伯川德价格博弈中的正利润均衡

在不变边际成本的同质产品伯川德价格博弈中,通常认为唯一均衡结果是各个企业获得零利润的纯战略纳什均衡.本文的研究表明,存在使企业获得正利润的混合战略纳什均衡,并给出了伯川德悖论均衡存在条件、正利润均衡存在条件和伯川德悖论结果的充分条件.     

均衡选择与合作组织

在N人博弈中存在多重博弈均衡问题,这意味着在非合作博弈中Nash均衡不惟一.建立模型研究了均衡点数目问题,并将其中的不同局中人看作是不同的合作组织分析均衡选择对于合作组织的影响,研究结果表明均衡选择模式将决定合作组织的内部结构和资产配置结构.     

供应链的利润博弈与均衡定价

供应链涉及多个利益主体,优化供应链的全局效益需要成员企业的协调来实现。效率评估的非参数法应用广泛,但是单纯的效率优化未考虑资源的可替代性和再分配,忽视了投入(产出)结构调整释放的优化空间。对于效率分解,取折衷或单边最优的方案不完全符合企业追求各自利益最大化的目标。本文针对两级供应链的利润优化问题建立一般化的分析框架,同时考虑了技术进步和资源可替代性的影响,对成员企业的利润博弈展开讨论,探讨了合作博弈如何促成供应链实现集权模式下的最优。通过建立议价模型得出了纳什均衡基础上的成员企业最优利润组合,并给出了实现最优分配方案的中间产品均衡定价。     

没有转移支付的“竞争—合作”理想点均衡研究

本文指出了纳什均衡的多重性是非合作博弈理论的主要问题之一,现有解决纳什均衡多重性问题的各种概念和方法尚有不足之处,研究提出了一种可以保证得到唯一均衡结果的新方法,即没有转移支付的"竞争-合作"理想点均衡,它相对现有概念和方法具有明显的优势.并举例验证了此计算方法.     

讨价还价过程与供应链的利润最大化均衡

是否存在一组贴现因子使得轮流出价的讨价还价的完美子博弈均衡刚好实现供应链总体利润最大?本文研究表明当博弈双方的贴现率都趋近于1,各企业利润之和将收敛于供应链的总体利润最大化均衡.接着,证明了当双方的贴现率严格地小于1时,供应链的总体利润不可能达到利润最大化均衡.最后,通过具体的算例来说明所得到的结论.     

基于共识程度的双体博弈纳什均衡拓展研究

首先对一般双体博弈的策略进行拓展,提出共识纳什均衡的概念,并证明其存在性;根据共识程度的降低提出其他3种拓展形式——近似共识纳什均衡、局部共识纳什均衡和局部近似共识纳什均衡,并举例进行说明;然后,对各种均衡形式下的合作效率进行分析和比较。研究表明,共识纳什均衡的利益分配是基于信息本身——竞争环境的特殊形式,它是具有效率的。其他3种形式均衡的效率低于共识纳什均衡,但仍高于双体博弈纳什均衡。共识纳什均衡和其他3种形式的均衡为参与人组织更具效率的合作提供了渠道和理论解释。     

我国证券投资者交易行为的进化博弈与多重均衡研究

本文应用进化博弈方法,建立了开放市场条件下证券投资者交易行为演化的进化博弈模型,并通过实证研究,分析了我国证券投资者行为进化的动态演化过程及其均衡点.研究结论表明,投资者交易行为的进化既不是传统金融学、也不是行为金融学认为的那样,仅存在单一路径和均衡点,而是可能具有多重均衡的特征,这是由投资者策略行为的互补性决定的.     

二次博弈下供应链的均衡订货批量分析

首先提出了二次博弈下供应商与零售商的四种博弈方式:静态-静态博弈、静态-动态博弈、动态-静态博弈和动态-动态博弈;并且分别对四种博弈方式下的均衡做了详细的分析和求解,同时通过一个实例求得了该博弈下的一个混合战略纳什均衡,对比一次博弈得到结论:在正常情况下,二次博弈较一次博弈而言,无论供应商、零售商还是整个供应链的成本都高。     

内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

基于内生时机的博弈理论,研究了内生的R&D时机下双寡头企业先进行R&D活动后进行产品市场价格竞争的多阶段动态博弈的均衡R&D顺序,其中产品市场上的需求函数是线性的且企业在产品市场上的行动是同时进行的。运用逆向归纳法研究表明均衡R&D顺序只由企业的R&D外溢水平决定：若两企业的外溢水平都较低（较高）,则均衡R&D顺序为两企业同时行动（分别以两企业为领头者的序贯行动）;若一个企业的外溢水平较低而另一企业的外溢水平较高,则均衡R&D顺序为以低外溢水平的企业为领头者的序贯行动。在序贯R&D时两企业的R&D总水平、社会总福利水平及产品市场产量（价格）都高于（低于）同时R&D时的情形。     

考虑缺货影响的企业产品满足率和价格均衡分析

本文考虑消费者对缺货的厌恶程度，构建由销售有区别产品的n个企业组成的竞争市场，利用随机效应理论建立MNL模型，分别在价格外生与价格内生条件下分析竞争市场的均衡情况。在价格外生情况下，本文分别证明了满足率竞争和市场份额竞争两种情形下纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。本文通过对两种情形下纳什均衡的比较分析，得到满足率竞争情形下企业提供更高的产品满足率，企业产品的市场份额增加，但企业获得的利润更低；在价格内生情况下，分别证明了价格满足率同时竞争与市场份额满足率同时竞争两种情形下纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性。通过比较分析，本文发现两种竞争情形下的产品满足率相同，但在价格满足率同时竞争情形下企业会制定更低的价格，企业产品的市场份额增加，获得的利润更低。最后通过数值仿真，本文表明市场中的企业数量越多，企业的价格和利润越低。此外，降低消费者对缺货的厌恶程度、产品单位成本或提高消费者对产品的估值能够使企业获得更大的利润。     

带预算约束的广告主均衡报价研究——基于纳什均衡角度

从广告主角度出发，研究基于纳什均衡概念的带有预算约束的关键词拍卖问题。首先推导出纳什均衡下各个广告主报价的上界和下界。其次给出广告主报价向上偏离无利可图的充要条件，并进行了数值分析。此外，通过数值实例分析了广告主报价向下偏离时对其收益的影响。利用各个广告主报价的上下界和预算刻画了带有预算约束的纳什均衡。最后，利用广告主报价在纳什均衡下的上界给出报价向量是带预算约束的纳什均衡的充要条件。对于广告主制定预算策略具有参考作用。     

Money in Search Equilibrium,in Competitive Equilibrium,and in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We compare three market structures for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We also extend work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and entry. We study how equilibrium and the effects of policy depend on market structure. Under bargaining, trade and entry are both inefficient, and inflation implies first‐order welfare losses. Under price taking, the Friedman rule solves the first inefficiency but not the second, and inflation may actually improve welfare. Under posting, the Friedman rule yields the first best, and inflation implies second‐order welfare losses.     

Cursed Equilibrium

There is evidence that people do not fully take into account how other people's actions depend on these other people's information. This paper defines and applies a new equilibrium concept in games with private information, cursed equilibrium, which assumes that each player correctly predicts the distribution of other players' actions, but underestimates the degree to which these actions are correlated with other players' information. We apply the concept to common‐values auctions, where cursed equilibrium captures the widely observed phenomenon of the winner's curse, and to bilateral trade, where cursedness predicts trade in adverse‐selections settings for which conventional analysis predicts no trade. We also apply cursed equilibrium to voting and signalling models. We test a single‐parameter variant of our model that embeds Bayesian Nash equilibrium as a special case and find that parameter values that correspond to cursedness fit a broad range of experimental datasets better than the parameter value that corresponds to Bayesian Nash equilibrium.     

From the Marginal Equilibrium to the Generational Paradigm. Microeconomic Behavior in a Dynamic Model of Social Equilibrium

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to formulate an initial hypothetical framework describing microeconomic behavior of labour market agents in a dynamic model of social equilibrium. To this end we outline an alternative hypothesis concerning the process of determination of labour demand and of the allocation of employment requirements on a generational basis. Reformulating the microeconomic model to consider labour as a quasi-fixed factor, comparable to a population, and which follows a biological, more than a mechanical logic, the paper assigns primary roles to careers and dual markets, the first-job market, and factors of asynchrony and social control mechanisms. At the same time, the generational determinants of the supply of labour are identified, together with the processes of identification and selection between labour demand and supply. On the basis of these considerations the concept of the generational paradigm is brought into the analysis. This paradigm designates the set of determinants of labour supply and demand behavior that are functions of time, of social and institutional variables, and of the technical and organizational structure of production. The paper ends with an initial thesis that the working of the generational paradigm is a crucial factor in the overall social equilibrium.     

Equilibrium Bias of Technology

This paper presents three sets of results about equilibrium bias of technology. First, I show that when the menu of technological possibilities only allows for factor‐augmenting technologies, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change relatively biased toward that factor—meaning that the induced technological change increases the relative marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant. Moreover, this induced bias can be strong enough to make the relative marginal product of a factor increasing in response to an increase in its supply, thus leading to an upward‐sloping relative demand curve. I also show that these results about relative bias do not generalize when more general menus of technological possibilities are considered. Second, I prove that under mild assumptions, the increase in the supply of a factor induces technological change that is absolutely biased toward that factor—meaning that it increases its marginal product at given factor proportions. The third and most important result in the paper establishes the possibility of and conditions for strong absolute equilibrium bias—whereby the price (marginal product) of a factor increases in response to an increase in its supply. I prove that, under some regularity conditions, there will be strong absolute equilibrium bias if and only if the aggregate production function of the economy fails to be jointly concave in factors and technology. This type of failure of joint concavity is possible in economies where equilibrium factor demands and technologies result from the decisions of different agents.     

On the Effects of Capacity Agent on Market Equilibrium

We consider a setting of two firms and one capacity agent. Each firm serves a primary market, and the capacity agent sustains a common market to draw demand for capacity from the external firms. The firms can partner with the capacity agent under her contract to serve the common market. When they use the common market mainly as an outlet for their unused capacities, the capacity agent will only specify a variable fee for each capacity unit deployed through her, and prefer to partner with one firm in most circumstances. When the firms adjust capacities to accommodate the businesses created by serving the common market, the capacity agent will specify a lump‐sum payment and a variable fee, and will be more likely to incentivize only one firm to partner with her, when the common market is sufficiently large or the demands in the common and primary markets are strongly correlated. She will always use a fixed fee to extract, while not necessarily all, the profit gains to the firms serving the common market, but will use a variable fee only when partnering with both firms. The key results are robust with respect to market configuration and contract type.     

农地流转交易的市场均衡分析

为了逻辑一致地理解农地流转交易中影响农地供给和需求意愿的因素,以及市场力量对土地均衡交易量、交易价格和经济效率的作用,建立基于农户和企业最优决策的需求-供给模型,并求解和分析模型的均衡。结果表明:(1)给定影响土地供给和需求意愿的因素,与竞争性土地市场比较,垄断将导致均衡交易量和均衡交易价格下降,并使经济效率降低;(2)给定其他因素,一个(影响土地供给或需求意愿的)因素在竞争性土地市场和垄断市场中对均衡交易量和交易价格的影响方向一致。     

Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium

We study economies with adverse selection, plus the frictions in competitive search theory. With competitive search, principals post terms of trade (contracts), then agents choose where to apply, and they match bilaterally. Search allows us to analyze the effects of private information on both the intensive and extensive margins (the terms and probability of trade). There always exists a separating equilibrium where each type applies to a different contract. The equilibrium is unique in terms of payoffs. It is not generally efficient. We provide an algorithm for constructing equilibrium. Three applications illustrate the usefulness of the approach, and contrast our results with those in standard contract and search theory.     

Macroeconomic Determinants of Equilibrium Unemployment Insurance

This paper proposes a new modeling strategy as regards the definition of an optimal level of unemployment benefits. While the traditional methodology privileges labor market equilibrium to derive optimal employment, wage and unemployment benefit levels, we present a model in which the optimal level of unemployment benefits is a function of the government’s macroeconomic objectives in terms of inflation and output fluctuations. In a second stage, the model allows for the investigation of unemployment insurance effects on labor market equilibrium.