Probability of Exporting Infected Carcasses from Vaccinated Pigs Following a Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease Epidemic

Emergency vaccination is an effective control strategy for foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) epidemics in densely populated livestock areas, but results in a six‐month waiting period before exports can be resumed, incurring severe economic consequences for pig exporting countries. In the European Union, a one‐month waiting period has been discussed based on negative test results in a final screening. The objective of this study was to analyze the risk of exporting FMD‐infected pig carcasses from a vaccinated area: (1) directly after final screening and (2) after a six‐month waiting period. A risk model has been developed to estimate the probability that a processed carcass was derived from an FMD‐infected pig (P_carc). Key variables were herd prevalence (P_H), within‐herd prevalence (P_A), and the probability of detection at slaughter (P_SL). P_H and P_A were estimated using Bayesian inference under the assumption that, despite all negative test results, ≥1 infected pigs were present. Model calculations indicated that P_carc was on average 2.0 × 10^?5 directly after final screening, and 1.7 × 10^?5 after a six‐month waiting period. Therefore, the additional waiting time did not substantially reduce P_carc. The estimated values were worst‐case scenarios because only viraemic pigs pose a risk for disease transmission, while seropositive pigs do not. The risk of exporting FMD via pig carcasses from a vaccinated area can further be reduced by heat treatment of pork and/or by excluding high‐risk pork products from export.     

Quantitative Assessment of the Risk of Release of Foot‐and‐Mouth Disease Virus via Export of Bull Semen from Israel

Various foot‐and‐mouth disease (FMD) virus strains circulate in the Middle East, causing frequent episodes of FMD outbreaks among Israeli livestock. Since the virus is highly resistant in semen, artificial insemination with contaminated bull semen may lead to the infection of the receiver cow. As a non‐FMD‐free country with vaccination, Israel is currently engaged in trading bull semen only with countries of the same status. The purpose of this study was to assess the risk of release of FMD virus through export of bull semen in order to estimate the risk for FMD‐free countries considering purchasing Israeli bull semen. A stochastic risk assessment model was used to estimate this risk, defined as the annual likelihood of exporting at least one ejaculate of bull semen contaminated with viable FMD virus. A total of 45 scenarios were assessed to account for uncertainty and variability around specific parameter estimates and to evaluate the effect of various mitigation measures, such as performing a preexport test on semen ejaculates. Under the most plausible scenario, the annual likelihood of exporting bull semen contaminated with FMD virus had a median of 1.3 * 10^?7 for an export of 100 ejaculates per year. This corresponds to one infected ejaculate exported every 7 million years. Under the worst‐case scenario, the median of the risk rose to 7.9 * 10^?5, which is equivalent to the export of one infected ejaculate every 12,000 years. Sensitivity analysis indicated that the most influential parameter is the probability of viral excretion in infected bulls.     

Employment Policy,the Crowding‐out Effect and Imperfect Competition

This paper presents a macroeconomic model with imperfect competition in the commodity market, and uses it to address how the commodity market’s structure is related to the efficacy of government employment policies. It is found that job creation in the public sector may lead to a decrease in output and an increase in prices. In particular, these adverse side‐effects will be alleviated when competition in the goods market is less perfect. We also find that public‐sector job creation definitely has a positive effect on total employment, though it may crowd out private‐sector employment.     

Equilibrium in Continuous‐Time Financial Markets: Endogenously Dynamically Complete Markets

We prove existence of equilibrium in a continuous‐time securities market in which the securities are potentially dynamically complete: the number of securities is at least one more than the number of independent sources of uncertainty. We prove that dynamic completeness of the candidate equilibrium price process follows from mild exogenous assumptions on the economic primitives of the model. Our result is universal, rather than generic: dynamic completeness of the candidate equilibrium price process and existence of equilibrium follow from the way information is revealed in a Brownian filtration, and from a mild exogenous nondegeneracy condition on the terminal security dividends. The nondegeneracy condition, which requires that finding one point at which a determinant of a Jacobian matrix of dividends is nonzero, is very easy to check. We find that the equilibrium prices, consumptions, and trading strategies are well‐behaved functions of the stochastic process describing the evolution of information. We prove that equilibria of discrete approximations converge to equilibria of the continuous‐time economy.     

Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game‐Theoretic Model*

In this paper we explore strategic decision making in new technology adoption by using economic analysis. We show how asymmetric information affects firms' decisions to adopt the technology. We do so in a two‐stage game‐theoretic model where the first‐stage investment results in the acquisition of a new technology that, in the second stage, may give the firm a competitive advantage in the product market. We compare two information structures under which two competing firms have asymmetric information about the future performance (i.e., postadoption costs) of the new technology. We find that equilibrium strategies under asymmetric information are quite different from those under symmetric information. Information asymmetry leads to different incentives and strategic behaviors in the technology adoption game. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that market uncertainty may actually induce firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. We also show that having better information is not always a good thing. These results illustrate a key departure from established decision theory.     

The Impact of Mega‐Catastrophes on Insurers: An Exposure‐Based Analysis of the U.S. Homeowners’ Insurance Market

Insurance is a key risk‐sharing mechanism that protects citizens and governments from the losses caused by natural catastrophes. Given the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural catastrophes over recent years, this article analyzes the performance effects of mega‐catastrophes for U.S. insurance firms using a measure of market expectations. Specifically, we analyze the share price losses of insurance firms in response to catastrophe events to ascertain whether mega‐catastrophes significantly damage the performance of insurers and whether different types of mega‐catastrophes have different impacts. The main message from our analysis is that the impact of mega‐catastrophes on insurers has not been too damaging. While the exact impact of catastrophes depends on the nature of the event and the degree of competition within the relevant insurance market (less competition allows insurers to recoup catastrophe losses through adjustments to premiums), our overall results suggest that U.S. insurance firms can adequately manage the risks and costs of mega‐catastrophes. From a public policy perspective, our results show that insurance provides a robust means of sharing catastrophe losses to help reduce the financial consequences of a catastrophe event.     

Dynamic Pricing and Lead‐Time Policies for Make‐to‐Order Systems*

Make‐to‐order firms use different approaches for managing their lead‐times and pricing in the face of changing market conditions. A particular firm's approach may be largely dictated by environmental constraints. For example, it makes little sense to carefully manage lead‐time if its effect on demand is muted, as it can be in situations where leadtime is difficult for the market to gauge or requires investment to estimate. Similarly, it can be impractical to change capacity and price. However, environmental constraints are likely to become less of an issue in the future with the expanding e‐business infrastructure, and this trend raises questions into how to manage effectively the marketing mix of price and lead‐time in a more “friction‐free” setting. We study a simple model of a make‐to‐order firm, and we examine policies for adjusting price and capacity in response to periodic and unpredictable shifts in how the market values price and lead‐time. Our analysis suggests that maintaining a fixed capacity while using lead‐time and/or price to absorb changes in the market will be most attractive when stability in throughput and profit are highly valued, but in volatile markets, this stability comes at a cost of low profits. From a pure profit maximization perspective, it is best to strive for a short and consistent lead‐times by adjusting both capacity and price in response to market changes.     

Tying the Acquirer's Human Resource Management Quality to Cross‐Border Acquisition Divestment Probability: Curvilinear Connection with Slacklining

Cross‐border acquisitions are growing in volume and global economic importance, yet a considerable number end in failure. Many of these failures may be linked to people management‐related issues. We extend this stream of research by investigating the impact of the acquirer's aggregate human resource management (HRM) quality on cross‐border acquisition divestment. Our empirical analysis uses a panel database of 4128 cross‐border acquisition/year observations and an event history design. The findings confirm a curvilinear relationship and suggest that acquisition failures are not merely associated with poor HRM quality, but also with very high levels of HRM quality, that is, with both extremes. Moreover, our results show that financial slack has a significant moderating effect on the curvilinear relationship between HRM quality and the likelihood of acquisition divestment. Overall, our study reveals boundary conditions for the widely demonstrated positive relationship between HRM quality and organizational performance in an acquisition context.     

Adaptive Tactical Pricing in Multi‐Agent Supply Chain Markets Using Economic Regimes

In today's complex and dynamic supply chain markets, information systems are essential for effective supply chain management. Complex decision making processes on strategic, tactical, and operational levels require substantial timely support in order to contribute to organizations' agility. Consequently, there is a need for sophisticated dynamic product pricing mechanisms that can adapt quickly to changing market conditions and competitors' strategies. We propose a two‐layered machine learning approach to compute tactical pricing decisions in real time. The first layer estimates prevailing economic conditions—economic regimes—identifying and predicting current and future market conditions. In the second layer, we train a neural network for each regime to estimate price distributions in real time using available information. The neural networks compute offer acceptance probabilities from a tactical perspective to meet desired sales quotas. We validate our approach in the trading agent competition for supply chain management. When competing against the world's leading agents, the performance of our system significantly improves compared to using only economic regimes to predict prices. Profits increase significantly even though the prices and sales volume do not change significantly. Instead, tactical pricing results in a more efficient sales strategy by reducing both finished goods and components inventory costs.     

Labour‐market Institutions and Macroeconomic Shocks

Abstract. Macroeconomic shocks and labour‐market institutions jointly determine employment growth and economic performance. The effect of shocks depends on the nature of these institutions and the effect of institutional change depends on the macroeconomic environment. It follows that a given set of institutions may be appropriate in one epoch and not in another. We derive a dynamic model of labour demand in which the effect of firing costs on labour demand depends on the macroeconomic environment: when the level of macroeconomic activity is expected to drop and/or the trend rate of productivity growth is small, a rise in firing costs affects mainly (and adversely) the hiring decision and not the layoff decision. This makes firing costs harmful to employment when it may appear most appropriate. In contrast, firing costs can raise employment during periods of high growth and positive shocks. Our hypothesis is supported by empirical results using OECD data.     

Drivers and Outcomes of Long‐term Orientation in Cooperative Relationships

We argue in this paper that a buyer may deliberately develop long‐term orientation as a governance mechanism to deal with risks arising from exchange hazards, and to reduce the opportunistic behaviour of a supplier. While the exchange hazards of asset specificity pose a safeguarding problem, those of market uncertainty pose an adaptation problem. We test our model on a sample of 221 procurement partnerships. Our results show that satisfactory prior history of a supplier, asset specificity of the buyer and market uncertainty are all positively related to a buyer's long‐term orientation towards a supplier. Consistent with the idea that asset specificity and market uncertainty pose different governance problems, we find that satisfactory prior history reduces the positive relationship between asset specificity and a buyer's long‐term orientation, but enhances the positive relationship between market uncertainty and a buyer's long‐term orientation. We also find that a buyer's long‐term orientation fully mediates the relationship between satisfactory prior history and a supplier's opportunistic behaviour. Finally, implications on the theory and the practices of relationship governance are discussed.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

Equilibrium Wage‐Tenure Contracts

In this study we consider a labor market matching model where firms post wage‐tenure contracts and workers, both employed and unemployed, search for new job opportunities. Given workers are risk averse, we establish there is a unique equilibrium in the environment considered. Although firms in the market make different offers in equilibrium, all post a wage‐tenure contract that implies a worker's wage increases smoothly with tenure at the firm. As firms make different offers, there is job turnover, as employed workers move jobs as the opportunity arises. This implies the increase in a worker's wage can be due to job‐to‐job movements as well as wage‐tenure effects. Further, there is a nondegenerate equilibrium distribution of initial wage offers that is differentiable on its support except for a mass point at the lowest initial wage. We also show that relevant characteristics of the equilibrium can be written as explicit functions of preferences and the other market parameters.     

Explaining the Causes and Effects of Dynamic Capabilities Generation: A Multiple‐Indicator Multiple‐Cause Modelling Approach

The purpose of this paper is to develop a multiple‐indicator multiple‐cause model to explain dynamic capabilities generation. We use one of the main common effects of dynamic capabilities (operational, structural and strategic flexibility) to design a measurement tool for dynamic capabilities generation. Based on this measurement tool, we test the influence of several factors identified in the specialized literature as potential causes that trigger and promote dynamic capabilities generation. We use data from a survey of 200 CEOs of Spanish firms to test the model. The results show that only organizations whose managers have perceived a high degree of environmental dynamism have generated dynamic capabilities. The results also show that knowledge codification and technical innovation are significantly related to dynamic capabilities generation. We attempt to shed light on current theoretical debates about dynamic capabilities generation and provide a practical guide to explain the origin and results of dynamic capabilities that have been tested empirically.     

Crime,Search, and Ex‐offenders’ Accessibility to Labor Markets

Rehabilitation for ex‐offenders has positive (e.g. more production) and negative (e.g. more crime) effects on society. We investigate the effect of rehabilitation on criminal behavior and the labor market using a search model. In the case where ex‐offenders cannot join the labor market, promoting rehabilitation for them may reduce crime. In such a case, the equilibrium allocation may be inefficient. Moreover, under the Hosios condition, equilibrium labor market tightness is lower than the efficient outcome because of crime, as the crime option raises the value of unemployed workers. Because this option works as a negative externality on matched firms, equilibrium tightness is lower than the optimal level.     

The Long‐term Impacts of the Cultural Revolution: A Micro‐Analysis

This paper provides a micro‐analysis of the long‐term impacts of a particular historical event: the Cultural Revolution in urban labor market of China. Using the life‐cycle models and synthetic cohort approach, I demonstrate that the Cultural Revolution produced a lasting negative effect on permanent income for the subjected birth cohorts and this effect was amplified from the middle 1990s to the early 2000s as the Chinese market economy increasingly evolved. Channels in the mechanism of the impact includes productivity determinants (educational attainment, work experience, and health), marriage, and personality. The conclusions are robust to a variety of controls for family background as well as contamination factors, examinations with various control groups, contemporaneous comparisons, and placebo tests.     

A Hybrid Methodology for Modeling Risk of Adverse Events in Complex Health‐Care Settings

In spite of increased attention to quality and efforts to provide safe medical care, adverse events (AEs) are still frequent in clinical practice. Reports from various sources indicate that a substantial number of hospitalized patients suffer treatment‐caused injuries while in the hospital. While risk cannot be entirely eliminated from health‐care activities, an important goal is to develop effective and durable mitigation strategies to render the system “safer.” In order to do this, though, we must develop models that comprehensively and realistically characterize the risk. In the health‐care domain, this can be extremely challenging due to the wide variability in the way that health‐care processes and interventions are executed and also due to the dynamic nature of risk in this particular domain. In this study, we have developed a generic methodology for evaluating dynamic changes in AE risk in acute care hospitals as a function of organizational and nonorganizational factors, using a combination of modeling formalisms. First, a system dynamics (SD) framework is used to demonstrate how organizational‐level and policy‐level contributions to risk evolve over time, and how policies and decisions may affect the general system‐level contribution to AE risk. It also captures the feedback of organizational factors and decisions over time and the nonlinearities in these feedback effects. SD is a popular approach to understanding the behavior of complex social and economic systems. It is a simulation‐based, differential equation modeling tool that is widely used in situations where the formal model is complex and an analytical solution is very difficult to obtain. Second, a Bayesian belief network (BBN) framework is used to represent patient‐level factors and also physician‐level decisions and factors in the management of an individual patient, which contribute to the risk of hospital‐acquired AE. BBNs are networks of probabilities that can capture probabilistic relations between variables and contain historical information about their relationship, and are powerful tools for modeling causes and effects in many domains. The model is intended to support hospital decisions with regard to staffing, length of stay, and investments in safety, which evolve dynamically over time. The methodology has been applied in modeling the two types of common AEs: pressure ulcers and vascular‐catheter‐associated infection, and the models have been validated with eight years of clinical data and use of expert opinion.     

Entry Deterrence of Capacitated Competition Using Price and Non‐Price Strategies

We analyze the role of pricing and branding in an incumbent firm's decision when facing competition from an entrant firm with limited capacity. We do so by studying two price competition models (Stackelberg and Nash), where we consider the incumbent's entry‐deterrence pricing strategy based on a potential entrant's capacity size. In an extension, we also study a branding model, where the incumbent firm, in addition to pricing, can also invest in influencing market preference for its product. With these models, we study conditions under which the incumbent firm may block the entrant (i.e., prevent entry without any market actions), deter the entrant (i.e., stop entry with suitable market actions) or accommodate the entrant (i.e., allow entry and compete), and how the entrant will allocate its limited capacity across its own and the new market, if entry occurs. We also study the timing difference between the two different dynamics of the price competition models and find that the incumbent's first‐mover advantage benefits both the incumbent and the entrant. Interestingly, the entrant firm's profits are not monotonically increasing in its capacity even when it is costless to build capacity. In the branding model, we show that in some cases, the incumbent may even increase its price and successfully deter entry by investing in consumer's preference for its product. Finally, we incorporate demand uncertainty into our model and show that the incumbent benefits from demand uncertainty while the entrant may be worse off depending on the magnitude of demand uncertainty and its capacity.     

A MARKET UTILITY‐BASED MODEL FOR CAPACITY SCHEDULING IN MASS SERVICES

Only a small set of employee scheduling articles have considered an objective of profit or contribution maximization, as opposed to the traditional objective of cost (including opportunity costs) minimization. In this article, we present one such formulation that is a market utility‐based model for planning and scheduling in mass services (MUMS). MUMS is a holistic approach to market‐based service capacity scheduling. The MUMS framework provides the structure for modeling the consequences of aligning competitive priorities and service attributes with an element of the firm's service infrastructure. We developed a new linear programming formulation for the shift‐scheduling problem that uses market share information generated by customer preferences for service attributes. The shift‐scheduling formulation within the framework of MUMS provides a business‐level model that predicts the economic impact of the employee schedule. We illustrated the shift‐scheduling model with empirical data, and then compared its results with models using service standard and productivity standard approaches. The result of the empirical analysis provides further justification for the development of the market‐based approach. Last, we discuss implications of this methodology for future research.     

Competing on Time: An Integrated Framework to Optimize Dynamic Time‐to‐Market and Production Decisions

This study develops a comprehensive framework to optimize new product introduction timing and subsequent production decisions faced by a component supplier. Prior to market entry, the supplier performs process design activities, which improve manufacturing yield and the chances of getting qualified for the customer's product. However, a long delay in market entry allows competitors to enter the market and pass the customer's qualification process before the supplier, reducing the supplier's share of the customer's business. After entering the market and if qualified, the supplier also needs to decide how much to produce for a finite planning horizon by considering several factors such as manufacturing yield and stochastic demand, both of which depend on the earlier time‐to‐market decision. To capture this dependency, we develop a sequential, nested, two‐stage decision framework to optimize the time‐to‐market and production decisions in relation to each other. We show that the supplier's optimal market entry and qualification timing decision need to be revised in real time based on the number of qualified competitors at the time of market‐entry decision. We establish the optimality of a threshold policy. Following this policy, at the beginning of each decision epoch, the supplier should optimally stop preparing for qualification and decide whether to enter the market if her order among qualified competitors exceeds a predetermined threshold. We also prove that the supplier's optimal production policy is a state‐dependent, base‐stock policy, which depends on the time‐to‐market and qualification decisions. The proposed framework also enables a firm to quantify how market conditions (such as price and competitor entry behavior) and operating conditions (such as the rate of learning and inventory/production‐related costs) affect time‐to‐market strategy and post‐entry production decisions.