Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments

This paper reviews economic policies and instruments available to the developed countries to reduce unwanted migration from developing countries, not all of which is irregular migration. Countries generally welcome legal immigrants and visitors, try to make it unnecessary for people to become refugees and asylum seekers, and try to discourage, detect, and remove irregular foreigners. There are three major themes: 1. There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants, and the distinction between migrants motivated by economic and non–economic considerations is often blurred. Perhaps the best analogy is to a river – what begins as one channel that can be managed with a dam can become a series of rivulets forming a delta, making migration far more difficult to manage. 2. The keys to reducing unwanted migration lie mostly in emigration countries, but trade and investment fostered by immigration countries can accelerate economic and job growth in both emigration and immigration countries, and make trading in goods a substitute for economically motivated migration. Trade and economic integration had the effect of slowing emigration from Europe to the Americas, between southern Europe and northern Europe, and in Asian Tiger countries such as South Korea and Malaysia. However, the process of moving toward freer trade and economic integration can also increase migration in the short term, producing a migration hump, and requiring cooperation between emigration and immigration destinations so that the threat of more migration does not slow economic integration and growth. 3. Aid, intervention, and remittances can help reduce unwanted migration, but experience shows that there are no assurances that such aid, intervention, and remittances would, in fact, lead migrants to stay at home. The better use of remittances to promote development, which at US$65 billion in 1999 exceeded the US$56 billion in official development assistance (ODA), is a promising area for cooperation between migrants and their areas of origin, as well as emigration and immigration countries. There are two ways that differences between countries can be narrowed: migration alone in a world without free trade, or migration and trade in an open economy. Migration will eventually diminish in both cases, but there is an important difference between reducing migration pressures in a closed or open world economy. In a closed economy, economic differences can narrow as wages fall in the immigration country, a sure recipe for an anti–immigrant backlash. By contrast, in an open economy, economic differences can be narrowed as wages rise faster in the emigration country. Areas for additional research and exploration of policy options include: (1) how to phase in freer trade, investment, and economic integration to minimize unwanted migration; (2) strategies to increase the job–creating impacts of remittances, perhaps by using aid to match remittances that are invested in job–creating ways.     

Social effects of migration in receiving countries

This paper examines the impact of post-1945 migration into Western, Middle, and Northern Europe from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, and migration to the traditional immigration countries by Asian and Latin American immigrants, on the social structures of receiving countries. Between 1955 and 1974, 1) traditional migration to the US and Australia became less important for European countries while traditional receiving countries accepted many immigrants from developing countries; and 2) rapid economic revival in Western and Northern Europe caused a considerable labor shortage which was filled by migrant workers especially from Southern Europe, Turkey, and Northern Africa, who stayed only until they reached their economic goals. Since 1974, job vacancies have declined and unemployment has soared. This employment crisis caused some migrants 1) to return to their countries of origin, 2) to bring the rest of their families to the receiving country, or 3) to lengthen their stay considerably. The number of refugees has also significantly increased since the mid-970s, as has the number of illegal migrants. After the mid-1970s, Europe began to experience integration problems. The different aspects of the impact of migration on social structures include 1) improvement of the housing situation for foreigners, 2) teaching migrants the language of the receiving country, 3) solving the unemployment problem of unskilled migrants, 4) improvement of educational and vocational qualifications of 2nd generation migrants, 5) development of programs to help unemployed wives of migrants to learn the language and meet indigenous women, 6) encouraging migrants to maintain their cultural identity and assisting them with reintegration if they return to their original country, 7) coping with the problems of refugees, and 8) solving the problems of illegal migration. Almost all receiving countries now severely restrict further immigration. [Those policies should result in improved development of aid policies towards sending countries. Immigration from other countries to those of the European Economic community should be limited to that for humanitarian reasons.     

Bulgarian Turkish emigration and return

The main factors which determined the 1989 migration of Turks in Bulgaria back to Turkey are discussed. Background history is provided. After World War I, Turks in bulgaria comprised 10% of the total population. Bulgarian policy had been, up to the 1980s to send Rumelian Turks back, but the policy after 1980 was one of a national revival process to integrate Turks into the developed socialist society. Muslim traditions, customs, and Turkish language were interfered with. International disfavor resulted. In May 1989, the Communist Party declared, in an effort to show democratic ideals, open borders. Thus began the new emigration wave. 369,839 people fled to the Turkish border. 43% of the 9.47 ethnic Turks in bulgaria went to Turkey within 4 months. The numbers decreased in November, and soon after the communist regime ended. New laws were adopted allowing Turks to assume their original Turkish names. The huge migration was clearly political, and as such, the emigrant Turks should be determined as refugees and asylum seekers. The provocation of ethnic Turks was used by the communist regime to solve potential social conflicts. Not only did Turks flee to escape from violence or for religious, cultural, and moral reasons but also due to free market initiatives begun in Turkey in the early 1980s which improved Turkish quality of life. Food and consumer goods were cheaper and economic advantages were perceived. Emigrants were primarily peasants with lower levels of education, professional qualifications, and labor skills. 154,937 (42%) returned to bulgaria and 58% stayed in Turkey to comprise 25% of the former Turkish population. During this period, tensions between countries was high.l Bulgarians actively encouraged emigration and Turkey welcomed it. The emigrants to Turkey were seen as foreigners (muhacir or gocmen) but were received with good will and were readily accepted into menial positions. Emigrants were confronted with political, linguistic, and cultural differences. The unifying factor was the Islamic religion. For those returning to Bulgaria, the change in regime meant the government worked to solve the emigrants' housing problems and teaching Turkish in primary and secondary schools. The result of this massive migration has been a change in the demographics and social structure of Bulgaria, and the realization that forceful migration is inefficient in solving problems.     

EU Integration & Emigration Consequences: The Case of Lithuania

This paper analyses the causes, consequences, and policy implications of Lithuanian emigration following the country’s European Union (EU) accession in May 2004. After placing Lithuanian emigration in its historical context, the study assesses the recent dynamics, including the driving forces and characteristics of Lithuanian emigration at both the international and domestic level. The study finds that the primary determinants of this movement are both demand‐ and supply‐side factors. On the demand side, the labour shortages, decline in the working age population, and desire for cheaper labour in Western European countries function to attract Lithuanian labour. Concurrently, lower wages, higher unemployment, and the generally less developed economic conditions in Lithuania are encouraging Lithuanians to take advantage of the greater mobility that came with EU accession. The expanding networks linking migrants and potential migrants are facilitating this out‐migration, as well as the social mind‐set by which emigration is a perceived solution to socio‐economic difficulties. This study concludes that the consequences of this new emigration reality are mixed. The free movement of workers has helped to relieve pressure on the domestic labour market, drive down unemployment, place upward pressure on wages, and increase the remittances rate to Lithuania. However, concern is not ill‐founded; recent emigration has introduced labour market shortages, placed greater demographic pressure on the country, and increased the likelihood of brain drain. This study argues, therefore, that while Lithuanian emigration cannot and should not be stopped, Lithuania does have policy alternatives as a sending‐country that will help to mitigate the costs of emigration and maximize the benefits for the country’s long‐term development.     

Best Practices to Reduce Migration Pressures

Are there best practices to foster economic development, reduce population growth, and protect the environment in source countries of unauthorized migration, in a manner that reduces emigration pressures and redirects migration towards legal channels? This paper outlines cooperative actions that can be undertaken by both source and receiving countries to better manage the movements of people over national borders. There are two broad approaches to foster wanted migration and to reduce unwanted migration. First, maximize migration’s payoffs by ensuring that the 3 Rs of recruitment, remittances, and returns foster economic and job growth in emigration areas. Second, make emigration unnecessary by adapting trade, investment and aid policies, and programmes that accelerate economic development and thus make it unnecessary for people to emigrate for jobs and wages. Most of the changes needed for stay–at–home development must occur in emigration areas, but immigration areas can cooperate in the management of immigration, guest workers, and students, as well as in promoting freer trade and investment, and in targeting aid funds. In a globalizing world, selective immigration policies may have important development impacts, as with immigration country policies toward students, and workers in particular occupations, such as nurses and computer programmers, as well as with mutual recognition of occupational licenses and professional credentials. Trade policies affecting migration are also important, such as trade in services and laws regulating contracts between firms in different countries that allow the entry of lower wage workers as part of the contract. opening channels for legal migration can deter irregular migration.     

Nigerians in China: A Second State of Immobility

China’s rapid economic development has been accompanied by new forms of immigration. Investors and professionals from developed countries are increasingly joined by a diverse group of immigrants from around the world. While there is a large body of academic literature on Chinese emigration, China’s new role as a country of immigration has received less scholarly attention. This paper addresses the dynamics of South–South migration to China through a study of Nigerians in Guangzhou, a major international trading hub. The analysis is based on qualitative interviews and participant observation among African traders and migrants in Guangzhou. The paper contends that Nigerian immigration to China epitomizes global migration trends towards a diversification of migration flows, commercialization of the migration process and increased policing of foreigners within national borders. China was rarely the preferred destination of this study’s Nigerian informants but, rather, a palatable alternative, as their aspirations to enter Europe and North America were curtailed by restrictive immigration regimes. They escaped a situation of involuntary immobility in Nigeria through short‐term visas obtained with the help of migration brokers. However, opportunities for visa renewals are scant under the current Chinese immigration policy. Undocumented migrants find their mobility severely inhibited: They must carefully assess how, when and with whom they move about in order to avoid police interception. This is a business impediment, as well as a source of personal distress for migrants who engage in trade and the provision of trade‐related services. The situation can be described as a “second state of immobility”: the migrants have succeeded in the difficult project of emigration, but find themselves spatially entrapped in new ways in their destination country.     

Channels of Entry and Preferred Destinations: The Circumvention of Denmark by Chinese Immigrants

As globalization spread during the 1990s, and especially since the turn of the millennium, European states have increasingly claimed their right to assert their sovereignty by regulating migration at the level of the individual (OECD, 2001: 76–81). Political parties have succeeded in gaining support on policy statements pertaining exclusively to migration. For example, recent legislation in Denmark restricts the categories of persons eligible as refugees to “Convention refugees” satisfying only the narrowest international criteria set out in the UN Refugee Convention. The civil rights of asylum seekers are restricted by prohibiting marriage while their applications are under review. To limit family reunification among immigrants, the present Danish Government has even prohibited immigrants with permanent residence status and Danish citizens from bringing non‐Danish spouses under age 24 into the country. These attempts at border enforcement and immigration control have been described by some critics as the endeavours of European Union (EU) members to build a “Fortress Europe” against immigrants from developing countries. Policy decisions and the implementation of various measures from finger printing to radar surveillance to control immigrants have corroborated such perceptions, but this paper will show that gaining entry to a highly controlled country such as Denmark from a poorer country such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) is fairly straightforward. Politicians may wish to convey the impression of being in control of international mobility by launching diverse anti‐immigration acts, but since the immigration embargo of the early 1970s all EU countries have received millions of immigrants, and increasingly permit or accept immigrants of various kinds to reside and work within their borders (Boeri et al., 2002). Immigration from developing countries is not evenly distributed throughout the EU, but rather targets specific destinations. This article will attempt to explain the direction of Chinese immigration flows to Europe in response to labour‐market demand, rather than as a consequence of “loopholes” in a country's legal or welfare provisions. By analysing historical and demographic data on the PRC Chinese in Denmark, I attempt to demonstrate that, despite being a European country with one of the lowest asylum rejection rates for PRC Chinese, the scope of Chinese asylum seekers and regular and irregular migrants arriving by way of family reunification remained limited in the 1990s compared to southern, central, and eastern European countries. My analysis of Danish data in relation to Chinese migration suggest that destinations related to the globalization of Chinese migration is more determined by labour and capital markets than the presumed attraction of social welfare benefits provided by a European welfare state such as Denmark.     

Refugee movements and Turkey

There has been a long tradition in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic of receiving refugees. There were Jewish refugees from the Spanish Inquisition, Hungarians and Poles fleeing revolts in 1848-9, and those of Turkish descent and usually from the Balkans. Concurrent with this trend is the history of refugees and immigrants leaving Turkey, such as many Armenians, Greeks and Jews leaving at the turn of the century, and after 1923 and the Treaty of Lausanne. Little is currently published on the topic. This article defines a refugee; provides an overview of the refugee problems of the 1980's due to Bulgarian, Kurdish, and Turkish refugees; and the legal and political aspects. As a country of origin, there is discussion of the political and economic aspects of Turkish asylum seekers in Europe. The potential refugee flows to and from Turkey are also examined. I) For this study, refugees are victims of political violence and are persecuted for political or religious beliefs, ethnic or racial background, or war. In Turkey, there are national refugees, international refugees outside the Convention, and UNHCR Convention refugees. During the 1980's all 3 groups were arriving: from eastern Europe, Iranian Kurds, Iraqis, and ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and Afghanistan. The Turkish restricted acceptance of the 1951 Convention on Refugees creates serious humanitarian and security consequences for refugees other than those from eastern Europe and of Turkish ethnicity. Political considerations play an important role in treatment where security threats outweigh humanitarian need. The case is given for Kurdish refugees. II) Asylum seekers from Turkey in Western Europe was determined between 1986-90 to be 185,000 from applications. These figures have risen steadily due to the political instability and military activity of areas bordering Iraq and Syria, the Emergency Region. In addition there are economic and employment problems, and there has been a suspension of human rights. Europe in return has tightened legislation and procedures to differentiate economically motivated refugees from authentic political asylum seekers. Further research is needed to investigate refugee problems. Further refugees may come due to the promotion of a Black Sea Cooperation Region and easier crossings of borders to the former Soviet Republics. Ethnic Turks in Moldavia or Romania or Bulgaria may leave due to unrest. Factors affecting asylum seekers are improvements in Turkey's human rights record, repeal of bans of the Kurdish language, completion of the South Eastern Development Project, and the European government policy on asylum.     

National conceptions,transnational solidarities: Turkey,Islam and Europe

In this article, I examine the interplay between the institutionalization of Islam in Europe and the transnationalism of Turkey's Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Based on extensive fieldwork in Turkey, Austria, Belgium, France and Germany, I demonstrate not only the salience of the nation‐state prerogative on the part of both European states and the Turkish state but also the tension between national conceptions of Muslim identity on both sides amid transnational solidarities. I also argue that, to a certain extent, European policies of detransnationalizing the Muslim field in Europe also intersect with the Diyanet's transnational politics vis‐à‐vis Turkish/Muslim immigrants in their common resistance to the deculturalization of Muslims in Europe. While European countries try to nationalize their respective Muslim communities into their cultural and juridical framework through reterritorialization, the Diyanet has increasingly deterritorialized its activities to preserve a Muslim identity engrained in Turkishness – hence, the coexistence of both a tension and mutual accommodation between Europe and Turkey.     

East-west vs. south-north migration: effects upon the recruitment areas of the 1960s

"This article is focused on Turkey and Turkish emigration abroad. It examines integration of second generation immigrants in Western Europe and various forces fostering Islamic identity. It then compares political discourse on immigration in France and Germany. It concludes that the resurgence of ethnic identity as the basis for effective political action in widely divergent societies is a key feature of the post-Cold War period."     

Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey: A Narrative Inquiry

Abstract

Turkey has been experiencing a migration policy transformation in the wake of a new ruling entitled the ‘Foreigners and International Protection Law’ (FIPL). This qualitative inquiry investigates this major change process by focusing on the planned reorganisation which is a result of the legislation process, with the aim of connecting the change process to a change model. The researcher interviewed twenty-seven middle and upper-level managers and experts from the Foreigners, Border, and Asylum Department (FBAD) and Asylum and Migration Bureau (AMB) of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior. Both their implementation of the change process and perceptions on such a transformation period were investigated. The study also examined the change process of the irregular migration and asylum regime within Turkey’s bid for full European Union membership as well as implementation of the draft FIPL. This study provides an example of a policy change process by analysing how governmental practice and legislation have evolved with regard to irregular migration, asylum seekers, and refugees in Turkey. The results noticeably reveal that, instead of seeing irregular migration and asylum as merely a threat to national security or a welfare issue, Turkey has chosen a way of developing a humanitarian approach in both the legislative and administrative fields. This is the first study which attempts to analyse a particular policy change process in the migration and asylum regime in Turkey. The results could influence policy dynamics and set priorities by suggesting policy solutions.     

Refugees in Greece: Facing a Multifaceted Labyrinth

The years after 2015 were remarkable for the reception and accommodation schemes of refugees fleeing Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The EU‐Turkey common statement of March 2016 and, most of all, the sealing of the Balkan corridor, blocked the flow of refugees towards central Europe through Greece, testing the readiness of the Greek authorities to take action to meet a series of urgent needs (accommodation, nutrition, asylum procedures, health) and social integration processes (education, training, access to labour). Approximately 45,000 refugees are settled in refugee camps or urban settlements all over the country. Those entrapped in the Eastern Aegean islands should be returned to Turkey, which is considered a “safe third country”. The purpose of this article is to shed light on a phenomenon that is ongoing and challenges a series of policies and legal principles both in Greece and the EU.     

A clash of civilizations? Examining liberal‐democratic values in Turkey and the European Union1

Turkey's proposed entry into the European Union (EU) has been undermined by Europeans’ perceptions of Turkish–European cultural differences, particularly regarding the liberal‐democratic values that the EU promotes (democracy, rule of law, and respect for and appreciation of minority/human rights). Yet, cross‐national research on values has not focused on Turkey, the EU, and these liberal‐democratic values, leaving assumptions of cultural differences and their explanations untested. Through analyses of World and European Values Survey data (1999–2002), this article asks whether people in Turkey have the same values regarding democracy, rule of law (versus religious and authoritarian rule), and minority/human rights as people in EU member and candidate states (as of 2000)? What factors explain these values? I find that people in Turkey support democracy to the same extent as people in EU member and candidate states, but people in Turkey are more supportive of religious and authoritarian rule and are less tolerant of minorities. Although the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis expects liberal values to be ordered according to countries’ religious traditions, with western Christian the most supportive and Islamic the least, only for tolerance of minorities values is this pattern found. Instead, economic development most consistently explains differences between Turkey and EU member and candidate states in support for these values. I conclude with calls for theoretical refinement, particularly of the clash of civilizations thesis, along with suggestions for future research to examine more Muslim and Orthodox countries; I discuss the debate over Turkey's EU entry.     

Latin American Migration to Spain: Main Reasons and Future Perspectives

Over the last two decades, Spain has evolved rapidly from a classic labour exporter to a labour importer. Until the 1930s Spain's migration history was predominantly marked by emigration to the Americas, and from the end of World War II until the early 1970s by emigration to some industrialized countries in Western Europe. For the first time in modern times, Spain is now the second country in the world with large‐scale immigration. Its strategic location, a relatively permissive immigration policy and economic opportunities derived from Spain's entry into the European Community have positioned this country as a major destination for immigrants. Additionally, since the mid‐1990s international migration in Spain has dramatically changed in origin composition. Despite the common perception of Africa as the most important source of immigration, some Latin American countries, in a very short time, have become some of the major sources of immigration to Spain; indeed, the term “Latin‐Americanization” has been coined to describe this process. This being so, the aim of this article is twofold. First, we examine the main reasons behind the extremely rapid increase of Latin American migration to Spain during the last decade. Then we briefly discuss some future perspectives.     

Transnational Turkish–German community in limbo. Consequences of political tensions between migrant receiving and sending countries

A profound political tension between Turkey and Germany has gained an overall dimension on the political agenda of the intra-European migration discussion since 2016. As close trade partners, Turkey and Germany became gradually political adversaries on different issues. 2016 and the following years marked a turnover in the already worsened mutual relations. A series of political issues such as recognising the Armenian genocide in 1915, open allegations and critical views against the Turkish President and prohibition of election campaigns for Turkish government politicians in Germany had driven political relations between the two countries to nadir. This obscure situation led the Turks of Germany (The phrases “Turks of Germany” or “Turkish migrants” are persons with migration background from Turkey who still bear Turkish citizenship or formerly were Turkish citizens. This group's ethnic or confessional identity is not recognised; their legal status and country of origin are preponderant.), who have close ties to their ancestors’ homeland and consider Germany as the centre of their lives, nolens volens into a limbo situation. Within the “guest-worker program” framework in the second part of the 20th century, highly industrialised countries of Western Europe recruited migrant workers from different countries. This workforce should perform mostly blue-collar labour in the receiving countries. After six decades of Turkish presence in Germany, the grandsons and granddaughters of the former guest workers are well-represented in almost every sector of the society. However, their loyalty and integrability to the receiving country are challenged by German politics, especially by the governments of conservative chancellor Angela Merkel (2005–2021). If Turks of Germany feel closely connected to Turkey and Turkish culture (Workers from Turkey brought with them to the country of immigration their own “cultural assets”. Those are, language, religious and customary beliefs, social habits, dress, music, literature, social codes and manners, shared history, food, etc. However, migrants in the receiving country undergo a process of hybridity under the influence of the new cultural environment. (Please see: Bhabha [The location of culture, New York, NY: Routledge, 1994]) Culture within the framework of post-colonialism has also been discussed in Edward W. Said's book “Culture and Imperialism” (Said [Kültür ve Emperyalizm. Kapsamlı Bir Düşünsel ve Siyasal Sorgulama Çalışması. Hil Yayın: İstanbul, 1998]). If Turks of Germany feel closely connected to Turkey and Turkish culture, they are not recognised as integrable members of the society. Identity-based and culture-oriented policies inexorably influence the willingness of migrants to feel like equal members in the host society, and it applies even to the new generations with migration backgrounds. The question of migrant integration is the most emotionally debated issue in Germany and seems to be the greatest challenge in the political agenda. Beyond the bilateral Turkish–German issues, the growing xenophobic sentiments, islamophobia and Europe-wide political populism may cause a persistent bilateral tension in the medium term between the countries and among the transnational and native communities. Anti-Turkish rhetoric in the media alienates the Turkish community and has a value to jeopardise integration efforts more and more.     

Refugees of Turkish origin: "coerced immigrants" to Turkey since 1945

"While several studies (in both Turkish and English) have been made on migration to the Ottoman Empire from the Caucasus and the Balkans during the nineteenth century...very little systematic and comprehensive research on migration has been undertaken on the period since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. This article, which aims to partially fill the gap, is divided into three parts: the issue of national refugees (refugees of Turkish origin) in relation to Turkey's overall refugee policy; Turkey's policy towards national refugees; and the volume and causes of refugee migration to Turkey since 1945." (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA)     

The International Migration System Between Turkey and Russia: Project‐Tied Migrant Workers in Moscow

The last 50 years of emigration history in Turkey indicate that the migratory flows of Turkish citizens have consecutively become a part of various migratory systems. In this essay, our main aims are twofold. First, we attempt to document the dynamics and mechanism of project‐tied migration from Turkey to the Russian Federation, focusing in particular on the case of project‐tied workers migrating from Turkey to Moscow. Second, this effort intends to elaborate on the research on migratory systems between Turkey and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central and Northern Asian countries, mainly referring to macro‐, micro‐ and meso‐level factors affecting the relevant migration systems. In this paper, in which we tackle the various migration systems with which Turkey is involved, we conclude by arguing that parallel to the new migration patterns that have been experienced throughout the post‐Soviet geographies, the internalization process of Turkish constructors within the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy has widened the direction of the migration flows from Turkey by introducing new migrant worker profiles to different regions. In this sense, short‐term labour migrants, shuttle traders and in particular project‐tied migrant workers show not only the important role that migrants may play in the shift towards a market‐based economy in the Russian Federation, but also how they have become crucial actors of the migration system between Turkey and Russia.     

Migration Trends and Migration Policy in Europe

This paper summarizes the latest information on both stocks and flows of migrants in Europe, focusing specifically on arrivals from developing countries. It starts out by setting this into its historical context by showing how flows of labour migrants were followed by flows of family members, and later by asylum seekers and refugees. Then it looks more closely at recent migration data, though it finds these to be frequently incomplete and inconsistent. The most comparable cross–national data come from the OECD and Eurostat, which indicate that Germany had the largest flows of migrants in the 1990s followed by the United Kingdom. In addition to these arrivals there are probably between 2 and 3 million undocumented immigrants in Europe – accounting for 10 to 15 per cent of the total population of foreigners. The paper also traces the countries from where immigrants are leaving. Sources vary considerably from one immigration country to another, reflecting a number of factors, of which the most important are former colonial links, previous areas of labour recruitment, and ease of entry from neighbouring countries. In recent years, however, immigrants have been coming from a wider range of countries and particularly from lower–income countries. The paper also examines changes in immigration policy. National policies were fairly liberal during the 1950s and 1960s, before becoming restrictive from the 1970s on. Recently, however, a number of governments have been revising their policies to take better account of employment and demographic needs. The paper also traces the emergence of a cross–national European response to immigration, as European Union (EU) countries have become more concerned about their common external frontier. Thus far European countries have done little to try to control migration through cooperation with sending countries. They could, for example, direct Official Development Assistance to those countries most likely to send immigrants, though few appear to have done so in a deliberate fashion. The paper concludes that in the future immigration to the EU is likely to increase, both as a result of the demand for labour and because of low birth rates in the EU. In the short and medium term many of these requirements are likely to be met by flows from Eastern Europe, particularly following the eastward expansion of the EU. But, the longer–term picture will probably involve greater immigration from developing countries.     

‘Implicit’ remittances in family relationships: The case of Bangladeshis in Italy and beyond

In this article – based on 100 in-depth interviews with divided and reunited Bangladeshi families in Italy, Bangladesh, and London – we discuss how remittances are influenced by gender relations within the family, what social meanings they assume, what family memberships they reinforce, how the intertwining between migration and family cycle affects them. By adopting an intersectional approach, we show how economic transfers are normally sent to the family of the first-migrant man, although they may assist the emigration of the wife's male relatives: a phenomenon that we call ‘implicit remittances’. A second set of results concerns changes over time in remittances and two events of the family cycle are decisive: the family reunification in Italy and the demise of parents in the country of origin. In both cases, remittances are reduced, cease, or are limited to gifts in particular circumstances.     

“We will Manage It” – Did Chancellor Merkel's Dictum Increase or Even Cause the Refugee Movement in 2015?

In public and scientific debates about the dynamics of the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, there are highly controversial positions concerning the statement on August 2015 by Chancellor Merkel: “We will manage it” Did this dictum actually increase or even unleash the refugee migration towards Europe in 2015? Was Germany's governmental policy against the legal European and national frame? Based on an analysis of legal documents and public statements, the article first reconstructs the development of refugee immigration into the EU, especially to Germany, in 2015 and reviews whether the German government violated law and opened one-sided borders. Based on survey data of 4,500 refugees in 2016, it then analyses whether the Merkel dictum significantly changed the volume and the reasons why refugees decided to flee to Germany. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.