Comparison of methods for positional analysis: Structural and general equivalences

This paper explores the conceptualization and measurement of social position in relational data. It is argued that social positions are evidenced in the interactions among individuals, which are encoded in measured social relations. Given a set of measured relations the task is to reveal social positions which consist of groups of individuals wth similar patterns of relations. Methods based on two alternative approaches are discussed. The first set of approaches is based on structural equivalence, and locates groups of similar individuals based on the extent to which they share identical ties with identical others. A second set of approaches, here called general equivalences, locates groups of similar individuals based on their sharing of “types” of ties with “types” of others. Procedures based on these different approaches are described and applied to actual data and to a constructed example. Results suggest that these different approaches identify different kinds of social groups. It is argued that structural equivalence is an unsuitable basis for analysis of relational data if the goal is detection of social positions.     

Constitutions, voting and democracy: A review

This review of William Riker's work suggests that his interest in rational choice theory was based on his desire to understand profound constitutional transformation in U.S. political history. Although he argued that “anything can happen in politics,” his use of the notion of heresthetic allowed him to focus on key contingent events. Indeed his later work added depth to his inductive generalizations on the nature of “federal bargains” and coalition formation.  Recent work by Austen-Smith and Banks, Merrill and Grofman, and Lijphart is also discussed in the light of Riker's earlier ideas on voting and democracy. Received: 25 February 2000/Accepted: 16 March 2000     

Impartiality,friendship-networks and voting behavior: Evidence from voting patterns in the Eurovision Song Contest

What is the extent to which a country's political institutions impact aggregate voting behavior in a comparative perspective? More specifically, are citizens in some countries more inclined vote on the basis of ‘quality’ or ‘merit’ over ‘friendship’ or ‘loyalty’, and if so, why? This paper seeks to address how the extent to which a country's political institutions are impartial (treats all citizens equally, free from corruption, strong rule of law) impact aggregate citizen behavior. When political institutions are more (less) impartial, success in society is more often on the basis of merit (patrimonial ties). This test cases is voting in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) from 1975 to 2012 among pairs and blocs of ‘voting friends’. The theory elucidates that given that certain pairs or blocs exhibit systematic voting bias for one another over time, the bias will be considerably less among impartial states than those with highly partial institutions. Using several measures of ‘friendship’, I find strong empirical evidence for this claim, even when controlling for myriad alternative factors and taking into account various voting regimes. The analysis gives us new insights on how political institutions condition aggregate citizen behavior in general and that although there is much bias in ESC voting, not all bias is equal among friend-countries.     

Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium

We introduce the following basic voting method: voters submit both a “consensus” and a “fall-back” ballot. If all “consensus” ballots name the same option, it wins; otherwise, a randomly drawn “fall-back” ballot decides. If there is one potential consensus option that everyone prefers to the benchmark lottery which picks the favorite of a randomly drawn voter, then naming that option on all “consensus” ballots builds a very strong form of correlated equilibrium. Unlike common consensus procedures, ours is not biased toward the status quo and removes incentives to block consensus. Variants of the method allow for large groups, partial consensus, and choosing from several potential consensus options.     

Rationing,bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets

This paper analyzes the temporary equilibrium of 2-sided markets from the point of view of bargaining theory. The minimum rule, quantity traded equal the minimum of demand and supply, is shown to hold under both the Nash bargain and the -transfer value. Moreover, both concepts imply that rationing is uniform on the long side of the market. The paper then considers disequilibrium price dynamics. Under majoritarian price dynamics, nex period's price is the majority rule price of this period's active traders. The sequence of temporary equilibria according to the majoritarian price dynamics is shown to converge to Walrasian equilibrium.The author wishes to thank Y. Balaska, V. Böhm, F. Breyer, J. M. Grandmont, R. Guesnerie, R. Myerson, W. Hildenbrand, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. Research support from the National Center for Scientific Research (France) and the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged     

Integrity and Presidential Approval, 1980-2000

Do individuals' assessments of the president's integrity consistentlyaffect their evaluations of his job performance? Previous researchsuggests that they might, but extant studies typically do notdirectly examine the effects of these assessments. Those thatdo have examined only a few time points, leaving the questionof whether integrity assessments consistently affect approvalacross presidencies unresolved. Further, they do not examinethe effects of integrity on Bill Clinton's approval after theLewinsky scandal, a time when many argued that integrity assessmentswere irrelevant to evaluations of his job performance. Thisstudy examines the effects of integrity assessments on approvalof four presidents using 10 surveys from 1980 to 2000. Integrityassessments are found to influence approval throughout the period,although the magnitude of their effect varies somewhat. Further,integrity assessments affected approval for Clinton in aboutthe same way they shaped approval for previous presidents. Althoughmost studies of presidential approval focus on the economy andforeign affairs, these results suggest that evaluations of thepresident's job performance are in part evaluations of the presidenthimself. However, more politically substantive factors exertfar greater influence on approval. Therefore, approval is tiedto far more than just good character, which reflects favorablyon the quality of the public's evaluations of their presidents.     

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study

We report on laboratory experiments on voting. In a setting where subjects have single-peaked preferences, we find that the rational choice theory provides very good predictions of actual individual behavior in one-round and approval voting elections but fares poorly in explaining vote choice under two-round elections. We conclude that voters behave strategically as far as strategic computations are not too demanding, in which case they rely on simple heuristics (under two-round voting) or they just vote sincerely (under single transferable vote).     

Religion and animal welfare: Evidence from voting data

In November 2002, Florida residents voted on a ballot proposal limiting farming practices that are deemed cruel to pigs. Using county level data, models of support for the proposal are estimated, paying particular attention to the influence of religion. Although the rate of adherents to Catholicism and evangelical denominations are statistically and economically relevant to explain support for the ban, political preferences and socio-economic factors are more important in terms of substantive significance than religious affiliation.     

Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution

A new solution concept is axiomatically characterized for tournaments that represent cooperative majority voting. The predicted set of outcomes lies inside the top-cycle set, the uncovered set, and the Banks set.This research was supported by NSF grants SES 8612120 and SES 8896228. I thank Georges Bordes, Gary Cox, Bhaskar Dutta, Richard McKelvey, Nicholas Miller, Emerson Niou, Peter Ordeshook, and Peyton Young for helpful comments. Niou is responsible for the example in Sect. 4. Presented at the Public Choice Society Meetings, Tucson, March 1987, and at the Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behaviorial Sciences, UCLA, October 1988.     

Overreporting voting: why it happens and why it matters

The key to understanding why people overreport is that those who are under the most pressure to vote are the ones most likely to misrepresent their behavior when they fail to do so. Among all nonvoters, the most likely to overreport are the more educated, partisan, and religious, and those who have been contacted and asked to vote for a candidate. The greater the concentration of African-American and Latino nonvoters in a district, the greater the probability of overreporting in those districts, both among those in the relevant minority group and among white Anglos. White nonvoters are more likely to overreport in the Deep South than elsewhere. Overreporting matters: using reported votes in place of validated votes substantially distorts standard multivariate explanations of voting, increasing the apparent importance of independent variables that are related in the same direction to both overreporting and voting and sharply decreasing the apparent importance of independent variables related in opposing directions to those two variables.     

Class voting, social change, and the left in Australia, 1943-96

The relationship between class and voting choices has been the subject of controversy in recent years, especially in connection with the apparent decline of the traditional left. This paper examines class voting in Australia, focusing on three major issues: (1) changes in the overall strength of class voting (2) realignment, or changes in the relative political positions of the classes (3) the connection between the strength of class voting and support for Labor. It finds that (1) there is a decline in 'general' class voting (2) much of this decline involves a realignment of certain middle class groups, but there is no support for the popular idea that class alignments have become more complex (3) there is no connection between the strength of class voting and Labor performance. Our results cast doubt on accounts that regard the electoral difficulties of left parties as a symptom of the decline of class.     

Equitable agendas: agendas ensuring identical sincere and sophisticated voting decisions

 Sophisticated voting under amendment procedure using majority rule usually results in a decision that is distinct from the decision obtained through sincere voting. In this article it is shown that the underlying majority tournament (determined by the voters’ preferences) admits an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical if and only if the initial strong component of the tournament is not a 3-cycle. As a result, most tournaments, in an asymptotic sense, admit an agenda so that the sincere and sophisticated decisions are identical. Received: 31 August 1993/Accepted: 28 August 1995     

HARM overview and its application: some practical examples

The Hand Arm Risk Assessment Method (HARM 1.0) has been developed for occupational health officers to perform risk assessments of developing arm, neck or shoulder pain during hand arm tasks. The tool can also help in finding solutions for risk reduction and estimating their effect on the risk level. In this paper the status of affairs and the practical application of HARM is described. The usage of HARM is explained and illustrated with the risk assessment of a specific hand arm task. In addition, the experiences with the application of HARM by a stone factory in The Netherlands are described.     

Social stratification,voting behaviour,and the images of Canadian federal political parties*

Nous servant des sondages faits sur les élections nationales canadiennes de 1965 et 1968, nous développons l'analyse d'ogmundson sur l'esprit de vote des différentes classes sociales, dans l'enquête de 1965. Dans son étude, il comparait les résultats obtenus quand les orientations de classes des partis politiques étaient formulées de trois façons possibles: d'après les jugements des experts, d'après la moyenne des évaluations données par les répondants du sondage de 1965, et d'après les estimations idiosyncratiques de chaque répondant. Les deux derniers critères étaient pris des évaluations de chaque parti, selon une échelle sémantique à sept points, qui avait, comme points axiaux: “pour la classe moyenne” opposéà“pour la classe ouvrière.” Notre analyse répond à trois questions: premièrement, si les découvertes de base d'Ogmundson pour 1965 tiennent pour 1968; deuxièmernent, si les évaluations sur les partis par les répondants, d'aprés une deuxième échelle établie parles points “de gauche” opposées à“de droite,” donnent des résultats comparables, aussi bien sur les échelles que dans les sondages. Finalement, en utilisant une analyse de facteur, s'il y a, sur l'ensemble de treize échelles employées dans chaque enquête, quelque évidence d'un facteur de classe dans les évaluations données aux partis. La réponse est affirmative pour la première question et négative pour la seconde. Dans le cas de la troisième, un seul facteur fixe apparaît pour chaque parti, comme décrit par ses électeurs. La structure de ce facteur est commune à tous les partis dans les deux élections, et cela n'a pas grand chose à faire avec les orientations de classe perçues par les répondants. On explore toujours les implications théoriques de ces données. Using the 1965 and 1968 Canadian national election surveys, we extend Ogmundson's analysis of the “class” vote in the 1965 survey. He compared the results obtained when the class orientations of political parties were defined in three alternative ways: according to the judgments of experts: according to the mean ratings given by respondents in the 1965 survey; and according to each respondent's idiosyncratic ratings. The latter two criteria were taken from ratings of each party along a 7–point semantic differential-type scale which had as its end points “for the middle class” v. “for the working class.” Our analysis answers three questions: first, whether Ogrnundson's basic findings for 1965 hold also for 1968: second, whether respondents' ratings of the parties along a second scale anchored by “left-wing” v. “right-wing” yield comparable results across scales and Surveys; third, using factor analysis, whether there is any evidence for a class-based theme in the ratings given parties on the set of thirteen scales employed in each survey. The answer is affirmative to the first question and negative to the second question. In the case of the third question, a single unrotated factor emerged for each party as described by its voters. The structure of this factor was common to all parties in both elections, and it appeared to have very little to do with their perceived class orientations. Theoretical implications of these findings are explored.