代理人间具有竞争关系的薪酬激励机制设计

销售系统中存在着典型的信息不对称情况:委托人(公司)对代理人(销售人员)的努力程度具有不对称信息,委托人不能观测到代理人努力程度,因而常根据销售业绩来制定薪酬激励机制.本文研究销售系统中具有多个代理人且代理人之间存在竞争关系的委托代理问题.在假设市场最终需求对努力水平敏感,且某代理人努力水平提高时,他可以在开拓市场的同时,吸引对方顾客的条件下,建立了具有多代理人且代理人间存在竞争的委托代理模型.得到当努力成本、风险规避度、产出不确定性越大,代理人的风险分担越小,利润提成越低,越倾向于取得固定工资;竞争程度越高,代理人的努力程度也随之提高;利用代理人之间的竞争可以使委托人获利等结论.     

薪酬参照体的效应研究:基于多表征的路径模型与相对重要性

参照体选择在分配公平、薪酬满意研究中扮演重要角色,而以往研究多是关注焦点对象与参照体在薪酬上的数量差异。本文认为,参照体数量差异并不能完整表征参照体的效应,为此提出了信息知晓度、判断关联性、比较频率、数量差异等四类表征,在理论基础上构造路径模型与研究假设。实证研究表明,信息知晓度、判断关联性正向影响特定参照体的比较频率;数量差异正向影响分配公平、薪酬水平满意,比较频率负向影响分配公平、薪酬水平满意。通过三种研究路径的比较研究证实,自我生活成本等七类参照体相对重要。未来亟需就参照体选择的相关机制在纵贯上、在不同的组织情境下及考虑个体差异等方面予以深入考察。     

绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度影响的实证研究

以14家企业的506份薪酬满意度问卷及其客观薪酬数据为样本,以SPSS13.0软件为工具,采用曲线估计和分层多元回归分析探讨绩效工资强度对员工薪酬满意度的影响,以及职位层次对这一关系的调节作用.研究结果表明,绩效工资强度与薪酬满意度之间呈倒U型关系,职位层次对这一关系具有调节作用.最后,讨论了对企业薪酬管理实践的指导意义以及该领域未来的研究方向.     

Power and Pay: The Politics of CEO Compensation

This paper examines CEO compensation, with an emphasis on the power of CEOs to influence their own compensation by managing the compensation process. It analyzes the CEO's power over the board of directors and the political tactics used by the CEO to manage the board and its compensation decisions. An empirical examination of CEO compensation in 203 large American manufacturing firms in 1985 illustrates the effect of CEO power on compensation and the flexibility available to the CEO in establishing the legitimacy of compensation. The implications of this perspective for management control of corporations and for CEO compensation research are considered.     

Self-Solicited Feedback: Effects of Hourly Pay and Individual Monetary Incentive Pay

The frequency of feedback solicitation under hourly pay and individual monetary incentive pay conditions was examined. A between-subjects design was used with 30 college students in the two groups. Participants attended three experimental sessions and entered the cash value of simulated bank checks presented on a computer screen. Performance was higher for individuals who were paid incentives; however, participants who were paid incentives did not self-solicit feedback more than those who were paid hourly. Rather, participants in both groups solicited feedback quite frequently. Additionally, performance was not related to feedback solicitation. These results suggest that the incentives did not make feedback more reinforcing even though the incentives were functional rewards and the feedback was correlated with the amount of pay earned: the better the feedback, the more pay participants earned. The results also support the position that it may be necessary to pair objective feedback with an evaluative component to enhance performance.     

The Governance of Directors' Pay: Evidence from UK Companies

We examine the determination of directors' compensation in UK quoted companies between 1985 and 1994. The primary innovation contained in the paper is the focus on the governance mechanisms that determine pay outcomes. Our results indicate that: (i) directors' compensation is positively related to pre-dated shareholder returns and company size with the quantitative effect of the latter dominating the former. (ii) We find that the pay-for-performance link has become quantitatively stronger over our sample period. (iii) There has been positive adherence to the principles of the Cadbury report, but these variables play little statistical role in shaping the direct compensation of top directors.     

New Firms as Employers: The Wage Penalty for Voluntary and Involuntary Job Switchers

According to previous research, new firms pay lower wages. However, previous studies have been unable to control for the possibility that the opportunity costs of accepting employment at new firms may differ across individuals. In this paper, we investigate whether a wage penalty for being employed at a new firm exists if we take the individual employee's experience and status in the labour market into consideration. We focus on individuals who decide to switch jobs and use matched employee–employer data about all firms and employees in Sweden for the period 1998–2010. Our results show that the share of job transitions into lower wages are higher for those who switch to new firms compared with incumbent firms (40 per cent and 31 per cent, respectively). Our endogenous wage equation estimates indicate that being an involuntary job switcher has an equally negative effect on wages at both new and incumbent firms. However, the positive effect of education on wages is more pronounced for job switchers selecting into incumbent firms.     

薪酬变动、绩效薪酬知觉与薪酬满意:成就需要与风险厌恶的调节效应

通过收集的479份样本开展实证研究,证实了成就需要与风险厌恶的调节作用。研究结果表明,高的成就需要强化了绩效薪酬知觉与薪酬满意之间的关系;高的风险厌恶弱化了薪酬变动与薪酬满意之间的正向关系,且强化了薪酬变动的负向效应。     

The Motherhood Wage Penalty and Its Determinants: A Public–Private Comparison

We investigate whether public and private sector employees bear a different wage penalty for having children. According to our estimates, the total motherhood wage penalty is much larger in the private than in the public sector. Nevertheless, in both sectors, we find no unexplained penalty once we control for potential determinants of the family pay gap, namely, a reduced labour supply of mothers, child‐related career interruptions, less access to management positions, and adjustments in working conditions. Finally, only child‐related career interruptions play a different role in explaining the motherhood wage penalty in each sector.     

The Role of Firm Size and Performance Pay in Determining Employee Job Satisfaction Brief: Firm Size,Performance Pay,and Job Satisfaction

Abstract. Job satisfaction reflects the on‐the‐job utility of workers and has been found to influence both the behavior of workers and the productivity of firms. Performance pay remains popular and widely used to increase worker productivity and more generally align the objectives of workers and firms. Yet, its impact on job satisfaction is ambiguous. Whereas the increased earnings increase job satisfaction, the increased effort and risk decreases job satisfaction. This paper finds empirical evidence that on net performance pay increases job satisfaction but does so largely among union workers and males in larger firms.     

绩效评估公平、工资系统认知与绩效工资公平关系研究:兼论绩效工具性感知的中介效应

通过对528名企业员工采用自我报告式问卷调查,本研究考察了绩效评估公平、工资系统认知和绩效工具性感知对绩效工资公平的直接或间接影响.对调查数据进行回归分析和结构方程模型分析,结果显示绩效工具性感知在绩效工资公平前因变量影响机制中起部分中介作用;绩效评估公平对绩效工资公平有显著的直接正向影响,也通过绩效工具性感知预测了绩效工资公平;工资系统认知对绩效工资公平有显著的直接正向影响,也通过绩效工具性感知预测了绩效工资公平.绩效评估公平、工资系统认知和绩效工具性感知是绩效工资公平的重要前因变量,三个变量联合解释了绩效工资公平60％的变异量.最后对基于研究结论的启示进行了讨论.     

Internationalization and Indigenous Technological Efforts of Emerging Economy Firms: The Effect of Multiple Knowledge Sources

Getting engaged in competitive international markets motivates exporting firms to enhance their technological competitiveness and invest in research and development (R&D). While in-house R&D investment is important for getting advanced technologies, the technologies needed by exporters located in emerging economies (EEs) typically readily exist overseas. Drawing on organizational learning literature, we argue that the R&D intensity stimulated by exporting may be reduced when 1) EE exporters are better prepared and motivated to absorb foreign knowledge, 2) foreign sources of knowledge are more available, and/or 3) local technology supply is poor. An analysis on 5592 automobile parts and component manufacturers in China during 2005–2007 supports these arguments. To compete in markets abroad, Chinese firms' R&D intensity increases with export intensity when their export intensity is low. As the export intensity exceeds a certain threshold, their R&D intensity starts to decrease as intensive exporters are better prepared and motivated to acquire knowledge from foreign sources. When substitutive foreign knowledge sources such as foreign parents and FDI spillovers in the local industry is available, firms' R&D intensity stimulated by exporting can be further reduced. Better local technology supply can increase the R&D intensity stimulated by exporting.     

Sickness Absence,Sick Leave Pay,and Pay Schemes

Utilizing Norwegian linked register and survey data, while exploiting a discontinuity in public sick pay legislation, I show that the public sick pay compensation level causally affects male performance pay workers' sick leave days. Both male and female performance pay workers experience longer sick leaves when provided private supplementary sick pay compared with those being eligible for public sick pay only. This differential impact of the replacement rate on workers' sick leave rates reveals heterogeneous behavioural changes following public sick pay cuts, and this heterogeneity will be reinforced by the provision of employer‐provided sick pay to attractive worker groups.     

个人投资理财应注意的问题

本文简要介绍了个人投资理财的涵义和必要性,提出个人投资理财应坚持的原则和步骤以及应注意的几个要点.     

Pay Dispersion and Executive Behaviour: Evidence from Innovation

Compensation packages are widely used to motivate top executives. Pay dispersion among a firm's executives, however, can be associated with the antithetic effects of social comparison and individual motivation, with unclear implications for the company. We focus on innovation activities, which represent an important channel through which pay dispersion can affect firm performance, and test our predictions by exploring innovative output as a function of executives’ pay dispersion in a panel of US firms. We find that executive pay dispersion acts as a double‐edged sword. On the one hand, the higher the dispersion in variable pay, the higher the innovation. On the other hand, the larger the dispersion in fixed pay, the lower the innovation. Results are robust to a number of tests, such as restricting the analysis to executives with direct responsibility for innovation projects and considering individual incentives in the form of cash pay.     

绩效工资:一把双刃剑

绩效工资目前已成为我国薪酬支付的主流方式之一,但有关绩效工资对员工态度和行为的影响的研究还很少.本文以574名知识员工为研究对象,实证分析了绩效工资对知识员工分配公平感、帮助行为和自我发展的影响,研究同时考察个体层面的价值认同和组织层面的程序公正氛围,对绩效工资与员工态度和行为关系的调节作用.数据分析采用多层次线性模型,分析结果显示,绩效工资在个体层面有效提高了员工分配公平感和自我发展行为,而在组织层面,绩效工资降低了组织中员工分配公平感和帮助行为的整体水平.在高价值认同和高程序公正氛围中,绩效工资对员工态度和行为有更多的积极作用;在低程序公正氛围中,绩效工资则呈现一定的消极作用.本文最后讨论了研究的理论和实践意义,以及研究的局限.     

Remuneration Committees,Pay Consultants and the Determination of Executive Directors' Pay

This paper explores how Board Remuneration Committee (Remco) decisions about executive pay are influenced by pay consultants. Drawing on resource dependency theory and case study evidence from five companies, the paper illuminates the complexities of the pressures and processes confronting both Remcos and pay consultants in the determination of executive pay awards. In contrast to ‘managerial power’ arguments, it demonstrates that the Remcos are proactive in managing pay policy, conscientious in seeking to ensure that pay is appropriate and not over‐generous, and that pay consultants are independent and take their instructions entirely from the Remco. Nevertheless, Remcos' understandings of the wider pay environment, informed by the comparative data supplied by pay consultants, constructs a climate in which the Remcos come to perceive a need for periodic upward pay adjustments to ensure that executive remuneration is consistent with external benchmarks if they are to avoid recruitment and retention problems.     

不同薪酬契约对创新行为的影响分析:实验的证据

本文设计了一个鸡尾酒配比实验,采用实验研究的方法检验了短视契约、终止契约和长期契约对实验者创新的影响,研究结果表明:(1)与短视契约和终止契约相比,长期契约下实验者的创新绩效更好;(2)与短视契约和终止契约相比,长期契约下实验者的创新水平更高;而且上述结果在考虑实验者风险偏好的情况下依然是稳健的。该实验说明容忍经理人短期的失败,并赋予长期薪酬更高的权重能够激励经理人进行更多的创新投入,并且有效的提高创新绩效。     

Willingness to Pay for Shifting Inventory Risk: The Role of Contractual Form

In order to reduce their inventory risk, firms can attempt to contract with their suppliers for shorter supply lead‐times, with their buyers for longer demand lead‐times, or both. We designed a controlled laboratory experiment to study contracts that shift a focal firm's inventory risk to its supply chain partners and address two questions. First, is it more effective if the cost of shifting inventory risk is framed as a fixed fee or in per‐unit cost terms? We find that, generally, our participants are willing to pay more to avoid supply–demand mismatches than the expected costs from such mismatches. This tendency to overpay is mitigated under fixed fee schemes. Second, does it matter whether the option to reduce inventory risk is the outcome of either increased responsiveness from the upstream supplier or advanced demand information from the downstream buyer? Our results suggest that this difference, when only a matter of framing, has no significant effect on willingness‐to‐pay.     

Legislative Pay and Legislator Quality

This study extends previous work by Mixon and Wilkinson (1999, Public Finance Review 27: 418–433) and Palia (2000, RAND Journal of Economics 31: 165–179) suggesting that formal human capital attainment is lower in political and managerial roles wherein expected compensation is less. The present study constructs a cumulative probability distribution function for years of education attained for both branches of the 109th US Congress and finds that the distribution of years of education attainment in the US Senate second‐order dominates that in the US House due to differences in the expected compensation levels favoring the former congressional branch. The stochastic dominance test results are supported by findings of significant differences in education attainment (favoring senators) at different quantiles of the joint education attainment distribution. Finally, goodness‐of‐fit tests also indicate that the distribution of education attainment quality in the US Senate, as measured by various academic institution quality indicators, is significantly different from that in the US House, again owing to the differences in expected compensation.