Optimal Uniform Pricing Strategy of a Service Firm When Facing Two Classes of Customers

When facing heterogeneous customers, how should a service firm make its pricing decision to maximize revenue? If discrimination is allowed, then priority schemes and differentiated pricing are often used to achieve that. In many applications, however, the firm cannot or is not allowed to set discriminatory prices, for example, list price in retail stores, online shopping, and gas stations; thus a uniform price must be applied to all customers. This study addresses the optimal uniform pricing problem of a service firm using a queueing system with two classes of customers. Our result shows that the potential pool of customers plays a central role in the firm's optimal decision. Depending on the range of system parameters, which are determined explicitly by the primitive data, the firm's optimal strategy may choose to serve only one class of customers, a subset of a class of customers, or a combination of different classes of customers. In addition, the optimal price is in general not monotonic with respect to the potential market sizes because their changes may lead to a major shift in the firm's decision on which customer class to serve. However, unless such a shift occurs, the optimal price is weakly decreasing in the potential market sizes.     

Product Positioning and Pricing Under Production Cost Considerations*

A framework in a competitive environment is proposed that incorporates production cost and economies of scale in the problem of positioning a product for a market segment. The model facilitates the existence of a Nash equilibrium in prices and product positions. As such, firms can simultaneously choose prices and product positions for the segment. This result improves the traditional theory on equilibria points in prices and product positions where firms choose their product positions first and then set their prices. A sensitivity analysis demonstrates the effects of changes in the unit savings derived from economies of scale or the cost of furnishing a product with its attributes by one firm on the product positions, prices, and profits of all competing firms. More important, the paper examines the effect on prices and profits of competing firms when one of the firms repositions its product closer to the segment's ideal point. It is shown that under certain conditions, the profit of a firm may actually decrease as it redesigns its product closer to the segment's ideal point. These conditions assist management to identify the product design beyond which enhancements of the product would lead to lower profits because of increasing production costs. It is also shown that the price of this firm increases. Past research supports the idea that positioning a brand closer to the ideal point, given fixed product positions of competing firms, would lead to greater buyer preferences and eventually higher profits. The price and profits of the competing firm may increase or decrease. Conditions are derived under which a movement towards the segment's ideal point by one firm would lead to higher profits by the competing firm.     

Price Setting With Menu Cost for Multiproduct Firms

We model the decisions of a multiproduct firm that faces a fixed “menu” cost: once it is paid, the firm can adjust the price of all its products. We characterize analytically the steady state firm's decisions in terms of the structural parameters: the variability of the flexible prices, the curvature of the profit function, the size of the menu cost, and the number of products sold. We provide expressions for the steady state frequency of adjustment, the hazard rate of price adjustments, and the size distribution of price changes, all in terms of the structural parameters. We study analytically the impulse response of aggregate prices and output to a monetary shock. The size of the output response and its duration both increase with the number of products; they more than double as the number of products goes from 1 to 10, quickly converging to the response of Taylor's staggered price model.     

The interaction between stock prices and corporate investment: is Europe different?

I find limited evidence of firm learning from stock prices in Europe and uncover multifaceted complementarities between firm informational and operating environments in determining investment sensitivity to stock prices. Specifically, European firms seemingly do not shift away from their own (peer) stock prices even in instances in which their peers’ (own) stock prices become relatively more informative about firms’ fundamentals. This is consistent with European managers adopting more conservative strategies relative to their U.S.-based peers, and stock prices being less revealing in Europe than in the U.S. Furthermore, while a firm may attach equal weight to both its own stock prices and peer price innovations when peer firms are relatively smaller, investment responds more positively to peers’ price shocks than to that firm’s own stock prices when peers are relatively larger. Interestingly, investment sensitivity to peers’ stock prices decreases in peers’ market share, operating performance, and capital intensity. The decrease is accentuated when peer firms have more informative stock prices and are industry leaders or more capital intensive, thereby signaling perceived reduced growth opportunities. Broadly, these results imply that the specifics of the interaction between stock prices and firm behavior in the U.S. do not necessarily generalize to Europe. More important, these different learning patterns are partly attributable to differences in the amount of internal information, which in turn depends on country-level institutional infrastructures.     

Mass Customization and Guardrails: “You Can Not Be All Things to All People”

A mass customization strategy enables a firm to match its product designs to unique consumer tastes. In a classic horizontal product‐differentiation framework, a consumer's utility is a decreasing function of the distance between their ideal taste and the taste defined by the most closely aligned product the firm offers. A consumer thus considers the taste mismatch associated with their purchased product, but otherwise the positioning of the firm's product portfolio (or, “brand image”) is immaterial. In contrast, self‐congruency theory suggests that consumers assess how well both the purchased product and its overall brand image match with their ideal taste. Therefore, we incorporate within the consumer utility function both product‐specific and brand‐level components. Mass customization has the potential to improve taste alignment with regard to a specific purchased product, but at the risk of increasing brand dilution. Absent brand dilution concerns, a firm will optimally serve all consumers’ ideal tastes at a single price. In contrast, by endogenizing dilution costs within the consumer utility model, we prove that a mass‐customizing firm optimally uses differential pricing. Moreover, we show that the firm offers reduced prices to consumers with extreme tastes (to stimulate consumer “travel”), with a higher and fixed price being offered to those consumers having more central (mainstream) tastes. Given that a continuous spectrum of prices will likely not be practical in application, we also consider the more pragmatic approach of augmenting the uniformly priced mass customization range with preset (non‐customized) outlying designs, which serve customers at the taste extremes. We prove this practical approach performs close to optimal.     

Product Differentiation,Multiproduct Firms,and Estimating the Impact of Trade Liberalization on Productivity

This paper studies whether removing barriers to trade induces efficiency gains for producers. Like almost all empirical work which relies on a production function to recover productivity measures, I do not observe physical output at the firm level. Therefore, it is imperative to control for unobserved prices and demand shocks. I develop an empirical model that combines a demand system with a production function to generate estimates of productivity. I rely on my framework to identify the productivity effects from reduced trade protection in the Belgian textile market. This trade liberalization provides me with observed demand shifters that are used to separate out the associated price, scale, and productivity effects. Using a matched plant–product level data set and detailed quota data, I find that correcting for unobserved prices leads to substantially lower productivity gains. More specifically, abolishing all quota protections increases firm‐level productivity by only 2 percent as opposed to 8 percent when relying on standard measures of productivity. My results beg for a serious reevaluation of a long list of empirical studies that document productivity responses to major industry shocks and, in particular, to opening up to trade. My findings imply the need to study the impact of changes in the operating environment on productivity together with market power and prices in one integrated framework. The suggested method and identification strategy are quite general and can be applied whenever it is important to distinguish between revenue productivity and physical productivity.     

Outsourcing Manufacturing: Secure Price‐Masking Mechanisms for Purchasing Component Parts

This paper develops and tests a privacy‐preserving business process that supports the selection of a contract manufacturer by an original equipment manufacturer (OEM), and the determination of whether the OEM or the chosen contract manufacturer will procure each of the components to be used in the manufacture of the OEM's branded product. Our “secure price‐masking (SPM)” technology contributes to procurement theory and practice in four significant ways: First, it preserves the privacy of every party's individual component prices. Second, SPM assures that the contract manufacturers will bid their own private purchase cost (i.e., not add a margin to their cost). Third, SPM is not invertible; i.e., none of the participants can “solve” for the private inputs of any other participant based on its own inputs and the outputs provided to it by SPM. Fourth, the posterior distribution of any other participant's private inputs is practically indistinguishable from its prior distribution. We also describe the results of a proof‐of‐concept implementation.     

The Retail Space‐Exchange Problem with Pricing and Space Allocation Decisions

We consider retail space‐exchange problems where two retailers exchange shelf space to increase accessibility to more of their consumers in more locations without opening new stores. Using the Hotelling model, we find two retailers’ optimal prices, given their host and guest space in two stores under the space‐exchange strategy. Next, using the optimal space‐dependent prices, we analyze a non‐cooperative game, where each retailer makes a space allocation decision for the retailer's own store. We show that the two retailers will implement such a strategy in the game, if and only if their stores are large enough to serve more than one‐half of their consumers. Nash equilibrium for the game exists, and its value depends on consumers’ utilities and trip costs as well as the total available space in each retailer's store. Moreover, as a result of the space‐exchange strategy, each retailer's prices in two stores are both higher than the retailer's price before the space exchange, but they may or may not be identical.     

Financial Hedging and Optimal Procurement Policies under Correlated Price and Demand

We consider a firm that procures an input commodity to produce an output commodity to sell to the end retailer. The retailer's demand for the output commodity is negatively correlated with the price of the output commodity. The firm can sell the output commodity to the retailer through a spot, forward or an index‐based contract. Input and output commodity prices are also correlated and follow a joint stochastic price process. The firm maximizes shareholder value by jointly determining optimal procurement and hedging policies. We show that partial hedging dominates both perfect hedging and no‐hedging when input price, output price, and demand are correlated. We characterize the optimal financial hedging and procurement policies as a function of the term structure of the commodity prices, the correlation between the input and output prices, and the firm's operating characteristics. In addition, our analysis illustrates that hedging is most beneficial when output price volatility is high and input price volatility is low. Our model is tested on futures price data for corn and ethanol from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

TIME‐BASED PRICING AND LEADTIME POLICIES FOR A BUILD‐TO‐ORDER MANUFACTURER

We studied time‐based policies on pricing and leadtime for a build‐to‐order and direct sales manufacturer. It is assumed that the utility of the product varies among potential customers and decreases over time, and that a potential customer will place an order if his or her utility is higher than the manufacturer's posted price. Once an order is placed, it will be delivered to the customer after a length of time called “leadtime.” Because of the decrease in a customer's utility during leadtime, a customer will cancel the order if the utility falls below the ordering price before the order is received. The manufacturer may choose to offer discounted prices to customers who would otherwise cancel their orders. We discuss two price policies: common discounted price and customized discounted price. In the common discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers a single lower price to the customers; in the customized discounted price policy, the manufacturer offers the customers separately for individual new prices. Our analytical and numerical studies show that the discounted price policies results in higher revenue and that the customized discounted price policy significantly outperforms the common discounted price policy when product utility decreases rapidly. We also study two leadtime policies when production cost decreases over time. The first uses a fixed leadtime, and the second allows the leadtime to vary dynamically over time. We find that the dynamic leadtime policy significantly outperforms the fixed leadtime policy when the product cost decreases rapidly.     

Non-parametric measurement of economies of scale and scope in non-competitive environment with price uncertainty

In non-competitive market characterized by heterogeneous firms and price uncertainty, we discuss the measurement of economies of scale and scope due to process indivisibilities arising from the task-specific production processes of multiproduct firm. Two competing DEA cost models—one based on the factor-based technology set and the other based on cost-based technology set, are examined in terms of their relative strengths and weakness to reveal scale and scope economies. Given the assumptions underlying both cost models, it is argued that the latter model may be relatively flexible and empirically demanding over the former one. The flexibilities are described in terms of price uncertainty; firms' heterogeneity; and the control over on the mix and quantities of inputs and their prices. And, as regards the underlying linkage of scale with scope properties with respect to diversified vis-à-vis additive firm, we find that the former model not only fails to exhibit one important property, i.e., the independence between scope properties of diversified firm and scale properties of additive firm, but also reveals one strange property, i.e., falling of scale elasticity of an additive firm irrespective of its no economies or diseconomies of scale possibility.     

Optimal Reserve Prices in Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name‐your‐own‐price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double‐bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single‐bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer‐own list‐price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single‐bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list‐price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double‐bid scenario can outperform a single‐bid scenario in both single‐channel and dual‐channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double‐bid scenario is no less than that in the single‐bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer‐own list‐price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single‐bid and double‐bid scenarios.     

FAIR PRICING

This paper explores the consequences of supposing that consumers see a firm as fair if they cannot reject the hypothesis that the firm is somewhat benevolent towards them. When consumers can reject this hypothesis, some become angry, which is costly to the firm. The desire to appear benevolent can lead firms to adopt third‐degree price discrimination based on the income of different consumer classes while foreswearing third‐degree price discrimination based on differences in the elasticity of demand. It can also explain why prices seem to be more responsive to changes in factor costs than to changes in demand that have the same effect on marginal cost. Lastly, if consumers experience regret or disappointment when faced by increased prices, the model can explain why prices can be more rigid in response to disasters that increase demand dramatically than they are when there is a less substantial increase in demand.     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

PRODUCT OFFERING,PRICING, AND MAKE‐TO‐STOCK/MAKE‐TO‐ORDER DECISIONS WITH SHARED CAPACITY

In an era of mass customization, many firms continue to expand their product lines to remain competitive. These broader product lines may help to increase market share and may allow higher prices to be charged, but they also cause challenges associated with diseconomies of scope. To investigate this tradeoff, we considered a monopolist who faces demand curves, which for each of its potential products, decline with both price and response time (time to deliver the product). The firm must decide which products to offer, how to price them, whether each should be make‐to‐stock (mts) or make‐to‐order (mto), and how often to produce them. The offered products share a single manufacturing facility. Setup times introduce disceonomies of scope and setup costs introduce economies of scale. We provide motivating problem scenarios, model the monopolist's problem as a non‐linear, integer programming problem, characterize of the optimal policy, develop near‐optimal procedures, and discuss managerial insights.     

Committed Versus Contingent Pricing Under Competition

Should capacitated firms set prices responsively to uncertain market conditions in a competitive environment? We study a duopoly selling differentiated substitutable products with fixed capacities under demand uncertainty, where firms can either commit to a fixed price ex ante, or elect to price contingently ex post, e.g., to charge high prices in booming markets, and low prices in slack markets. Interestingly, we analytically show that even for completely symmetric model primitives, asymmetric equilibria of strategic pricing decisions may arise, in which one firm commits statically and the other firm prices contingently; in this case, there also exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Such equilibrium behavior tends to emerge, when capacity is ampler, and products are less differentiated or demand uncertainty is lower. With asymmetric fixed capacities, if demand uncertainty is low, a unique asymmetric equilibrium emerges, in which the firm with more capacity chooses committed pricing and the firm with less capacity chooses contingent pricing. We identify two countervailing profit effects of contingent pricing under competition: gains from responsively charging high price under high demand, and losses from intensified price competition under low demand. It is the latter detrimental effect that may prevent both firms from choosing a contingent pricing strategy in equilibrium. We show that the insights remain valid when capacity decisions are endogenized. We caution that responsive price changes under aggressive competition of less differentiated products can result in profit‐killing discounting.     

Selling Finite Capacity in Bulks*

We consider a firm that owns a limited capacity for the delivery of services or for the production of customized products. Potential buyers specify the amount of capacity they will require for the execution of their intended services, goods or projects. Based on the size of the requirement, the firm makes a bid while being challenged in various ways: (1) it only knows the underlying probability function from which its customers’ reservation prices are drawn, (2) arrival of additional future requests is stochastic, and, (3) the firm knows in advance neither the magnitude of these potential requests nor the buyer's reservation price. The firm aims to maximize its expected profit by choosing its pricing mechanism. The fact that capacity is demanded in varying amounts distinguishes this problem from most available literature in which standard sizes are sold or partial fulfillment and displacement are permitted. Lacking such allowances presents a new challenge to the firm as in conjunction with pricing it should also address the issue of various sizes requests’ compatibility to achieve optimal utilization of its capacity in order to maximize expected profit. In this article, we consider two approaches of handling this problem: myopic and foresighted. We formulate and analyze the problem to obtain the firm's optimal bidding decisions as well as managerial insight about the optimal bid level and its important role in coordinating buyers’ requests. Furthermore, due to this role, pricing patterns in this environment are different than those in standard unit sales.     

Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Management with Regular and Expedited Supplies

We consider a periodic‐review inventory system with regular and expedited supply modes. The expedited supply is faster than the regular supply but incurs a higher cost. Demand for the product in each period is random and sensitive to its selling price. The firm determines its order quantity from each supply in each period as well as its selling price to maximize the expected total discounted profit over a finite or an infinite planning horizon. We show that, in each period if it is optimal to order from both supplies, the optimal inventory policy is determined by two state‐independent thresholds, one for each supply mode, and a list price is set for the product; if only the regular supply is used, the optimal policy is a state‐dependent base‐stock policy, that is, the optimal base‐stock level depends on the starting inventory level, and the optimal selling price is a markdown price that decreases with the starting inventory level. We further study the operational impact of such supply diversification and show that it increases the firm's expected profit, reduces the optimal safety‐stock levels, and lowers the optimal selling price. Thus that diversification is beneficial to both the firm and its customers. Building upon these results, we conduct a numerical study to assess and compare the respective benefit of dynamic pricing and supply diversification.     

面向价值共创的服务衍生供需决策优化研究

针对制造企业服务衍生时，制造企业与客户间可能存在的"双重边际效应"问题，以制造企业服务衍生特征刻画为基础，构建了服务衍生供需价值创造模型，比较分析了分散和集中两种决策情形下的价值创造，发现集中决策下供需双方能够创造整体更高的价值，但制造企业存在陷入"服务悖论"的风险，由此，设计了有助于协调供需价值分配的收益共享契约。研究表明，收益共享契约能够缓解制造企业与客户间的"双重边际效应"，契约能够激发制造企业以更为积极主动的态度改进服务衍生方案，提升方案的性价比，并由此促进市场需求，实现供需双方的价值共创。