HOW TO HAGGLE and TO STAY FIRM: BARTER AS HIDDEN PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Barter transactions, conducted openly by established corporations, play an increasingly significant role in the U.S. economy. The model developed here helps explain why firms use barter and yields predictions concerning the circumstances under which barter is likely to occur. It is shown that when two firms barter goods used as inputs, price discrimination occurs. This price discrimination is hidden from the firms' other customers because the real values of the transacted goods to the barterers are different from the accounting prices used in the transaction. Since price discrimination that is observed by potential customers might have an adverse effect on the selling firm's future bargaining power, barter will have value as a means of hiding price discrimination.     

ADVERTISING AS A PRIVATELY SUPPLIED PUBLIC GOOD

In this paper we take a view of advertising and certain other nonprice competition as public goods. This leads to a new fundamental justification of the zero price distribution of advertising, coupled with a mark-up of the advertised good as a disguised form of price discrimination which approximates that required for efficient pricing of a public good. Further, we present a numerical counterexample wherein the commonly-observed zero price distribution of advertising is shown to lead to higher consumer and seller welfare than its separate sales at cost.     

IS THERE ADVERSE SELECTION IN LIFE INSURANCE MARKETS?

Adverse selection theory predicts people with a high risk of death are more likely to own life insurance. Using a unique data set merging administrative and survey records, we test this theory and find the opposite: people with high death risk are less likely to own life insurance. We postulate advantageous selection and price discrimination swamp adverse selection in individual life insurance markets. To determine which effect is more powerful, we analyze group life insurance markets, where insurance companies cannot price discriminate as well as in individual markets. Our data suggest that price discrimination has a stronger effect than advantageous selection. (JEL D8, G1, I1)     

QUALITY DIFFERENCES,THIRD‐DEGREE PRICE DISCRIMINATION,AND WELFARE

We propose a model with two markets to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination with quality differences. In each market a local firm that operates in that market only competes against a global firm that operates in both markets. Local firms produce higher‐quality goods than the global firm. If the quality levels of the local firms' products are the same, price discrimination is never welfare‐decreasing. If they differ, discrimination is welfare‐increasing if quantity increases. Because of a positive allocation effect of price discrimination, there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases with price discrimination. (JEL D43, D60)     

PRICE COMPETITION UNDER COST UNCERTAINTY: A LABORATORY ANALYSIS

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We report an experiment in which two, three, and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is more aggressive than in equilibrium. Absolute and relative surplus increases with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, because enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most cost-efficient firm. (JEL C90 , C72 , D43 , D83 , L13 )     

IMPERFECT COMPETITION and BUSINESS CYCLES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

Does imperfect competition increase the magnitude of business cycles? If so, the variability of an industry's employment and output should be positively related to the market power of firms in that industry. This paper demonstrates that the opposite is true: U.S. manufacturing industries with high price-cost margins display less employment variability than do low-markup industries. These high-markup industries display less price variability as well. Highly concentrated industries, however, do display more employment variability. To some degree, markups may reflect labor hoarding rather than market power; this may account for part, but not all, of the negative correlation between markups and variability.     

DESIGNED TO FAIL: THE MEDICARE AUCTION FOR DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT

We examine the theoretical properties of the auction for Medicare Durable Medical Equipment. Two unique features of the Medicare auction are (1) winners are paid the median winning bid and (2) bids are nonbinding. We show that median pricing results in allocation inefficiencies as some high‐cost firms potentially displace low‐cost firms as winners. Further, the auction may leave demand unfulfilled as some winners refuse to supply because the price is set below their cost. We also introduce a model of nonbinding bids that establishes the rationality of a lowball bid strategy employed by many bidders in the actual Medicare auctions and recently replicated in Caltech experiments. We contrast the median‐price auction with the standard clearing‐price auction where each firm bids true costs as a dominant strategy, resulting in competitive equilibrium prices and full efficiency. (JEL D44, I11, H57)     

PRODUCT SUBSTITUTABILITY AND COMPETITION IN LONG-DISTANCE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

I estimate the degree of substitutability between U.S. long-distance telecommunications carriers. AT&T's Marshallian demand elasticity for basic long-distance service is estimated to be about –10. With various assumptions regarding producer behavior, a range of residual demand elasticities, price-cost margins, and the dead-weight losses are calculated. I argue that producer behavior is such that the dead-weight loss to supracompetitive pricing is likely to be about 1.5% of industry revenues. The results bear on whether AT&T's deregulation was merited and whether to allow the Bell Operating Companies to enter the long-distance market. ( JEL L13, L96, C30)     

PRICE DIFFERENTIALS and PRICE DISCRIMINATION: REPLY and EXTENSIONS

Precise definitions of price discrimination are analyzed in this paper as part of a reply to one of my earlier papers on a related topic. The main conclusion is that the two definitions used most frequently are appropriate only in special circumstances not recognized previously. No definition exists to cover all real-world situations.     

BERTRAND COMPETITION WITH ASYMMETRIC MARGINAL COSTS

This article tests the prediction of three discrete asymmetric duopoly price competition games in the laboratory. The games differ from each other in terms of the size of the cost asymmetry that induces a systematic variation in the difference between the firms' marginal costs. While the standard theory requires the low‐cost firm to set a price just equal to the high‐cost firm's marginal cost, which is identical across all three games, and win the entire market, intuition suggests that market price may increase with a decrease in the absolute difference between the two marginal costs. We develop a quantal response equilibrium model to test our competing conjecture. (JEL L11, L12, C91, D43)     

Union rents and market structure revisited

Several recent studies give conflicting evidence on whether market power associated with industry concentration is an important source of union rents. Using a 1977 sample of 327 four-digit manufacturing industries, we re-examine the issue with a regression analysis that allows for differential union effects on price-cost margins across three levels of concentration. Large and small firm as well as industry average price-cost margins are analyzed. The results reaffirm those of Hirsch and Connolly (1987), who conclude that the effect of unions on profits is independent of market structure, and thus market power is not an important source of union rents. We find that unionization: (1) reduces industry profits in all three concentration groups with statistically insignificant differential effects, and (2) has a greater negative effect on the profits of large firms than it does on the profits of small firms, regardless of the concentration category. We benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee. Any remaining errors are our own.     

Symbolic meanings of prices: Constructing the value of contemporary art in Amsterdam and New York galleries

This article develops a sociological analysis of the price mechanism on the market for contemporary art. On the basis of in-depth interviews with art dealers in New York and Amsterdam, I address two pricing norms: one norm inhibits art dealers from decreasing prices; the other induces them to set prices according to size. To account for these pricing norms, I argue that price setting is not just an economic but also a signifying act: despite their impersonal, businesslike connotations, actors on markets manage to express a range of cognitive and cultural meanings through prices. Previously, meanings of prices have been recognized in signaling theories within economics. However, these meanings are restricted to profit opportunities. Within the humanities, by contrast, meanings of prices are restricted to contaminating or corrosive meanings. The sociological perspective I develop claims that prices, price differences, and price changes convey multiple meanings related to the reputation of artists, the social status of dealers, and the quality of the artworks that are traded.     

Racially Charged Cookies and White Scholarships: Anti-Affirmative Action Protests on American College Campuses

Between 2001 and 2012, students at colleges throughout the United States protested affirmative action policies using various tactics, most notably anti-affirmative action “bake sales,” where the price of the goods was based on the race of the purchaser: white males were charged the most; blacks and Latinos, the least. Other means of protest included “whites-only” or equal opportunity scholarships, an “equal opportunity carnival,” and other satirical productions. Through qualitative content analysis of print and online materials about each protest, I found that the motivations of these protesters can be understood using Eduardo Bonilla-Silva’s theories of color-blind racism, particularly the concepts of “abstract liberalism” and “minimization of racism.” I also contend that a secondary goal of these demonstrations is to establish white racial identity as a public identity upon which claims of “reverse discrimination” and oppression can be built.     

Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types

We study a model with local public goods in which agents' crowding effects are formally distinguished from their taste types. It has been shown that the core of such an economy can be decentralized with anonymous admission prices (which are closely related to cost share prices). Unfortunately, such a price system allows for an arbitrary relationship between the public goods level in a given jurisdiction and the cost to an agent for joining. Formally, this means that admission prices are infinite dimensional. Attempts to decentralize the core with finite price systems such as Lindahl prices suggest that this is possible only under fairly restrictive conditions. In this paper, we introduce a new type of price system called finite cost shares. This system has strictly larger dimension than Lindahl prices but, in contrast to general cost share prices, is finite. We show that this allows for decentralization of the core under more general conditions than are possible with Lindahl prices. Received: 18 January 2000/Accepted: 21 January 2002 The authors would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

A GUIDE TO THE PITFALLS OF IDENTIFYING PRICE DISCRIMINATION

This paper demonstrates that plausible cost-based explanations exist for what are commonly perceived to be cases of price discrimination. We explain such commonly discussed problems as the price spreads of retail gasoline products, the "high" price of dinners at restaurants, the "high" price of popcorn at movie theaters, and the fact that airline ticket prices vary with how long the ticket is purchased before the flight's departure. Our explanations benefit from not relying on consumer ignorance or implicit collusion among numerous sellers.     

A theory of quality-related differences in retail margins: why there is a 'premium' on premium gasoline

This paper develops a theory of vertical and horizontal product differentiation to explain observed price-cost margin differentials for goods that differ in quality. The difference in price-cost margins between the high- and low-quality goods is shown to depend positively on consumers' average valuation for incremental increases in quality and positively on the distance to each competitor's closest rival. These predictions are largely supported using an extensive station-level data set of premium and regular unleaded gasoline prices from the Los Angeles Basin area from 1992–1995.     

PEAK LOAD PRICING IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS

The paper offers an explanation for temporal price dispersion. Temporal price dispersion in the model is due neither to exogenous shifts in demand nor to price discrimination motives as shown in other papers. In this paper the explanation relies on peak-load pricing. In the model presented, consumers decide to purchase a given product in a certain time period according to the satisfaction they derive from the product at that time and to the prices and number of customers they expect at each firm and period. The demand in each period is controlled by sellers through prices. By offering different prices in different periods, sellers motivate consumers to spread themselves across periods in a profitable way. Therefore, the demand and price in each time period is determined endogeneously.     

PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN RELATED MARKETS

The Pigou-Robinson pricing rule for third degree monopolistic price discrimination states that price ratios vary inversely with ratios of direct price elasticities of demand. The rule holds when markets are sealed, and cross price elasticities of demand are zero. We show how the rule can fail when imperfect sealing permits leakage. We also develop a general discriminatory pricing rule that holds when leakage causes market demands to be related. The general pricing rule is based on all direct price elasticities of demand, all cross price elasticities of demand, and the size distribution of the markets     

WHY DO ENERGY PRICES MATTER? THE ROLE OF INTERINDUSTRY LINKAGES IN U.S. MANUFACTURING

There is considerable empirical evidence that energy prices had a large effect on the U.S. economy between World War II and the 1980s. This paper argues that linkages between manufacturing industries amplify the effect of an energy price shock and help explain the large effect. In particular, energy-intensive industries are important input suppliers to other industries. When the price of energy increases, energy-intensive industries contract, raising materials prices for other industries. Because of the reduction in materials supply, the downstream industries also contract, which I refer to as the supply effect. Using data from the Census of Manufactures, I find that the supply effect accounted for about one half of the sensitivity of value added to the price of energy. I use plant-level census data to show that the supply effect caused similar changes in value added per plant as in value added per industry. A price increase caused a small, although statistically significant, decrease in entry and had no effect on exit. Finally, the supply effect reduced plant-level labor demand . ( JEL E32, Q43)     

How age discrimination in employment affects stockholders

We analyze the impact on stock prices, and thus on stockholders, of 84 newspaper announcements regarding corporate age discrimination lawsuits. We find that, on average, initial announcements cause a 2 percent decline in stock price, a $40 million average loss in total stock value for the large firms charged. The stock price decreases are consistent with investor concerns about the firms’ ability to attract and retain good employees given the discrimination charges. Though age discrimination in employment is a pervasive and growing problem, such findings may discourage managers from engaging in discriminatory practices. The authors thank Jane Blank and Malcolm Matthew for helpful comments. This research was supported by a University of Windsor Research Board Grant.