Stochastic Choice and Consistency in Decision Making Under Risk: An Experimental Study

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to uncover the stochastic structure of individual preferences over lotteries. Unlike previous experiments, which have presented subjects with pair-wise choices between lotteries, our design allowed subjects to choose between two lotteries or (virtually) any convex combination of the two lotteries. We interpret the mixtures of lotteries chosen by subjects as a measure of the stochastic structure of choice. We test between two alternative interpretations of stochastic choice: the random utility interpretation and the deterministic preferences interpretation. The main findings of the experiment are that the typical subject prefers mixtures of lotteries rather than the extremes of a linear lottery choice set. The distribution of choices does not change between a first and second asking of the same question. We argue that this provides support for the deterministic preferences interpretation over the random utility interpretation of stochastic choice. As a subsidiary result, we find a small proportion of subjects make choices that violate transitivity, but the level of intransitive choice falls significantly over time.     

Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory

This paper discusses aspects of the theory of social choice when a nonempty choice set is to be determined for each situation, which consists of a feasible set of alternatives and a preference order for each voter on the set of nonempty subsets of alternatives. The individual preference assumptions include ordering properties and averaging conditions, the latter of which are motivated by the interpretation that subset A is preferred to subset B if and only if the individual prefers an even-chance lottery over the basic alternatives in A to an even-chance lottery over the basic alternatives in B. Corresponding to this interpretation, a choice set with two or more alternatives is resolved by an even-chance lottery over these alternatives. Thus, from the traditional no-lottery social choice theory viewpoint, ties are resolved by even-chance lotteries on the tied alternatives. Compared to the approach which allows all lotteries to compete along with the basic alternatives, the present approach is a contraction which allows only even-chance lotteries.After discussing individual preference axioms, the paper examines Pareto optimality for nonempty subsets of a feasible set in a social choice context with n voters. Aspects of simple-majority comparisons in the even-chance context follow, including an analysis of single-peaked preferences. The paper concludes with an Arrowian type impossibility theorem that is designed for the even-chance setting.     

Approaches to cardinal utility

In a previous article (see [3]) a system of axioms is proposed stating conditions which are necessary and sufficient to determine a cardinal utility function on any set, finite or infinite, of outcomes X. The present paper discusses and interprets the meaning of those axioms, and compares this new approach to cardinal utility with the utility differences approach proposed by Alt and Frisch, among others, and with the expected utility approach of von-Neuman and Morgenstern. The notion of repetition of the same choice situation is presented and its interpretation discussed. It is then argued that this notion leads naturally to the system of axioms presented in On Cardinal Utility. It is also argued that this notion must be used if we want to have a more clear understanding of the meaning of the axioms proposed by Alt and Frisch. Finally, it is remarked that since uncertainty is not present in the new approach, it is free of the paradoxes that have plagued the expected utility hypothesis.     

Ross' measure of risk aversion and portfolio selection

This article shows that if Ross' definition of riskier is replaced by a more traditional definition, such as a mean-preserving spread or second-degree stochastic dominance, then the application of Ross's stronger measure of risk aversion to the portfolio problem may no longer produce the desired result. It is also shown that the stronger measure may not perform satisfactorily when applied to exponential utility functions.The authors are grateful to John Pratt for his helpful comments.     

What can the regression model of human judgment learn from multi-attribute decision theory?

Zeleny's recent conjecture that multi-attribute decision theory may help to overcome the inadequacies of the linear regression model is incorrect. Recognition of the information processing advantages inherent in multiple -attribute decision situations combined with a requirement of transitivity itself implies linear objective functions. This follows from some recent developments by a psychologist and an economist in the analysis of individual and collective decision processes, developments which do not take as their starting point the paradigm of choice offered in utility theory.     

What if utility functions do not exist?

Often the preferences of decision-makers are sufficiently inconsistent so as to preclude the existence of a utility function in the classical sense. Several alternatives for dealing with this situation are discussed. One alternative, that of modifying classical demands on utility functions, is emphasized and described in the context of the theory of measurement developed in recent years by behavioral scientists. The measurement theory approach is illustrated by discussing the concept of the dimension of a partial order. Even if we cannot assign numerical utility or worth values which reflect preferences in the classical utility function sense, from the measurement theory point of view we can still learn a lot about the preferences by finding several measures of worth so that a given alternative x is preferred to an alternative y if and only if x is ranked higher than y on each of the worth scales. If such measures can be found, it follows that the preferences define a partial order, and the smallest number of such scales needed is called the dimension of the partial order. If one-dimensional preferences (those amenable to classical utility assignments) cannot be found, then the next best thing is to search for partially ordered preferences with as small a dimension as possible. Several conditions under which a partial order is two-dimensional are described.The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Joel Spencer and Ralph Strauch. He also thanks Kirby Baker and Peter Fishburn for permission to quote freely from earlier joint work on two-dimensional partial orders.     

Modelling curiosity in decision-making

This paper develops a model of choice with an agent that is capable of experiencing curiosity using Loewenstein’s (Psychol Bull 116(1):75–98, 1994) information gap interpretation of curiosity. We then proceed to determine the restrictions on choice behaviour implied by the model in two choice environments: no discovery—where the Decision-Maker does not have the opportunity to learn—and discovery—where she is afforded such an opportunity. These restrictions can be applied by an observer to determine if a Decision-Maker’s choices align with the model.     

Ambiguity framed

In his exposition of subjective expected utility theory, Savage (1954) proposed that the Allais paradox could be reduced if it were recast into a format which made the appeal of the independence axiom of expected utility theory more transparent. Recent studies consistently find support for this prediction. We consider a salience-based choice model which explains this frame-dependence of the Allais paradox. We then derive the novel prediction that the presentation format responsible for reductions in Allais-style violations of expected utility theory will also reduce Ellsberg-style violations of subjective expected utility theory. This format makes the appeal of Savage’s “sure thing principle” more transparent. We design an experiment to test this prediction and find strong support for such frame-dependence of ambiguity aversion in Ellsberg-style choices. In particular, we observe markedly less ambiguity-averse behavior in Savage’s matrix format than in a more standard “prospect” format. This finding poses a new challenge for the leading models of ambiguity aversion.     

Choice Functions with States of Mind

An agent is rational by dominance then states of mind (DSM) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives that are not dominated by any other alternative in the choice set, and second, by choosing the preselected alternative corresponding to his state of mind. This state of mind is dependent on the previous choices he made. An agent is rational by states of mind then dominance (SMD) if he makes his decisions by, first, preselecting the alternatives corresponding to his state of mind and second, choosing the alternative that is not dominated. We give axiomatizations for SMD-rational or DSM-rational choice functions.      

Ambiguity aversion in the small and in the large for weighted linear utility

The widely observed preference for lotteries involving precise rather than vague of ambiguous probabilities is called ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity aversion cannot be predicted or explained by conventional expected utility models. For the subjectively weighted linear utility (SWLU) model, we define both probability and payoff premiums for ambiguity, and introduce alocal ambiguity aversion function a(u) that is proportional to these ambiguity premiums for small uncertainties. We show that one individual's ambiguity premiums areglobally larger than another's if and only if hisa(u) function is everywhere larger. Ambiguity aversion has been observed to increase 1) when the mean probability of gain increases and 2) when the mean probability of loss decreases. We show that such behavior is equivalent toa(u) increasing in both the gain and loss domains. Increasing ambiguity aversion also explains the observed excess of sellers' over buyers' prices for insurance against an ambiguous probability of loss.     

Rule utilitarianism,rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior

The paper first summarizes the author's decision-theoretical model of moral behavior, in order to compare the moral implications of the act-utilitarian and of the rule-utilitarian versions of utilitarian theory. This model is then applied to three voting examples. It is argued that the moral behavior of act-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a noncooperative game, played in the extensive mode, and involving action-by-action maximization of social utility by each player. In contrast, the moral behavior of rule-utilitarian individuals will have the nature of a cooperative game, played in the normal mode, and involving a firm commitment by each player to a specific moral strategy (viz. to the strategy selected by the rule-utilitarian choice criterion) — even if some individual actions prescribed by this strategy, when considered in isolation, should fail to maximize social utility.The most important advantage that rule utilitarianism as an ethical theory has over act utilitarianism lies in its ability to give full recognition to the moral and social importance of individual rights and personal obligations. It is easy to verify that action-by-action maximization of social utility, as required by act utilitarianism, would destroy these rights and obligations. In contrast, rule utilitarianism can fully recognize the moral validity of these rights and obligations precisely because of its commitment to an overall moral strategy, independent of action-by-action social-utility maximization.The paper ends with a discussion of the voter's paradox problem. The conventional theory of rational behavior cannot avoid the paradoxical conclusion that, in any large electorate, voting is always an irrational activity because one's own individual vote is extremely unlikely to make any difference to the outcome of any election. But it can be shown that, by using the principles of rule-utilitarian theory, this paradox can easily be resolved and that, in actual fact, voting, even in large electorates, may be perfectly rational action. More generally, the example of rule utilitarianism shows what an important role the concept of a rational commitment can play in the analysis of rational behavior.     

Convex stochastic dominance with finite consequence sets

Stochastic dominance is a notion in expected-utility decision theory which has been developed to facilitate the analysis of risky or uncertain decision alternatives when the full form of the decision maker's von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function on the consequence space X is not completely specified. For example, if f and g are probability functions on X which correspond to two risky alternatives, then f first-degree stochastically dominates g if, for every consequence x in X, the chance of getting a consequence that is preferred to x is as great under f as under g. When this is true, the expected utility of f must be as great as the expected utility of g.Most work in stochastic dominance has been based on increasing utility functions on X with X an interval on the real line. The present paper, following [1], formulates appropriate notions of first-degree and second-degree stochastic dominance when X is an arbitrary finite set. The only structure imposed on X arises from the decision maker's preferences. It is shown how typical analyses with stochastic dominance can be enriched by applying the notion to convex combinations of probability functions. The potential applications of convex stochastic dominance include analyses of simple-majority voting on risky alternatives when voters have similar preference orders on the consequences.     

The impact of risk sharing on efficient decision

A group of risk-averse members must choose among monetary risks and payoff-sharing rules. Departure from the status quo requires unanimous consent. Such groups drill for oil, bail out nations, and make hostile takeover bids. Assume agreement on probabilities. As is well known, if all members have identically shaped HARA utility functions, efficient group act-choices follow another such function independently of payoff sharing. We show that all other groups inevitably have complex efficient behavior, accepting gambles among individually unacceptable lotteries in almost every status quo position. We also develop proper risk aversion for groups, and treat disagreement on probabilities.Support of the Associates of the Harvard Business School (Pratt) and the Business and Government and Energy and Environmental Policy Centers (Zeckhauser) is gratefully acknowledged. We received helpful comments from Scott Johnson, Mark Machina, and a referee. Jay Patel provided assistance beyond the call of collegiality.     

Parametric multi-attribute utility functions for optimal profit under risk constraints

We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family of utility functions defined on a larger set of decisions than the original one; he adopts pessimism and performs first a minimization of expected utility over this family, then performs a maximization over a new decisions set. This economic behaviour is called “maxmin under risk” and studied by Maccheroni (Econ Theory 19:823–831, 2002). As an application, we make the link between an expected prospect maximization problem, subject to conditional value-at-risk being less than a threshold value, and a non-expected utility economic formulation involving “loss aversion”-type utility functions.     

Anxiety and Decision Making with Delayed Resolution of Uncertainty

In many real-world gambles, a non-trivial amount of time passes before the uncertainty is resolved but after a choice is made. An individual may have a preference between gambles with identical probability distributions over final outcomes if they differ in the timing of resolution of uncertainty. In this domain, utility consists not only of the consumption of outcomes, but also the psychological utility induced by an unresolved gamble. We term this utility anxiety. Since a reflective decision maker may want to include anxiety explicitly in analysis of unresolved lotteries, a multiple-outcome model for evaluating lotteries with delayed resolution of uncertainty is developed. The result is a rank-dependent utility representation (e.g., Quiggin, 1982), in which period weighting functions are related iteratively. Substitution rules are proposed for evaluating compound temporal lotteries. The representation is appealing for a number of reasons. First, probability weights can be interpreted as the cognitive attention allocated to certain outcomes. Second, the model disaggregates strength of preference from temporal risk aversion and thus provides some insight into the old debate about the relationship between von Neumann–Morgenstern utility functions and strength of preference value functions.     

Aggregation theorems and multidimensional stochastic choice models

In many choice situations, the options are multidimensional. Numerous probabilistic models have been developed for such choices between multidimensional options and for the parallel choices determined by one or more components of such options. In this paper, it is assumed that a functional relation exists between the choice probabilities over the multidimensional options and the choice probabilities over the associated component unidimensional options. It is shown that if that function satisfies a marginalization property then it is essentially an arithmetic mean, and if the function satisfies a likelihood independence property then it is a weighted geometric mean. The results are related to those on the combination of expert opinion, and various probabilistic models in the choice literature are shown to have the geometric mean form.     

Order extensions,budget correspondences,and rational choice

This article is concerned with extensions of a continuous ordering R on a set X to a subset P(X) of the power set of X. The underlying topology will be the Hausdorff metric topology. We will see that continuous extensions of R do not require that P(X) contain every nonempty finite subset of X. Therefore, the analysis can be applied to consumer theory and inverse choice functions. In analogy to these functions budget correspondences are established which relate alternatives x with certain subsets of X, according to the extended ordering.     

Hostile interpretation as a transdiagnostic factor for cooccurring anxiety in boys with aggressive behavior problems

Many children with aggressive behavior problems also suffer from anxiety. This cooccurrence may perhaps be explained by transdiagnostic factors. Identifying these factors seems crucial, as they may be important targets to treat these cooccurring problems effectively. This two-study paper investigates whether hostile interpretation of others’ intentions is a transdiagnostic factor for cooccurring aggression and anxiety problems, examining two samples of boys in middle childhood. We assessed boys’ aggression and anxiety using teacher-report in Study 1 (N = 84, M_age = 10.10), and parent-report in Study 2 (N = 115, M_age = 10.55). In both studies, we assessed hostile interpretation using vignettes describing ambiguous provocations by peers. Both studies revealed a strong association between aggression and anxiety problems, underscoring the necessity to examine factors that can explain this cooccurrence. However, in neither study was this association reduced when we added hostile interpretation to the model, suggesting that hostile interpretation did not function as a transdiagnostic factor in our samples. One possible explanation for these findings is that hostile interpretation predicts both aggression and anxiety problems, but in different children. We, therefore, encourage scholars to conduct more research to explain the high comorbidity of aggression and anxiety problems in children. Future research should also examine hostile interpretation as predictor or transdiagnostic factor for aggression and anxiety problems in more diverse population, including girls and other age groups.     

A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs

When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on E ^c, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with multiple priors, and have common induced preferences over lotteries. The paper shows that when all priors give positive probability to an event E, a certain coherence property between conditional and unconditional preferences is satisfied if and only if the set of subjective probability measures considered by the agent given E is obtained by updating all subjective prior probability measures using Bayes rule.