Situated legitimacy: Deliberative arenas and the new rural governance

Rural governance in the UK and elsewhere has undergone far-reaching changes, as partnerships and other collaborative approaches have emerged to address the challenges of rural sustainable development. The legitimacy of this ‘new rural governance’ is purportedly grounded in deliberation between stakeholders, but this is problematic—it is not clear how ‘legitimacy’ is to be understood now that the criteria of legitimacy appropriate to representative democratic government are not obviously applicable.Here we propose an analysis of legitimacy as situated—that is, given meanings by actors in specific contexts—and continuously constructed through discursive processes, where it also plays a reciprocal, highly political role in shaping those processes. We use this framework to analyse decision making in three distinctive deliberative arenas for sustainable transport policy making in the Peak District National Park in England. Legitimacy claims were found to be significant elements in each arena, but no single, overriding legitimacy discourse was successfully established. Instead, each arena's legitimacy was a hybrid, justified through a complex mix of competing rationales.While no single conclusion can be drawn about the legitimacy of ‘the new rural governance’, the strongest legitimising principles remained those grounded in representative democracy. In contrast, the ‘new’ approaches rely on deliberative norms accepted only by (some of) the relatively limited circle of stakeholders directly involved. More generally, if such norms are to become accepted principles for legitimate rural governance, then more work is needed to discursively establish their acceptability both in networks of governance and with the wider population.     

Inequality aversion,impartiality and utilitarianism

Egalitarianism presents the problem of baseline-dependence: egalitarianism from where? No collective choice can be egalitarian for all choices of a baseline. So the question arises as to whether and how the egalitarian program can be weakened in order to be compatible with baseline-independence. I characterize the set of choices that satisfy a minimal degree of inequality-aversion, embodied in the generalized Lorenz criterion, independently of the choice of a baseline. It turns out that this set coincides with the Lorenz-Utilitarian set, the set of Utilitarian choices which are not Lorenz dominated for any choice of baseline. Either this set is empty or it coincides with the Utilitarian set (when this is a singleton). Moreover, I also characterize the full Utilitarian set by using a standard requirement of impartiality (the Suppes-Sen criterion).     

“Fracking democracy”: Issue management and locus of policy decision-making in the Marcellus Shale gas drilling debate

This study examined a two-year period in which natural gas development in the Marcellus Shale region of Pennsylvania expanded rapidly, as did public policy proposals meant to deal with the myriad legal, economic, and environmental issues that accompanied this growth. Focusing on the use of legitimacy strategies during the critical phase of the issue of hydraulic fracturing, the study examined how activists and energy industry advocates argued that different levels of government policy making – local, state, and federal – should be the locus of policy decisions. Both the “fractivists” and the energy industry sought to legitimize state-level legislators and regulators. Activists viewed federal-level intervention as legitimate leverage for their work in the state, while the energy industry saw federal regulators as redundant and restrictive. Finally, while both sides viewed local authorities as legitimate actors, the energy industry sought to limit their ability to act against the development of new wells.     

A note on restricted majority rules: invariance to rule selection and outcome distinctiveness

Recently, Karotkin (1993) has shown that in the symmetric uncertain dichotomous choice model the set of restricted majority rules (RMRs) is special in the sense that a member of this family of rules is always the worst rule among the potentially optimal weighted majority rules (WMRs). In the current paper we establish two additional special properties of RMRs. First, given a particular configuration of the group members' decisions, the collective choice is invariant to the selection of WMRs if it is invariant to the selection of RMRs. Second, given a particular decision profile, a potentially optimal WMR can result in a distinctive collective choice which is different from the choice of any other potentially optimal WMR, if and only if it is a RMR.     

The Moral Economy of Neoliberalism: How Voters Use Neoliberal Ideology to (De)Legitimate Undocumented Worker Access to Labor Markets

Neoliberalism is prevalent in American life. While researchers have documented the use of neoliberal ideology in institutional and macrolevel policy contexts, they have yet to investigate how voters use neoliberal ideology to legitimate their position on economic policy. I use data from semi‐structured interviews with 85 Tucsonans about why they voted the way they did on Proposition 202 (2008): “Arizona Stop Illegal Hiring”—which sought to reregulate undocumented worker labor market access—to address this gap. I found evidence of two distinct neoliberal ideological legitimations: “fair market competition” and “individual responsibility.” Furthermore, I use these data to shed light on the debate over whether neoliberalism spans partisan affiliation or converges with American conservatism. I found that voters across party lines who supported the measure paired neoliberal legitimations with conservative legitimations. We can interpret this bipartisan use of neoliberal ideology as evidence of a neoliberal “moral economy”—or consensus about the moral principles in which market action is embedded. Evidence of this moral economy indicates that moral principles from neoliberal ideology are simultaneously bipartisan and converge with American conservatism. These findings suggest that there could be a broader moral consensus among voters concerning the legitimacy of anti‐immigration economic policies.     

What is the right way to protest? On the process of justification of protest,and its relationship to the propensity to participate in different types of protest

This study explores how citizens in Spain perceive different tactics employed in anti-austerity protests in 2011–2013, and tests the model of the process of justification of protest. This model combines the elements of Gamson’s collective action frames theory (effectiveness, anger and grievances, operationalized as appraisal of harm) with the concept of legitimacy. It also links justification to the intention to participate. We empirically differentiate between three protest tactics: normative demonstrations, non-normative peaceful strategies, and non-normative violent actions. We find that demonstrations are perceived to be more legitimate, but less effective than non-normative peaceful protests. Violent strategies, on the other hand, are seen to be more effective than legitimate. We postulate and find that legitimacy and effectiveness partially or fully mediate the impact of political ideology, anger, and appraisal of harm on the probability of participation in non-normative protest. Finally, we establish meaningful differences in the predictors of the likelihood of joining normative, non-normative peaceful, or non-normative violent protests. Overall, our results suggest that the study of justification of collective action and especially, the inclusion of the notion of legitimacy, enriches our understanding of the popular approval of and propensity to participate in different forms of collective protest.     

摩洛哥阿拉维君主制统治合法性分析

本文从历史与传统、现代与理性、宗教以及国王个人魅力等四个方面分析了1956年独立后摩洛哥阿拉维君主制统治合法性的基础和来源.作者指出,摩洛哥阿拉维君主制的统治反映了韦伯关于合法统治的三种类型,即合理型、传统型和魅力型,其中,传统型占主导地位并与伊斯兰教紧密相连.迄今,宗教神圣的合法性体现了阿拉维君主制所有统治合法性学说的本质,然而其神圣性也遭到了质疑和挑战.     

Effects of labeled child benefits on family savings

Contrary to standard microeconomic principles, it is by now well understood that income is not fungible. For example, the label of a government transfer can induce individuals to make expenditure decisions that are skewed towards the label. In this paper, I show that child benefits are disproportionately used for savings assignable to children. I exploit a policy reform in a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of child benefits on savings. The results suggest a significant positive effect on long-term savings and weak evidence for effects on child-assignable consumption. I conclude that labeling effects should be considered carefully by policy makers, if not for nudging individuals, then to avoid affecting decisions unintentionally.     

‘Hypernudge’: Big Data as a mode of regulation by design

ABSTRACT

This paper draws on regulatory governance scholarship to argue that the analytic phenomenon currently known as ‘Big Data’ can be understood as a mode of ‘design-based’ regulation. Although Big Data decision-making technologies can take the form of automated decision-making systems, this paper focuses on algorithmic decision-guidance techniques. By highlighting correlations between data items that would not otherwise be observable, these techniques are being used to shape the informational choice context in which individual decision-making occurs, with the aim of channelling attention and decision-making in directions preferred by the ‘choice architect’. By relying upon the use of ‘nudge’ – a particular form of choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives, these techniques constitute a ‘soft’ form of design-based control. But, unlike the static Nudges popularised by Thaler and Sunstein [(2008). Nudge. London: Penguin Books] such as placing the salad in front of the lasagne to encourage healthy eating, Big Data analytic nudges are extremely powerful and potent due to their networked, continuously updated, dynamic and pervasive nature (hence ‘hypernudge’). I adopt a liberal, rights-based critique of these techniques, contrasting liberal theoretical accounts with selective insights from science and technology studies (STS) and surveillance studies on the other. I argue that concerns about the legitimacy of these techniques are not satisfactorily resolved through reliance on individual notice and consent, touching upon the troubling implications for democracy and human flourishing if Big Data analytic techniques driven by commercial self-interest continue their onward march unchecked by effective and legitimate constraints.     

摩洛哥阿拉维君主制统治合法性分析

本文从历史与传统、现代与理性、宗教以及国王个人魅力等四个方面分析了1956年独立后摩洛哥阿拉维君主制统治合法性的基础和来源。作者指出，摩洛哥阿拉维君主制的统治反映了韦伯关于合法统治的三种类型，即合理型、传统型和魅力型，其中，传统型占主导地位并与伊斯兰教紧密相连。迄今，宗教神圣的合法性体现了阿拉维君主制所有统治合法性学说的本质，然而其神圣性也遭到了质疑和挑战。     

Tax differentiation,lobbying, and welfare

To what extent a taxing authority should be granted the power to impose different tax schedules to different groups of taxpayers? Although the policy maker aims at maximizing social welfare, her tax policy may be distorted by the lobbying activity of taxpayers. In this political environment we characterize the conditions under which social welfare can be increased by restricting the set of tax instruments available to the policy maker; i.e., the scope of tax differentiation. We show that full differentiation is more costly, in terms of welfare distortions, when the lobbies are asymmetric in size, while minimal differentiation is more costly when the tax bases are asymmetric across different groups.     

Generalized median social welfare functions

The article considers the construction of social welfare functions when the set of alternatives is the two-dimensional nonnegative orthant, as would be the case if there are two divisible public goods which can be consumed in any nonnegative quantities. With individual and social preferences required to be linear and strictly monotonic, but otherwise unrestricted, we characterize all of the social welfare functions which satisfy binary independence of irrelevant alternatives and anonymity and which satisfy binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, anonymity, and weak Pareto. These classes of social welfare functions are shown to be formally equivalent to the classes of social choice functions characterized by Moulin in his study of strategy-proof social choice with single-peaked preferences.We are grateful to Charles Blackorby, Hervé Moulin, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Satisficing in strategic environments: A theoretical approach and experimental evidence

The satisficing approach is generalized and applied to finite n-person games. We formally define the concept of satisficing and propose a theory that allows satisficing players to make “optimal” decisions without being equipped with any prior. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach.     

Welfare, freedom of choice and composite utility in the logit model

Discrete choice models characterize the alternatives in the choice set by utilities/attributes. The decision making is described by a probability distribution over the choice set. In this paper we introduce a welfare measure based on expected payoff and expected freedom of choice for the simple one parameter logit model. In this case the welfare measure turns out to be the so called composite utility. This means that the composite utility can be interpreted as the combined benefit of expected payoff and expected freedom of choice. The proposed welfare measure can be extended to the linear-in-parameters logit model and nested logit models and others. The proposed welfare measure is formulated in terms of the choice probability distribution. It depends on the form of the probabilities, but not on any particular derivation of the distribution.     

How to reach legitimate decisions when the procedure is controversial

Imagine a group that faces a decision problem but does not agree on which decision procedure is appropriate. In that case, can a decision be reached that respects the procedural concerns of the group? There is a sense in which legitimate decisions are possible even if people disagree on which procedure to use. I propose to decide in favour of an option which maximizes the number of persons whose judged-right procedure happens to entail this decision given the profile. This decision rule is based not only on a profile in the standard sense, but in addition on a profile of judged-right procedures. To justify this decision rule, I present a set of simple axioms leading to it as the only solution.     

Darren: Erotic Interludes in Political Transference

The dilemmas and opportunities of interpellation and intelligibility play out also in the sexual domain. In “Darren: Erotic Interludes in Political Transference,” Stephen Hartman shows how interpellation makes both him and Darren intelligible and therefore anxious: The power of discourse to legitimate desire means that you can lose your legitimacy and fall into abjection if you ever refuse your interpellation. Here Hartman, interpellated by The New York Times announcement of his marriage to another man, desexualizes and abjects his patient by interpellating his desire as a desire to be a married gay guy, a “good gay” too.     

A measure of distance between judgment sets

In the literature on judgment aggregation, an important open question is how to measure the distance between any two judgment sets. This is relevant for issues of social choice: if two individuals hold different beliefs then we might want to find a compromise that lies somewhere between them. We propose a set of axioms that determine a measure of distance uniquely. This measure differs from the widely used Hamming metric. The difference between Hamming’s metric and ours boils down to one axiom. Given judgment sets A and B, this axiom says that if the propositions in ${A \cap B}$ jointly imply that the propositions in A?B share the same truth value, then the disagreement between A and B over those propositions in A?B should be counted as a single disagreement. We consider the application of our metric to judgment aggregation, and also use the metric to measure the distance between preference rankings.     

Corporate fraud,systematic risk,and shareholder enrichment

The impact of the disclosure of alleged illegal corporate activities together with the possible motives for their use increasingly has become the subject of research by financial scholars. These studies primarily analyze the disclosure’s effect on the market returns of the firm’s equity. The consensus of these studies is that the initial disclosure of alleged illegal corporate activities results in significant negative abnormal returns to the existing shareholders. The size of these abnormal returns generally exceeds the actual fines, fees and penalties that the firms eventually experience. The impact of these disclosures on systematic risk and their possible implications for managerial behavior and corporate policy have suffered from relative neglect. The present research seeks to establish what, if any, impact the disclosure of alleged corporate fraud has on systematic risk. Using the data set provided by Karpoff and Lott (1993, The reputational penalty firms bear from committing corporate fraud. J Law Econ, 34, 757–802), this research tests whether securities experience any significant beta shifts upon the initial disclosure of alleged corporate fraud. Empirical tests find evidence consistent with the theory that agents engage in illegal activity in an attempt to enhance share price. The empirical results also provide additional insight into the question of why corporations engage in criminal activity.     

Arrow's paradox and mathematical theory of democracy

Two measures, the weight of coalitions and the probability of situations in decision making, are used to characterize the representativeness, i.e. the capability of individuals to represent the social preference. It is proved that there always exists an individual who represents a majority on average, and an individual who represents a majority in most cases. This result is applied to Arrow's social choice model. It follows that there always exists a dictator who is a representative of the society rather than a dictator in a proper sense. After the concept of dictator has been refined to a dictator in a proper sense, Arrow's axioms become consistent. The idea of optimal representation is extended to limited groups of representatives which make decisions on behalf of the whole society. We consider the cabinet (named by analogy with the cabinet of ministers) which consists of a few representatives with delimited domains of competence, and the council which makes decisions by means of voting. It is shown that the representativeness of optimal cabinets and councils tends to 100% of maximally possible values as the number of their members increases, independently of the size of the society. We suggest a geometric interpretation of optimal representatives, cabinets, and councils, based on approximation formulas for the indicators of representativeness derived for the model with a large number of independent individuals. Finally, for cabinets and councils we establish the consistency of different concepts of optimality with respect to different indicators of representativeness. Our consideration is applicable to multicriteria decision making. An appointment of a cabinet or a council corresponds to selecting a few partial criteria. Therefore, the obtained results can be used for reducing the set of partial criteria to a certain sufficient minimum. The concepts of dictator, cabinet, and council can be understood as models of president, government, and parliament, respectively. Thus our results justify reducing social choice to individual choice or small group choice. Although it is in use in all democratic systems, its acceptability is not evident at all. In other words, we justify the demoncraticity of such forms of political power as the president, the parliament, and the government.     

Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

We characterize completely ordinal and onto choice rules that are subgame perfect of Nash equilibrium (SPE) implementable via randomized mechanisms under strict preferences. The characterization is very operationalizable, and allows us to analyse SPE implementability of voting rules. We show that no scoring rule is SPE implementable. However, the top-cycle and the uncovered correspondences as well as plurality with runoff and any strongly Condorcet consistent voting rule can be SPE implemented. Therefore our results are favourable to majority based voting rules over scoring rules. Nevertheless, we show that many interesting Condorcet consistent but not strongly Condorcet consistent rules, such as the Copeland rule, the Kramer rule and the Simpson rule, cannot be SPE implemented.