Population growth trends in India: 1991 census

The decennial census counted the total population of India at 843.931 million as of the sunrise of March 1, 1991. The total is 160.6 million higher than that of a decade earlier in 1981. The actual census count exceeded by 45 million the official projections for 1991 based on the 1971 census. However, the official projections for the same year based on the 1981 census fell short by 7.6 million only. Most of the observed differences are explained by the slower decline in the fertility levels. The population growth ratepeaked during 1971–81, perhaps in 1972–73 (based on the Sample Registration Scheme data). The average annualexponential growth rate declined marginally to 2.11 per cent (4.5%) after having remained at a plateau for the previous two decades of 1961–71 and 1971–81. At this point in time, the fertility and mortality trends indicate that India will reach the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate of Unity] by the years 2010–2015. It can be said with a greater degree of certainty that the official target of reaching the replacement level fertility by the year 2000a.d. will not be reached. Based on the 1991 census results, it can be said that India will reach the billion mark by the turn of the century. The World Bank projects a population of 1,350 million by the year 2025a.d., and a stationary population of 1,862 million by the year 2150a.d., assuming that the replacement level fertility [Net Reproductive Rate = 1] in India is reached about the year 2015a.d.     

China's New Demographic Reality: Learning from the 2010 Census

China conducted its sixth modern census in 2010, recording a total of 1.34 billion people. This article presents an overview of the early census results. The data are of reasonable quality but contain some apparent defects where adjustments may be required. The census confirms that China has entered the era of demographic modernity and depicts the vast transformation of the country's rural‐urban distribution. Life expectancy has risen by 3–4 years in the decade since the last census, while fertility remains well below replacement—probably as low as 1.5 births per woman—and the sex ratio at birth is still significantly elevated. Low fertility and falling old‐age mortality are leading to continued and rapid population aging. Several coastal provinces grew by as much as 40 percent in the last decade, while a number of inland provinces have recorded population decline. China has reached an overall urban proportion of 50 percent.     

The completeness of enumeration in the 1973 census of the population of Colombia

The effort is made to determine the true size and distribution by age and sex of the population of the Republic of Colombia in October 1973. After initially arriving at estimates of the levels of fertility and mortality during the intercensal period and then correcting the 1964 census population for age misreporting and selective undernumeration of males, a hypothetical populaiton corresponding to October 1973 is constructed. Comparing the constructed population with the population observed in the census yelds an estimate of completeness of enumeration in 1973 that is relative to the enumeration of females in 1964. This estimate is obtained under the assumption that net international migration during the period was of negligible importance. As there is reason to believe that this is not a valid assumption and upon examining the limited amount of evidence available, speculaitons are made concerning the amount of net out-migration to have occurred during the 1964-1973 period and the size of the coresponding modificaiton in the estimate of completeness of enumeration. After adjusting for underenumeration of males in 1964 and neglecting the impact of international migration, a theoretical 1973 census population of 23,201,000 was estimated. Apart from the total number of people enumerated, the information that was analyzed from the advance sample appears to be of good quality, at least in relation to prior censuses. The estimates of fertility and mortality reveal an important decline in Colombian fertility. By coming up with separate estimates of infant and childhood and adult mortality, it has been possible to shed new light on the shape and the level of mortality in Colombia. The new Brass method for estimating adult mortality provides reliable results even when mortality has been declining, and there are recognizable distortions in the distribution of the population by age.     

Estimation of vital rates for Ghana

Abstract A complete and efficient registration system, of the type which would provide good data on births and deaths, does not exist in Ghana. However, registration of vital events is supposed to be compulsory in 39 towns in the country but the data collected in these areas are too inadequate and defective to provide a sound basis for the analysis of the dynamics of population growth. The results of the censuses conducted by the colonial governments are so defective and unreliable that they do not allow scientific research in the field of population analysis. Before 1960, therefore, when the national census and the post-enumeration survey (based on a 5% sample of the population) were carried out, estimates of fertility and mortality levels were little more than guesses. In this study an attempt has been made to utilize the information on the age-sex composition provided by the 1960 census and post-enumeration survey data on births and deaths to determine, as far as possible, the levels of fertility and mortality and the rates of population growth in Ghana. The fertility estimates-i.e. a crude birth rate of 50, total fertility rate of 6.9 and a gross reproduction rate of 3.4-show that Ghana's fertility is one of the highest in the world. An expectation of life at birth of 40 years, an infant mortality of 160 and a crude death rate of 23 appear to be the most plausible estimates. These estimates yield a rate of natural increase of 2.7% and a growth rate of 3.0% per annum.     

Bayesian population reconstruction of female populations for less developed and more developed countries

We show that Bayesian population reconstruction, a recent method for estimating past populations by age, works for data of widely varying quality. Bayesian reconstruction simultaneously estimates age-specific population counts, fertility rates, mortality rates, and net international migration flows from fragmentary data, while formally accounting for measurement error. As inputs, Bayesian reconstruction uses initial bias-reduced estimates of standard demographic variables. We reconstruct the female populations of three countries: Laos, a country with little vital registration data where population estimation depends largely on surveys; Sri Lanka, a country with some vital registration data; and New Zealand, a country with a highly developed statistical system and good quality vital registration data. In addition, we extend the method to countries without censuses at regular intervals. We also use it to assess the consistency of results between model life tables and available census data, and hence to compare different model life table systems.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

Annual fertility rates from census data on own children: Comparisons with vital statistics data for the United States

This paper begins by describing the procedure and data requirements for calculating annual fertility rates from census data on own children. Then, using data from the United States Censuses of 1960 and 1970, fully adjusted estimates are presented and compared with recorded vital statistics rates. Total fertility estimates derived from own children data for whites average less than two percent lower than the recorded rates- a difference that can be attributed partially to the fact that the estimates are adjusted for net census undercount but the recorded rates are not. Even without adjustments for mortality, children not living with their mothers, and net census undercount, the own children data estimates accurately replicate recorded trends (even though the levels are misspecified). The utility of own children data for the study of differential fertility is discussed.     

How Many More Missing Women? Excess Female Mortality and Prenatal Sex Selection, 1970–2050

Sex‐based discrimination has resulted in severe demographic imbalances between males and females, culminating in a large number of “missing women” in several countries around the world. We provide new estimates and projections of the number of missing females and of the roles played by prenatal and postnatal factors in this imbalance. We estimate time series of the number of missing females, the number of excess female deaths, and the number of missing female births for the world and selected countries. Estimates are provided for 1970–2010 and projections are made from 2010 to 2050. We show that the estimates of these different indicators are consistent with one another and account for the dynamics of the population of missing females over time. We conclude that the number of missing females has steadily risen in the past decades, reaching 126 million in 2010, and the number is expected to peak at 150 million in 2035. Excess mortality was the dominant cause of missing females in the past, and this is expected to remain the case in future decades in spite of the recent rise of prenatal sex selection. The annual number of newly missing females reached 3.4 million in 2010 and is expected to remain above 3 million every year until 2050.     

Cohort Replacement and Homeostasis in World Population, 1950–2100

Using a simple empirical approach, we analyze world and regional‐level cohort replacement as determined by the key components of population dynamics, i.e. fertility, survival, and migration, for 1950–2010, using UN data. We define two kinds of homeostatic relationships among these components: fertility responses to mortality change (type I) and migration responses to changes in net reproduction (type II), and show that both can be observed to some degree in this period. We examine the extent of cohort replacement embodied in the medium‐variant UN population projections over 2010–2100 and consider how the international migration assumptions made in such projections would be affected by a homeostatic perspective.     

Fertility trends,excess mortality,and the Great Irish Famine

This paper has developed estimates of the age-specific mortality rates prevailing during the Great Irish Famine and has analyzed fertility trends during the 25 years before the Famine. Our calculations confirm that 1 million Irish people perished as a result of this disaster. This figure does not include the deaths among the 1.3 million emigrants who left Ireland during the Famine period. The Famine produced a significant drop in the fertility rate, and we estimate that more than 300,000 births did not take place as a result of the Famine. The effects were especially severe on the very young and the very old, a result echoed in the findings of demographic analyses of other famines. Our procedure permits a reconstruction of the Irish population by age and sex during the period 1821-1841. In addition, it yields year-by-year estimates of the birth rate over this period. We estimate that the rate fell by about 14 percent, a result robust to our assumptions regarding emigration. Economic historians have debated this issue, and we hope that our evidence, although preliminary, will be of assistance. Our analysis also permits year-by-year reconstruction of Irish population totals for the period 1821-1851. Two years are of particular interest. Virtually all recent writers, with the notable exception of Lee (1981), have suggested that the 1831 census returns overestimated the actual population resident in Ireland at that date. Our reconstruction supports the validity of the 1831 census figure. We obtain a total of 7,847,000, which is in good agreement with the disputed census figure of 7,767,000. But perhaps the most interesting figure is the population total for the end of 1845, the highest ever achieved in Ireland. We estimate that the population on the eve of the Great Famine was 8,525,000. Throughout the paper we have tried to highlight those areas in which the data are unreliable, unavailable, or distorted. We have tried to devise cross-checks for consistency and to test the sensitivity of the results to a range of assumptions. A case in point concerns the age-sex profile and volume of emigration to England, Scotland, and Wales. Additional work at the micro level would be helpful here. More solid evidence on Famine births would also be helpful. The parish registers we have sampled certainly provide a clue to trends, but we have only made a start in that respect. A much more comprehensive survey is needed to convey the national picture.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Significance and effect of the population census]

A summary of topics on which the Chinese government is seeking further information through the 1982 census is provided. Topics to be covered include total population; fertility, mortality, and growth rates; urban and rural population distribution; population projections, including age, sex, and marital status characteristics; labor force size; and minority population estimates.     

American fertility in transition: New estimates of birth rates in the United States, 1900–1910

This article presents new estimates of age-specific overall and marital fertility rates for the entire United States for the period 1900-1910. The estimation techniques are the two-census parity increment method and the own-children method. The data sources are the 1900 census public use sample and tabulations of 1910 census fertility data published with the 1940 census. Estimates are made for the total population, whites, native-born whites, foreign-born whites, and blacks. Low age-specific marital fertility at younger ages is consistent with a view of a distinctive American fertility pattern at this time.     

中国的生育水平——基于模拟的验证

中国的实际生育水平一直存在争议,2010年的普查数据为我们提供了考察生育水平的新证据。本文根据2000年人口普查资料,使用人口模拟模型,选取不同的生育水平方案,来模拟2001—2010年历年的出生人口数量和2010年的人口总量,以判断2000—2010年生育水平。结果表明,现行的总和生育率在1.7以下,1.6左右,2010年在1.6以下,但降到1.5以下的可能性也非常大。为了避免低生育的更进一步的严重后果,中国应该适时地完善生育政策。     

2000-2010年福建省人口死亡统计分析

人口死亡水平的变动与趋势包含了与社会发展互为因果的潜在信息,对其进行挖掘可以为人口数量与素质、城市化与劳动就业、人口分布与资源环境承载力以及人口老龄化等问题的解决提供重要参考。基于“五普”、“六普”的人口普查数据,文章利用模型生命表方法对福建省的人口死亡率进行了校正;宏观角度对比分析了2000年-2010年福建省人口死亡水平与模式变化,微观多角度剖析了设区市之间预期寿命、婴儿死亡的差异及其原因。研究结论为：一是福建省人口死亡率显著降低,人口健康水平大幅提升,婴儿死亡漏报、错报问题明显减少;二是九个设区市之间的死亡模式存在地区差异,城市化水平、生育水平及社会卫生条件是差异产生的显著性影响因素,但经济发展、教育水平和公共医疗卫生的作用不明显。     

How Far Has Fertility in China Really Declined?

According to births in the last year as reported in China's 2000 census, the total fertility rate (TFR) in the year 2000 in China was 1.22 children per woman. This estimate is widely considered to be too low, primarily because some women who had out‐of‐quota births according to China's one‐child family policy did not report those births to the census enumerator. Analysis of fertility trends derived by applying the own‐children method of fertility estimation to China's 1990 and 2000 censuses indicates that the true level of the TFR in 2000 was probably between 1.5 and 1.6 children per woman. A decomposition analysis of change in the TFR between 1990 and 2000, based on our best estimate of 1.59 for the TFR in 2000, indicates that about two‐fifths of the decline in the conventional TFR between 1990 and 2000 is accounted for by later marriage and less marriage, and three‐fifths by declining fertility within marriage. The analysis also applies the birth history reconstruction method of fertility estimation to the two censuses, yielding an alternative set of fertility estimates that are compared with the set derived by the own‐children method. The analysis also includes estimates of trends in fertility by urban/rural residence, education, ethnicity, and migration status. Over time, fertility has declined sharply within all categories of these characteristics, indicating that the one‐child policy has had large across‐the‐board effects.     

Population dynamics in Germany: the role of immigration and population momentum

The effects of changes in rates of mortality, fertility, and migration depend not only on the age-specific patterns and levels of these rates, but on the age structure of the population. In order to remove the influences of the age structure and concentrate on the effects of the demographic rates themselves, a common practice is to analyze the influences of the rates for a standard age structure. This paper analyzes current and future population changes in Germany, using a stationary population equivalent model (SPE) that shows long-term effects of current fertility, mortality, and international migration patterns. Results indicate that the German population will eventually decline because of below replacement fertility, if net immigration does not counteract this decrease. This means, for instance, that the long-term stationary population levels for Germany will decrease by approximately 6.5 million during a decade in which current fertility, mortality, and international migration levels prevail. The paper also reports how various other assumptions for mortality, fertility, and international migration affect the SPE model for Germany.     

Population statistics] as of July 1, 1999

Reported in tabular form are population statistics published by the Institute for Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, in Thailand, as of July 1, 1999. The three objectives of the table were 1) to present the most recent estimates of relevant population numbers and vital rates twice a year, 2) to provide the most accurate demographic estimates possible through the use of standard techniques of demographic analysis, and 3) to disseminate the demographic data to Thailand, and international researchers and planners. The table shows statistics on the following elements: total population; population by sex; population in urban and rural areas; population by region; population by age group; crude birth and death rates; natural growth rate; infant mortality rate; life expectancies at birth and at 60 years and over; total fertility rate; contraceptive prevalence rate; and median age. A new basis for age estimates is also presented.     

Regional trends in fertility and mortality in Brazil

Abstract Questions asked in the 1970 Brazilian census allow the application of fertility and childhood mortality techniques developed by W. Brass. Using some propositions based on fertility estimates from the 1970 census data it was possible to extend the analysis to the 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses. Estimates are also provided for ten Brazilian regions, for 1940, 1950 and 1970. These estimates show a slight decrease in the fertility level for the country as a whole, but two different trends at regional levels. Between 1940-50 and 1960-70 the poorer regions experienced constant or increasing fertility levels while developed regions experienced declining ones, with only one exception. The mortality estimates indicate a consistent decline in the mortality level of all regions, but also a divergent trend between poor and developed regions, in life expectancies at birth. This work is a summarized version of Chapters II, III and IV of my Ph.D. thesis written under the supervision of Professor D. V. Glass and Mr J. Hobcraft at the University of London. I am most grateful to my supervisors as well as to Professor W. Brass for valuable comments on several aspects of the thesis. While carrying out this study, the author was supported by grants from the Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil, and the Ford Foundation.     

An analysis of net immigration in census coverage evaluation

National surveys monitored growth in the foreign-born population for the 1980s, especially net undocumented migration's continuing role, but the 1990 census portrayed an even larger foreign-born population than these surveys. Undercoverage in 1990 could have been higher than initially presented because preliminary studies may have insufficiently accounted for decadal net immigration. Assumptions intended to maintain a high undocumented undercount performed poorly when census counts of foreign-born residents became known. Any point estimate for net undocumented migration, calculated as a residual, is likely to be biased by assumptions and data gaps for components of calculating net legal immigration, especially in the direction of underestimation. A reasonable statement is that at least 2.1–2.4 million undocumented residents were enumerated in the 1990 census. The number of unenumerated undocumented residents may easily have ranged between 0.5 million and 3.0 million, and a narrower range of 1 million to 2 million is plausible. Despite the importance of undocumented migration measurement for census evaluation and policy purposes, differences among various undocumented estimates are more likely to stem from discrepancies in universe, reference dates, or individual judgment, rather than analytic refinement. Better measurement of the foreignborn population or its census coverage would aid in setting upper limits on net undocumented migration.     

The UN Population Division on Replacement Migration

The most salient demographic trend pictured by the influential set of population projections prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations (a unit in the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs) is the continuing substantial increase—albeit at a declining rate—of the global population during the coming decades. According to the “medium” variant of the most recent (1998) revision of these projections, between 2000 and 2050 the expected net addition to the size of the world population will be some 2.85 billion, a figure larger than that of the total world population as recently as the mid‐1950s. All of this increase will occur in the countries currently classified as less developed; in fact, as a result of their anticipated persistent below‐replacement levels of fertility, the more developed regions as a whole would experience declining population size beginning about 2020, and would register a net population loss of some 33 million between 2000 and 2050. A report prepared by the UN Population Division and released on 21 March 2000 addresses some of the implications of the changes in population size and age structure that low‐fertility countries will be likely to experience. The 143‐page report, issued under the eyecatching title Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?, highlights the expected magnitude of these changes by the imaginative device of answering three hypothetical questions. The answer to each of these questions is predicated on the assumption that some specified demographic feature of various country or regional populations would be maintained at the highest level that feature would exhibit, in the absence of international migration, in the United Nations' medium population projections (as revised in 1998) during the period 1995–2050. The selected demographic features are total population size, the size of the working‐age population (15–64 years), and the so‐called potential support ratio: the ratio of the working‐age population to the old‐age population (65 years and older). The illustrative device chosen for accomplishing the specified feats of preserving the selected demographic parameters (i.e., keeping them unchanged up to 2050 once their highest value is attained) is international migration. Hence the term “replacement migration.” Given the low levels of fertility and mortality now prevailing in the more developed world (and specifically in the eight countries and the two overlapping regions for which the numerical answers to the above questions are presented in the report), and given the expected future evolution of fertility and mortality incorporated in the UN population projections, the results are predictably startling. The magnitudes of the requisite compensatory migration streams tend to be huge relative both to current net inmigration flows and to the size of the receiving populations; least so in the case of the migration needed to maintain total population size and most so in the case of migration needed to counterbalance population aging by maintaining the support ratio. Reflecting its relatively high fertility and its past and current record of receiving a large influx of international migrants, the United States is a partial exception to this rule. But even for the US to maintain the support ratio at its highest—year 1995—level of 5.21 would require increasing net inmigration more than tenfold. The country, the report states, would have to receive 593 million immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or a yearly average of 10.8 million. The extreme case is the Republic of Korea, where the exercise calls for maintaining a support ratio of 12.6. To satisfy this requirement, Korea, with a current population of some 47 million, would need 5.1 billion immigrants between 1995 and 2050, or an average of 94 million immigrants per year. (In the calculations, the age and sex distribution of migrants is assumed to be the same as that observed in the past in the main immigration countries. The fertility and mortality of immigrants are assumed to be identical with those of the receiving population.) The “Executive Summary” of the report is reproduced below, with the permission of the United Nations. Chapters of the full report set out the issues that prompted the exercise; provide a selective review of the literature; explain the methodology and the assumptions underlying the calculations; and present the detailed results for the eight countries and two regions selected for illustrative purposes. A brief discussion of the implications of the findings concludes the report. As is evident even from the figures just cited, immigration is shown to be at best a modest potential palliative to whatever problems declining population size and population aging are likely to pose to low‐fertility countries. The calculations, however, vividly illustrate that demographic changes will profoundly affect society and the economy, and will require adjustments that remain inadequately appreciated and assessed. The criteria specified in the UN calculations—maintenance of particular demographic parameters at a peak value—of course do not necessarily have special normative significance. Past demographic changes, with respect notably to the age distribution as well as population size, have been substantial, yet they have been successfully accommodated under circumstances of growing prosperity in many countries. But the past may be an imperfect guide in confronting the evolving dynamics of low‐fertility populations. As the report convincingly states, the new demographic challenges will require comprehensive reassessments of many established economic and social policies and programs.