Fertility transition in a rural,Catholic population: Bavaria, 1880–1910

The decline of human fertility that occurred in Europe and North America in the nineteenth century, and elsewhere in the twentieth, remains a topic of debate largely because there is no accepted explanation for the event. This paper uses district-level data from Bavaria to study the correlates of the decline of fertility in that German kingdom in the nineteenth century. Bavaria's fertility transition was later and less dramatic than in other parts of Germany. Our results for Bavaria indicate that the European Fertility Project was right about the role of religion and secularization, but missed an important role for the economic and structural effects stressed by economic historians.     

Quantitative aspects of marriage,fertility and family limitation in nineteenth century America: Another application of the coale specifications

This paper deals with three aspects of the decline in the fertility of white women in the United States from 1800 to 1920. The first concerns the portion of the secular decline in the total fertility rate which was due to changes in marriage rates and the portion due to decreases in marital fertility rates. The second concerns the fraction of couples in the nineteenth century who acted effectively to reduce their fertility and the third deals with the importance of abortion as a family-limiting practice among white couples in the nineteenth century.     

The decline of non-marital fertility in Europe, 1880-1940

Abstract Between 1880 and 1940, to take approximate dates, illegitimate fertility rates in Europe dropped precipitously, falling in most countries by 50% or more. The rates used throughout this paper relate extra-marital births to the number of unmarried (i.e. single, widowed and divorced) women; we use a standardized index, I ({ih}) to be discussed later. In Fig. 1 we present most of the European series of I ( h )'s that can be computed from existing census and vital registration data. Although there are interesting exceptions the general picture is clear: a decline in illegitimate fertility commenced in most countries in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and was arrested in the 1920's and 1930's. Once it had begun in a country, the downward course was swift and uninterrupted, until non-marital fertility had been cut in half.     

From natural fertility to family limitation: The onset of fertility transition in a sample of German villages

Utilizing data from a sample of German village genealogies, it is possible to document the changes in reproductive patterns on the family level that started to take place in Germany during the nineteenth century and formed the basis for the secular decline in fertility which eventually encompassed the entire country. One striking finding from this study was the substantial diversity among the small sample of villages in terms of the timing of the emergence of family limitation. While couples in all villages who married during the last half of the eighteenth century appeared to be characterized predominantly by natural fertility the emergence of family limitation began as early as the turn of the nineteenth century in some places and as late as the end of the nineteenth century in others. Occupational differentials with respect to family limitation were also examined. There is little evidence that changes in birth spacing played an important part in the initial phase of the fertility trnsition. Rather, the underlying process appears to involve a change from fertility patterns that were characterized by the absence of parity-dependent control to one in which attempts to terminate childbearing in response to the number of children already born becomes widespread.     

Smallpox and Epidemiological-Demographic Change in Europe: The Role of Vaccination

The relationship between smallpox epidemics, overall mortality and population growth, as reflected in an excess of births over deaths, has been examined with regard to the main sources of evidence from different parts of Europe. Epidemiological-demographic changes concomitant with different phases in the introduction of immunisation against the disease have been assessed in the light of evidence from records showing some causes of death as well as numbers of burials. By the eighteenth century; smallpox epidemics appear to have become predominant as an influence on fluctuations in overall mortality in much of Europe. Evidence is reviewed which suggests that although inoculation had probably protected many from smallpox after the mid-eighteenth century, to an extent that could have reduced overall mortality, vaccination enthusiastically promoted after 1800 had a dramatic epidemiological-demographic impact. Data from many sources have been summarised and indicate that the disease was virtually brought under control in North Western Europe during the course of the nineteenth century. Smallpox had probably caused between 8 and 20 per cent of all deaths directly in eighteenth-century Europe as well as unquantifiable secondary and associated morbidity and mortality. The removal of such a deleterious disease from a chain of infections affecting the population at this time, accounted for much of the increasingly more important role of mortality decline as the significant factor in demographic change. The evidence is circumstantial, but suggests that the unprecedented population growth of the early decades of the nineteenth century could in large part have been due to the control of smallpox through vaccination measures. The virtual elimination of the disease as a killer in Europe by the end of the century, following legislation and revaccination programmes was a unique achievement with further consequences for sustained population growth and improvements in health which for many were the only source of improvements in the standard of life.     

Marital Fertility Decline in the Netherlands: Child Mortality, Real Wages, and Unemployment, 1860–1939

Previous studies of the fertility decline in Europe are often limited to an earlier stage of the marital fertility decline, when the decline tended to be slower and before the large increase in earnings in the 1920s. Starting in 1860 (before the onset of the decline), this study follows marital fertility trends until 1939, when fertility reached lower levels than ever before. Using data from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands (HSN), this study shows that mortality decline, a rise in real income, and unemployment account for the decline in the Netherlands. This finding suggests that marital fertility decline was an adjustment to social and economic change, leaving little room for attitudinal change that is independent of social and economic change.     

Modernization and Tradition in the Recent History of Italian Fertility

The secular decline of Italian fertility, started in the last decade of the nineteenth century, came to an end in the early 1950'sand has recovered slightly in the last fifteen years. Italian experience seems to follow, with a twenty-year lag, the experience of the more advanced western European populations. At present, with an average of 2.5 children per marriage, Italian fertility is very close to the French and to the average European level.At the regional level, two contrasting patterns can be detected. On one side stands the very low fertility of the North and of the Center, mostly below replacement in the last thirty years;on the other, the still high fertility of the South.In the North and in the Center, where the decline started earlier, fertility has fallen well below replacement level in the last thirty years. In the South, where the decline started in the late 1920's and early 1930's, a large family system still prevails, and the spreading of voluntary control faces barriers setup by a long historyof cultural isolation,attachment to tradition and religion. In the last 15 years, however, the gap has narrowed slowly, more because of an upturn of fertility in the North and in the Center than because of the decline in the South.Another interesting feature of Italian fertility is low class differentials: the fertility of the most prolific segment (farmers, farm laborers) is only 20 percent higher than the fertility of the less prolific professional groups. Finally, Italian experience provides an interesting example of the changing relationship linking the economic level of the population and fertility changes; in 1931-51 a negative correlation linked the changes in fertility to the economic level of the region, while in 1951-61 and 1961-66 a very high and positive correlation can be observed.As for the future trends in fertility, two factors may have an important role. In the first place, on the one hand, the economic policy of the government, aiming at reducing the economic gap between the South and the rest of the country, may accelerate the leveling of regional fertility differentials. The same effect, on the other hand, may be reached by more liberal legislation, now under way, for birth control and family planning propaganda.     

Rethinking the “early” decline of marital fertility in the united states

In this article, I rely on new estimates of nineteenth-century mortality and the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series to construct new estimates of white fertility in the nineteenth-century United States. Unlike previous estimates that showed a long-term decline in overall fertility beginning at or before the turn of the nineteenth century, the new estimates suggest that U.S. fertility did not begin its secular decline until circa 1840. Moreover, new estimates of white marital fertility, based on "own-children" methods, suggest that the decline in marital fertility did not begin in the nation as a whole until after the Civil War (1861-1865).     

Spatial Analysis of the Causes of Fertility Decline in Prussia

This article contributes to the geographic analysis of fertility decline in the demographic transition in Europe. We reanalyze Galloway, Hammel, and Lee's (1994) Prussian data with spatial analysis methods. Our multivariate analysis provides evidence of the predictive effect of both economic and cultural variables. Furthermore, even after all of the observable economic, social, and cultural variables have been controlled for, our findings show that a significant unexplained geographic clustering of fertility decline remains. We then specify spatial econometric models, which show that in addition to economic and cultural factors, socio‐geographic factors such as being adjacent to areas of sharp fertility decline are also needed to understand the pattern of fertility decline. These results provide new support for the role of social diffusion in the process, while allowing for the direct structural effects of economic change.     

The Decline of marital fertility in Japan

Summary Studies concerning the demographic history of Tokuwara and Meiji Japan suggest that fertility rose substantially before declining during the twentieth century. Were the motivations and circumstances which held down natality during the feudal period similar to those which account for the modern fertility decline and the low birth rate obtaining in the Japan of to-day? The thesis of this paper is that the pre-modern situation was fundamentally different from the modern one. During the Tokugawa era infanticide and abortion were used, independently of parity, to eliminate weak offspring whose chances of survival were deemed poor. Desired natality generally exceeded natural fertility. With the rise of income per head during the Meiji period the population's need for these desparate practices vanished. To-day parity-specific control characterizes fertility. Parityspecific control was diffused throughout Japan in response to declining desired fertility. Desired fertility fell significantly below natural fertility sometime during the late nineteenth or early twentieth century and the wish to reduce actual fertility to the desired level stimulated the adoption of parity-specific control. The speed of decline in marital fertility was partially governed by official policies toward contraception and abortion, contraception and abortion.     

Fertility and land availability in rural Brazil

Differences between the marital fertility of the agricultural frontier and that of the more settled rural areas of southern Brazil are analyzed in this paper. Fertility rates derived from 1970 census data appear to decrease as the degree of settlement increases, suggesting an experience parallel to the decline in U.S. rural fertility in the late nineteenth century, which Easterlin and others have attributed to increased scarcity of land for starting new farm households. Multivariate analysis of the Brazilian data shows parallels between the two situations but also reveals that the importance of literacy, child survival, and access to land is relatively greater than that of the availability of land for explaining fertility differentials in Brazil.     

Ages at menarche and menopause: Some mediaeval authorities

Abstract It is well known that the duration of the fecund period in the female has not been constant, in the last couple of centuries at least. Tanner(1) has assembled the best menarche statistics currently available for Western peoples in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has concluded that the average age at menarche has fallen fairly consistently, at a rate of four months per decade, since c. 1830. This puts menarche somewhere between 15+ and 17+ in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, against equivalent figures of 12+ and 14 in the mid-twentieth. For earlier periods Tanner's methods cannot be applied because of the lack of clinical data of the order he requires; but Backman, in a more general survey, concluded that in classical antiquity the time of menarche was fairly constant at around the age of fourteen and probably remained at about that age until the beginning of the modern era, But c. 1500, or earlier, a retardation of menarche began throughout Europe ... By the end of the eighteenth century this process of retardation had produced the very high figure of 17·5-18 years, at least in northern Europe. In the early nineteenth century, perhaps c. 1830, there began a progressive decline in the age of menarche, which now seems to be levelling out at around the age of 14·0-14·5.     

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.     

Smallpox in nineteenth-century India

This study uses the large, but neglected, body of Indian historical demographic and health data to show that smallpox was a major killer in past times. At the start of the nineteenth century roughly 80 percent of India's population had no effective protection against the disease, and in these circumstances virtually everyone suffered from it in childhood. The main exception was Bengal, where the indigenous practice of inoculation greatly limited the prevalence of the disease. Smallpox case fatality in India was high—around 25–30 percent in unprotected populations—and significantly higher than estimated for unprotected populations in eighteenth-century Europe. Although vaccination reached India in 1802, the practice spread slowly during the first half of the nineteenth century. From the 1870s onward there were considerable improvements in vaccination coverage. The study demonstrates a close link between the spread of vaccination and the decline of smallpox. Whereas at the start of the nineteenth century the disease may have accounted for more than 10 percent of all deaths in India, by the end of the century smallpox had become a comparatively minor cause of death as a result of improved vaccination coverage.     

Approaches to the Fertility Transition in Victorian England

The secular decline of marital fertility which took place in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century England and Wales is considered by using a number of approaches. Among the theoretical approaches considered are those of transition models, and social diffusion. The former overemphasises the role of industrialization and urbanization; the latter is inappropriate when dealing with the development of a small-family ideal in Victorian society. Explanations of fertility decline using ecological and time-series analysis are considered. The registration districts of England and Wales provide the framework for analyses of spatial variations in marital fertility and its correlates in 1861, 1891 and 1911. A time-series analysis attempts to establish the sequential nature of social, economic and demographic changes during the sixty years preceding the First World War. The following points are emphasised in conclusion. The Victorian fertility transition was not directly related to the development of an urban-industrial society, the social diffusion of family ideals or the use of appliance methods of contraception. But its immediate cause was probably linked to the substantial increase in family planning literature available from the 1870s, and the challenge that this posed to the tradition of unlimited marital fertility. This critical change in social attitudes to family planning was facilitated both by developments in mass education and, ultimately by the decline of infant mortality.     

Alvin Hansen on Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth

The driving forces of economic growth, according to the mainstream of classical economic thinking, are threefold: technological innovations, the opening up of new territories and discovery of new resources, and increase in population. In interaction, in an entrepreneurial market economy, these forces generate growth not only in the aggregate but also per capita. Evidence of their power was seen in the long stretch of rising living standards in the West over the nineteenth century, despite the ups and downs of the business cycle. However, the economic experience of the interwar years, and in particular the Great Depression of the 1930s, suggested that the forces were largely spent and hence that future economic prospects were gravely imperiled. The Keynesian revolution in economics was a response to the evident malfunctioning of the capitalist economic system, although the policy recipes it offered (for increasing demand and investment to levels capable of generating an equilibrium consistent with full employment of productive resources, especially labor) by no means commanded unanimity. The most prominent American contributor to and spokesman for the new line of economic analysis—often called “the American Keynes”—was Alvin H. Hansen (1887–1975), who took up his professorship of political economy at Harvard in 1937, just after the appearance of Keynes's General Theory. In that post, which he held until his retirement in 1956, he was one of the most influential economists of the era as a theorist, policy adviser, and teacher. Hansen interpreted the economic problems of the 1930s not just as the manifestation of a particularly sharp cyclical downturn, but as evidence of secular stagnation caused by the closing of the economic frontier, sluggishness in technological innovation, and, not least, “a drastic decline in population growth.” This “stagnation thesis” is most succinctly set out in his presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in Detroit, 28 December 1938, under the title Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. The address is re‐produced below from the March 1939 issue of the American Economic Review. (The opening paragraphs of the address, and two paragraphs, immediately preceding the closing paragraph, in which Hansen discusses changes in US national income in the 1930s, have been omitted.) Hansen's analysis of the effects of declining population growth in many ways echoes the thesis set out by Keynes in his seminal Galton Lecture delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1937 (reprinted in the Archives section of PDR 4, no. 3): a demographic slowdown decreases opportunities for profitable investments and increases levels of attempted saving, hence pushes the economy toward a low‐growth equilibrium at which resources are underutilized and unemployment is high. Hansen puts special emphasis on demographically induced shifts in the composition of output. He suggests that, beyond its direct positive effect on investment and output, population growth also has an indirect enhancing effect on these factors by facilitating technological progress–contrary to the “older Malthusian view.” In his policy proposals Hansen was more interventionist than Keynes, advocating a more intrusive government role in the economy as a possible means of escaping the vicious cycle of low demand and high unemployment. As to government action to reverse demographic trends seen as deleterious, neither Keynes nor Hansen argued for policies to increase fertility, presumably because they saw them as both inappropriate and, in comparison to remedial economic policy measures, inefficient or unfeasible. The demands of the war economy in the years following Hansen's address took care of the employment problem, and the immediate postwar decades brought the stimuli of pent‐up consumer demand, an outpouring of technological innovations, a reopening of the economic frontier produced by a more liberal trade regime, and, also, an acceleration of population growth. The result was rapid overall economic growth and increasing levels of per capita income. Keynesian demand management played some role in this economic success story: by the end of the 1960s even US President Richard Nixon pronounced himself a Keynesian. But it offered no remedy for the stagflation that eventually followed. The growth‐promoting recipes favored in the last decades of the century (especially in the most successful developing economies) were anything but Keynesian: limited government, fiscal restraint, and globalization. Yet recent and anticipated demographic trends, especially in Europe—notably fertility decline and population aging—make Hansen, once again, interesting reading. Commitments of the modern welfare state for health care, retirement pensions, and job security command wide approval, but they have boosted governments' weight in the economy and made labor markets inflexible, unemployment high, and retirement early—developments that may increasingly impose a brake on economic growth and on improvements of living standards. Reform measures to ease these burdens are, in principle, straightforward, but their immediate social costs are heavy and their rewards are delayed, hence resistance to reform is strong and growing. This is likely to stimulate the search for alternative policies that offer politically more palatable tradeoffs—some of which may turn out to have an unmistakably Hansenian flavor. As to future population trends, Hansen, despite his reference to a “drastic decline in population growth” based on a comparison of nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century Western demographic change, envisaged a convergence to a stationary population or a tendency toward very slow decrease. Yet some economies are already locked into a demographic pattern that augurs sharper declines and more rapid population aging, enhancing the relevance of the issues posed by Hansen. In Germany, for example, in the absence of immigration, the population between ages 20 and 40 will decline from 21.6 million in 2005 to 16.3 million in 2025—a drop of 23 percent. Over the same time period, the population aged 60 and older will grow from 20.5 million to 25.8 million—an increase of 26 percent. Serious efforts to slow population decline and retard population aging by stimulating fertility would of course add another major burden to government budgets.     

Two and a half centuries of demographic history in a Bavarian village

Abstract A village genealogy containing family histories of couples married between 1692 and 1939 serves as the basis for a study of the demographic history of a Bavarian village. The past patterns of marriage, re-marriage, widowhood, illegitimacy, bridal pregnancy, marital fertility, family size, and birth intervals are examined. Both the age at marriage and illegitimacy increased and then declined during the nineteenth century, apparently in response to changes in restrictive marriage legislation. Differences in fertility for occupational groups were insignificant. Marital fertility remained extremely high before 1900 suggesting the absence of any substantial family limitation within marriage. A rise in marital fertility that occurred during the last half of the nineteenth century appears to result from a change in breast-feeding customs. The actual number of children surviving to maturity for most couples was kept quite low, however, through late marriage and high infant mortality. Only during the twentieth century are substantial declines in infant mortality and fertility evident.     

What do we know about the timing of fertility transitions in europe?

The Princeton project on the decline of fertility in Europe (the European Fertility Project) suggested that this historical fertility transition occurred virtually simultaneously in a wide variety of economic and social environments. This finding has been cited widely as evidence for an innovation/diffusion view of fertility transitions. We demonstrate that the demographic methods used to date the fertility transition in Europe—primarily I_g, and (to a lesser extent) the Coale-Trussell M&m indices—may fail to detect the initial stages of a fertility transition and therefore cannot be used as the basis for strong statements about the timing of transitions. We review these measurement problems and their implications for the current understanding of the European fertility transition.     

The western fertility decline: Reflections from a chronological perspective

The study of recent fertility trends in the West has been dominated by examinations of Europe. A better perspective on twentieth-century fertility movements can be gained by giving an equal emphasis to trends in the ‘Offshoots’ (USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand). This paper focuses on the periods of rapid fertility decline and to a greater extent on the intervening periods of near-equilibrium. It is suggested that the ‘late twentieth century compromise’ is more stable than is suggested by reports on its internal strains, and that only massive government intervention could raise fertility.