The axioms and algebra of ambiguity

This paper continues a study of event ambiguity as a primitive concept. Axioms are described for a comparative ambiguity relation on an arbitrary event set that are necessary and sufficient for a representation of the relation by a functional that is nonnegative, vanishes at the empty event, and satisfies complementary equality and submodularity. Uniqueness characteristics of representing functionals are discussed. The theory is extended to multifactor events, where marginal ambiguity and additive representations arise.     

Correction to: Persuasion under ambiguity

Theory and Decision - In Proposition 4, lines 3, 4 and 8, 9 were scrambled by mistake during the pagination process of the online published article.     

A simplified axiomatic approach to ambiguity aversion

This paper takes the Anscombe–Aumann framework with horse and roulette lotteries, and applies the Savage axioms to the horse lotteries and the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms to the roulette lotteries. The resulting representation of preferences yields a subjective probability measure over states and two utility functions, one governing risk attitudes and one governing ambiguity attitudes. The model is able to accommodate the Ellsberg paradox and preferences for reductions in ambiguity.     

The role of ambiguity in manipulating voter behavior

In the standard account of ambiguous political rhetoric, ambiguity is equated with voter uncertainty: a politician takes an ambiguous stance on an issue by announcing to the voters a lottery over the positions he might take on that issue. The present account equates ambiguity with multiple meanings: a politician takes an ambiguous stance on an issue if his rhetoric admits of different meanings in different contexts. The linguistic account of ambiguity is based upon the formal logical concept of a piecewise definition. Piecewise defined terms provide the politician with the means of uttering statements each of which has seperate meanings for different voters.This paper formalizes the multiple-meaning account of ambiguity and traces the implications of the formalization for political strategy. The findings are: ambiguous rhetoric is often optimal; the conditions under which it is optimal are simple; and the selection of optimal ambiguous rhetoric is rarely simple.     

The ambiguity of social return policies in the Netherlands

Social procurement policies, which aim to create employment opportunities for vulnerable groups, such as the long‐term unemployed and the disabled, have become increasingly popular in recent years. Despite their growing popularity, empirical research on this topic is limited. Combining insights from the social policy and public administration literatures, we explore the development and implementation of “social return” policies by the Dutch government. These policies are a form of social procurement that require private employers to spend a percentage of public tenders to hire individuals far removed from the labor market. Social procurement appears, by definition, to be a form of social investment. However, our analysis of the ideas underlying its use in the Netherlands suggests that significant contradictions exist, with evidence of neoliberal New Public Management tendencies, social investment, and the more recent form of public administration, New Public Service. Using extensive document analysis of parliamentary documents, discussions and evaluative reports from 2008 to 2014, we reveal the tensions inherent in the Dutch approach and discuss possible implications for our understanding of social policy and administration as well as social protection.     

Measuring ambiguity preferences: A new ambiguity preference survey module

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - Ambiguity preferences are important to explain human decision-making in many areas in economics and finance. To measure individual ambiguity preferences, the...     

Persuasion under ambiguity

Theory and Decision - This paper introduces a receiver who perceives ambiguity in a binary model of Bayesian persuasion. The sender has a well-defined prior, while the receiver considers an...     

Elicitation of preferences under ambiguity

This paper is about behaviour under ambiguity—that is, a situation in which probabilities either do not exist or are not known. Our objective is to find the most empirically valid of the increasingly large number of theories attempting to explain such behaviour. We use experimentally-generated data to compare and contrast the theories. The incentivised experimental task we employed was that of allocation: in a series of problems we gave the subjects an amount of money and asked them to allocate the money over three accounts, the payoffs to them being contingent on a ‘state of the world’ with the occurrence of the states being ambiguous. We reproduced ambiguity in the laboratory using a Bingo Blower. We fitted the most popular and apparently empirically valid preference functionals [Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and α-MEU], as well as Mean-Variance (MV) and a heuristic rule, Safety First (SF). We found that SEU fits better than MV and SF and only slightly worse than MEU and α-MEU.     

No-betting Pareto under ambiguity

It has been argued that Pareto-improving trade is not as compelling under uncertainty as it is under certainty. The former may involve agents with different beliefs, who might wish to execute trades that are no more than betting. In response, the concept of no-betting Pareto dominance was introduced, requiring that putative Pareto improvements must be rationalizable by some common probabilities, even though the participants’ beliefs may differ. In this paper, we argue that this definition might be too narrow for use when agents are not Bayesian. Agents who face ambiguity might wish to trade in ways that can be justified by common ambiguity, though not necessarily by common probabilities. We accordingly extend the notion of no-betting Pareto dominance to characterize trades than are “no-betting Pareto” ranked according to the maxmin expected utility model.

     

Statistical decisions under ambiguity

This article provides unified axiomatic foundations for the most common optimality criteria in statistical decision theory. It considers a decision maker who faces a number of possible models of the world (possibly corresponding to true parameter values). Every model generates objective probabilities, and von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility applies where these obtain, but no probabilities of models are given. This is the classic problem captured by Wald’s (Statistical decision functions, 1950) device of risk functions. In an Anscombe–Aumann environment, I characterize Bayesianism (as a backdrop), the statistical minimax principle, the Hurwicz criterion, minimax regret, and the “Pareto” preference ordering that rationalizes admissibility. Two interesting findings are that c-independence is not crucial in characterizing the minimax principle and that the axiom which picks minimax regret over maximin utility is von Neumann–Morgenstern independence.     

The sensitivity of subjective probability to time and elicitation method

The paper reports the results of a survey designed to elicit probability judgements for different types of events: ‘pure chance’ events, for which objective probabilities can be calculated; ‘public’ events, about which there may be some discussion in social groups and the media; and ‘personal’ events, such as those relating to crime or accidental injury. Even among respondents deemed to be ‘well-calibrated’ in the domain of pure chance events we find limited sensitivity to the ‘temporal scope’ of public and personal events—this being especially marked for personal events. We discuss possible reasons and some implications for policy-related survey work.

Insurer ambiguity and market failure

A series of studies investigate the decision processes of actuaries, underwriters, and reinsurers in setting premiums for ambiguous and uncertain risks. Survey data on prices reveal that all three types of these insurance decision makers are risk averse and ambiguity averse. In addition, groups appear to be influenced in their premium-setting decisions by specific reference points such as expected loss and the concern with insolvency. This behavior is consistent with a growing analytical and empirical literature in economics and decision processes that investigates the role that uncertainty plays on managerial choices. Improved risk-assessment procedures and government involvement in providing protection against catastrophic losses may induce insurers to reduce premiums and broaden available coverage.This article is part of a larger effort supported by the National Science Foundation on The Role of Insurance, Compensation, Regulation, and Protective Behavior in Decision Making about Risk and Misfortune. We greatly appreciate the many helpful comments and suggestions by our colleagues on the project: Jon Baron, Colin Camerer, Neil Doherty, Jack Hershey, Eric Johnson, and Paul Kleindorfer. Support from NSF Grant #SES8809299 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Hard evidence and ambiguity aversion

This article shows that if an allocation rule can be implemented with unlimited information certification, then it can also be implemented with limited information certification if the designer can use ambiguous communication mechanisms, and if agents are averse to ambiguity in the sense of maxmin expected utility. The reverse implication is true if there is a single agent and a worst outcome.     

Judged knowledge and ambiguity aversion

Competence has recently been proposed as an explanation for the degree of ambiguity aversion. Using general knowledge questions we presented subjects with simple lotteries in which they could bet on an event and against the same event. We show that the sum of certainty equivalents for both bets depends on the judged knowledge of the class of events. We also elicited the decision weights for events and complementary events. We found a similar effect of knowledge on the sum of decision weights.     

Sampling experience reverses preferences for ambiguity

People often need to choose between alternatives with known probabilities (risk) and alternatives with unknown probabilities (ambiguity). Such decisions are characterized by attitudes towards ambiguity, which are distinct from risk attitudes. Most studies of ambiguity attitudes have focused on the static case of single choice, where decision makers typically prefer risky over ambiguous prospects. However, in many situations, decision makers may be able to sample outcomes of an ambiguous alternative, allowing for inferences about its probabilities. The current paper finds that such sampling experience reverses the pattern of ambiguity attitude observed in the static case. This effect can only partly be explained by the updating of probabilistic beliefs, suggesting a direct effect of sampling on attitudes toward ambiguity.     

Risk,ambiguity, and insurance

In a series of experiments, economically sophisticated subjects, including professional actuaries, priced insurance both as consumers and as firms under conditions of ambiguity. Findings support implications of the Einhorn-Hogarth ambiguity model: (1) For low probability-of-loss events, prices of both consumers and firms indicated aversion to ambiguity; (2) As probabilities of losses increased, aversion to ambiguity decreased, with consumers exhibiting ambiguity preference for high probability-of-loss events; and (3) Firms showed greater aversion to ambiguity than consumers. The results are shown to be incompatible with traditional economic analysis of insurance markets and are discussed with respect to the effects of ambiguity on the supply and demand for insurance.University of Chicago Graduate School of BusinessUniversity of Pennsylvania The Wharton School     

Non-expected utility risk premiums: The cases of probability ambiguity and outcome uncertainty

This paper discusses two problems. (a) What happens to the conditional risk premium that a decision maker is willing to pay out of the middle prize in a lottery to avoid uncertainty concerning the middle prize outcome, when the probabilities of other prizes change? (b) What happens to the increase that a decision maker is willing to accept in the probability of an unpleasant outcome in order to avoid ambiguity concerning this probability, when this probability increases? We discuss both problems by using anticipated utility theory, and show that the same conditions on this functional predict behavioral patterns that are consistent both with a natural extension of the concept of diminishing risk aversion and with some experimental findings.     

The impact of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion on annuity and saving choices

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty - We analyze the impact of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion on the competing demands for annuities and bequeathable savings using a lifecycle recursive utility...