Fertility decline and gender bias in

Although it is widely acknowledged that the preference for sons is a barrier to a decline in fertility, considerable disagreement exists as to what actually happens to this preference when fertility declines in a region of low female autonomy. By analyzing the data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS), we present evidence from northern India to show that the preference for sons is reduced when the ideal family size becomes small, even though it does not completely disappear. This finding appears to contradict trends in the juvenile sex ratio and the incidence of female feticide that suggest the intensification of gender bias. We argue that the anomaly is the result of a diffusion of prenatal sex-diagnostic techniques in regions where there is a large unmet demand for such methods. Using the NFHS data, we estimate that in northern India, girls currently constitute about 60% of the unwanted births and that the elimination of unwanted fertility has the potential to raise the sex ratio at birth to 130 boys per 100 girls.     

Fertility trends in Pakistan--the decline that wasn't

The own-child method of fertility estimation was applied to data from 4 successive household surveys in Pakistan--the 1973 Housing, Economic, and Demographic Survey; the 1975 Pakistan Fertility Survey; the 1979 Population, Labor Force, and Migration Survey; and the 1981 Census. Results suggest large fertility oscillations 8-15 years before each survey, a sharp decline during the next 6 years, and a slight upturn in the year preceding the survey. However, when the 4 data sources are analyzed together, it becomes clear that the reported fertility declines are spurious. In fact, the results indicate that Pakistan's total fertility rate actually increased in the 2 decades preceding the 1981 Census, from slightly under to slightly above 7 children/women. This pattern is apparent when fertility data are aggregated over calendar years, allowing the tendency for errors from age misreporting to cancel one another out. Whatever fertility decline may have occurred has been confined to the very small group of Pakistan women with more than a primary education. It appears that births were misplaced away from the survey date, because of a pattern of exaggerations of children's ages that increases with age, thereby underestimating fertility in the 5-year period just before the survey. This analysis points to the value of juxtaposition of trends from multiple data sources. It further suggests a need for serious attention to family planning program performance in Pakistan if the Government's goal of achieving a birth rate of 36/1000 by 1988 is to be achieved.     

Fertility decline in Germany: An econometric appraisal

Summary A re-analysis of Knodel's data provides some new results for the fertility decline in Germany and a new approach to testing hypotheses about the demographic transition. Two formulations of transition theory are compared: one emphasizing the importance of changing social and economic structure for fertility decline; the other, the changing relationships between fertility and its determinants over time. To evaluate these formulations, multivariate time series cross-sectional models are developed. The statistical models permit the estimation of relationships both cross-sectionally and over time. As a consequence, the ability of the independent variables to explain cross-sectional as against temporal differences is evaluated. Industrialization, urbanization, religious composition, migration, infant mortality and marriage patterns satisfactorily explain the fertility decline once regional differences have been taken into account. Persisting characteristics of regional units account for much of the unexplained variance. Industrialization is the main explanatory variable of fertility decline in Germany. In the period considered, its impact on fertility increased substantially.     

Fertility decline and female chances of marriage in Malaya

A feature of the demographic pattern of post-World War II Malaya has been its high rate of natural growth, which reached 31/2 per cent per annum in the mid-1950s. However, the average age at marriage of the female population has been rising for most of this period, and since 1956 there has been a considerable and sustained fall in the birth rate.

In this paper simple models are developed to show that in a closed population a continuing high rate of population growth is incompatible with a pattern of universal female marriage, monogamy and a culturally imposed age difference of considerable size between spouses. The demonstration provided by the models is then offered as at least a partial explanation of the fertility and female marriage trends in contemporary Malaya. Discrepancies between the population of Malaya and the models have to be taken into account. A pattern of polygamous and unstable marriage does exist amongst the Malaysians and, to a much lesser extent, in the Chinese community. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed the passing of the large surplus of single males built up in the Chinese sector of the population during the years oflarge scale immigration. Such a transition is well under way in the Indian community too.

It is suggested that a substantial average age gap between spouses may be an aspect of many contemporary societies which reacts against the persistence of extremely high rates of natural increase. Even where demographic pressures in the ‘marriage market’ act towards a lessening of this gap, there is a cultural lag, during which period many females are forced to marry late or not at all.

Most of the study was made on a pan-Malayan basis (i.e. combining the Federation of Malaya and the State of Singapore) to achieve comparability with earlier censuses and as a recognition that with unrestricted migration between these areas they still form a single demographic unit. The terms Malaya and Malayans will be used when referring to this area or its inhabitants. The so-called major races of the country are Malaysians, Chinese and Indians. The first will be used in accordance with the census definition to cover the indigenous inhabitants of Malaya or the Malay Archipelago (Indonesia, British Borneo and the Philippines). As most of these people are either indigenous or have been in Malays for some generations they are usually called Malays (except for the aborigines). However, the all-embracing census term will be used here. Indians, in conformity with most local usage, will be used for the groups classified as Indians and Pakistanis at the 1957 censuses of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. The group was very small.     

Fertility in botswana: The recent decline and future prospects

Recent estimates of fertility in Botswana suggest a rapid decline of more than two births per woman between 1981 and 1988. This paper proposes that the baseline fertility was overestimated but that nonetheless fertility declined by about one birth per woman during the 1980s. The decline in fertility was linked to a deterioration in social and economic conditions caused by a major drought in the early 1980s and to the increased availability of family planning services in the same period. Fertility apparently began to rebound in the late 1980s in response to improved conditions, which came about as a result of a successful drought relief program. Future declines in fertility depend on the continued success of the family planning program, particularly in rural areas.     

Fertility decline in Bangladesh: an emerging family planning success story

Bangladesh has a population of 115 million people, and the economic growth rate of 3.7% during the 1980s was undermined by rapid population growth. The annual population growth rate was 3% in the 1960s and early 1970s, 2.5% between 1981-91 decreasing to 2.3% in 1991. The average of number of children is 4.6/woman compared with 7 in the 1960s. Infant mortality dropped from 150/1000 births in 1976 to 118/1000 in 1991. Life expectancy rose from 47 to 54 years. The 1991 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey showed that 39.9% of married women under 50 use contraceptives in 1991 vs. 18.6% in 1981. The use of modern methods increased from 10.9% in 1981 to 31.2% in 1991, while traditional methods rose from 7.7% to 8.7%. Sterilization was most prevalent in 1981. 29,000 female family planning (FP) workers were aggressively engaged in dispensing FP services in 1990. The Social Marketing Company sells pills, condoms, and oral rehydration salts through 130,000 retail outlets. The 1989 Contraceptive Prevalence Survey showed that 40% of pill and condom users obtained them from this network, and 95.4% of women knew about 4 methods of contraception. In 1990 there were 120 private organizations providing contraceptive services. Some of the components of the government FP program include field worker distribution door-to-door of injectable contraceptives (50% injectable usage rate in the Matlab project); recordkeeping activities; a satellite clinic network with access to contraceptive services; and decentralization through the Upazila (subdistrict) approach. The logistics system of FP has improved the warehousing, transportation, and management information system. Foreign aid (mainly USAID) financing of contraceptives helped avert 14.4 million births between 1974-90. The increase of contraceptive prevalence to 50% by 1997 would avert another 21.9 million births during 1991-96 (replacement fertility requires 70% prevalence.     

Fertility decline in Punjab, India: parallels with historical Europe

Two interesting features emerge from this study of fertility behaviour in Punjab. First, it brings out the common features of peasant life and demographic behaviour found in this developing-country setting and in historical Europe. As in much of Europe, marriage was regulated to adjust to the availability of land and other resources. It is interesting to note that the operation of this 'nuptiality valve' was quite consistent with a system of joint families and partible inheritance. Secondly, the findings suggest that we need to re-define what we understand to be the features of socio-economic development which are crucial for fertility decline. Fertility began to decline steadily in this part of Punjab as early as 1940, at a time when the society was overwhelmingly agrarian, illiterate, and infant mortality was high with no access to modern contraceptive technology, as in historical Europe. The onset of the decline was brought about by development interventions which stabilized fluctuations in crop yields and mortality, thus radically improving stability of people's expectations. This study also points out the inapplicability of Mamdani's theories of fertility behaviour to the people he studies.     

Fertility decline in Taiwan: A study using parity progression ratios

Taiwan's decline in fertility is studied by using period parity progression ratios. Levels of marriage and motherhood are found to have been high and essentially constant though the late 1980s, suggesting that the decline has been due almost entirely to declines in second and higher order-births. Families with three or more children play an important role in maintaining the current level of fertility. The level of fertility would be even lower without these families. They contributed more than one-half child per woman to the total fertility rate during most of the 1980s. Total fertility rates computed from the period parity progression ratios indicate a substantially higher level of fertility than the conventional total fertility rate; they remained above or at replacement level through 1988. A formal demographic analysis suggests that the conventional total fertility rate has been depressed by shifts in age at childbearing.     

Fertility differentials as evidence of incipient fertility decline in a developing country

Abstract Age data from the 1960 and earlier censuses of Ghana allow the construction of child-woman ratios which appear to indicate the existence of a substantial urban-rural fertility differential. Plausible assumptions of urban-rural mortality differentials increase the apparent fertility differential. In this paper recently published data for Statistical Areas in the country's larger towns are used to demonstrate that one explanation for the fertility differential is almost certainly the enumeration of some females in the towns, while one or more of their surviving children were enumerated outside. Nevertheless, in 1960 the four largest towns exhibited birth levels which are likely to have been about 11% below those of the population in the surrounding regions. Roughly half the differential can be attributed to a general urban-rural differential and half to socio-economic differentials within the towns. It is shown that most fertility reduction within the towns may be explained by delayed female marriage, and that such delay is associated with extended education. It is also shown that amongst the higher socio-economic status groups a small part of the reduction can probably be attributed to the prevention of pregnancy within marriage, and that the making of such attempts is positively associated with extended education, urban birth, participation in first and monogamous marriages, Protestantism, and the holding of views about the harmful effect of high population growth rates on attempts to raise living standards. It is argued that these fertility differentials are evidence of some fertility decline among key groups in the population and that such declines are likely to become more widespread.     

Fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition: Testing three theories with cross-national data

This study uses aggregate data on a large number of the world's societies to test three theories of fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition. One prominent theory relates fertility decline to the changing economic value of children. With industrialization and overall modernization the economic value of children's labor shifts from positive to negative. This interpretation has been challenged by those who claim that the flow of wealth in preindustrial societies is always from parent to child rather than from child to parent. An alternative interpretation is that fertility levels reflect people's efforts to promote their reproductive success, and that this requires the careful tracking of infant and child mortality. Fertility rates are adjusted to the rate of infant and child survival, and will be high when survival rates are low and low when survival rates are high. A third theory emphasizes female empowerment. Fertility will be high when women are highly subordinated to men, but as women gain more autonomy and control over their own lives they reduce their fertility levels because, among other possibilities, higher levels of fertility present them with serious burdens. We tested all three theories through multiple regression analyses performed on two samples of societies, the first a large sample of the world's nation-states during the period between 1960 and 1990, and the second a sample of now-developed societies between 1880 and 1940. Our findings showed that infant mortality was an excellent predictor of fertility, and that female empowerment was a good predictor. However, there was only weak support for the argument that the economic value of children's labor plays an important role in fertility decisions. The findings were discussed in the context of a broader interpretation of fertility behavior in societies with high levels of industrialization and modernization.     

Fertility decline in Scotland, England and Wales, and Ireland: comparisons from the 1911 census of fertility

Data on family size by year of marriage, age at marriage, and duration of marriage, from the 1911 Fertility Census, are compared between Scotland, England and Wales, Irish county boroughs, and the rest of Ireland. While means show significant inter-country differences, from the 1880s marked similarities are found across all the countries in the pattern of fertility decline, strongly suggesting significant fertility limitation in rural Ireland well before 1911. Noting the implications for the use of rural Ireland as a natural fertility population, the data are instead compared with the Coale-Trussell and Hinde-Woods schedules. The former provides more plausible results, which imply strong period rather than cohort effects in the fertility decline. Except in rural Ireland, little evidence is found for significant fertility limitation early in marriage among younger marrying couples, but many older marrying couples appear to have stopped childbearing at very low parities from an early date.     

生育理性和生育决策与我国低生育水平稳定机制的转变

自改革开放以来 ,我国人口生育率水平出现了迅速的转变 ,特别是 1 992年我国确立了市场经济为目标的经济改革以来 ,生育率水平更是进一步降低到更替水平以下。如果说 ,生育率的迅速转变是在国家计划生育政策干预下启动的 ,那么 ,在 1 990年代生育率的下降应该主要是社会和经济发展的结果。以市场经济为导向的经济改革和经济的迅速发展 ,已经为稳定我国城市地区人口低生育率水平提供了必要的经济条件 ,同时 ,制度、技术和文化等因素的变革已经为我国个人生育决策理性化创造了条件 ,低生育水平的稳定机制已经开始从政策控制为主转向群众自我控制为主的转变     

Fertility decline in a US population favoring large families: A hazard-model analysis of the effect of sib death on Amish fertility

This paper uses proportional hazards techniques and population data from a directory of the Old Order Amish of the Lancaster, PA settlement. It examines the effect of death of the immediately prior sibling on the risk of childbearing for up to 11 children. Prior research typically has pooled data for maternal cohorts. In contrast, separate models are estimated for each maternal cohort. The results are based on all reported first marriages of Amish women born between 1884–1973 (N = 4066). Hazard models run separately for children of each birth order reveal that net of maternal age and length of the prior birth interval (and other statistical and design controls), the death of the prior sib significantly increases the risk of a subsequent birth for the lower birth orders. Separate models by maternal cohort show that sib death increases the risk primarily for later cohorts. The pattern of effects from child mortality and other variables suggests changes in fertility behavior among the Amish, who have strong, traditional norms opposing contraception and favoring large families.     

论生育文化和生育文明

生育文明中表现了生育文化的种种现象和活动,生育文化也体现了生育文明的历史轨迹、进程和内容。生育文化的发展表现了不同时期人类生育文明的进步与发展,不体现生育文化内涵的生育文明显然是不存在的。然而,严格说来,生育文化和生育文明是既有密切联系,又有一定区别的两个不完全等同的概念。正确认识和理解生育文化和生育文明的概念、内涵、功能及其相互关系,对于推动新时期人口计生工作的深入发展,进一步开展人口和计划生育的理论研究,具有十分重要的意义和作用。     

Fertility trends in Australia

Using published data from the Australian vital registration and census systems, several time series are compiled: crude birth rates from the 1860s; fertility rates from the 1880s; age-specific and parity-specific measures from the 191Os; cumulative fertility measures by birth year of parent beginning with the 1890s; and cumulative fertility measures for marriages by year contracted from the 1910s.The decline in fertility to the 1930s, the upswing to 1961, and declines thereafter revealed by annual fertility measures show far more variation than do measures of total generation fertility—2.7 children per woman born in 1893–95, 2.3 1906–10, 2.8 1921–25, and perhaps 3.0 for women born in the 1930s. Both annual and generation measures show a younger age at parenthood, a decrease in childlessness, and progressively fewer large families. In the light of present experience, it seems not unreasonable to project generation fertility of 2.5 children, implying a crude birth rate of about 20 per thousand for the next fifteen years or so.     

Fertility in black Africa

The number of children per woman is between 6 and 7 children in Black Africa. Infertility and poor fertility existing in certain regions of Africa only appear in results concerning central Africa. 6-10% of births occur in women between the ages of 40 and 50. It must be noted that the goal of the majority of societies in Black Africa is to have numerous descendants. Factors of fertility in Africa examined are: precocious marriage, a long period of exposure to the risk of pregnancy, birth spacing and pathological infertility. The paper also discusses modern contraception and birth control, the improvement of sanitation conditions as part of the battle against infertility and infant mortality, combating infertility, decreasing infant mortality and governmental attitudes toward fertility control. Despite the efforts of several private and governmental agencies to promote family planning, progress in Africa has been modest. In the majority of Black African countries, women do not have access to contraception. In rural areas, the absence of an administrative infrastructure prevents diffusion of information and access to contraception. Improving general health conditions has 2 consequences on fertility: it reduces infertility due to diseases that cause sterility and it reduces infant mortality which affects birth intervals. So far birth control has only been successful among the very educated women. However, a great potential for more users exists.