Affective Housing Ownership in China’s New Property Regime

This article investigates the ‘affective’ dimension of Chinese urbanites’ ubiquitous practices of real estate investment and hard bargaining against housing demolition. In their endeavours regarding the active or ‘passive’ possession of housing property, investors and evictees share an immense mania and anxiety over exploiting or missing out on this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to participate in the property pursuit. I depict how the notion of affect, as represented by anxiety and a vernacular moral expression, conjoined to reshape urban subjectivity. The present case of housing investment mania and counter-demolition acuity in a whole new private property regime represents a fluid context for exploring affect’s concrete penetrating power that allows us to go deeper toward revealing social phenomena and sociality.     

Equilibrium and efficiency with property rights and local consumption externalities

There is no mechanism that guarantees existence and Pareto optimality of equilibrium in all situations if each individual has limited property rights and a utility function that depends upon his neighbour's consumption. This is true under virtually any assumption about coalition formation. Therefore, Sen's paradox of the Paretian liberal is confirmed in an economic exchange setting with limited externalitities, and Coase's conjecture on the efficiency of bargaining with complete information is denied.David Austen-Smith, Michael Peters, and Jonathan Riley provided helpful comments at various stages. I am grateful for their suggestions and for the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada). Responsibility for the paper's deficiencies rests with the author, of course.     

SUBSIDY AND TUITION POLICIES IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Although public appropriations to higher education and tuition rates are set under alternative arrangements, the optimal allocation is readily achievable. The decentralized linear-subsidy case produces an externality that reduces joint welfare below the centralized (first-best) case, but when vertical constraints are added or bilateral bargaining occurs, tuition maximizes joint surplus. Specifications differ in the subsidy's assigned role, which varies from affecting tuition directly to being indeterminate under Nash bargaining. When marginal cost of education is nondecreasing, the ratio of nonresident to resident tuition declines with increases in the demand for education and with decreases in the state budget. (JEL D4, I2 )     

The impact of biological preferences on parental investments in children and step-children

A remarriage typically involves significant changes in a family’s financial circumstance, and these changes, combined with the relative bargaining relationship between spouses, likely affect the well-being of the children who are part of the family. In this paper, I use the separate-spheres model, a theoretical model that explains the determinants of bargaining power in marriage, to analyze how a remarried couple’s bargaining relationship affects their child investment in stepfamilies. Based on this theoretical model, I build and estimate an empirical model that investigates the determinants of parental investment. As evidence of parental preference for biological children over stepchildren, I find that an increased wage rate of a biological mother significantly improves her child investment when her husband is a stepfather of the child, while there is no such effect for mothers living with the biological father of the child.

Show Me Your Papers! Obama’s Birth and the Whiteness of Belonging

In the wake of Barack Obama's 2009 ascension to the White House, stories questioning his citizenship slowly trickled into the mainstream. By 2011, ??Birtherism????the belief that Obama is constitutionally disqualified from holding Presidential office??was a principle aspect of public discourse. Through an analysis of online comments in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, I analyze how dominant understandings of citizenship, race, class, and civil rights structure public navigation of ??Birther?? claims. I find the presence of several ??narratives of belonging????shared stories that people socially construct to account for who they are, how the world works, and where different people belong. These narratives reveal the sustained conflation of citizenship with an ideal or ??hegemonic?? form of white racial identity.     

Should ownership last forever?

This paper investigates the utility of all intellectual property rights being time limited with no limits required for real assets and corporate shares. Ownership rights evolved from hereditary rulers seeking to maintain political power and wealth in perpetuity. This objective is no longer relevant with rulers elected for a fixed time. Neither are perpetual rights consistent with economic justice, efficiency and sustainability. A review of modern techniques of investment analysis reveals that unlimited life property rights are not required and that they can result in investors obtaining benefits in excess of the incentive required to bring forth their investment. Tax incentives provide a voluntary way to introduce time limited property rights to improve equity and efficiency by transferring the ownership of realty or firms to their operational/strategic stakeholders. In this way the wealth of nations could be both democratized and localized to build a more sustainable and just society.     

Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption

We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic, the welfare of all household members moves in the same direction when bargaining power shifts, at the expense (or for the benefit) of outside consumers. Typically a shift of bargaining power within a set of households also impacts upon other households. We show that each individual of a sociological group tends to benefit, if he can increase his bargaining power, but suffers if others in his group do the same.     

The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia

I examine ownership structure of Russian firms during the 1998?C2006 period, where a greater emphasis is placed on motivations behind increased government ownership in the latter years, when oligarchs?? opportunistic influence on the firm diminished as state ownership correspondingly increased. As this phenomenon is also correlated with improved corporate growth during the period, I argue that state participation in corporate governance acted as an effective substitute mechanism to constrain wealth-tunnelling behaviour of corporate insiders and local bureaucrats in a country defined by a weak property rights system.     

Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims

Do people have an innate respect for property? In the literature, there is controversy about whether human subjects are taking averse. We implemented a dictator game with a symmetric action space to address potential misconceptions and framing and demand effects that may be responsible for the contradictory findings. Misconceptions can occur as a result of unclear property rights, while framing and demand effects can occur if anonymity is not preserved. Our paper is the first to implement both a strict double-blind anonymity protocol and clear property rights. We established clear property claims by asking subjects in our legal treatment to bring their own property to the experiment. In the effort treatment, the experimenter transferred the property publicly to subjects after they completed a real effort task. Our data suggest that without social enforcement, respect for property is low. Yet, the taking rate significantly differs from the theoretically predicted maximum. Consistent with the Lockean theory of property, respect for property grows when the entitlement is legitimized by the labor the owner had to invest to acquire it.     

Labour Relations during and after Apprenticeship: Amity Hall,Jamaica, 1834–1840

This article contributes to the scholarly literature on labour relations in the transition from slavery to freedom in Jamaica. Based on the plantation papers of the Goulburn family, who owned Amity Hall sugar estate in Vere parish, it traces the contested negotiations between apprentices and free blacks on the one hand and the absentee owner and his manager on the other in a period of two transitions, from slavery to apprenticeship in 1834 and from apprenticeship to a restricted freedom in 1838. This enables one to document the variety of ways in which this crucial period affected the conditions, hours and remuneration for work. Though Amity Hall had a less fractious transition out of slavery than some other Jamaican plantations, the article reveals the difficulties faced by planters in overcoming labour shortages, the bargaining power of Jamaicans at crop time, and the contests over wages, rents and provision grounds that shaped labour relations after 1838. By 1840, the owner and manager and the workers at Amity Hall had not bridged the clear division in their expectations and interests since the Emancipation Bill came into effect.     

Consequentialism,rights, and the new social welfare theory

Traditional consequentialist social welfare theory [SWT] is intendedly value-free and institutionless. It follows that, while unattenuated exchange and property rights are assigned an implicit, instrumental role in the achievement of first-best Paretian optima, little attention has focused on alternative rights construals, on their associated, correlative duties, and on the implications for SWT. This is true, even among economists who regard “freedom” as morally exigent.This paper argues that the rights which social welfare theorists regard as instrumentally important—and, therefore, legally sanctioned—need not, in consequentialist theory, be respected: The duties which are correlative to social welfare theorists' implicitly sanctioned rights may, in consequentialist terms, be overcome by purely utilitarian considerations. It follows, pari passu, that reliance on a goal-based efficiency standard is irreconcilable with respect for the rights which most economists either take to be intrinsically important or seek to justify. Granting this, normative analysis must take account of the logical and other tensions among consequences, rights, duties, and other dimensions of moral evaluation.     

Workers, Unions, and Takeovers

How do takeovers affect workers?? wages and job security in the short-run? What role does the labor union play in mitigating these effects? I answer these two questions by analyzing wage and employment outcomes of over 4,000 public firms that were acquired between 1981 and 2002, using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. I find that target establishments exhibit a net contraction in wages and employment, relative to comparable establishments after takeovers. Targets?? establishments in more unionized industries experience worse wage and employment outcomes after takeovers. These adverse effects are exacerbated when the establishment is located in a state with Right-to-work laws where unions face a less favorable bargaining environment. These findings indicate that target firms?? employees are negatively affected by takeovers and that their labor unions do not mitigate these negative effects.     

The ��Semiotic Self��: From Peirce and Mead to Wiley and Singer

Norbert Wiley (1994) provides a synthesis of Peirce??s and Mead??s views on the self. The Peirce-Mead ideal type model of the self involves the I and the me as well as the I and the you. Hence, at each moment we are a combined ??me-I-you?? in past, present and future. Milton Singer (1989) discovers the semiotic self through his anthropological research, but does not apply the concept as rigorously as one might hope. Peirce??s triadic epistemology and Pragmatism is explored to frame his contribution to the semiotic self. His categories of Firstness, Secondnes and Thirdness are briefly considered. Some anecdotal information about the self in Indic Civilization is discussed. It is argued that the INSOR model can be useful. The key is to move beyond Cartesian notions and to see the semotic self as a ??semiotic object,?? always subject to interpretation by the person engaged in symbolic interaction and exchange.     

The affluent home owner: labour market position and the shaping of housing histories

This article draws on research designed to explore aspects of social stratification within owner occupation. The research reconstructed and compared the housing, employment and family histories of two groups of home owners in two contrasting localities in Bristol. This article focuses on the top end of the owner occupied market, a neglected area in the sociology of housing, and explores the connections between bargaining power in the labour market and the shaping of housing histories. It is argued that core workers in the labour market exercise choice in the housing market within a framework of job determined constraints. These constraints are accompanied by a range of subsidies and benefits which are unavailable to the majority of households. As a consequence it is suggested that this group's housing histories are shaped by qualitatively distinct processes which go beyond the single fact that their earned incomes are relatively large.     

PRODUCTION EXTERNALITIES AND LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIA: BARGAINING AND PIGOVIAN TAXATION

This paper analyzes bargaining and Pigovian taxation solutions to inefficiencies from production externalities with free entry. The Coase Theorem fails in a decentralized context but remains valid if the property rights holder can act like a command economy planner. A less powerful price-taking rights holder's objective function is nonconcave, causing an inefficient bargaining outcome. Bargaining complicates Pigovian taxes with a nonlinear tax scheme required to sustain the optimum. Polluting firms pay a franchise tax whose revenue is given lump sum to consumers and face a marginal charge only on excess output, which thus raises no revenue in equilibrium.     

Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint

We study a particular restitution problem where there is an indivisible good (land or property) over which two agents have rights: the dispossessed agent and the owner. A third party, possibly the government, seeks to resolve the situation by assigning rights to one and compensate the other. There is also a maximum amount of money available for the compensation. We characterize a family of asymmetrically fair rules that are immune to strategic behavior, guarantee minimal welfare levels for the agents, and satisfy the budget constraint.     

Incomplete property rights, redistribution, and welfare

In a world where the private protection of property is costly, government redistribution can lead to an increase in aggregate output. This result is not new. The novelty of this paper lies in specifying the conditions under which this efficiency-enhancing redistribution improves everyone’s welfare including the welfare of those whose labor finances the redistributive program (i.e., the rich) and how this is affected by the protection of property rights. The state may directly enhance economic rights through investments in security and the protection of property or it may indirectly do so through the redistribution of income. Under certain conditions, redistribution becomes desirable in situations where the state has exhausted its ability to enhance efficiency through the direct enforcement of property rights. In this case, redistribution can make all members of a society better off. Specifically, this occurs when the cost of predation is sufficiently low and the technology of private protection of property rights is sufficiently weak. The adverse effects of redistribution may be the consequence but not the cause of state failure. The real cause is a corrupt and inept state. My thanks are due to an anonymous referee and Zane Spindler for very helpful and critical comments. I thank SSHRC for financial support     

The monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: incentives for abatement and R&D

This article analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict liability in terms of social welfare. The reason is that output under strict liability is always less than first-best output, whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of liability rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter’s calculus under strict liability is similar to that of the social planner.     

Social exchange and common agency in organizations

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate a manager’s attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when management attention is not contractible, the first-best can only be achieved by granting autonomy to employees together with incentive pay for both managers and employees. When neither attention nor effort are contractible, an ‘attention race’ arises, as each manager tries to sway the employee’s effort his way. While this may result in too much social exchange, the attention race may also be a blessing because it alleviates managers’ moral-hazard problem in attention provision. Lastly, we show how organizational structure can be used to motivate managers and employees in the absence of formal incentives.     

The Human Habitat: a Systemization and Critique of Park’s Theory from a Radical Interactionist Perspective

When Park died, he left his theory of the human habitat not only incomplete, but in considerable disarray. Although few present-day scholars have demonstrated much interest in building on this critical body of Park’s work, which he based on dominance, it probably represents his most important contribution to American sociology. I argue that the key to systemizing his highly discursive account of the human habitat is to view it from an emergent social evolutionary perspective, which makes it possible to differentiate his notion of “community” from “society,” as well as explain how the two concepts can logically be viewed as both separate and unified entities. A community is not only a necessary stage in the social evolutionary process of producing a society, but it also provides the habitat needed for a society’s later emergence. Among other things, Park’s theory of the human habitat is also criticized for its failure to (1) distinguish dominance from domination, (2) identify the reciprocal relationship existing between power and domination, (3) accurately characterize the nature of the economic order operating in communities, and (4) demarcate a pre-lingual, lingual and literate communal stages that precedes in the social evolutionary process the possible development of a society. In passing, I also point out critical, but often overlooked aspects of Park’s theory of the human habitat that contradict popular characterizations of his work as being purblind to the operation of dominance and power, social Darwinist, conservative, sexist, and racist. Finally, I deduce the implications of his theory for the future emergence of a “world society.”