that mind, as Gubrium emphasizes, is a social construction that arises out of interaction. Similarly, I maintain that animals possess an admittedly rudimentary “self.” Here I focus special attention on Irvine's discussion of those “self experiences” that are independent of language and arise out of interaction. Finally, I discuss “joint action” as a key element of people's relationships with companion animals as both the animal and human attempt to assume the perspective of the other, devise related plans of action and definitions of object, and fit together their particular (ideally, shared) goals and collective actions. I stress the ways in which analytic attention to human-animal relationships may expand and enrich the understanding of issues of central sociological interest.     

MYTH,TEXT, AND INTERACTION COMPLICITY IN THE NEGLECT OF BLUMER'S MACROSOCIOLOGY

This article depicts a major line of assessment of the work of Herbert Blumer as constituting a series of myths. Portrayals of his work as subjectivistic and ideographic combine with the predominant myth that Blumer ignored issues of large-scale organization and social structure. Documentation of his analyses of corporate power relations, racial stratification, and industrialization and industrial organization reveals the mythical character of much published opinion regarding his work. The micro-macro distinction is an ideology within which these myths have been created and perpetuated. Interactionists who have benignly bought into that ideology contribute to the myth of Blumer's neglect of societal organization. In closing it is suggested that greater attention needs to be given to the influence of Robert Park on Blumer's perspectives and that such an assessment might contribute to a broadening of the base of symbolic interactionism.     

HERBERT BLUMER'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO TWENTIETH-CENTURY SOCIOLOGY

Herbert Blumer's work has had considerable impact on the growth of twentieth-century sociology. He kept alive an interest in George Mead at a time when Pragmatism floundered. Although it is unlikely that Mead's work would have been overlooked, there can be no question that Blumer's forceful advocacy helped bring it to the forefront of modern social thought. Park first organized the subfield of collective behavior, but it was Blumer who kept it going in the face of opposition from structural-functionalism. Whether or not collective behavior endures as a separate area of specialization, sociologists will have to concern themselves with the manner in which human beings adapt to problematic situations. Although his views on methodology have been controversial, some of his positions will probably prevail. His insistence on the direct observation of people in their indigenous settings and his contention that human agency must be taken into account in explanations of social processes are difficult to counter.     

Extending and Broadening Blumer's Conceptualization of Fashion: Adding Notions of Generic Social Process and Semiotic Transformation

Abstract

Herbert Blumer's critics and followers have, for the most part, neglected the significance of his theory of fashion. In this paper I revisit Blumer's thesis on fashion by identifying the fashion process as an instance of the generic social process of semiotic transformation. The concept of semiotic transformation refers to the change in meanings of symbolic objects over time. By identifying six elements of the generic social process of semiotic transformation (systemic permeability, systemic freedom, logonomic fluidity, logonomic openness, indeterminacy, and logonomic hegemony) and by viewing semiotic transformation as a joint act grounded in emergence, I argue that the meaning of change over time is a process structuring both the definition of the situation and symbolic objects. I conclude the paper with a set of reflections on the significance of Blumer's work on fashion for the development of a research agenda of semiotic transformation and for the legacy and reception of Blumerian theory.     

HERBERT G. BLUMER (1900–1987): A LEGACY OF CONCEPTS,CRITICISMS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS

This article introduces a collection of articles written in honor of Herbert Blumer. It is noted what contributing authors identify as strengths and weaknesses of his theoretical and methodological analyses. Emphasized, however, is his view of reality as an ongoing emergent process. This view, coupled with his fundamental pragmatist stance, are the unifying and enduring themes in his life work. Blumer's impact on the social sciences will grow as more scholars become familiar with the full range of his ideas.     

HERBERT BLUMER: A PILGRIMAGE WITH PRAGMATISM

This article is an examination of Herbert Blumer's lifelong effort to perpetuate pragmatism raises serious questions about the future of the social sciences. He tried, through critical analyses, to tell social scientists how to make their fields scientific. Opposition to this effort was overwhelming and eventually weakened his own perspective and thus his influence in the discipline. The story of Blumer provides several lessons for future social scientists. It is intended that these lessons to be useful to those who still believe in a scientific social science.     

Discrimination and Reaction: The Practical Constitution of Social Exclusion

This article explores and extends Blumer's work on race prejudice and discrimination by using empirical data from an ethnographic study of minority communities in Greece. Blumer explains prejudice as the result of an interactional process through which one group defines itself as superior or dominant in relation to the other. His work on race prejudice has often been misinterpreted as emphasizing the individual's subjective imaginary of the “other.” Here I illustrate the importance of the intersubjective processes involved in defining a particular social situation as discriminatory. A central point of the article is to elaborate on his analysis by looking at the experience of prejudice and discrimination from the receiving end, through the participants' interpretation of their social interactions with the dominant group. Therefore I focus on how members of the subordinate group interact with the process that Blumer identifies.     

Toward A Renewed Sociological Jurisprudence: From Roscoe Pound to Herbert Blumer and Beyond

This article, based on the Distinguished Lecture presented on August 21, 2001, at the annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction in Anaheim, California, proposes a synthesis of Herbert Blumer's macrosociological perspective on the race question with Roscoe Pound's philosophy and science of law (i.e., his so‐called sociological jurisprudence), Joseph Tussman's and Jacobus tenBroek's juridical methodology, and Philip Selznick's sociology of responsive law. The compound so produced will help to establish a foundation for a praxiological sociology of American constitutional law. The article focuses on the problem of legislative‐made “classifications” and their relations to the legitimate public purposes entailed in the enactment of statutes, laws, and decrees. Such classifications become problematic when they are said to be “underinclusive,” “over‐inclusive,” or both in seeking to effect their aims. Strategic research sites for this issue are racial and ethnic classifications that single out one or a limited cluster of racial or ethnic groups for special benefits (“affirmative action”) or restitution (“reparations”). Calling for a reinvigoration of Pound's pragmatic approach to sociological jurisprudence, I show how Blumer's analysis of the “color line”—when seen in relation to the original intent of the makers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth post‐Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and, using Tussman's and tenBroek's showing of how such categorizations might be both methodically evaluated and applied to the challenged classifications—provides grounds for reconsidering whether the latter are instances of “reverse discrimination” and, hence, violations of the constitutional requirement of “equal protection of the law.” The science of law is a science of social engineering having to do with that part of the whole field which may be achieved by the ordering of human relations through the action of politically organized society. —Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law We did not hold it necessary to wait for nature to put a canal across the Isthmus of Panama, and we shall not much longer hold it necessary to wait for nature to dig the legal canals that will give security to neglected human interests which clamor for recognition and protection. —Roscoe Pound, “Juristic Problems of National Progress”     

LE CONTE,ROYCE, TEGGART,BLUMER: A BERKELEY DIALOGUE ON SOCIOLOGY,SOCIAL CHANGE,AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTION

The tradition of sociological discourse at the University of California at Berkeley antedates departmentalization by-more than seven decades. Berkeley's sociology is treated in this article as a dialogue with the ghost of Comte, embracing the works of Joseph Le Conte, Josiah Royce, Frederick Teggart, and Herbert Blumer. That dialogue ultimately produced a prolegomena to a phenomenological theory of social change that has yet to be fully developed. The central concepts of this incipient theory of social change are “release and reverie.” The dimensions and potentiality for this theory are elaborated, and the contribution of Berkeley's sociology to macrosociological issues is indicated.     

Blumer’s dilemma: The critic as a tragic figure

Herbert Blumer criticized sociological research for its failure to confront obdurate, empirical reality. However, Blumer conducted little research of his own. An examination of his works on crowds, fashion, and social problems reveals some of the same problems he found in others’ works. Blumer illustrates how critics risk becoming tragic figures, wedded to theoretical principles that cannot be put into practice. Thanks to Irwin Deutscher, John Lofland, Kathleen Lowney, David Maines, and Robert Prus for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Cognition in Situations

The symbolic interactionist tradition can contribute to advancing sociological studies of cognition by setting dual process models on more solid ground. I draw on Blumer's epistemological statements and the interactionist tradition more broadly to consider how dual process models of cognition could be applied to naturally occurring situations. I suggest that attending to the ways the past and the future are handled and modified within social interaction provides a usable inroad for the sociology of cognition to engage with situational analysis. I identify “resonance” and “iterative reprocessing” as concepts that are suitable to this end.     

G. H. MEAD'S SOCIAL BEHAVIORISM VS. THE ASTRUCTURAL BIAS OF SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM*

Symbolic inleractionism has been criticized for having an astructural bias. This paper presents a response to that criticism by examining the ontological stance contained in Mead's social behaviorism and contrasting it with the ontological stance of symbolic interactionism's chief architect, Herbert Blumer. Mead's social behaviorism is shown to be a nondualist philosophy of conduct based solidly on conceptions of the human community and of individual conduct as organized on the basis of social acts–a view not shared by Blumer.     

Mead's Lost Conception of Society

The single best word to describe the impact of George Herbert Mead's ideas on the intellectual world is “ironic.” Although Mead was a philosopher, his ideas have been more influential in sociology than in philosophy. Despite Mead's belief that it is the job of sociologists to study society, it is his notion of the self rather than his notion of society that has received the most attention in this field. Mead himself is first and foremost responsible for this ironic state of affairs because his analysis of society is so obscure at points that it is hard for most sociologists to understand. However, Mead alone is not to blame. The two main expositors of his sociological thought since his death, Herbert Blumer and Hans Joas, added to the confusion by not making clear that Mead sees society as a “body of institutions.” To correct their distortions of Mead's notion of society, I provide an alternative exposition of that notion. I disclose how Mead addresses the three main problems that he believes must be resolved before society can be understood: (1) the operation of institutions in the daily lives of people; (2) the origination of early institutions, such as language, the family, the economy, religion, polity, and science; and (3) the change of these institutions after their inception.     

SUBSTANCE AND STYLE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL LEGACY OF HERBERT BLUMER

The substance and the style of Herbert Blumer's legacy to sociology are examined. Examining the former proceeds by specifying essentials and nonessentials of a symbolic interactionist framework, and by distinguishing between Blumer's ideas that do and do not contribute toward the objective of general explanatory theory premised on the framework together with rigorous tests of such theory using a full arsenal of research methods and techniques. Examining the latter proceeds by suggesting that Blumer's style of combative and oppositional argumentation, while not without its utility, has contributed to a present-day scholasticism within symbolic interactionism that inhibits the development of the framework.     

Naturalistic Observation in the Laboratory

Symbolic interactionists generally eschew laboratory research in favor of naturalistic observation in field settings. This is consistent with the recommendations of Blumer, who argued that social processes and relationships, which are the appropriate subject matter for sociology, cannot be studied adequately within the laboratory. In this statement, I argue that when the laboratory is used as a “provocative stage,” the integrity of social action and social relationships as they are manifest in social process can be as adequately studied in the laboratory as they can be in the field. I further argue that when the laboratory is used in the manner specified here, Blumer's recommendations are more adequately met than they are in field studies.