Does Global Fertility and Cultural Transition Affect Human Development? The Neglected Role of the Demographic Transition

This study approaches the potential influence of the demographic transition on outcomes of human development. By re-conceptualizing demographic transition as global fertility and cultural transition and combining all distal macro forces including modernization, techno-economic heritage, and economic dependency, an integrated model for explaining human development outcomes can be theoretically formulated and subjected to empirical test. A panel regression analysis of available data from all developing countries supports the influence of the distal macro forces and the intervening role played by global fertility and cultural transition in affecting human development. In particular, a four-indicator index of global fertility and cultural transition shows the strongest effect on human development index, even controlling for the lagged dependent variable and the latest most competing explanatory variables. Following the long continuing process of the demographic transition, the empirical implication of this newly constructed index of global fertility and cultural transition for exploring alternative measures of human development and policy implications for third world human development are discussed.     

Why the Total Fertility Rate of 2010 Population Census is so Low?

The total fertility rate of 2010 population census hits a new low record.Careful analysis shows that such a new low fertility rate is mainly resulted from the declined fertility rate in first parity despite the slightly increased fertility rates in second order and over.The total fertility rate at first parity has fallen the most among the rural residents due to remarkably postponed age of marriage or child-bearing,so ever large percentage of unmarried women in their bearing age helps to depress the fertility rate at first parity.After excluding the parity structural effect of women,measured with the progressive fertility rates,the levels of the 2010census have kept almost the same as those in year 2005.Therefore,fertility decline in the latest census cannot be simply attributed to under-reported births.In addition,the latest census turns out that the life fertility rate is around 1.5,almost reaching to the requirement of current fertility policy.     

The rising share of nonmarital births: Fertility choice or marriage behavior?

Much of the sharp rise in the share of nonmarital births in the United States has been attributed to changes in the fertility choices of unmarried and married women-in response, it is often argued, to public policy. In contrast, we develop and test a model that attributes the rise to changes in marriage behavior, with no necessary changes infertility. A variety of empirical tests strongly support this conclusion and invites focused attention to issues related to marriage behavior as well as to the interactions between marriage and fertility.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

The More the Merrier? The Causal Effect of High Fertility on Later-Life Loneliness in Eastern Europe

Levels of later-life loneliness are high in Eastern Europe. We assess whether having more children is protective against later-life loneliness for Eastern-European mothers and fathers. Drawing on Generations and Gender Surveys data of 25,479 parents aged 50–80 from eight Eastern-European countries, we adopt an instrumental approach exploiting parents’ preference for mixed-sex offspring to estimate the causal effect of having additional children on feelings of loneliness. We find that having an additional child has a causal protective effect against loneliness for mothers. Ordinary least squares regression models also show a weak but statistically significant negative association between number of children and later-life loneliness among fathers. However, results of the instrumental variable analyses are inconclusive for this group. We thus do not find statistically significant causal evidence that having an additional child is protective against loneliness for fathers. Our results underline the importance of addressing reverse causality and selection bias when investigating the links between number of children and later-life loneliness, particularly among women. The causal evidence presented here suggests that the trend towards families with fewer children noted in several Eastern-European countries may place new cohorts of older Eastern-Europeans, and in particular Eastern-European women, at risk of stronger feelings of loneliness.

     

The Leverage of Demographic Dynamics on Carbon Dioxide Emissions: Does Age Structure Matter?

This article provides a methodological contribution to the study of the effect of changes in population age structure on carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions. First, I propose a generalization of the IPAT equation to a multisector economy with an age-structured population and discuss the insights that can be obtained in the context of stable population theory. Second, I suggest a statistical model of household consumption as a function of household size and age structure to quantitatively evaluate the extent of economies of scale in consumption of energy-intensive goods, and to estimate age-specific profiles of consumption of energy-intensive goods and of CO₂ emissions. Third, I offer an illustration of the methodologies using data for the United States. The analysis shows that per-capita CO₂ emissions increase with age until the individual is in his or her 60s, and then emissions tend to decrease. Holding everything else constant, the expected change in U.S. population age distribution during the next four decades is likely to have a small, but noticeable, positive impact on CO₂ emissions.     

The End of “Lowest‐Low” Fertility?

Total fertility rates fell to previously unseen levels in a large number of countries beginning in the early 1990s. The persistence of TFRs below 1.3 raised the possibility of rapid population aging and decline. We discuss the recent widespread turnaround in so‐called lowest‐low‐fertility countries in Europe and East Asia. The number of countries with TFRs below 1.3 fell from 21 in 2003 to five in 2008. Moreover, the upturn in the TFR was not confined to lowest‐fertility countries, but affected the whole developed world. We explore the demographic explanations for the recent rise in TFRs stemming from fertility timing effects as well as economic, policy, and social factors. Although the current economic downturn may suppress TFRs in the short run, we conclude that formerly lowest‐low‐fertility countries will continue to see increases in fertility as the transitory effects of shifts to later childbearing become less important.     

Is the Association Between Education and Fertility Postponement Causal? The Role of Family Background Factors

A large body of literature has demonstrated a positive relationship between education and age at first birth. However, this relationship may be partly spurious because of family background factors that cannot be controlled for in most research designs. We investigate the extent to which education is causally related to later age at first birth in a large sample of female twins from the United Kingdom (N = 2,752). We present novel estimates using within–identical twin and biometric models. Our findings show that one year of additional schooling is associated with about one-half year later age at first birth in ordinary least squares (OLS) models. This estimate reduced to only a 1.5-month later age at first birth for the within–identical twin model controlling for all shared family background factors (genetic and family environmental). Biometric analyses reveal that it is mainly influences of the family environment—not genetic factors—that cause spurious associations between education and age at first birth. Last, using data from the Office for National Statistics, we demonstrate that only 1.9 months of the 2.74 years of fertility postponement for birth cohorts 1944–1967 could be attributed to educational expansion based on these estimates. We conclude that the rise in educational attainment alone cannot explain differences in fertility timing between cohorts.     

Why are Children with Married Parents Healthier? The Case of Pediatric Asthma

Among a recent birth cohort in U.S. cities, young children were far more likely to be diagnosed with asthma and to experience an asthma-related emergency if their parents were unmarried. Using longitudinal data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, I find that the child health benefits of marriage seem to stem from the benefits of parental coresidence and the demographic and socioeconomic correlates of marriage. Children whose parents live apart appear to be at heightened risk of asthma even after taking into account demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The child health benefits of marriage are only weakly related to mothers’ health behaviors and are not related to father involvement. An analysis of relationship transitions suggests that marital disruption may be more harmful for children than the disruption of cohabiting unions. The results provide some cautions and considerations for the U.S. government’s Healthy Marriage Initiative.

A Reversal in the Relationship of Human Development With Fertility?

Myrskylä et al. (2009) found that the relationship between the human development index (HDI) and the total fertility rate (TFR) reverses from negative (i.e., increases in HDI are associated with decreases in TFR) to positive (i.e., increases in HDI are associated with increases in TFR) at an HDI level of 0.86. In this article, we show that the reversal in the HDI-TFR relationship is robust to neither the UNDP’s recent revision in the HDI calculation method nor thedecomposition of the HDI into its education, standard-of-living, and health subindices.     

The Decline of Fertility in Los Angeles,California, 1880–1900

Data from the 1900 U.S. Census of Population show that fertility in Los Angeles California, declined by more than 50 per cent between 1880 and 1900. Women's mean age at first marriage, which rose by approximately three years, contributed to the decline, but change in marital fertility was more important than change in nuptiality. Although the fertility of in-migrating U.S.-born women was lower than that of California-born women, the decline was not explained by in-migration. The emergence of a class differential in fertility, with couples of higher status having fewer children than those of lower status, and the simultaneous weakening of class differentials in secondary-school attendance, together suggest that the rise of universal secondary schooling probably did not account for the marital fertility decline experienced in middle- and upper-status families.     

The Polygyny–Fertility Hypothesis: A Re-evaluation

Previous studies of the relationship between polygynous marriages and fertility have produced mixed results, although on balance evidence suggests that fertility levels are lower in polygynous than in monogamous marriages. It is argued that the inconsistent results stem from the aggregation of fertility data among all wives in polygynous unions, and that major differences are due to variations in fertility by wife-order and number of wives in polygynous unions. Data for 2534 polygynists with 7378 marriages are analysed and contrasted with fertility data from once married women, using information covering population of Utah during the nineteenth century. Our data indicate significant variations in fertility levels by wife-order; these fertility differences are largely due to variations in length of exposure to the risk of conception and birth intervals.     

Union Instability as an Engine of Fertility? A Microsimulation Model for France

Opportunities for conceiving and bearing children are fewer when unions are not formed or are dissolved during the childbearing years. At the same time, union instability produces a pool of persons who may enter new partnerships and have additional children in stepfamilies. The balance between these two opposing forces and their implications for fertility may depend on the timing of union formation and parenthood. In this article, we estimate models of childbearing, union formation, and union dissolution for female respondents to the 1999 French Etude de l’Histoire Familiale. Model parameters are applied in microsimulations of completed family size. We find that a population of women whose first unions dissolve during the childbearing years will end up with smaller families, on average, than a population in which all unions remain intact. Because new partnerships encourage higher parity progressions, repartnering minimizes the fertility gap between populations with and those without union dissolution. Differences between the two populations are much smaller when family formation is postponed—that is, when union formation and dissolution or first birth occurs after age 30, or when couples delay childbearing after union formation.     

Nonmarital Childbearing in Russia: Second Demographic Transition or Pattern of Disadvantage?

Using retrospective union, birth, and education histories that span 1980–2003, this study investigates nonmarital childbearing in contemporary Russia. We employ a combination of methods to decompose fertility rates by union status and analyze the processes that lead to a nonmarital birth. We find that the increase in the percentage of nonmarital births was driven mainly by the growing proportion of women who cohabit before conception, not changing fertility behavior of cohabitors or changes in union behavior after conception. The relationship between education and nonmarital childbearing has remained stable: the least-educated women have the highest birth rates within cohabitation and as single mothers, primarily because of their lower probability of legitimating a nonmarital conception. These findings suggest that nonmarital childbearing Russia has more in common with the pattern of disadvantage in the United States than with the second demographic transition. We also find several aspects of nonmarital childbearing that neither of these perspectives anticipates.     

Latest-Late Fertility? Decline and Resurgence of Late Parenthood Across the Low-Fertility Countries

After decades of fertility postponement, we investigate recent changes in late parenthood across low-fertility countries in the light of observations from the past. We use long series of age-specific fertility rates from the Human Fertility Database (1950–2016) for women, and new data covering the period 1990–2016 for men. In 1950, the contribution of births at age 40 and over to female fertility rates ranged from 2.5 to 9 percent, but then fell sharply until the 1980s. From the 1990s, however, the prevalence of late first births increased rapidly, especially so in countries where it was initially lowest. This has produced a late fertility rebound in the last two decades, occurring much faster for women than for men. Comparisons between recent and past extremely late (age 48+) fertility levels confirm that people are now challenging the natural fertility barriers, particularly for a first child.     

The Institutional vs. the Academic Definition of the Quality of Work Life. What is the Focus of the European Commission?

In recent years, we have seen how the quality of work life has been focused and defined by the European Commission (EC). In our study we compare the EC definition with the academic one and try to see how close they are. We also analyse the possibility of applying the institutional definition to the Spanish case through the development of specific indicators. Our main conclusions are that QWL is increasingly important for policy makers. In addition, it is essential to have objective indicators and to conduct surveys in order to reliably measure QWL.     

Explaining Changing Suicide Rates in Norway 1948–2004: The Role of Social Integration

Using Norway 1948–2004 as a case, I test whether changes in variables related to social integration can explain changes in suicide rates. The method is the Box-Jenkins approach to time-series analysis. Different aspects of family integration contribute significantly to the explanation of Norwegian suicide rates in this period. The estimated effect of separations is stronger than the effect of divorces, both for men and women, probably because separations are closer in time to the “real” marital breakup. This difference has not been demonstrated in earlier time-series research. Marriages decrease the suicide rates for males. The unemployment estimate for men has a negative sign, contributing to fewer suicides. Both increasing alcohol (beer) consumption and fewer marriages seem to be implicated in the soaring suicide rate for young men since 1970.