管理层自利行为与外部监督——基于信息披露的信号博弈

代理理论框架下的企业高层管理者具有普遍的自利倾向，而信息不对称是产生代理问题的重要原因。缓解代理问题的方法不外乎监督，激励和减少信息不对称。现有文献通常分别考察以上三种机制对缓解代理问题的作用，本文则构建了管理层与企业外部监督者之间的信号博弈模型，同时考虑监督、激励和信息披露之间的互动，分析外部监管对高管自利行为的有效监督机制。研究表明：在缺少激励机制的情况下，以信息披露质量为信号的博弈仅存在一个低效率的混合均衡，即无论高管是否存在自利行为，都会选择低的信息披露质量。而在对高管选择高质量的信息披露策略给予一定的奖励时，可以实现分离均衡。由此我们提出新的包含奖励的信息披露激励机制以及在这一机制下外部监管者的最优策略选择。利用金牌董秘的评选及其对外部监管的信号效应，我们为理论模型的结论提供了实证支持。     

What is quality, and how is it measured?

There is currently no universally accepted definition of "quality of care." This article describes two aspects of measurement that contribute to an assessment of quality--the perception of quality of care held by patients and comparisons of clinical care to established standards. Ongoing monitors that lead to this assessment of quality in a large HMO are described in detail. They include patient satisfaction surveys, quality of care evaluations, comparative medical expense reports, cost-effectiveness studies, and a unique physician incentive bonus plan.     

我国企业股票激励的瓶颈及其对策研究

股票期权激励在西方国家的许多先进公司得以实施,并取得了很大的成功,而且已呈现出逐步向其它国家蔓延的国际性趋势。面对这股潮流的冲击,我国的一些企业已开始逐步采用这种激励制度,但该制度在我国企业的应用并不理想,存在许多瓶颈性制约因素,必须通过采取完善资本市场环境、建立现代企业制度、规范会计处理、修改法律等措施,保证该制度朝着健康、稳定、有序的方向发展。     

Cost containment in health care: a model for management research.

Cost containment is a dominant problem in the health care field, but it has not been addressed from a comprehensive management perspective. To fill this gap, we have developed an inclusive model of the cost containment process. The model has implications for management research in several areas: cost containment baselines, incentive systems, organization structures, cost/quality trade-offs, and cost containment constraints.     

基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制设计

针对供应链质量问题频发的现状,运用单阶段静态质量激励模型揭示了供应商质量投入动机不足的原因,并提出基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励机制。研究表明:在基于跨期约束的供应链动态质量激励模型中,博弈末期的双方最优决策与单阶段静态模型一致,即供应商的质量投入水平等于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,而博弈第一阶段的供应商质量投入水平将大于零售商对供应商的转移支付系数,从而实现了零售商对供应商质量投入的有效激励。最后通过算例仿真验证了当零售商与供应商的绝对风险规避系数、随机冲击的波动增大时,基于跨期约束的动态质量激励模型的供应链总体效用要明显高于静态模型,实现了供应链绩效的帕累托改进。     

基于股票期权的商业银行经理人激励约束机制研究

我国股份制商业银行还没有一种严格意义上的股票期权制度,也没有解决如何制定基于股票期权的最优激励约束合同的理论问题.文章对传统薪酬制度的激励机制和股票期权制度的激励机制进行了对比研究,然后利用博弈论的基本原理构造导入股票期权的商业银行经理人激励约束机制.研究表明,基于股票期权的薪酬制度优于传统固定薪酬制度和经营者年薪制;引入股票期权制度后在激励约束机制的相互制衡作用、以及银行股东和经理人在个人效用最大化条件下,可以达成最优合同.     

工程质量优化的承包商群体激励效率演化分析

针对业主与多标段承包商群体的一对多结构,考虑业主如何通过单价合同与收益共享合同所组成的菜单合同模式对承包商群体进行激励以优化工程质量。本文构建了单阶段群体激励模型以及考虑承包商个体存在公平感知的多阶段群体激励模型,通过计算实验方法探讨不同报酬结构下的激励效率及其演化。研究表明:业主实行同一报酬结构在多阶段工程建设中难以维持高效率;单阶段激励中较好的报酬结构并不适用于多阶段激励过程;个体的公平感知对激励绩效会产生负面影响;报酬结构中针对不同质量标准的激励力度均会对激励效率产生影响,仅针对单一激励力度进行调整或忽视激励力度间的协同均不能实现较好的激励效果。     

The Role of Contracts on Quality and Returns to Quality in Offshore Software Development Outsourcing

In this study, we examine how the different incentive structures inherent in two primary contract types—time and materials (T&M) and fixed price (FP)—influence the quality provided by the vendor in the software development outsourcing industry. We argue that the incentive structure of FP contracts motivates a vendor to be more efficient in the software development process, which results in higher quality as compared to projects executed under a T&M contract. We thus argue that vendors consistently staff FP projects with better trained personnel because they face the most risk on these contracts, resulting in better outcomes on these projects. We extend our analysis to propose that providing higher quality is associated with higher profit margins for the vendor only for FP contracts. We develop and test these hypotheses on data collected from 100 software projects completed by a leading Indian offshore vendor. The results provide strong support for our fundamental thesis that the drivers of and returns to quality vary by contract type. We discuss the implications of our research for both researchers and practitioners.     

“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管模型研究

在市场监管领域全面推行“双随机、一公开”监管，是党中央、国务院作出的重大决策部署，是市场监管理念和方式的重大创新。本文首次构建“双随机、一公开”产品质量监管的理论模型，理清“双随机”与“一公开”及各参与主体之间的作用关系，分析市场主体名录库和执法检查人员名录库中抽查企业与检查人员的群体行为演化机理，得出针对“双随机、一公开”监管的激励机制。研究发现：通过“双随机”抽取检查人员和抽查企业并“公开”产品质量信息，需配以恰当的激励机制才能有效制约抽检企业的假冒伪劣行为和检查人员的无效抽检行为；当公开声誉较高时，对检查人员实施质检激励或对抽查企业实施质量激励均可以使得系统良性演化，但如果公开声誉较低，需同时对检查人员和抽查企业实施质检与质量双重激励；质检激励机制设计时需对标准质量和假冒伪劣对应的检查人员分别给予质检激励，质量激励机制设计时需对有效抽检和无效抽检对应的抽查企业分别给予质量激励；质检激励和质量激励下系统稳定点的演化轨迹存在很大差异，质检激励先使得检查人员演化到有效抽检，然后通过公开声誉带动抽查企业演化到标准质量，而质量激励先使抽查企业演化到标准质量，然后通过公开声誉带动检查人员演化到有效抽检，如果公开声誉较低，这种传动机制会被阻断导致系统不会演化到理想状态。最后本文为完善和创新“双随机、一公开”监管提出了针对性的政策建议。     

工期-质量协调均衡的项目导向型供应链跨组织激励

在假定项目型组织之间平等合作的基础上,从项目价值增值最大化角度,考虑工期-质量目标努力成本关系,构建并剖析工期-质量协调均衡的项目导向型供应链跨组织激励模型,并对模型进行数据模拟和算例分析。结果表明,不论工期-质量目标间努力成本是否存在线性关系,以调整不同控制目标的激励强度为协调手段,实施工期-质量协调激励策略不仅可实现项目导向型供应链项目价值增值的最大化,而且可实现合作双方净收益的帕累托改善,进而使得承包商在工期-质量目标上合理分配资源和努力水平,实现项目工期-质量目标间的协调均衡。     

Reporting quality of health care to the board

The reporting of quality of health care to the governing board has long been an enigma. Now we are in the midst of a revolution in health care, as we shift our focus from solely the clinical performance of individuals to a broader scope of assessing and improving all activities around patient services and patient care--i.e., management outcomes integrated with clinical outcomes to help identify opportunities to improve patient care. In addition, apprised of corporate liability for the quality of care provided in health care organizations, governing boards are raising questions and demanding more information. To maintain this high degree of interest in quality of health care, information should be restricted to what the board needs to know. This article will be confined to the hospital's organizationwide quality system of monitoring and evaluating. While medical staff credentialing and privileging are also board responsibilities and quality management activities should be used in the privileging and credentialing process, they will not be addressed in this article.     

A new perspective on quality

The U.S. health care sector consumes nearly 13 percent of our nation's gross national product, $800 billion annually. Our nation allocates the highest amount per capita to health care in the world. Yet many measures of health care outcomes from these expenditures are inferior to other developed nations. The American health care system costs too much, excludes too many, fails too often, contains much excessive and inappropriate care, and knows too little about the effectiveness of the things it does. The purpose of this article is to discuss current payers' perspectives on the potential for quality improvement in the U.S. health care system.     

Transition to capitation. Aligning incentives for success

Horror stories abound about providers that have failed to modify their incentive systems and have exhausted their annual capitation budget in the first six months of the plan year. Aligning the business strategy and financial incentives in advance is the best way to ensure that your integrated delivery system's transition to capitation is a success story. Rarely are physicians or hospitals with experience limited to the fee-for-service arena prepared to jump into a managed care or capitated compensation system. The transition can be eased by implementing a "shadow" capitation or similar arrangement that will test physician performance under a risk arrangement in advance. The information can be used to restructure the compensation system to ensure that the behaviors being encouraged will promote successful care and fiscal management.     

The consumer and provider: pillars of the new health care system

Managed care has suffered a public backlash, with complaints increasing across the nation from unhappy patients. The physician community despises the current system and is wrestling for control of clinical decision-making. A health care system that is disliked by the public and is despised by the physician community can never succeed. No health care system or reform is possible without willing or even enthusiastic physician participation because only they can control costs, quality of care, and consumer satisfaction. A successful health care system recognizes that only providers can control quality of care and costs--and will create appropriate incentives that allow physicians to do so without losing the public's trust. The author advocates a new system, where consumers choose provider organizations based on disease expertise and purchase insurance through Internet accessible brokers. Provider organizations assume economic risk and have the detailed know-how to treat a specific disease spectrum better and cheaper. Consumers purchase this new "product" in a competitive market and are the principal benefactors of this market-driven, unmanaged care system.     

Sourcing Information Security Operations: The Role of Risk Interdependency and Competitive Externality in Outsourcing Decisions

Firms are increasingly outsourcing information security operations to managed security service providers (MSSPs). Cost reduction and quality (security) improvement are often mentioned as motives for outsourcing information security, and these are also the frequently cited reasons for outsourcing traditional information technology (IT) functions, such as software development and maintenance. In this study, we present a different explanation—one based on interdependent risks and competitive externalities associated with IT security—for firms' decisions to outsource security. We show that in the absence of competitive externalities and interdependent risks, a firm will outsource security if and only if the MSSP offers a quality advantage over in‐house operations, which is consistent with the conventional explanation for security outsourcing. However, when security risks are interdependent and breaches impose competitive externalities, although firms still have stronger incentive to outsource security if the MSSP offers a higher quality in terms of preventing breaches than in‐house management, a quality advantage of MSSP over in‐house management is neither a prerequisite for a firm to outsource security nor a guarantee that a firm will. In addition to MSSP quality, the type of externality (positive or negative), the degree of externality, whether outsourcing increases or decreases risk interdependency, and the breach characteristics determine firms' sourcing decisions. When security breaches impose a positive externality, the incentive to outsource is enhanced if the MSSP decreases the risk interdependency and diminished if the MSSP increases this interdependency. A negative externality has the opposite effect on firms' incentives to outsource. A high demand spillover to a competitor, together with a high loss in industry demand because of a security breach, enhances these incentives to outsource security operations when the externality is negative. Finally, we extend our base model in several dimensions and show that our main results regarding the impact of interdependent risks and competitive externalities on sourcing decisions are robust and generalizable to different specifications.     

DEVELOPING SOPHISTICATED QUALITY IMPROVEMENT APPROACHES THROUGH BUSINESS-ACADEME COLLABORATIONS: INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE

The pursuit of better performance has led to a number of business-academe collaborations. These collaborators have developed a number of sophisticated approaches that go far beyond such traditional simple methods as benchmarking against the best company, Ishikawa diagrams on feedback and control, Pareto diagrams, incentive systems based solely on output or quality, standard process control charts, and separate treatment of control charts and product inspection. The authors in this special issue report on approaches like benchmarking industrial performance through industry studies; the use of an artificial-intelligence statistical-tree growing method to analyze complex customer service data; an incentive system based on the total quality management (TQM) concepts of continuous improvement, teamwork, adaptation to change, and a focus on customer satisfaction; and integration of product inspection and process control. Because of the continuing widespread interest in TQM, there is an opportunity to take stock of how successful TQM initiatives have been and how we should consolidate and further extend the knowledge in TQM. Two of the papers report on the gap between what organizations espouse as TQM and what they actually implement and on the literature on TQM.     

基于质量意识的复杂产品质量控制激励策略

激励在复杂产品供应链中对主供协同合作关系及质量控制发挥了重要作用。本文研究基于主制造商在复杂产品生产研发前按照客户要求形成的质量意识的激励策略是否可以实现复杂产品质量控制问题。考虑具有质量意识的主制造商和其系统供应商组成的两级供应链,建立以主制造商为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,分别讨论无激励和存在激励时的主供生产最优决策。基于激励方式的不同,将激励策略分为根据供应商产品质量水平激励以及根据主制造商质量意识水平激励两种方式。研究结果表明激励是供应商加强协同合作、改进产品质量的内在动力,主制造商根据质量意识激励供应商可以进一步促使双方协同合作,提高产品质量,使双方获得更高的利润从而实现供应链整体利润最大化。此外用灵敏度分析发现提高主制造商质量意识水平可以增加双方协同合作努力程度,有效提升产品质量水平并实现帕累托改进。     

The Bonus Scheme,Motivation Crowding-out and Quality of the Doctor-Patient Encounters in Chinese Public Hospitals

Methods of paying health providers have been extensively studied in health economics. Bonus as a powerful incentive has been widely used to boost staff morale and improve productivity in hospitals. This may, however, also create unintended consequences. This study analyzes primary data collected from a physician survey in China and demonstrates that the extensive use of quantity-based bonuses has not only led to the provision of unnecessary care but also crowded out physician’s intrinsic motivations, resulting in a decline in the quality of services. More appropriate physician remuneration mechanisms must be introduced in China’s ongoing health reform.     

It’s Not What You Pay it’s the Way that You Pay it and that’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance

Management scholars and economists have recently set out the requirements of a system to elicit good performance when it is necessary to align the interests of the principal and agent. We analyse pay and performance in an occupation — jockeys — replete with moral hazard possibilities. We are able to do this because, most unusually, a measure of pure individual performance exists for an unbalanced panel of some 50 individuals for 8 years. Three hypotheses are tested. First, in line with classic agency theory, we expect monitoring mechanisms and incentive contracts to be used to align the interests of principals and agents. Second, pay and performance should be positively associated, subject to the first hypothesis being confirmed. Third, a limited number of jockeys were paid via an alternative mechanism involving very large non-contingent retainer fees. This serves as our counterfactual payment system. In line with agency theory we expect worse performance under such a system than under an incentive contract. The three hypotheses are confirmed: incentive contracts generate superior performance to non-contingent payment systems. Our evidence suggests that ‘it’s not what you pay it’s the way that you pay it … and that’s what gets results’. It is maddening that society confers its blessings on traditional academic pursuits but views the study of horseracing as utter frivolity (Beyer, 1983).     

Applied health services research: responding to the changing health care environment

Health care in America is changing rapidly. The forces that are reforming our health care system are both numerous and compelling. Americans are requesting access to more affordable health care. At the same time, many Americans want to build upon what is considered the best and most technologically advanced health care system in the world. Especially during economically troubled times, innovative and well-formulated solutions to respond to these fundamental challenges are needed to improve the quality and accessibility of health care. It is essential that policy markers base their health care decisions on sound medical research that specifically examines which aspects of medical care improve patient outcomes.