Individual vs. group decision-making: an experiment on dynamic choice under risk and ambiguity

This paper focuses on the comparison of individual and group decision-making, in a stochastic inter-temporal problem in two decision environments, namely risk and ambiguity. Using a consumption/saving laboratory experiment, we investigate behaviour in four treatments: (1) individual choice under risk; (2) group choice under risk; (3) individual choice under ambiguity and (4) group choice under ambiguity. Comparing decisions within and between decision environments, we find an anti-symmetric pattern. While individuals are choosing on average closer to the theoretical optimal predictions, compared to groups in the risk treatments, groups tend to deviate less under ambiguity. Within decision environments, individuals deviate more when they choose under ambiguity, while groups are better planners under ambiguity rather than under risk. Our results extend the often observed pattern of individuals (groups) behaving more optimally under risk (ambiguity), to its dynamic dimension.

     

Expected discounted utility

Standard axioms of additively separable utility for choice over time and classic axioms of expected utility theory for choice under risk yield a generalized expected additively separable utility representation of risk-time preferences over probability distributions over sure streams of intertemporal outcomes. A dual approach is to use the analogues of the same axioms in a reversed order to obtain a generalized additively separable expected utility representation of time–risk preferences over intertemporal streams of probability distributions over sure outcomes. The paper proposes an additional axiom, which is called risk-time reversal, for obtaining a special case of the two representations—expected discounted utility. The axiom of risk-time reversal postulates that if a risky lottery over streams of sure intertemporal outcomes and an intertemporal stream of risky lotteries yield the same probability distribution of possible outcomes in every point in time then a decision-maker is indifferent between the two. This axiom is similar to assumption 2 “reversal of order in compound lotteries” in Anscombe and Aumann (Ann Math Stat 34(1):199–205, 1963, p. 201).

     

Boundedly rational expected utility theory

We build a satisficing model of choice under risk which embeds Expected Utility Theory (EUT) into a boundedly rational deliberation process. The decision maker accumulates evidence for and against alternative options by repeatedly sampling from her underlying set of EU preferences until the evidence favouring one option satisfies her desired level of confidence. Despite its EUT core, the model produces patterns of behaviour that violate standard EUT axioms, while at the same time capturing systematic relationships between choice probabilities, response times and confidence judgments, which are beyond the scope of theories that do not take deliberation into account.

     

Demand for health risk reductions: A cross-national comparison between the U.S. and Canada

Using a large stated preference survey conducted across the U.S. and Canada, we assess differences in individual willingness to pay (WTP) for health risk reductions between the two countries. Our utility-theoretic choice model allows for systematically varying marginal utilities for avoided future time in different adverse health states (illness-years, recovered/remission years, and lost life-years). We find significant differences between Canadian and U.S. preferences. WTP also differs systematically with age, gender, education, and marital status, as well as a number of attitudinal and subjective health-perception variables. Age profiles for WTP are markedly different across the two countries. Canadians tend to display flatter age profiles, with peak WTP realized at older ages.     

Justice in an uncertain world: Evidence on donations to cancer research

The paper uses information on actual and hypothetical charitable contributions to cancer research in the United Kingdom to elicit information on justice principles endorsed by donors. They face a choice between fund-raising contributions for several hereditary and lifestyle-related cancers. Donors’ choices of how much to donate to different cancers reveal how they view luck vis-a-vis risky individual choices. The estimation results reveal that donations are smaller for cancers with higher prevention rates, which is the probability that the potential cancer victim can avoid the cancer in question by some choice. We also find that provision of information on lifestyle-related causes of cancer adversely affects contributions. In contrast, information on hereditary causes has a positive effect on donations. Furthermore, a large share of donors indicated in their feedback that they chose donations to a hereditary over a lifestyle-related cancer to “punish” poor individual choices. These findings suggest that many donors lean toward choice egalitarianism, which conditions donations on the potential beneficiaries’ choices.

     

Risk aversion,downside risk aversion,and the transition to entrepreneurship

In this paper, we discuss the transition from secure employment to risky self-employment (entrepreneurship) caused by a small increase in wealth. Building on the apportioning risk literature, we prove that the transition from secure employment to risky entrepreneurship is based on a measure of the difference between the strength of downside risk aversion and the strength of risk aversion. This result highlights the idea that using the behavioral approach of risky lotteries to study entrepreneurship can produce different results from the traditional economic theory of entrepreneurship, which can have policy implications that must be considered with caution.

     

The two faces of independence: betweenness and homotheticity

This paper shows that expected utility belongs to the intersection of models satisfying betweenness and a homotheticity condition for risky choice. Betweenness models can accommodate variable risk attitudes, originally highlighted by the Allais paradox, by restricting indifference curves to be linear while allowing non-parallelism. Homotheticity, in contrast, restricts indifference curves to be parallel while permitting non-linearities, such as those highlighted by inverse-S probability weighting. Data from an experiment indicate that approximately 2/3s of participants satisfied homotheticity. Of this group, about half satisfied the expected utility hypothesis. The other half violated expected utility and therefore betweenness. These results indicate that homothetic preferences, and in particular those violating betweenness, can be empirically relevant for decision making under risk.

     

On the (Sample) Condorcet Efficiency of Majority Rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity

The Condorcet efficiency of a social choice procedure is usually defined as the probability that this procedure coincides with the majority winner (or majority ordering) in random samples, given a majority winner exists (or given the majority ordering is transitive). Consequently, it is in effect a conditional probability that two sample statistics coincide, given certain side conditions. We raise a different issue of Condorcet efficiencies: What is the probability that a social choice procedure applied to a sample matches with the majority preferences of the population from which the sample was drawn? We investigate the canonical case where the sample statistic is itself also majority rule and the samples are drawn from real world distributions gathered from national election surveys in Germany, France, and the United States. We relate the results to the existing literature on majority cycles and social homogeneity. We find that these samples rarely display majority cycles, whereas the probability that a sample misrepresents the majority preferences of the underlying population varies dramatically and always exceeds the probability that the sample displays cyclic majority preferences. Social homogeneity plays a fundamental role in the type of Condorcet efficiency investigated here.

     

Dynamic Choice, Independence and Emotions

From the viewpoint of the independence axiom of expected utility theory, an interesting empirical dynamic choice problem involves the presence of a “global risk,” that is, a chance of losing everything whichever safe or risky option is chosen. In this experimental study, participants have to allocate real money between a safe and a risky project. Treatment variable is the particular decision stage at which a global risk is resolved: (i) before the investment decision; (ii) after the investment decision, but before the resolution of the decision risk; (iii) after the resolution of the decision risk. The baseline treatment is without global risk. Our goal is to investigate the isolation effect and the principle of timing independence under the different timing options of the global risk. In addition, we examine the role played by anticipated and experienced emotions in the choice problem. Main findings are a violation of the isolation effect, and support for the principle of timing independence. Although behavior across the different global risk cases shows similarities, we observe clear differences in people’s affective responses. This may be responsible for the conflicting results observed in earlier experiments. Dependent on the timing of the global risk different combinations of anticipated and experienced emotions influence decision making.      

Empirical tests of stochastic binary choice models

This paper provides an experimental test of stochastic choice models of decisions. Models that admit Fechnerian structure are tested through the repeated pairwise choice problems. Results refute the Fechner hypothesis that characterizing the probability of selecting a given prospect increases in how strongly it is preferred to alternative choices. However, the experimental data lend support to characterizing an individual’s binary choice probability as some scalable functions of the von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities in the risky context.

     

Revealed desirability: a novel instrument for social welfare

The note puts forward the idea of revealed desirability, a novel instrument, which like revealed preference is observable from choice and important for individual and social welfare. We provide the axiomatic underlying individual’s choice model, preliminary experimental results that support the idea, and an appealing allocation rule that uses the revealed desirability information along with the revealed-preference information.

     

Noise and bias in eliciting preferences

In the context of eliciting preferences for decision making under risk, we analyse the features of four different elicitation methods—pairwise choice, willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-accept, and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism—and estimate noise, bias and risk attitudes for two different preference functionals, Expected Utility and Rank-Dependent Expected Utility. It is well-known that methods differ in terms of the bias in the elicitation; it is rather less well-known that methods differ in terms of their noisiness. It has also been reported that risk attitudes are not stable across different elicitation methods. Our results suggest that elicited preferences should only be used in the context in which they were elicited, and the bias in the certainty-equivalent methods should be kept in mind when making predictions based on the elicited preferences. Moreover, conclusions should be moderated to take into account the various methods’ noise, which is generally lowest in the case of pairwise choice.     

Conspicuous conservatism in risk choice

We analyze the risk levels chosen by agents who have private information regarding their quality, and whose performance will be judged and rewarded by outsiders. Assume that risk choice is observable. Agents will choose risk strategically to enhance their expected reputations. We show that conspicuous conservatism results: agents of different qualities choose levels below those that would be chosen if quality were observable. This happens because bad agents must cloak their identity by choosing the same risk level as good agents, and good agents are more likely to distinguish themselves if they reduce the risk level. Our results contrast starkly with those for the case when risk choice cannot be observed.

Does educational inequality predict exercise of users' choice? Survey evidence from domiciliary care services among elderly in Oslo,Norway

The traditional goal of equality in services remains at the heart of the Scandinavian welfare model; however, in recent decades, policymakers have also placed increased emphasis on user influence over services. Voice and choice are two channels to achieve this goal. The possibility to give feedback and voicing dissatisfaction to service providers (voice) is a well-established channel of service users' influence, however it is increasingly supplemented by user choice schemes (choice), where one can choose between different public and private service providers. We use the case of domiciliary care for the elderly to examine how the traditional goal of user equality is associated with the growing emphasis on user influence through voice and choice. The analyses are based on user surveys carried out by the municipality in the city of Oslo, which is arguably the only municipality in Norway where user choice plays a significant role in elderly care. Since the municipality subsidizes the private providers, individual economic resources should have less relevance. However, voicing dissatisfaction and choosing between different providers may anticipate cognitive resources that are not equally distributed among the users. The survey data indicate that there is an association between level of education and propensity to exploit all channels of user influence. Expanding user influence by introducing user choice thus confirms the differences between highly educated and less educated.     

Factors Affecting Choice and Satisfaction: Social Work in Turkey

ABSTRACT

The study examines the relationship between professional choices and employment expectations of social worker trainees in the country of Turkey. Professional choices are examined according to gender and the relationship between employment expectations and satisfaction. This study examined responses with a comparative relational scanning model with a sample of 692 social service (social worker) trainees studying at four different universities in Turkey. Students were surveyed and answered 25 open- and closed-ended questions identifying aspects related to their career choice. Study findings reveal that gender, university entrance scores, and employability were high among the career selection factors. Additional factors identified included family-related factors, personality traits, and compatibility. Examination of the findings is discussed, and recommendations for further research are made.     

Analysis of Intertemporal Choice: A New Framework and Experimental Results

This paper reports the results of a series of experiments examining intertemporal choice. The paper makes three contributions: First, it presents a new analytic device, the intertemporal choice triangle, which is analogous to the Marschak--Machina choice triangle used in the analysis of choice under risk. Second, we have developed a new experimental design based on the intertemporal choice triangle which allows subjects greater flexibility in making choices, and which allows the researcher to make more subtle inferences, than are possible with designs previously employed. Subjects are able to create their most-preferred outcome in each choice situation by choosing a constrained linear combination of two extreme options. Third, our results show that while subjects do not typically maximize present value, they are significantly influenced break by present value considerations. We refer to this finding as it present value-seeking behavior. We find only weak evidence of several previously documented intertemporal choice anomalies in our framework.     

Scope insensitivity in health risk reduction studies: A comparison of choice experiments and the contingent valuation method for valuing safer food

Scope insensitivity and embedding are fundamental concerns in contingent valuation studies for health risk reductions. Recently, choice experiments have increasingly been used to obtain contingent willingness to pay (WTP) estimates. We juxtapose the WTP estimates of a choice experiment (CE) to those of the contingent valuation method (CVM) for different health risk reductions and compare them in the extent of scope insensitivity and embedding. WTP using CVM is scope sensitive for single health risks, but embedding is observed for multiple disease risks. In contrast, WTP based on the CE is highly scope sensitive and convex in risk reduction levels.

Patients’ competence to consent to neurobiological research

Progress has been made defining the standards for determining subjects’ competence to consent to research: abilities to communicate a choice, understand relevant information, appreciate the nature of the situation and its consequences, and manipulate information rationally. Available data show clearly that persons with mental illness display a spectrum of decisionmaking abilities, with many performing well, but some doing quite poorly. More attention now is required to identifying the degree of capacity required for competent consent to projects with varying risk/benefit characteristics. Practical means are also required for screening for subjects with impaired capacities, attempting to improve their performance, and providing substituted consent when their deficiencies are intractable.