Cognitive rationality and alternative belief measures

In this article, we first examine the various criticisms of the probabilistic model. Then we introduce capacities in order to show that if a probability measure corresponds to anesthetizing the belief of the agent's knowledge, it is then possible to suggest another type of rationality—namely, being able to describe a wise and a rash behavior when facing risk—and therefore another model of belief under uncertainty. While trying to specify various alternative measures, possibility, necessity, and measures resulting from a triangular norm or from a triangular conorm, we finally try to define the field of application of the probabilistic model as well as a sign of the rationality choice: constraint of mass-unity for traditional rationality, and constraint of duality for the one we present.This article is a revised version of a paper presented during the FUR V Congress, Duke University, North Carolina, USA, June 10–13, 1990. I am indebted to Bertrand Munier, Alain Chateauneuf, Olivier Favereau, Jacques-François Thisse, Bernard Walliser, and Kip Viscusi for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.     

诸神之争的再阐释:一个社会学的结构视角

世俗化及逆世俗化范式的对立其实蕴含着更大的连续性,即如何理解宗教多元主义背后的诸神之争,总的来说,韦伯之后那些解释宗教变迁的理论范式均未突破韦伯对宗教的比较研究范畴,难以在当前复杂而多元的文化环境下为个人提供总体指导,但是二者共同揭露了诸神之争条件下西方宗教工具理性和价值理性交互作用所促成的理性化的动力机制,即西方宗教维护自身价值理性的方式从中世纪教会主导的政治性垄断过渡到现代性条件下宗教多元主义的市场化竞争。     

Negotiation support: Development of representations and reasoning

The general importance of negotiations and bargaining as means of decision making has given rise to considerable research within two broad paradigms. The behavioral paradigm has attempted to discover rationality in specific situations in order to generalize. The formal paradigm has assumed a general rationality which could be applied to specific problems. This strict dichotomy imposes unnecessary restrictions on the use of formal approaches to structure, represent, and support negotiators. Logic-based approaches, such as rule-based formalism, make it possible to blend unique and specific aspects of a problem, with general reasoning mechanisms and rationality postulates. This paper introduces rule-based formalism and discusses its advantages and disadvantages. It attempts to present its ability to represent complex decision processes and to reason using formal structures. The approach is illustrated with several simple examples.     

Market uncertainty and the process of belief formation

Subjective or personal belief formation has been up to now grounded on axioms (e.g., the axioms of Savage) that can be described asintrospection axioms, for they bear only on judgments formed by the individual within himself (e.g., judgments on the ordering of the “acts” in Savage's contribution), excluding every reference to other, possibly external, sources of opinion formation. This current view, linked to the traditional concept ofinstrumental economic rationality, implicitly assumes cognitive capacities that are most of the time out of the reach of any individual. Therefore this view is little or improperly used in the practical world of economics and/or management. An alternative view of belief formation on a market is offered in this article, grounded on a much more modest demand of cognitive capacities from the individual and on a different concept of economic rationality known ascognitive rationality. The model introduces to this end the global concept of market psychology as well as the concept of regular revision of the sets of opinions. Belief formation then appears as a process of deliberation between the individual and the market, rationality emerging within this process as deeply intertwined with the way the individual revises his opinions during the process. The rational treatment of beliefs in view of reaching a decision can consequently be carefully distinguished from their rational formation process.     

Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction

The problem of finding sufficient doxastic conditions for backward induction in games of perfect information is analyzed in a syntactic framework with subjunctive conditionals. This allows to describe the structure of the game by a logical formula and consequently to treat beliefs about this structure in the same way as beliefs about rationality. A backward induction and a non-Nash equilibrium result based on higher level belief in rationality and the structure of the game are derived.     

Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory.     

现代宗教是理性选择的吗质疑宗教的理性选择研究范式

本文在关注宗教社会学理论如何给现代社会的宗教现象以合理的解释的同时,对运用理性选择理论解释现代宗教的取向提出商榷。尽管理性选择理论非常强势,号称有相当普遍的解释力,但本文还是试图对以理性选择理论来解释现代社会宗教的有效性提出质疑,认为 “宗教经济”范式中的宗教市场的“供方”与“求方”是理解宗教的错误逻辑,在工具理性和价值理性两个重要概念中有相互混淆和偷换之嫌。本文最后指出,目前仅以宗教市场理论研究中国宗教具有一定的危险性,必须谨慎地使用。     

"家族理性"与家族企业治理的几个问题

"家族理性"是以家族及其事业的整体荣誉、整体利益最大化和稳定发展为最高价值取向而支配人去思考、推理、判断、行事的心理认知结构。家族理性与个人理性、集体理性不同,是基于传统文化背景对个人理性的超越。中国社会家族企业治理中所存在的问题,如产权问题、信用问题、治理结构等,运用家族理性的概念和理论能够得到合理的解释。     

An Experiment on Rational Insurance Decisions

We describe the results of an experiment on decision making in an insurance context. The experiment was designed to test for the underlying rationality of insurance consumers, where rationality is understood in usual economic terms. In particular, using expected utility as the preference function, we test for positive marginal utility, risk aversion, and decreasing absolute risk aversion, all of which are normal postulates for any microeconomic decision context under uncertainty or risk. We find that there the discrepancy from rational decision making increases with the sophistication of the rationality criteria, that irrationality concerning fair premium contracts is uncharacteristically high, and that the slope of absolute risk aversion seems to depend on the format of the insurance contract. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Rationality for Economists?

Rationality is a complex behavioral theory that can be parsed into statements about preferences, perceptions, and process. This paper looks at the evidence on rationality that is provided by behavioral experiments, and argues that most cognitive anomalies operate through errors in perception that arise from the way information is stored, retrieved, and processed, or through errors in process that lead to formulation of choice problems as cognitive tasks that are inconsistent at least with rationality narrowly defined. The paper discusses how these cognitive anomalies influence economic behavior and measurement, and their implications for economic analysis.     

Individual rationality and the concept of social welfare

This paper, written in October 1974, deals with some game aspects of the social choice problem. The question asked is whether there exists a social decision rule satisfying the conditions imposed by Arrow over all the preference profiles that may logically arise under it (in the sense of being compatible with individual rationality). This question is answered in the affirmative. The meaning of this result is that if Arrow's condition of unrestricted domain is modified so as to exclude any profile which contradicts individual rationality, then an Arrovian social welfare function can be shown to exist (subject to the assumption that whenever the social outcome is in doubt, individuals use the maximin criterion in order to choose their voting strategy).This research was written up in October 1974 at Northwestern University and was partially supported by the National Science Foundation.     

Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument

Probabilistic theories of rationality claim that degrees of belief have to satisfy the probability axioms in order to be rational. A standard argument to support this claim is the Dutch Book argument. This paper tries to show that, in spite of its popularity, the Dutch Book argument does not provide a foundation for normative theories of rationality. After a presentation of the argument and some of its criticisms a problem is pointed out: the Dutch Book argument applies only to situations with a specific formal structure. Several attempts to justify the argument for more general situations are considered and rejected. The only way to remedy the shortcoming, it is argued, seems to be the acceptance of a far-reaching and highly implausible empirical hypothesis.     

How robust is the rationality assumption in economics? A statistical test based on student grade distributions

This note re-addresses the question of the rationality of economic actors in a new setting. We examine the distribution of final course grades for a “Principles of Economics Class” in an effort to draw conclusions about rational student work effort. Based on the concepts of the opportunity cost of time, the relative reward for earning various grades (based on university codes for determining grade points) and the concept of rationality, we expect to find a greater percentage of grades at the lower end of the distribution for each grade level. We find statistical evidence that there are more students at the lower end of each grade interval than at the upper end. This result is consistent with what economists have long conjectured: students are rational in the allocation of study time.     

科举、商品化与社会平等:清代广西土司社会的“文明化”

本文探讨了清代中央王朝在广西土司地区推行科举以及该地方社会因应这一政策而逐步“文明化”的过程。文章首先描述了广西土司地区依据土地的占有与使用而建构起来的社会结构与身份体系，继而梳理了清初以来中央王朝在该地区推行科举的历史进程，并说明清政府的科举政策如何与地方社会进行互动，进一步导致了土司社会的重构。在此基础上，本文利用地方文书材料，探讨了地方社会群体如何通过商品化手段转变身份，进而追求社会平等与自由的“文明化”过程。     

Is the Disposition of Constrained Maximization Chosen Rationally?

One of the most important issues in moral philosophy is whether morality can be justified by rationality. The purpose of this study is to examine Gauthier’s moral theory, focusing on the disposition of constrained maximization, which is the main thrust of his project to justify morality rationally. First of all, I shall investigate Gauthier’s assumption and condition for the rationality of the disposition of constrained maximization so as to disclose that the disposition of constrained maximization is not necessarily chosen by rational agents. Then I shall explore his other arguments including ones for the reinterpretation of rationality and the self-critical reflection of rational beings, which can be considered as his further efforts to make the disposition of constrained maximization a rational choice. By exploring them, I shall attempt to indicate that those arguments are not valid so long as he clings to the maximizing conception of rationality and thereby this conception of rationality itself is not enough to provide morality with a basis.     

The Expansion of Peasant Rationality： An Analysis of the Creators of the “China Miracle”——Challenging Existing Theories and Proposing New Analytical Approaches

在中国,农民占多数,长期以来农民被视为传统保守的力量。长期日常农业生产方式下形成的农民理性,在农业社会内部的功效是有限的,主要是生存理性。而这种理性以其惯性进入工商业社会后会形成扩张势态,产生一种农民理性与工业社会优势结合的“叠加优势”,释放出传统农业社会和现代工商业社会都未有的巨大能量。要理解“中国奇迹”,必须理解中国农民;要理解农民,必须理解农民理性。以农民理性中的关键性词语来说明农民理性扩张是如何造就“中国奇迹”的,需要跳出传统与现代二元对立的思维定式,高度重视社会变革中的民性民情民意。     

第三部门的兴起及价值理性的回归

第三部门的兴起在全球方兴未艾 ,这种社团革命缘于西方国家福利制度的失灵和市场的失灵。第三部门的兴起不是传统社会中的民间组织的复兴 ,而是对以理性为基础的现代社会的政府及市场的失灵进行纠正 ,也是对现代社会工具理性过度膨胀所造成的种种社会问题的解决途径。就某种程度而言 ,第三部门的兴起缓解了现代社会工具理性和价值理性的紧张关系 ,使价值理性回归成为可能。因此 ,第三部门的研究对转型的中国具有重要的现实意义。     

曼海姆:社会重建时代的理性与非理性研究

曼海姆指出,现代西方社会危机根源于理性与非理性在社会发展中的失调,主要表现在:人类控制非理性能力发展的不均衡与分配的不平等;工业社会的功能理性导致实质理性的丧失;大众政治的非理性对现代民主的威胁;个人和社会处在一种“有组织的不安全”状态。曼海姆基于批判理性主义的立场,试图通过弘扬教育、实施民主、制定计划,来重建一种理性与情感协调的社会,以解决社会的危机。     

Culture and the Explanation of Choice behavior

This paper shows how alternative, culturally-determined motivational forces can be substituted for self-interest or rationality in the theory of choice. Several possibilities are considered, including the replacement of preference optimization by such propellants as the selection of the `second best' or the `central' option. It is argued that although all choice behavior, even that consistent with the alternatives considered, can ultimately be understood as satisfying the criterion of rationality, richer and more meaningful explanation is obtained by focusing on culturally significant alternative motivations when the latter turn out, in particular environments, to be more important than self-interest.     

"人的自我中心"与"理性"--兼评鲍曼的《现代性与大屠杀》

人的自我中心与理性是现代性的两个主要推动力和特征,也是后现代着力批判的对象."人的自我中心"与现代"理性"具有种种复杂关系,这种关系造成了现代理性的种种问题和矛盾.理性只有重新获得德性维度和反省能力,才能在促使人的自我中心的发展之后,与感性和信仰一道,超越人的自我中心.而个人生活的重新社会化同时也是新的生活共同体的建立,则是现代性问题的化解之道.