Demand Forecast Sharing in Supply Chains

This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study.     

Service and Price Competition When Customers Are Naive

We consider a system of two service providers each with a separate queue. Customers choose one queue to join upon arrival and can switch between queues in real time before entering service to maximize their spot utility, which is a function of price and queue length. We characterize the steady‐state distribution for queue lengths, and then investigate a two‐stage game in which the two service providers first simultaneously select service rates and then simultaneously charge prices. Our results indicate that neither service provider will have both a faster service and a lower price than its competitor. When price plays a less significant role in customers’ service selection relative to queue length or when the two service providers incur comparable costs for building capacities, they will not engage in price competition. When price plays a significant role and the capacity costs at the service providers sufficiently differ, they will adopt substitutable competition instruments: the lower cost service provider will build a faster service and the higher cost service provider will charge a lower price. Comparing our results to those in the existing literature, we find that the service providers invest in lower service rates, engage in less intense price competition, and earn higher profits, while customers wait in line longer when they are unable to infer service rates and are naive in service selection than when they can infer service rates to make sophisticated choices. The customers’ jockeying behavior further lowers the service providers’ capacity investment and lengthens the customers’ duration of stay.     

The Impact of Contracts and Competition on Upstream Innovation in a Supply Chain

We consider a supply chain with an upstream supplier who invests in innovation and a downstream manufacturer who sells to consumers. We study the impact of supply chain contracts with endogenous upstream innovation, focusing on three different contract scenarios: (i) a wholesale price contract, (ii) a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract, and (iii) a revenue‐sharing contract. We confirm that the revenue‐sharing contract can coordinate supply chain decisions including the innovation investment, whereas the other two contracts may result in underinvestment in innovation. However, the downstream manufacturer does not always prefer the revenue‐sharing contract; the manufacturer's profit can be higher with a quality‐dependent wholesale price contract than with a revenue‐sharing contract, specifically when the upstream supplier's innovation cost is low. We then extend our model to incorporate upstream competition between suppliers. By inviting upstream competition, with the wholesale price contract, the manufacturer can increase his profit substantially. Furthermore, under upstream competition, the revenue‐sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, and results in an optimal contract form for the manufacturer when suppliers are symmetric. We also analyze the case of complementary components suppliers, and show that most of our results are robust.     

双向公平关切下双渠道供应链的线上线下融合契约设计

针对双渠道供应链中存在消费者渠道偏好和双向公平关切的问题，探究如何将线上渠道商的平台优势与线下渠道商的服务体验优势有效融合。本文基于消费者渠道偏好下制造商、线上和线下渠道商三者之间同时存在双向公平关切的情形，分别讨论有无公平关切下双渠道供应链集中与分散决策的系统定价与收益差异问题，在此基础上，引入批发价格折扣与服务成本共担契约对供应链各主体进行协调。研究表明：双向公平关切因素会进一步加剧双渠道供应链的“双重边际效应”；横向和纵向公平关切系数对制造商和渠道商效用的影响趋势存在差异，且其可以分别增强和削弱消费者的讨价还价能力；通过将契约比例设置在一定区间内，能够促进制造商、线上和线下渠道商形成一个互补协作且融合的共赢模式。     

基于收益共享契约的供应链质量控制与协调机制

研究了单个供应商和单个零售商构成的供应链中,零售商采用收益共享契约对供应链成员质量控制决策的协调作用。分析了使用收益共享契约、供应商与零售商合作、使用批发价格契约三种情况下供应链成员的博弈均衡,并进一步通过比较讨论了收益共享契约对于供应链成员质量控制的优势和局限。研究表明,当销售量的变化对产品质量改进的敏感程度较高时,收益共享契约的协调效果较好,但对于零售商来说,虽然其利润高于采用批发价格契约,可利润份额却有所下降,这意味着收益共享契约对供应商更有利。     

公平偏好对横纵向供应链定价及其绩效的影响

本文分别在纵向供应链与横向供应链中，研究了供应链成员具有公平偏好时的定价决策及其绩效表现。研究结果表明：在纵向供应链中，供应商或零售商具有公平偏好并进行Stackelberg博弈，批发价格契约能够满足供应商或零售商的公平偏好，此时整个供应链的利润最优，效率最高；在横向供应链中，处于相同供应链层级的制造商具有公平偏好并进行Cournot博弈，批发价格契约不能满足其公平偏好，但整个供应链的利润与绩效显著高于完全理性时的供应链利润与绩效。最后进行算例分析，并给出一些管理意义。     

碳税政策下随机双渠道库存与协调研究

构建碳税政策下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,在考虑渠道之间缺货转换的基础上,研究批发价格合约和双向收入共享契约下渠道间双渠道库存竞争问题,并设计了由双向收入共享合约和转移支付机制组成的组合合约机制使制造商和零售商实现共赢,以此保证合约的有效执行。研究表明：批发价合约和双向收入共享合约下,制造商分别通过调控批发价格和收入分享比例来调控双渠道的库存水平,其中网络渠道最优库存水平随着零售渠道单位碳排放量增加而增加,零售商的库存水平随着其单位碳排放量增加而减少。进一步分析了渠道间单位产品碳排放差异对批发价格,以及传统零售渠道和网络渠道库存水平的影响如何受到缺货转换率和碳税税率的调节。     

直销渠道开通的情形下制造商与电商平台合约选择的研究

理论界认为代售合约具有明显的消除双重边际效应的作用,许多制造商和电商平台选择签订代售合约,但是也有制造商和电商平台选择了批发合约。本文以在线销售系统为背景,研究了直销渠道开通的情形下制造商和电商平台合约的选择。通过研究发现,制造商和电商平台并不是总偏好批发合约或代售合约,并且存在一个帕累托改进区域;虽然制造商在电商平台上有网络销售渠道,但是制造商会保留原有的直销渠道;对于电商平台来说,收益分配系数并不是越大越好;代售合约虽然能够消除双重边际效应,但在代售合约下,整个在线销售系统的效率并不总是最高的。另外,随着直销渠道的效率增加,制造商会先降低批发价格,然后再增加批发价格;与以往的研究结论不同,代售合约下电商平台的市场销售价格并不总是最小的。以上的结论其实都是批发合约下的直销渠道和代售合约下的电商平台在缓解双重边际效应方面的不同作用带来的。     

Supply Chain Coordination in the Presence of Gray Markets and Strategic Consumers

The practice of diverting genuine products to unauthorized gray markets continues to challenge companies in various industries and creates intense competition for authorized channels. Recent industry surveys report that the abuse of channel incentives is a primary reason for the growth of gray market activities. Therefore, it is crucial that companies take the presence of gray markets into consideration when they design contracts to distribute products through authorized retailers. This issue has received little attention in the extensive literature on contracting and supply chain coordination. In this study, we analyze the impacts of gray markets on two classic contracts, wholesale price and quantity discount, in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer when the retailer has the opportunity to sell to a domestic gray market. Our analysis provides interesting and counterintuitive results. First, a classic quantity‐discount contract that normally coordinates the supply chain can perform so poorly in the presence of a gray market that the supply chain would be better off using a wholesale price contract instead. Second, the presence of gray market can also degrade the performance of the wholesale price contract; therefore, a more sophisticated contract is needed for coordinating the supply chain. We show that contracts that solely depend on retailer's order quantity cannot coordinate the supply chain, and provide the conditions for coordinating the supply chain with price‐dependent quantity discount contracts. We also provide comparative statics and show that when there is a gray market, coordinating the supply chain enhances total consumer welfare.     

互补型闭环供应链的收益共享与成本共担契约协调优化

互联网平台开放、协作和分享的特点改变了传统的商业模式。如何将互联网思维与传统产业相融合,理论界和实业界正在进行理论探索和模式实践,突破线上平台商和线下渠道服务商界限以提高服务效率,解决线上平台服务和逆向回收难的瓶颈。本文针对单一线上平台商-单一线下渠道服务商的闭环供应链系统,探讨双方如何在正向供应链进行收益共享、逆向供应链进行渠道成本分担情境下的产品定价和服务优化决策。通过对比收益共享模型和收益共享-成本共担模型发现,线上平台商将部分收益分给线下服务商的同时,如果能分担线下渠道服务建设投入,将更有利于逆向回收和服务商逆向渠道服务水平的提高。最后,还通过数值分析,验证了分成分担比例对平台商和服务商决策的影响,以及对各决策变量的影响关系机理。     

基于SaaS模式的服务供应链协调研究

免费试用是SaaS(软件即服务)模式市场推广的主要方式,本文研究了服务需求由服务的免费试用决定的SaaS服务供应链中AIP(应用基础设施提供商)与ASP(应用服务提供商)间的协调问题。在信息对称下,以成本共担契约激励ASP提高免费试用的努力水平;在信息不对称的情况下,AIP采用服务能力预定策略避免低技术能力ASP的机会主义行为,通过成本与风险共担的组合契约激励ASP提高免费试用的努力水平和提高服务能力订购量。研究结果表明:提出的协调契约能够使免费试用的效果达到整体最优,实现SaaS服务供应链的最优绩效并使各参与方利润帕累托改进;提高ASP的技术能力可使免费试用取得更好的效果。通过数值模拟验证了模型的有效性并得出了其管理学意义。     

不同冷链服务模式下生鲜农产品供应链决策

基于单物流服务商、单供应商和单零售商构成的生鲜农产品供应链,构建3种冷链服务模式：承诺模式、提前要求模式与延后要求模式,探讨不同冷链服务模式对定价与冷链服务水平、企业绩效的影响。研究发现：某种冷链服务模式是否有利于消减数量与质量损耗依赖于产品易腐性、冷链服务成本及其分担比例。供应链成员无法在承诺模式与提前要求模式下形成统一的模式偏好。当物流服务商承担的冷链服务成本比例较低时,相比于提前要求模式,供应商偏好承诺模式,否则,偏好提前要求模式。承诺模式比提前要求模式更有利于物流服务商,然而对于零售商,结果正好相反。数值实验表明,虽然供应链成员无法对冷链服务模式形成整体的一致性偏好,但仍可实现局部的一致性偏好。     

不对称信息下考虑产能约束的供应链合同设计

本文针对由产能约束品牌制造商和零售商组成的供应链系统,考虑市场上消费者对产品的异质性偏好,以及品牌制造商和零售商之间存在信息不对称,研究品牌制造商最优合同设计与零售商定价策略,考察产能约束与不对称信息对产品定价和供应双方合作的影响。研究发现：受到产能约束的品牌制造商有三种合同策略,即低价合同、固定价格合同以及高价合同等三种合同,在低价合同下品牌制造商可以充分利用其产能约束,而在后两种合同下产品有可能滞销;不对称信息会导致"批发价格+一次性转移支付"合同不能完美协调供应链。当品牌制造商和零售商进行信息共享谈判时,若二者在高价合同下进行合作,则品牌制造商与零售商在一定条件下可以达成信息共享谈判,实现"双赢"。     

Revenue‐Sharing vs. Wholesale‐Price Contracts in Assembly Systems with Random Demand

Assembly and kitting operations, as well as jointly sold products, are rather basic yet intriguing A decentralized supply chains, where achieving coordination through appropriate incentives is very important, especially when demand is uncertain. We investigate two very distinct types of arrangements between an assembler/retailer and its suppliers. One scheme is a vendor‐managed inventory with revenue sharing, and the other a wholesale‐price driven contract. In the VMI case, each supplier faces strategic uncertainty as to the amounts of components, which need to be mated with its own, that other suppliers will deliver. We explore the resulting components' delivery quantities equilibrium in this decentralized supply chain and its implications for participants' and system's expected profits. We derive the revenue shares the assembler should select in order to maximize its own profits. We then explore a revenue‐plus‐surplus‐subsidy incentive scheme, where, in addition to a share of revenue, the assembler also provides a subsidy to component suppliers for their unsold components. We show that, by using this two‐parameter contract, the assembler can achieve channel coordination and increase the profits of all parties involved. We then explore a wholesale‐price‐driven scheme, both as a single lever and in combination with buybacks. The channel performance of a wholesale‐price‐only scheme is shown to degrade with the number of suppliers, which is not the case with a revenue‐share‐only contract.     

Contracting for Capacity under Renegotiation: Partner Preferences and the Value of Anticipating Renegotiation

This paper studies contract renegotiation in a stylized supply chain model. Two original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) sign fixed‐quantity contracts with a contract manufacturer (CM) prior to demand realization. Contract renegotiation after demand realization allows the OEMs to use capacity that is more or less than what they contracted for. We assume that the extra profit due to efficient allocation of capacity is allocated to the supply chain parties according to the egalitarian rule and investigate when an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is maximized. We aim to understand how an OEM's expected post‐renegotiation profit is affected by her ability to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract as well as the ability of the other OEM to do the same. Regardless of whether renegotiation is anticipated or not at the time of the initial contract, we find that an OEM, who had weak buyer power vis‐a‐vis the CM and was unable to negotiate a low wholesale price in the initial contract, may benefit more from renegotiation than a stronger OEM. In addition, we show that how the expected post‐renegotiation profit of an OEM changes with demand variance or anticipating renegotiation depends on the strength of the OEM's buyer power. Finally, we numerically test the robustness of our results in a supply chain with three OEMs and also identify when the OEMs prefer to leave the CM out of the renegotiation.     

考虑需求端和产出端不确定性的服务平台定价和商业模式研究

同时考虑平台需求端和供给端不确定性,分析此时服务平台的产品定价、最优激励、商业模式和效率损失传导。通过将委托代理理论和平台理论结合的方法进行分析,研究表明：（1）需求端和产出端的不确定性越高,平台对消费端的定价越低;随着需求端自网络外部性增强,需求端不确定对消费端的影响减弱;随需求端交叉网络外部性增强,需求端不确定对消费端的定价影响增强。（2）需求或产出不确定性越大,分成报酬占总报酬比例越低,平台商业模式更接近于雇佣或自营模式;反之接近纯平台模式。（3）产出端不确定性带来的效率损失在平台两端之间传导。当服务端存在不确定性,服务端报酬和需求端定价同时上升,服务提供端的报酬升高幅度大于需求端产品价格升高幅度。同时,平台将部分效率损失内化,平台承担的效率损失与需求端交叉网络外部性成正比。     

Online Intermediary as a Channel for Selling Quality‐Differentiated Services

When deciding whether to utilize an online intermediary in addition to their own distribution channels, quality differentiated service providers face the trade‐off between the benefit of extended reach and the threat of increased competition. Using an analytical framework, we analyze when and how service providers may utilize an online intermediary to their advantage in the presence of advance selling (i.e., selling a service at an early date for future consumption). In general, when an online intermediary is used, the competition effect dominates the reach effect and leads to a falling price trend. Interestingly, we find that the negative effect of increased competition on profits, due to intermediary usage, can be reversed by committing to self‐imposed participation limits (i.e., selling only a predetermined amount of services through the online intermediary). This ensures that the service provider is better off selling through both its own site and the online intermediary, rather than selling exclusively using either channel.      

生产商规模不经济的双渠道供应链协调策略选择

供应链协调是提高供应链整体利润、改善供应链各方利益的根本手段.旨在探讨生产商具有生产规模不经济特性的双渠道供应链协调策略.给出了集中决策下双渠道供应链的市场价格与整体利润,以及分散决策下批发价契约与收益共享契约的设计方法.提出了协调度的概念,即契约使供应链协调的程度.证明了批发价契约的协调度小于1,不能实现供应链的协调;而收益共享契约的协调度等于1,但相对于批发价契约,收益共享契约不能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润,导致收益共享契约不可实施.为找到双渠道供应链可实施的协调策略,提出了带固定补偿的收益共享契约的设计方法和用纳什讨价还价协商模型确定固定补偿的方法.结果表明,该契约的协调度等于1,并且相对于批发价契约能同时改善零售商和生产商的利润.另外,研究还表明:生产不经济的弹性系数与销售价格成正比、与供应链的整体利润成反比,并且不同渠道间的竞争越激烈,双渠道供应链的销售价格和需求反而越高,双渠道供应链的总利润也越高,并且,带固定补偿的收益共享契约同样可以协调线性成本下的双渠道供应链.最后用算例验证了本文结论的正确性和有效性.     

Quality of Service Based Pricing Schemes for Content Sharing in Peer‐to‐Peer Networks

In this paper, we study quality‐of‐service (QoS) based pricing schemes that serve as incentive mechanisms to induce sharing behaviors in Peer‐to‐Peer (P2P) networks. We incorporate operational QoS metrics into users’ utility functions and demonstrate how they affect individual users’ content sharing decisions. Using a game‐theoretic model, our study reveals how organizations respond to the changes of operational QoS metrics in their design of pricing schemes for various business objectives at different stages of network evolution. Our results show that a higher upload capacity can foster rational sharing to start when the network is small; however, it also discourages sharing behaviors when the network becomes large. In order to induce a socially optimal behavior, a pricing scheme will not charge users for requesting content while compensating them for sharing content. Such compensation is found to increase faster with the network size when the network is large. In order to maximize the profit of a monopolistic provider, however, a pricing scheme will charge content requests with a positive price while providing less compensation to sharing users compared to the socially optimal scheme. When the network size is small, such compensation can be even negative, which implies that a monopolistic provider discourages content sharing when the network is small, but encourages it when the network becomes larger. In addition, we find that more information about peer upload capacity discourages peers to share.     

考虑向上销售和渠道主导结构的BOPS定价与服务合作

在"线上下单,线下取货"的BOPS模式下进行了供应链主体的定价与服务合作决策分析。研究发现：1）在零售商主导的结构下,单位补偿契约可以实现合理的利润分配,且向上销售产品的批发价格将不会影响BOPS产品价格、服务决策和最优利润;2）在制造商主导的结构下,批发价格契约可以有效实现服务合作,单位补偿值可影响定价与服务决策继而影响主体间利润分配,且当单位补偿值为0时,供应链总利润最大;3）制造商主导下的供应链效率高于零售商主导下的情形,呈现的双重边际化效应较不明显。研究结论对商家进行全渠道实践提供了参考。