Local union mergers: Frequency,forms, and national union policy

This paper presents the results of a survey on the characteristics of almost 1,900 union mergers. It was found that a large proportion of national unions had some local mergers, but a majority of cases occurred in a few very active unions. Most mergers were absorptions of smaller locals into larger ones. Formal requirements for local mergers, either through general policies or constitutional clauses, were infrequent, but national level governing bodies appear to have substantial control over the approval of mergers. Suggestions are made for the further study of local mergers in relation to bargaining structure, local autonomy, membership participation, and local effectiveness.     

The compensation of national union presidents: Moderating effects of union size

Over the last forty years numerous reseachers from the fields of economics, finance, and human resources management have proposed and empirically evaluated a number of models in efforts to identify determinants of executive compensation. Recently, similar research efforts have been undertaken to identify compensation determinants for union officers, both at the local and national levels. As an extension of these works, this study found measures of union financial strength, job complexity, performance and tenure in office to be directly related to national union presidents’ compensation. Although union income and relative union member earnings were the strongest determinants of officer compensation for the sample of unions as a whole, analyses of three subgroups of unions based on size revealed very different findings for large as opposed to small and medium-sized unions.     

Outsourcing and union power

The outsourcing of union work and jobs either diffuses or diminishes union membership, depending on perspective and situation. The correlation of trends in union membership to trends in union power, while less than perfect, has until recently been relatively strong over the past sixteen years. The fact that as diverse a sample of unions as AFSCME, SEIU, and UAW have chosen to make outsourcing a prominent labor/public relations issue suggests that the correlation continues to be perceived by the union movement to be significant, notwithstanding the efforts of the “new” leadership of the AFL-CIO to break that link with respect to union political power by “taxing” member unions and their members to contribute both money and militancy to the 1996 election cycle. Although outsourcing may lead only to the diffusion of union membership either within or between unions, as opposed to the diminution of union membership, this fact has not received a great deal of attention. The net effect on total union membership of outsourcing from one union employer to another union employer is unclear, although the effect on the membership of the union at the outsourcing employer is not. The redistribution of membership within a union as a result of outsourcing is likely to have little immediate impact on union power. However, as even the best case scenario presented above suggests, it may have significant long-run deleterious effects on union bargaining power by taking labor out of a sheltered market and putting it into potentially competitive market. This is particularly likely to be the case when outsourcing (1) places the outsourced work into a different industry or wage contour and (2) creates the possibility of moving from sole-source to multiplesource supplier arrangements. The redistribution of membership between unions as a result of outsourcing is unlikely to have a major impact on union power broadly defined. It can have, however, serious deleterious effects in terms of the power of an individual union, as suggested in my “competitive case” scenario. The fact that one union’s losses due to outsourcing may be another union’s gain is of little consolation to the losing union. That act, in and of itself, may make the threat of outsourcing a potential union “Achilles heel” at the bargaining table by placing it into competition with some other, perhaps unknown, union as well as possibly nonunion competition. The most obvious threat to union power comes from outsourcing that diminishes union membership overall by transferring jobs from union to nonunion employers. The willingness and ability of employers to move work/jobs entirely out of the orbit of union control constitutes, in terms of power and particularly union bargaining power, a revisitation of the phenomenon of the “runaway shop.” It may also be viewed as a proactive form of hiring permanent replacements for (potentially) striking workers. The union options in dealing with such a challenge are to endeavor to preclude outsourcing through legislation or collective bargaining or to chase the work by organizing the unorganized, hopefully with the help of the unionized outsourcing employer. Neither option may be easy, but as the 1996 auto industry negotiations suggest, the former may be less difficult than the latter. The possibility that outsourcing from union to nonunion employer may provide unions with the power to organize from the top (outsourcer) down (outsourcee) cannot be entirely ignored as the issue of supplier “neutrality” reportedly was raised in the 1996 auto negotiations. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union political and financial power, by virtue of its impact on the level or distribution of union membership, can and may well be offset by an increase in union activism—as measured by dues levels, merger activity, organizing commitment, and political action. The adverse effects of outsourcing on union bargaining power are more problematical from the union standpoint. The effect of outsourcing, whatever its rationale or scenario, appears to be to put union labor back into competition. Thus, outsourcing constitutes yet another challenge to the labor movement in its ongoing and seemingly increasingly unsuccessful battle to take and keep U.S. union labor out of competition by proving itself able and willing to organize to the extent of the market and standardizing wages in that market.     

Outsiders in the union: organizing,consent, and union recognition campaigns

Although outsiders have played an important role in social protest in the U.S., outsiders’ role in the U.S. labor movement has been the focus of spirited debate. Debate about outsider organizers, in particular, reached a fevered pitch in the late 1990s, and continues today. This paper scrutinizes two of the core assumptions of this debate: that insider and outsider organizers operate differently on union recognition campaigns, and that workers respond to them differently in these settings. We analyzed 153 in-depth interviews with workers and organizers conducted at the height of the debate, in order to answer two questions: What is the role of outsider organizers during private sector union recognition campaigns, and how do outsider organizers secure workers’ consent in these settings? All of the organizers in our data-set were graduates of the AFL-CIO’s Organizing Institute, and 64 of them were outsiders. The outsider organizers in our data-set confronted barriers that insider organizers did not, including workers’ concerns about their youth, inexperience and lack of professionalism, and their own inability to relate to workers. While many critics of outsider organizers claim that these barriers are insurmountable, we found the opposite to be true. The vast majority of outsider organizers in our data-set successfully secured workers’ consent by demonstrating commitment, building relationships, and being honest and forthright. After proposing changes in organizer training and leadership development in response to these findings, we conclude with a brief discussion of the enduring debate about outsiders’ role in social protest in the U.S.     

Involvement with unions,union belief perspectives,and desires for union membership

This article addresses two theoretical problems associated with models of desires for union membership. First, does union involvement influence desires for membership by (1) locating unions in the routines of everyday life and thus engendering habitual desires for membership or (2) by shaping general beliefs about unions and, thus, creating ideological desires for membership? This study of the working class in Hamilton, Ontario supports both explanations, although the path of influence through beliefs is stronger. Second, why do a number of general union beliefs have net effects on desires for membership? This study finds that different types of beliefs are salient for different groups of workers. Therefore, a wide range of general beliefs must be considered if the desires for union membership of a diverse population are to be adequately predicted.     

From union hegemony to union disintegration: Collective bargaining in cement and related industries

The cement industry provides an interesting example of the impact of collective bargaining where management determines that it cannot afford a strike, yields to extreme union demands, but deludes itself that it can withstand the economic impact of unionism under such circumstances because almost all competitors are similarly situated and labor costs can be partially offset by automation. The small Cement, Lime, and Gypsum Workers Union won not only high wages and benefits, but imposed restrictive rules as severe as those in any industry. Eventually, however, foreign competition and economic realities forced the companies to revolt, and the union found that it could not sustain strikes. An ill-conceived merger broke up, an independent union was formed, and today unionism, once so strong, is weak and divided as management imposes or forces acceptance of its conditions. The story, while unique in many ways, resembles what has occurred in other industries with high fixed costs, militant unions, and the reluctance of management to sacrifice current gains for longer run needs. Professor Emeritus of Management and former Director, Industrial Research Unit. Ms. Sue Torelli, Librarian, Industrial Research Unit, and Kevin Barry, Librarian, Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University, provided helpful information and numerous documents.     

Right-to-work and union compensation structure

There are many reasons to expect that right-to-work legislation should affect unionism, independently of whether or not such legislation reflects the sentiments of the electorate. The strongest reason is that employees protected by right-to-work legislation can quit a union without quitting their job. This should make collective job actions more difficult and prompt local union leaders to strive more for consensus among members. If so, unions in right-to-work states should negotiate less pay for seniority than do unions in non-right-to-work states. PSID wage data generally confirm this prediction. The authors thank James Bennett, Art Blakemore, Dan Heldman, Barry Hirsch, Stuart Low, and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier draft.     

Heterogeneity and union membership determination

This paper formalizes theoretical and empirical analyses of the determination of union membership. It is argued that an important (and usually ignored) consideration affecting the union status of workers is the externalities between (potential) union members: The gain a worker derives from unionization is affected by the characteristics of the workers who already belong to the union, and the gain union members derive from admitting an additional worker to membership depends on that worker’s characteristics. Thus, two conditions must hold if a worker is to join a union: (1) unionization should increase his wage, and (2) union members must benefit from adding him. The main implication of this analysis is that in a given industry/occupation a union is more likely to form among workers withlower rents. To test this proposition, I present an empirical analysis using data from the May 1979 Current Population Survey (CPS) Public Use Sample. A procedure for measuring worker’s rent is discussed and certain relationships between rent and union membership are identified. I am most indebted to Finis Welch for many valuable comments and suggestions throughout the preparation of this study. I have also benefited from comments made by Mark Killingsworth, Kevin Murphy, Mark Plant, the editor of this journal, and an anonymous referee. The generous availability of the computer facilities at Unicon Research Corporation is appreciated.     

New strategies in union organizing

The AFL-CIO has called for new and more effective approaches in organizing. This paper reviews the classical organizing model and then identifies four strategic approaches to organizing that have been developed or re-emphasized in recent years including the corporate power strategy, the collective bargaining strategy, community acceptance and integration strategy, and the coordinated/pooled resource strategy. Factors affecting the use and success of these strategies are discussed. It is concluded that while some have promise, their limited use and mixed outcomes will probably minimize their significance in union organizing during the 1980’s.     

Repartnering after first union disruption

Using data from the 1995 General Social Survey (N= 2,639), this study examines two competing repartnering choices made by Canadians after first union disruption: marriage or cohabitation. About 42% of women and 54% of men form a second union 5 years after union disruption, with cohabitation being the most prevalent choice. The timing of second union formation is more rapid among former cohabitors than among the divorced. Widowhood is an acute barrier to repartnering. Gender is the most crucial determinant in the repartnering process; men have a higher rate of second union formation than women. The hazard rate of second union formation also varies by age at union disruption, duration of the first union, prior fertility (for men only), education, employment, and religion.     

AFSCME as a political union

AFSCME has emerged as the third largest union in the U. S. and the largest public-sector affiliate of the AFL-C1O. Since the 1960s, its leadership has vigorously pursued organizing and political action. Despite its highly visible role in U.S. politics, little systematic research exists on the union in this context. I examine AFSCME's political apparatus, the scope of its electoral and legislative involvement, its political ideology and legislative priorities, and its political effectiveness. I also explore the controversy regarding the use of compulsory dues for political purposes, and AFSCME's resulting rebate procedure. I find that AFSCME donates a considerable portion of its resources to political action (between 10 percent to a third of its budget at the international level), that its political ideology is focused heavily on expanding the rights and economic status of public employees, and that AFSCME has emerged as a prominent, if not the prominent, political union in the U.S. labor movement.     

The division of union rents

In this paper, a median voter model that recognizes the trade-off between higher wages and lower levels of employment is presented. It is argued that a seniority-based layoff rule creates the opportunity for mutually beneficial side-payments between older and younger workers. As a result, older workers reap more of the rents of unionization than do younger workers. The resulting distribution of union rents is found to be consistent with existing empirical evidence. We would like to thank Mike Baye and Gene Grossman for most useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining errors, of course, are solely our responsibility.     

Member participation in union activities: Perceptions of union priorities,performance, and satisfaction

Data obtained from union respondents of a survey using a national probability sample that is representative of the U.S. labor force revealed that members’ perceptions of their unions’ effectiveness in obtaining both extrinsic and intrinsic benefits and the unions’ responsiveness to membership were significantly related to member participation in union activities. Union satisfaction was inversely related to participation. Perceptions of union power and service and demographic variables, such as age and education, were found to have less significant linkages with member participation.     

The changing scope of union organizing

This paper presents a profile of the change in the scope of union organizing and provides empirical support for the numerous observations about the declining importance of jurisdictions in the selection of organizing targets. The scope of organizing is measured in terms of the distributions of the NLRB certification elections of 18 selected unions for 1973–1975 and 1983–1985. Diversity and concentration in organizing and its impact on election outcome are examined. The authors thank Azia Merchant for his assistance.     

Prizes in an industrial union environment

This paper proposes a short-run cross-sectional theory of how employers in an industrial union work environment try to foster and reward greater efforts and more productivity by individual workers by offering a “prize” in the form of shift premiums, overtime pay, and accident risk premiums. The theory is evaluated empirically with a set of micro data from a large industrial establishment. We found that the effect of such prizes is to steepen the upward portion of the earnings profile, dampen the compression of earnings in a union environment, and increase earnings differentiation.