Social Amplification of Wildfire Risk: The Role of Social Interactions and Information Sources

Wildfire is a persistent and growing threat across much of the western United States. Understanding how people living in fire‐prone areas perceive this threat is essential to the design of effective risk management policies. Drawing on the social amplification of risk framework, we develop a conceptual model of wildfire risk perceptions that incorporates the social processes that likely shape how individuals in fire‐prone areas come to understand this risk, highlighting the role of information sources and social interactions. We classify information sources as expert or nonexpert, and group social interactions according to two dimensions: formal versus informal, and generic versus fire‐specific. Using survey data from two Colorado counties, we empirically examine how information sources and social interactions relate to the perceived probability and perceived consequences of a wildfire. Our results suggest that social amplification processes play a role in shaping how individuals in this area perceive wildfire risk. A key finding is that both “vertical” (i.e., expert information sources and formal social interactions) and “horizontal” (i.e., nonexpert information and informal interactions) interactions are associated with perceived risk of experiencing a wildfire. We also find evidence of perceived “risk interdependency”—that is, homeowners’ perceptions of risk are higher when vegetation on neighboring properties is perceived to be dense. Incorporating social amplification processes into community‐based wildfire education programs and evaluating these programs’ effectiveness constitutes an area for future inquiry.     

Heuristics Structure and Pervade Formal Risk Assessment

Lay perceptions of risk appear rooted more in heuristics than in reason. A major concern of the risk regulation literature is that such “error‐strewn” perceptions may be replicated in policy, as governments respond to the (mis)fears of the citizenry. This has led many to advocate a relatively technocratic approach to regulating risk, characterized by high reliance on formal risk and cost‐benefit analysis. However, through two studies of chemicals regulation, we show that the formal assessment of risk is pervaded by its own set of heuristics. These include rules to categorize potential threats, define what constitutes valid data, guide causal inference, and to select and apply formal models. Some of these heuristics lay claim to theoretical or empirical justifications, others are more back‐of‐the‐envelope calculations, while still more purport not to reflect some truth but simply to constrain discretion or perform a desk‐clearing function. These heuristics can be understood as a way of authenticating or formalizing risk assessment as a scientific practice, representing a series of rules for bounding problems, collecting data, and interpreting evidence (a methodology). Heuristics are indispensable elements of induction. And so they are not problematic per se, but they can become so when treated as laws rather than as contingent and provisional rules. Pitfalls include the potential for systematic error, masking uncertainties, strategic manipulation, and entrenchment. Our central claim is that by studying the rules of risk assessment qua rules, we develop a novel representation of the methods, conventions, and biases of the prior art.     

Decision Making for Group Risk Reduction: Dealing with Epistemic Uncertainty

Group risk is usually represented by FN curves showing the frequency of different accident sizes for a given activity. Many governments regulate group risk through FN criterion lines, which define the tolerable location of an FN curve. However, to compare different risk reduction alternatives, one must be able to rank FN curves. The two main problems in doing this are that the FN curve contains multiple frequencies, and that there are usually large epistemic uncertainties about the curve. Since the mid 1970s, a number of authors have used the concept of “disutility” to summarize FN curves in which a family of disutility functions was defined with a single parameter controlling the degree of “risk aversion.” Here, we show it to be risk neutral, disaster averse, and insensitive to epistemic uncertainty on accident frequencies. A new approach is outlined that has a number of attractive properties. The formulation allows us to distinguish between risk aversion and disaster aversion, two concepts that have been confused in the literature until now. A two‐parameter family of disutilities generalizing the previous approach is defined, where one parameter controls risk aversion and the other disaster aversion. The family is sensitive to epistemic uncertainties. Such disutilities may, for example, be used to compare the impact of system design changes on group risks, or might form the basis for valuing reductions in group risk in a cost‐benefit analysis.     

Ecological Risk Assessment,Prediction, and Assessing Risk Predictions

Ecological risk assessment embodied in an adaptive management framework is becoming the global standard approach for formally assessing and managing the ecological risks of technology and development. Ensuring the continual improvement of ecological risk assessment approaches is partly achieved through the dissemination of not only the types of risk assessment approaches used, but also their efficacy. While there is an increasing body of literature describing the results of general comparisons between alternate risk assessment methods and models, there is a paucity of literature that post hoc assesses the performance of specific predictions based on an assessment of risk and the effectiveness of the particular model used to predict the risk. This is especially the case where risk assessments have been used to grant consent or approval for the construction of major infrastructure projects. While postconstruction environmental monitoring is increasingly commonplace, it is not common for a postconstruction assessment of the accuracy and performance of the ecological risk assessment and underpinning model to be undertaken. Without this “assessment of the assessment,” it is difficult for other practitioners to gain insight into the performance of the approach and models used and therefore, as argued here, this limits the rate of improvement of risk assessment approaches.     

Desired Risk: Broadening the Social Amplification of Risk Framework1

Recently Kasperson et al.⁽⁶⁾ have proposed a conceptual framework, “The Social Amplification of Risk,” as a beginning step in developing a comprehensive theory of public experience of risk. A central goal of their effort is to systematically link technical assessments of risk with the growing findings from social scientific research. A key and growing domain of public risk experience is “desired” risk, but this is virtually neglected in the framework. This paper evaluates the scope of the “Social Amplification of Risk Framework,” asking whether it is applicable to desired risks, such as risk recreation (hang gliding, mountain climbing, and so forth). The analysis is supportive of the framework's applicability to the domain of desired risk.     

Communicating Conservation Status: How Different Statistical Assessment Criteria Affect Perceptions of Extinction Risk

Although alternative forms of statistical and verbal information are routinely used to convey species’ extinction risk to policymakers and the public, little is known about their effects on audience information processing and risk perceptions. To address this gap in literature, we report on an experiment that was designed to explore how perceptions of extinction risk differ as a function of five different assessment benchmarks (Criteria A–E) used by scientists to classify species within IUCN Red List risk levels (e.g., Critically Endangered, Vulnerable), as well as the role of key individual differences in these effects (e.g., rational and experiential thinking styles, environmental concern). Despite their normative equivalence within the IUCN classification system, results revealed divergent effects of specific assessment criteria: on average, describing extinction risk in terms of proportional population decline over time (Criterion A) and number of remaining individuals (Criterion D) evoked the highest level of perceived risk, whereas the single‐event probability of a species becoming extinct (Criterion E) engendered the least perceived risk. Furthermore, participants scoring high in rationality (analytic thinking) were less prone to exhibit these biases compared to those low in rationality. Our findings suggest that despite their equivalence in the eyes of scientific experts, IUCN criteria are indeed capable of engendering different levels of risk perception among lay audiences, effects that carry direct and important implications for those tasked with communicating about conservation status to diverse publics.     

Rethinking Risk Assessment for Public Utility Safety Regulation

To aid in their safety oversight of large‐scale, potentially dangerous energy and water infrastructure and transportation systems, public utility regulatory agencies increasingly seek to use formal risk assessment models. Yet some of the approaches to risk assessment used by utilities and their regulators may be less useful for this purpose than is supposed. These approaches often do not reflect the current state of the art in risk assessment strategy and methodology. This essay explores why utilities and regulatory agencies might embrace risk assessment techniques that do not sufficiently assess organizational and managerial factors as drivers of risk, nor that adequately represent important uncertainties surrounding risk calculations. Further, it describes why, in the special legal, political, and administrative world of the typical public utility regulator, strategies to identify and mitigate formally specified risks might actually diverge from the regulatory promotion of “safety.” Some improvements are suggested that can be made in risk assessment approaches to support more fully the safety oversight objectives of public regulatory agencies, with examples from “high‐reliability organizations” (HROs) that have successfully merged the management of safety with the management of risk. Finally, given the limitations of their current risk assessments and the lessons from HROs, four specific assurances are suggested that regulatory agencies should seek for themselves and the public as objectives in their safety oversight of public utilities.     

Probability of Causation and the Attributable Proportion Risk

A uranium miner who smokes develops lung cancer: what is the probability that radiation, rather than tobacco, caused it? This paper briefly explains the principles and limits of probability models for which this question makes sense, and then shows how principles of risk accounting can be applied to obtain a solution to the general problem of attributing risk in the presence of joint, possibly interacting, causes. A procedure for calculating each factor's “share” in a jointly caused risk is proposed, and shown to be a generalization of the “probability of causation” concept. Problems of implementation and interpretation for the proposed attribution procedure are discussed, and illustrative error bounds are derived for a simple decision rule, in which probability of causation or attributable risk share calculations are made using aggregate data as a proxy for unknown individual data.     

Trust,Emotion, Sex,Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield

Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Polarized views, controversy, and conflict have become pervasive. Research has begun to provide a new perspective on this problem by demonstrating the complexity of the concept risk and the inadequacies of the traditional view of risk assessment as a purely scientific enterprise. This paper argues that danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Risk assessment is inherently subjective and represents a blending of science and judgment with important psychological, social, cultural, and political factors. In addition, our social and democratic institutions, remarkable as they are in many respects, breed distrust in the risk arena. Whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution to the problem at hand. If risk is defined one way, then one option will rise to the top as the most cost-effective or the safest or the best. If it is defined another way, perhaps incorporating qualitative characteristics and other contextual factors, one will likely get a different ordering of action solutions. Defining risk is thus an exercise in power. Scientific literacy and public education are important, but they are not central to risk controversies. The public is not irrational. Their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion and affect in a way that is both simple and sophisticated. The same holds true for scientists. Public views are also influenced by worldviews, ideologies, and values; so are scientists' views, particularly when they are working at the limits of their expertise. The limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach—one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessment and risk decision making in order to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions.     

Technical Note – Pricing Below Cost Under Exchange‐Rate Risk

Pricing below cost is often classified as “dumping” in international trade and as “predatory pricing” in local markets. It is legally prohibited from practice because of earlier findings that it leads to predatory behavior by either eliminating competition or stealing market share. This study shows that a stochastic exchange rate can create incentives for a profit‐minded monopoly firm to set price below marginal cost. Our result departs from earlier findings because the optimal pricing decision is based on a rational behavior that does not exhibit any malicious intent against the competition to be considered as violating anti‐trust laws. The finding is a robust result, because our analysis demonstrates that this behavior occurs under various settings such as when the firm (i) is risk‐averse, (ii) can postpone prices until after exchange rates are realized, (iii) is capable of manufacturing in multiple countries, and (iv) operates under demand uncertainty in addition to the random exchange rate.     

A Framework for Understanding Risk Perception,Explored from the Perspective of the Water Practitioner

Sustainable urban water systems are likely to be hybrids of centralized and decentralized infrastructure, managed as an integrated system in water‐sensitive cities. The technology for many of these systems is available. However, social and institutional barriers, which can be understood as deeply embedded risk perceptions, have impeded their implementation. Risk perceptions within the water sector are often unrecognized or unacknowledged, despite their role in risk management generally in informing value judgments and specifically in ranking risks to achieve management objectives. There has been very little examination of the role of these risk perceptions in advancing more sustainable water supply management through the adoption of alternative sources. To address this gap, this article presents a framework that can be used as a tool for understanding risk perceptions. The framework is built on the relational theory of risk and presents the range of human phenomena that might influence the perception of an “object at risk” in relation to a “risk object.” It has been synthesized from a critical review of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical studies of perception broadly and risk perception specifically, and interpreted in relation to water practitioners. For a water practitioner, the risk object might be an alternative water system, a component, a process, or a technology, and the object at risk could be public or environmental health, profitability, or professional reputation. This framework has two important functions: to allow practitioners to understand their own and others’ risk perceptions, which might differ, and to inform further empirical research.     

Risk Perception and Risk Analysis in a Hyperpartisan and Virtuously Violent World

I shall discuss, from a personal perspective, research on risk perception that has created an understanding of the dynamic interplay between an appreciation of risk that resides in us as a feeling and an appreciation of risk that results from analysis. In some circumstances, feelings reflect important social values that deserve to be considered along with traditional analyses of physical and economic risk. In other situations, both feelings and analyses may be shaped by powerful cognitive biases and deep social and partisan prejudices, causing nonrational judgments and decisions. This is of concern if risk analysis is to be applied, as it needs to be, in managing existential threats such as pandemic disease, climate change, or nuclear weapons amidst a divisive political climate.     

Some Limitations of Qualitative Risk Rating Systems

Qualitative systems for rating animal antimicrobial risks using ordered categorical labels such as “high,”“medium,” and “low” can potentially simplify risk assessment input requirements used to inform risk management decisions. But do they improve decisions? This article compares the results of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment systems and establishes some theoretical limitations on the extent to which they are compatible. In general, qualitative risk rating systems satisfying conditions found in real‐world rating systems and guidance documents and proposed as reasonable make two types of errors: (1) Reversed rankings, i.e., assigning higher qualitative risk ratings to situations that have lower quantitative risks; and (2) Uninformative ratings, e.g., frequently assigning the most severe qualitative risk label (such as “high”) to situations with arbitrarily small quantitative risks and assigning the same ratings to risks that differ by many orders of magnitude. Therefore, despite their appealing consensus‐building properties, flexibility, and appearance of thoughtful process in input requirements, qualitative rating systems as currently proposed often do not provide sufficient information to discriminate accurately between quantitatively small and quantitatively large risks. The value of information (VOI) that they provide for improving risk management decisions can be zero if most risks are small but a few are large, since qualitative ratings may then be unable to confidently distinguish the large risks from the small. These limitations suggest that it is important to continue to develop and apply practical quantitative risk assessment methods, since qualitative ones are often unreliable.     

The Constitution of Risk Communication in Advanced Liberal Societies

This article aims to bring to the fore some of the underlying rationales that inform common conceptions of the constitution of risk communication in academic and policy communities. “Normative,”“instrumental,” and “substantive” imperatives typically employed in the utilization of risk communication are first outlined. In light of these considerations, a theoretical scheme is subsequently devised leading to the articulation of four fundamental “idealized” models of risk communication termed the “risk message” model, the “risk dialogue” model, the “risk field” model, and the “risk government” model, respectively. It is contended that the diverse conceptual foundations underlying the orientation of each model suggest a further need for a more contextualized view of risk communication that takes account not only of the strengths and limitations of different formulations and functions of risk communication, but also the underlying knowledge/power dynamics that underlie its constitution. In particular, it is hoped that the reflexive theoretical understanding presented here will help to bring some much needed conceptual clarity to academic and policy discourses about the use and utility of risk communication in advanced liberal societies.     

Risk Preferences,Probability Weighting,and Strategy Tradeoffs in Wildfire Management

Wildfires present a complex applied risk management environment, but relatively little attention has been paid to behavioral and cognitive responses to risk among public agency wildfire managers. This study investigates responses to risk, including probability weighting and risk aversion, in a wildfire management context using a survey‐based experiment administered to federal wildfire managers. Respondents were presented with a multiattribute lottery‐choice experiment where each lottery is defined by three outcome attributes: expenditures for fire suppression, damage to private property, and exposure of firefighters to the risk of aviation‐related fatalities. Respondents choose one of two strategies, each of which includes “good” (low cost/low damage) and “bad” (high cost/high damage) outcomes that occur with varying probabilities. The choice task also incorporates an information framing experiment to test whether information about fatality risk to firefighters alters managers' responses to risk. Results suggest that managers exhibit risk aversion and nonlinear probability weighting, which can result in choices that do not minimize expected expenditures, property damage, or firefighter exposure. Information framing tends to result in choices that reduce the risk of aviation fatalities, but exacerbates nonlinear probability weighting.     

Communicating Actionable Risk for Terrorism and Other Hazards⋆

We propose a shift in emphasis when communicating to people when the objective is to motivate household disaster preparedness actions. This shift is to emphasize the communication of preparedness actions (what to do about risk) rather than risk itself. We have called this perspective “communicating actionable risk,” and it is grounded in diffusion of innovations and communication theories. A representative sample of households in the nation was analyzed using a path analytic framework. Preparedness information variables (including content, density, and observation), preparedness mediating variables (knowledge, perceived effectiveness, and milling), and preparedness actions taken were modeled. Clear results emerged that provide a strong basis for communicating actionable risk, and for the conclusion both that information observed (seeing preparedness actions that other have taken) and information received (receiving recommendations about what preparedness actions to take) play key, although different, roles in motivating preparedness actions among the people in our nation.     

Public Views on Drinking Water Standards as Risk Indicators

Government agencies often compare contaminant levels to standards and other regulatory benchmarks to convey relative risk to public audiences, as well as for enforcement. Yet we know little of how citizens interpret these risk indicators or factors influencing interpretations. Owners of private residential wells in New Jersey were surveyed by mail. A majority appreciated this comparison, trusted the standard, and could effectively compare the contaminant level to the standard. Most people who recalled that their own well water quality was unsatisfactory simply installed treatment systems. However, there was also a surprising amount of inability to tell whether pollution levels were better or worse than the standard, perhaps exacerbated by confusing institutional language to summarize the comparison (e.g., pollution “exceeds” or is “less than” the standard) and innumeracy. There was also substantial skepticism about the degree to which pollution levels below, or (to a lesser extent) above, the standard are harmless or harmful, respectively. Skepticism was variously due to distrust of standards, disbelief in thresholds for health effects, inability to accurately compare standards and contaminant levels, information processing, and demographics. Discontinuity in reactions below versus above the standard did not exist in the aggregate, and rarely among individuals, contrary to some previous findings. At identical standards and contaminant levels, familiar toxins (mercury, arsenic, lead) elicited higher risk ratings than less familiar ones. Given the wide institutional use of this risk indicator, further research on how to improve the design and use of this indicator, and consideration of alternatives, is warranted.     

Risk Assessment Can Be a Game‐Changing Information Technology—But Too Often It Isn't

The printing press was a game‐changing information technology. Risk assessment could be also. At present, risk assessments are commonly used as one‐time decision aids: they provide justification for a particular decision, and afterwards usually sit on a shelf. However, when viewed as information technologies, their potential uses are much broader. Risk assessments: (1) are repositories of structured information and a medium for communication; (2) embody evaluative structures for setting priorities; (3) can preserve information over time and permit asynchronous communication, thus encouraging learning and adaptation; and (4) explicitly address uncertain futures. Moreover, because of their “what‐if” capabilities, risk assessments can serve as a platform for constructive discussion among parties that hold different values. The evolution of risk assessment in the nuclear industry shows how such attributes have been used to lower core‐melt risks substantially through improved templates for maintenance and more effective coordination with regulators (although risk assessment has been less commonly used in improving emergency‐response capabilities). The end result of this evolution in the nuclear industry has been the development of “living” risk assessments that are updated more or less in real time to answer even routine operational questions. Similar but untapped opportunities abound for the use of living risk assessments to reduce risks in small operational decisions as well as large policy decisions in other areas of hazard management. They can also help improve understanding of and communication about risks, and future risk assessment and management. Realization of these opportunities will require significant changes in incentives and active promotion by the risk analytic community.