有限产能直销优先策略下双渠道供应链的定价博弈模型

针对产能约束下的双渠道供应链,考虑实际中常用的直销优先分配产能的策略,基于Stackelberg博弈研究制造商(领导者)和零售商(追随者)的定价决策,刻画均衡解并深入分析直销优先策略下产能约束对双渠道供应链利润的影响。研究发现,在不同产能水平下,制造商对两个渠道的依赖程度会发生变化。当产能短缺时,其利润主要源于直销渠道;而当产能相对充足时,其愿意分享更多的产能以换取零售渠道上的批发利润,且此时增大产能可能会损害制造商的利益。对零售商而言,当产能短缺时,其采用高溢价来弥补获得较少产能的劣势;当产能相对充足时,其采用薄利多销的策略来获取更多的利润。当产能过剩时,双方的利润不再受产能的影响,且产能过剩对双方而言不一定是最好的情况。研究结论为制造商的定价与在双渠道中的产能分配策略选择提供有益的管理启示。     

制造商应对强势零售商的战略反应及对我国零售业开放的启示

在渠道关系中,制造商与零售商的利益往往是相互冲突的,制造商面对强势零售商时处于弱势,而面对弱势零售商时则处于强势。基于不同时期零售商零售成本对称与不对称, 以及强势零售商向制造商规定供货价格而弱势零售商接受制造商的供货价格这两个前提进行分析,通过图形和数学模型来分析制造商的2种战略行为——定价战略和促销战略,以及制造商如何通过这2种战略使其利润最大化。同时,结合中国零售业完全开放的国情,讨论在零售成本非对称的情况下,制造商的2种战略行为对增加其自身利益的有效性及对中国零售业的启示。     

A Brief Review and Assessment of the Leegin Decision: Who Wins and Who Loses When Manufacturers Are Free to Set Retail Prices?

For decades, it has been a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law for manufacturers or distributors to specify retail selling prices. In the spirit of atomistic, unrestrained competition, retailers were free to set prices without undue interference from upstream channel participants. Attempts by manufacturers or other channel participants to restrict retail price setting initiatives were viewed by regulators as an unwarranted and illegal interference with the market mechanism. Restrictions on price setting initiatives would, it was argued, lessen competition and ultimately raise prices above competitive levels to the detriment of consumers. Recently, under the leadership of newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts, a more “business friendly” Supreme Court has reversed this policy; vertical price fixing is no longer a per se violation of U.S. antitrust law. By a five‐to‐four margin, the Court held in Leegin Creative Leather Products that manufacturers could, under certain circumstances, establish binding retail selling prices. Henceforth, retail price setting restrictions will be subject to a rule of reason evaluation whereby price restrictions will be assessed on a case‐by‐case basis. Proponents of the now‐legal restrictions argue that this will ensure that merchandise sold through retail outlets will receive needed support, free riding will be reduced or eliminated, and new brand introduction will be facilitated. Critics argue that the Court's decision marks a return to the days of fair trading; marginal firms will be protected, so‐called “inframarginal consumers” will be forced to pay for services they do not want or need, and prices for many branded products will rise, all to the detriment of consumer welfare.     

基于制造商网络渠道选择的双渠道供应链定价 与服务决策研究

本文考虑由线下零售商实体销售与制造商网络销售构成的网络直销,以及由线下零售商实体销售与线上零售商网络销售构成的网络分销两种制造商双渠道模式,研究“搭便车”行为下制造商模式选择和供应链最优定价与服务决策。研究发现:制造商的渠道选择策略与“搭便车”行为程度、消费者偏好网络渠道程度、价格敏感系数等有关。尤其当消费者受到的服务且对价格的敏感性相同时,制造商会选择网络直销双渠道模式。进一步分析消费者“搭便车”行为和网络渠道偏好对制造商渠道选择和定价决策影响发现,制造商在消费者偏好网络渠道程度比较低时应选择网络分销双渠道模式,而当消费者网络渠道偏好和“搭便车”行为程度都比较高时,制造商应选择网络直销双渠道模式。消费者网络渠道偏好或“搭便车”行为程度越大,两种模式下批发价格应设置的更低。网络直销渠道模式下“搭便车”行为程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置的更低,而消费者网络渠道偏好程度越大,网络渠道销售价格应设置得更高。     

考虑渠道权利结构的产品服务能力竞争机制研究——制造商服务视角

本文针对两个制造商和一个零售商构成的产品服务供应链,以制造商提供服务为视角,研究了产品服务能力竞争问题。运用Stackelberg动态博弈,分别从制造商Stackelberg、零售商Stackelberg和垂直纳什三种不同权利结构情形,求解了供应链成员企业的均衡策略。通过分析服务成本与不同渠道权利结构下均衡结果之间的变化关系,提出能够满足不同客户需求特征的产品服务能力竞争策略。结果表明,当价格与服务能力水平都比较低时,RS价格领先型策略能够满足实惠型客户需求;当服务能力水平比较高时,VN服务领先型策略能够满足经济型客户需求;当价格比较高时,MS产品领先型策略能够满足专业型客户需求;当价格与服务能力水平都比较高时,产品服务融合策略能够满足品质型客户需求。最后,结合批发价格、服务能力水平、零售价格与服务成本之间的数值变化关系,分析了产品服务能力竞争策略的有效性。     

双渠道供应链的产品互补合作策略研究

在供应链中,直销渠道和零售渠道商品的可替代性导致渠道冲突。考虑零售商在传统渠道中附带销售直销渠道商品的互补品,建立了渠道产品互补合作的供应链Bertrand博弈模型。发现若消费者对零售商处互补品的价格敏感,则供应链中互补品的价格下降,制造商产品的渠道价格增加,同时直销渠道的需求和收益均上升,对零售渠道中制造商产品的销售和收益增加有利。利用上述模型,通过算例得出,如果零售商选择合适的互补品在零售渠道进行销售,将能促进双方收益的增加,渠道产品互补合作策略是可行的。     

产品和零售商品牌差异条件下的渠道价格策略

从渠道中的制造商和零售商相对力量对比的角度,对渠道中的价格决策问题进行了研究.采用博弈理论,研究了由两个制造商和两个零售商组成的典型渠道结构中的价格决策问题,在研究渠道价格决策时,同时考虑了产品和零售商的差异,将产品差异提炼为产品成本和产品品牌差异,将零售商的差异提炼为零售成本和零售商品牌差异,并考虑了需求函数和渠道权利结构对渠道价格决策产生的影响.研究表明,渠道权利结构、产品差异和零售商差异均对渠道价格决策会产生影响,且对不同制造商和零售商的影响程度有较大的差异.     

碳税政策下随机双渠道库存与协调研究

构建碳税政策下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,在考虑渠道之间缺货转换的基础上,研究批发价格合约和双向收入共享契约下渠道间双渠道库存竞争问题,并设计了由双向收入共享合约和转移支付机制组成的组合合约机制使制造商和零售商实现共赢,以此保证合约的有效执行。研究表明：批发价合约和双向收入共享合约下,制造商分别通过调控批发价格和收入分享比例来调控双渠道的库存水平,其中网络渠道最优库存水平随着零售渠道单位碳排放量增加而增加,零售商的库存水平随着其单位碳排放量增加而减少。进一步分析了渠道间单位产品碳排放差异对批发价格,以及传统零售渠道和网络渠道库存水平的影响如何受到缺货转换率和碳税税率的调节。     

Betriebsformen im Automobilhandel �C Resultate einer empirischen Untersuchung

Whereas most retail industries are characterized by a great diversity of competitive retail formats, the automotive industry largely relies on one single retail format, the authorized car dealer. However, both automobile manufacturers and car dealers are trying to expand sales activities for automobiles by implementing new and innovative retail formats. A focal point raised within this context is the question about (potential) customers?? expectations regarding retail formats in the automotive industry. To be able to analyze these expectations, eleven attributes which are specific to automotive retail formats have been derived from a literature overview. The resulting taxonomy of attributes has then been used to systematically identify current and future retail formats in this particular industry. Using an hierarchical adaptive conjoint analysis model, the attributes describing different automotive retail formats have being extensively analyzed. By developing this specific conjoint analysis model, it is possible to both analyze single attributes and entire retail formats regarding their impact on the automotive market as well as particular market segments.     

The changing structure of food retailing in europe: the implications for strategy

European food retailers have increased their scale and scope while concentrating sales into large stores. Strategic implications include the need for scale to compete and organisational relationships to move from supply push to demand pull retailing. Consequences are different for private label and for branded manufacturers, who must respond to the demands of retail supply chains whilst retaining control of product development. Further concentration in both sectors is likely. Consumers are more mobile, but more captive to the retailer in store. Public policy makers are challenged to find new measures of retail power and both allow for innovation and ensure equitable shopping opportunities.     

The closed-loop supply chain network with competition,distribution channel investment,and uncertainties

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain network is investigated with decentralized decision-makers consisting of raw material suppliers, retail outlets, and the manufacturers that collect the recycled product directly from the demand market. We derive the optimality conditions of the various decision-makers, and establish that the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality problem. We establish convergence of the proposed algorithm that can allow for the discussion of the effects of competition, distribution channel investment, yield and conversion rates, combined with uncertainties in demand, on equilibrium quantity transactions and prices. Numerical examples are provided for illustration.     

基于“搭便车”行为的双渠道供应链库存竞争和促销策略

本文建立了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型，研究了随机需求下"搭便车"行为和渠道间缺货替代行为对供应链库存竞争与促销决策的影响。结果表明：分散式决策下，网络渠道替代率越高，零售商的最优订购量越大，同样的零售渠道替代率越高，制造商会为网络渠道提供更多的库存；而"搭便车"行为对零售商与制造商订购量的影响则取决于渠道替代率的变化，但"搭便车"行为会降低零售商促销努力水平。数值分析发现：分散式决策下，零售商最优订购量随"搭便车"行为的增加而减少。然而制造商的最优库存量并非随着"搭便车"行为程度的增加而增加，不同的是制造商网络渠道最优库存量取决于市场需求对传统零售渠道促销努力水平的弹性系数，即制造商网络渠道最优库存量随"搭便车"行为的增加先增加后减少。通过比较发现在不同的"搭便车"行为程度、传统零售渠道替代率、网络渠道替代率下，集中式决策下供应链期望收益大于分散式决策下供应链期望总收益。     

具有缺陷产品的双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡

本文研究了供应商向制造商供应原材料,制造商制造的产品(其中部分含有缺陷),通过零售商渠道和电子商务渠道销售给消费者,以满足消费市场需求,同时考虑消费者消费后产生的废旧品经由回收中心处理再到制造商处进行再制造的闭环供应链网络均衡模型。运用变分不等式理论和互补理论,分别刻画了供应市场、制造市场、零售市场、消费市场以及回收中心的最优行为,进而建立了双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡模型。利用变分不等式的对数二次型预测与校正 (LQP-PC)算法,设计了模型求解算法。结合算例分析了双渠道、再制造率和产品缺陷对网络均衡的影响。算例结果表明:当制造商采用电子商务销售渠道时,对传统渠道会造成一定影响;制造商的再制造率增加时,制造商的利润显著增加,供应链的整体利润也有所增加;制造商的产品缺陷率降低时,其自身利润有所增加,而供应链整体利润增加明显。本文的研究结论对未来双渠道闭环供应链网络均衡的研究具有一定的借鉴意义。     

中小制造企业在线直销与传统分销双渠道定价决策研究

针对传统渠道中处于非主导地位的中小制造企业开展双渠道销售时存在的价格冲突问题,考虑产品数字属性对渠道需求的影响,构建了制造商与零售商独立决策和制造商占非主导地位两种情况下的双渠道定价决策模型,给出了两种情况下的双渠道最优定价,并分别考察了产品数字属性变化以及决策权利结构不同对最优定价的影响。研究结果表明,处于非主导地位的中小制造企业应采用依从强势零售商的定价策略,该策略有利于制造商和零售商以及渠道整体收益的增加;随着产品数字属性的增大,制造商的最优定价相应地提高,而零售商的最优定价则相应地降低;制造商占非主导地位时的双渠道最优定价高于制造商与零售商独立决策时的双渠道最优定价。     

考虑产品体验性和营销努力的分销渠道合作策略研究

有关产品分销渠道合作的研究主要集中在渠道成本、风险规避、消费者公平偏好等方面,较少关注产品本身属性。对于体验性低的产品,消费者在网络渠道就能较为准确判断产品价值。而对于体验性高的产品,网络渠道由于其虚拟性导致消费者不能准确判断产品价值,实体渠道则可以凭借现实产品的体验吸引更多的消费者。但由于线下零售商营销努力的溢出效应,部分消费者在线下体验产品后转移到线上消费,因此有必要从产品体验性和营销努力角度研究多渠道的合作策略。本文从消费者效用角度分析了产品体验性和营销努力对不同渠道需求的影响,基于此研究了制造商和线下零售商的三种分销渠道合作策略,探讨产品体验性和营销努力对不同分销渠道选择的影响：第一种为制造商支持线下零售商实施营销努力的单一合作策略;第二种是在单一合作策略下,制造商与零售商采取价格协调契约的双重合作策略;第三种是制造商与零售商之间进一步引入收益共享契约的多重合作策略。通过对三种合作策略的数值仿真,结果表明：三种合作策略均能有效提高制造商与线下零售商的收益水平,并且产品体验性越低,合作策略作用越显著。制造商在进入市场初期,往往需要快速增加企业价值,此时双重合作策略是最优选择。当市场发展成熟,双重合作策略虽然能够有效提高线下零售商收益,但却减少制造商收益,为了激励制造商支持线下零售商实施营销努力,需要将合作收益再分配,此时多重合作策略是最优选择。     

考虑商誉的双渠道供应链动态定价与联合减排策略

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链，将产品商誉和减排量作为状态变量构建微分博弈模型。文章首先讨论了不同渠道结构下供应链成员的最优均衡策略，随后探讨了广告合作-减排成本分担契约对供应链协调性的影响，最后通过算例对模型进行了分析。研究发现，产品商誉轨迹随时间变化呈现多变性，而减排量轨迹则具有单调性。与单渠道相比，双渠道下零售商的广告努力和利润下降，而制造商的减排努力和利润增大，只有当传统渠道市场占有率较高且制造商竞争较小时，制造商单渠道的利润才高于双渠道，此时制造商将不会开设网络渠道。广告合作-减排成本分担契约可以实现制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统利润的帕累托改善，且消费者低碳偏好和品牌偏好越高，制造商和零售商越有动力达成合作。     

考虑再制造设计水平的多期闭环供应链网络均衡

再制造设计已应用于企业实践,利于产品的再制造过程,但需要额外的投资。本文以多个规划期为决策环境,以包含需求市场层、零售商层和制造商层的闭环供应链网络为研究对象,其中每层包含多个成员,研究了制造商产品可再制造性设计水平决策问题。政府规定最低可再制造设计水平,各制造商对新产品的可再制造设计水平、生产和交易等变量进行决策;正向渠道中零售商同时销售新产品和再制造品,逆向渠道中零售商受制造商委托,在每个规划期末,回收各需求市场产生的废旧品;消费者对新产品和再制造品评价不同,通常对新产品评价较高,而对再制造品评价较低,其对两种产品愿意支付的价格也会不同。利用变分不等式等理论获得制造商和零售商的均衡条件,并获得整个供应链网络均衡模型。采用修正投影收缩算法求解。通过算例对再制造投资影响因子、政府最低可再制造水平、消费者对再制造品的评价系数等参数对均衡结果的影响进行了分析,获得了在多规划期供应链网络环境下,制造商的产品可再制造设计水平和政府有关部门决策时需关注的问题等管理学启示。     

Competing for Shelf Space

In recent years, the competition for shelf space has intensified, as more products now compete for a retail space that has remained roughly constant. In this paper, we analyze the dynamics of this competition in a multi‐supplier retail point. Assuming that sales are shelf space dependent, we consider a retailer that optimizes its shelf space allocation among different products based on their sales level and profit margins. In this context, product manufacturers set their wholesale prices so as to obtain larger shelf space allocations but at the same time keep margins as high as possible. We analyze the equilibrium situation in the supply chain, and find that generally the retailer's and the suppliers' incentives are misaligned, resulting in suboptimal retail prices and shelf space allocations. We however find that the inefficiencies induced by suboptimal shelf space allocation decisions are small relative to those induced by suboptimal pricing decisions.     

Price,Rebate, and Returns Supply Contracts for Coordinating Supply Chains with Price‐Dependent Demands

Channel rebates and returns policies are common mechanisms for manufacturers to entice retailers to increase their order quantities and sales ultimately. However, when the underlying demand depends on the retail price, it has been known that channel coordination cannot be achieved if only one of these mechanisms is deployed. In this article, we show that a policy that combines the use of wholesale price, channel rebate, and returns can coordinate a channel with both additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demands. In addition to determining the sufficient conditions for the contract parameters associated with the equilibrium policy, we show that multiple equilibrium policies for channel coordination exist. We further explore how the equilibrium policy can be adjusted to achieve Pareto improvement. Other issues such as the maximum amount of expected profit that the manufacturer can share under the coordinated channel, the structural properties of the contracts under both the additive and multiplicative price‐dependent demand functions are also discussed.     

碳税政策下制造商竞争的供应链定价策略和社会福利研究

本文在考虑消费者环境意识下，探讨了制造商竞争情形下基于碳税政策的供应链成员定价策略和社会福利问题。研究表明，碳税政策的实施均会使得普通产品和低碳产品的批发价格和零售价格上升，且普通产品的价格变化总是较低碳产品更加明显；实施碳税政策前后，清洁型制造商面临的产品需求和利润变化总是较普通制造商更具有相对优势；制造商竞争有利于碳税政策引导制造商降低单位产品的碳排放量，实现绿色转型；碳税政策下，不论是清洁型制造商还是普通制造商，他们降低自身产品的单位碳排放量对提升自身产品在需求上的优势或减少自身产品在需求上的劣势都是有益的。当制造商之间的竞争性较小时，实施最优的碳税政策可以显著改善社会福利；特别是当消费者环境意识水平较低时，实施最优的碳税政策更为必要。当制造商之间的竞争强度较大时，不论消费者环境意识高低，直观税率值1可以作为一个近似最优的碳税政策，用以改善社会福利。