Stalled Fertility Decline in Egypt,Why?

After experiencing rapid decline since the 1980s, fertility in Egypt seemed to be stalling during the second half of the 1990s. In an effort to identify the population segment(s) responsible for the stalling, this study considers fertility trends of women from three standard of living strata (low, middle, and high). Using data collected by the 1988, 1992, 1995, and the 2000 Egypt Demographic and Health Surveys, the study indicates that the reproductive behavior of women from high and middle standards households is largely responsible for stalling of the fertility decline during recent years, and that prospects for a lower fertility in the future is limited, once the gap between the three groups closes. This means that the expectation of achieving replacement fertility Egypt within the next 15 to 20 years is in doubt if the current trends in the both actual and desired fertility of the middle and high strata continued. The key for future decline in fertility is the decline in desired number of children below the current level of 3 children by at least one segment of the population. The fact none of the three population segments expressed a desired fertility below 3 children deprived the society of a vanguard group that leads the rest of the society to replacement level fertility.     

The pattern of puerto rican fertility

The vital statistics of Puerto Rico for the period 1943–8 reveal a continuation of high crude birth rates and age-specific fertility rates. A careful examination of the figures does not suggest that there is as yet any decline in fertility, though with increasing urbanization such a decline may be expected to take place in the not too distant future.     

Russia Faces Depopulation? Dynamics of Population Decline

Between 1992 and 1993 Russia's population declined, as it has in every succeeding year. This has been viewed as a population disaster, related to high adult male mortality and deterioration of the health care system. Some see a substantially depopulated Russia in the future. However, the prospect of long-term population decline is completely due to recent declines in fertility. High adult male mortality, although a cause of great concern, does not contribute to the chance of long-term population decline. Projections of the future population of Russia depend upon the exact fertility assumptions used. Based on the example of fertility in the United States in the Great Depression and the Baby Boom following World War II, the future depopulation of Russia is far from certain.     

Modeling momentum in gradual demographic

The analysis of population momentum following a gradual decline in fertility to replacement level provides valuable insights into prospects for future population growth. Here, we extend recent work in the area by applying a new form of the quadratic hyperstable (QH) model, which relates exponentially changing fertility to the resultant exponentiated quadratic birth sequence. Modeling gradual transitions from an initial stable population to an ultimate stationary population indicates that such declines in fertility increase momentum by a product of two factors. The first factor is a previously noted continuation of stable growth for half the period of decline. The second is a not previously appreciated offsetting factor that reflects the interaction between the decline in fertility, the changing age pattern of fertility, and the changing age composition of the population. Numerical examples using both hypothetical and actual populations demonstrate that for declines of any length, the product of the two factors yields momentum values that closely agree with the results of population projections. The QH model can examine monotonic transitions between any two sets of constant vital rates. As a generalization of the fixed-rate stable model, it has great potential value in numerous areas of demographic analysis.     

Closing a Sociodemographic Chapter of Chinese History

At its recent Fifth Plenary Session held in Beijing, the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to abolish the one‐child policy and allow all couples to have two children, thus closing an important chapter of China's social and demographic history. Recent fertility trends make it clear why it is urgent to abandon this policy. Census and survey data show that China's TFR had already fallen below replacement in 1991. Since the mid‐1990s, TFRs in most years have been lower than 1.5 children per woman. Since 2010, even lower fertility rates have been recorded by the annual population change surveys. Since the mid‐1990s, fertility decline has been increasingly driven by generalized ideational changes resulting from the social, economic, and cultural transformation of recent decades. In recent years many couples who were entitled to have a second child have chosen not to do so. For this reason, the termination of the one‐child policy is unlikely to lead to a major upturn in fertility, but rather to the continuation of a low‐fertility regime with more diverse fertility patterns across different sub‐populations, a pattern that has been observed in many countries.     

Birth and death in cities in the developing world

City dwellers in Sub-Saharan Africa have increased roughly 600% in the last 35 years. Throughout the developing world, cities have expanded at a rate that has far outpaced rural population growth. Extensive data document lower fertility and mortality rates in cities than in rural regions. But slums, shantytowns, and squatters' settlements proliferate in many large cities. Martin Brockerhoff studies the reproductive and health consequences of urban growth, with an emphasis on maternal and child health. Brockerhoff reports that child mortality rates in large cities are highest among children born to mothers who recently migrated from rural areas or who live in low-quality housing. Children born in large cities have about a 30% higher risk of dying before they reach the age of 5 than those born in smaller cities. Despite this, children born to migrant mothers who have lived in a city for about a year have much better survival chances than children born in rural areas to nonmigrant mothers and children born to migrant mothers before or shortly after migration. Migration in developing countries as a whole has saved millions of children's lives. The apparent benefits experienced in the 1980s may not occur in the future, as cities continue to grow and municipal governments confront an overwhelming need for housing, jobs, and services. Another benefit is that fertility rates in African cities fell by about 1 birth per woman as a result of female migration from villages to towns in the 1980s and early 1990s. There will be an increasing need for donors and governments to concentrate family planning, reproductive health, child survival, and social services in cities, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, because there child mortality decline has been unexpectedly slow, overall fertility decline is not yet apparent in most countries, and levels of migration to cities are anticipated to remain high.     

Does low fertility call for new policies in some Asian countries?

Over the past 2 decades, Japan, China, Singapore, Hong Kong, and South Korea have completed a demographic transition from high birth and death rates and runaway population growth to reduced fertility and mortality and population growth approaching replacement levels. Among the outcomes of fertility decline, 3 have particularly far reaching effects: 1) Changes in family types and structures. Marriage and family formation are postponed, childbearing is compressed into a narrow reproductive span that begins later and ends earlier, and higher-order births become rare. Large families are replaced by small ones, and joint and extended families tend to be replaced by nuclear families. 2) Shifts in the proportions of young and old. Declining fertility means that the population as a whole becomes older. Decreases in the proportion of children provides an opportunity to increase the coverage of education. Increases in the proportion of the elderly means higher medical costs and social and economic problems about care of the aged. 3) Changes in the work force. There is concern that low fertility and shortages of workers will cause investment labor-intensive industries to shift to countries with labor surpluses. Another outcome may be an increase in female participation in the work force. The potential consequences of rapid fertility decline have sparked debate among population experts and policy makers throughout Asia. Current family planning programs will emphasize: 1) offering a choice of methods to fit individual preferences; 2) strengthening programs for sexually active unmarried people; 3) encouraging child spacing and reproductive choice rather than simply limiting the number of births; 4) making information available on the side effects of various family planning methods; 5) providing special information and services to introduce new methods; and 6) promoting the maternal and child health benefits of breast feeding and birth spacing.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

New perspective in population assistance

The United States Agency for International Development (AID), in a proposal to Congress, has suggested that before assistance is extended to developing countries, its impact on the country's population growth should be considered and development projects accepted that contribute directly to fertility declines. Foreign development projects will be examined for their direct and indirect impact on population growth. Some projects related to education, employment and economic development may be found, by their very nature, to encourage fertility decline and emphasized as a result of the impact examinations. Other projects may be changed to stress the features that are conducive to slowing population growth. The population impact examination proposal has been included in this year's legislation to authorize the continuation of United States development assistance programs for the fiscal year 1978.     

The evolution in China's fertility and an analysis of population development]

There have been numerous projections on China's population at the end of century. Their differences are due to different estimations on the effects of fertility determinants. 2 simulation models have been developed, both from micro and macro levels, to estimate the population at the end of the century on the basis of 6 different fertility patterns. 3 possible options for fertility patterns are discussed. 1.) The 1 child per family option means that every couple has 1 child by the year 1989, the population of China will be 1.2 billion in the year 2000. Even if this is a ideal situation, it would not be a feasible policy, as the pressure from the rural population to have more than 1 child has been increasing in recent years. Nevertheless, it is still possible for urban couples to accept having only 1 child. Therefore, encouraging more people to have 1 child should be held as a basic policy. 2.) Under the option of 2 children per family with 2 or 3 years of spacing, the total population in the year 2000 would be 1.2 - 1.4 billion, which is unacceptable in terms of the development situation. 3.) Following a differential fertility policy towards urban, rural, and minority populations would mean that urban couples would have 1 child, rural couples whose first child is a girl or those who are in special circumstance would have 2 children. Minorities would have 2 or 3 children. AMong the above options, number 3 is more likely to be achieved in view of current socioeconomic, cultural, and demographic factors.     

Geopolitical Aspects of Population in the Twenty‐First Century

Over the second half of the twentieth century rapid population growth in the less developed countries has redrawn the global demographic map. Many once‐poor countries have also experienced strong economic growth, which in combination with the demographic change has yielded marked shifts in the world's economic balance, with far‐reaching geopolitical implications. At the same time, low fertility in much of the developed world presages a future of population shrinkage, accompanied by pronounced population aging. In per capita terms, the economic advantages of the developed countries will likely persist for many years, but their actual and potential falls in population may accentuate their loss of relative economic power and eventually lead to marginalization of their international standing and influence. Preventing population shrinkage will be an urgent task for them, requiring either large‐scale immigration (likely to be ruled out) or raising the birth rate. Existing pro‐family policies have had at best modest effects on fertility levels. Two novel approaches are described that would plausibly have greater impact. One would counteract the disproportionate influence of older voters in the electorate by granting voting rights to all citizens, allowing custodial parents to vote on behalf of their children. The second would reform the public pension system to reestablish the link between the financial security of retired persons and the number of children they have raised to productive adulthood.     

Explanations of the fertility crisis in modern societies: A search for commonalities

Near‐global fertility decline began in the 1960s, and from the 1980s an increasing number of European countries and some Asian ones achieved very low fertility (total fertility below 1.5) with little likelihood of completed cohort fertility reaching replacement level. Earlier theory aiming at explaining this phenomenon stressed the incompatibility between post‐industrial society and behaviour necessary for population replacement. Recent theory has been more specific, often concentrating on the current Italian or Spanish situations or on the contrast between them and the situation in either Scandinavia or the English‐speaking countries, or both. Such an approach ignores important evidence, especially that from German‐speaking populations. The models available concentrate on welfare systems and family expenses, omitting circumstances that may be unique to individual countries or longer‐term factors that may be common to all.     

We must pay attention to the difference between the original intention and the current status of family planning]

Due to imperfections in the current family planning (FP) policy, and the differences un program implementation in urban and rural areas, the fertility of the urban population with higher IQ scores is under control but this is not the case for the rural population. Among rural couples, one child is rare and two or three are commonplace, while in cities over 70% of couples are having one child. In the metropolitan cities, this figure is about 90%. In the rural areas, provision of education is a serious problem because of insufficient resources, a lack of qualified teachers and inadequate facilities. At the present, at least 3 million school age children in rural areas can not go to primary school. Besides there is a big contrast in FP practice between Han nationality and minorities. Population growth is basically under control among the more advanced Han nationally but not among the less advances minority nationalities. This growth rate among the minority population was about 50.27/1000 in the past five years, which is alarming. Furthermore, the couples given opportunity to have a second child are often those whose first child had birth defects or is mentally retarded, whereas couples with a normal child can have only one child. This has become a vicious circle, since subsequent children are more likely to have the same birth defects. It was discovered from a 1983-85 survey that the prevalence of birth defects was 12.8/1000. The current situation is that the fertility of urban, educated, and healthy people is restricted while the less educated, those living in less developed areas, and those with health defects are having more children. The outcome of this situation is the decline of national population quality, which greatly deviates from the original intention of the FP.     

The Philippines: population trends and dilemmas

National and regional variations in population growth rates, age and sex composition, fertility and mortality measures, the numbers in the working age population and population distribution are described and their implications for future development outlined. The prospects for the next 20 years indicate a continuation and even exacerbation of regional imbalances in terms of birth, death, and migration rates with the Mindanao area turning out to be the most demographically disadvantaged of the 3 island groups. The policy makers will have to take account of current and projected numbers of people in the planning process if they wish to improve the welfare of each and every Filipino.     

Sub-Saharan Africa: population pressures on development

The population of sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at 434 million in 1984, is expected to reach 1.4 billion by 2025. The birth rate, currently 48/1000 population, continues to increase, and the death rate, 17/1000, is declining. Rapid population growth has curtailed government efforts to provide adequate nutrition, preserve the land base essential for future development, meet the demand for jobs, education, and health services, and address overcrowding in urban areas. Low education, rural residence, and low incomes are key contributors to the area's high fertility. Other factors include women's restricted roles, early age at marriage, a need for children as a source of security and support in old age, and limited knowledge of and access to modern methods of contraception. Average desired family size, which is higher than actual family size in most countries, is 6-9 children. Although government leaders have expressed ambivalence toward development of population policies and family planning programs as a result of the identification of such programs with Western aid donors, the policy climat is gradually changing. By mid-1984, at least 13 of the 42 countries in the region had indicated that they consider current fertility rates too high and support government and/or private family planning programs to reduce fertility. In addition, 26 countries in the region provide some government family planning services, usually integrated with maternal and child health programs. However, 10 countries in the region do not support family planning services for any reason. Unfortunately, sub-Saharan Africa has not yet produced a family planning program with a measurable effect on fertility that could serve as a model for other countries in the region. Social and economic change is central to any hope of fertility reduction in sub-Saharan Africa. Lower infant and child mortality rates, rising incomes, higher education, greater economic and social opportunities for women, and increased security would provide a climate more conducive to fertility decline. Given the limited demand, great sensitivity must be shown in implementing family planning programs.     

India's population in transition

This demographic profile of India addresses fertility, family planning, and economic issues. India is described as a country shifting from economic policies of self-reliance to active involvement in international trade. Wealth has increased, particularly at higher educational levels, yet 25% still live below the official poverty line and almost 66% of Indian women are illiterate. The government program in family planning, which was instituted during the early 1950s, did not change the rate of natural increase, which remained stable at 2.2% over the past 30 years. 1993 marked the first time the growth rate decline to under 2%. The growth rate in 1995 was 1.9%. The total population is expected double in 36 years. Only Nigeria, Pakistan, and Bangladesh had a higher growth rate and higher fertility in 1995. India is geographically diverse (with the northern Himalayan mountain zone, the central alluvial plains, the western desert region, and the southern peninsula with forest, mountains, and plains). There are regional differences in the fertility rates, which range from replacement level in Kerala and Goa to 5.5 children in Uttar Pradesh. Fertility is expected to decline throughout India due to the slower pace of childbearing among women over the age of 35 years, the increase in contraceptive use, and increases in marriage age. Increased educational levels in India and its state variations are related to lower fertility. Literacy campaigns are considered to be effective means of increasing the educational levels of women. Urbanization is not expected to markedly affect fertility levels. Urban population, which is concentrated in a few large cities, remains a small proportion of total population. Greater shifts are evident in the transition from agriculture to other wage labor. Fertility is expected to decline as women's share of labor force activity increases. The major determinant of fertility decline in India is use of family planning, which has improved in access and use during the 1980s. If India is to keep a stable population under 1.6 billion in the future, Indians may have to accept only one child per family.     

Fertility decline in Taiwan: A study using parity progression ratios

Taiwan's decline in fertility is studied by using period parity progression ratios. Levels of marriage and motherhood are found to have been high and essentially constant though the late 1980s, suggesting that the decline has been due almost entirely to declines in second and higher order-births. Families with three or more children play an important role in maintaining the current level of fertility. The level of fertility would be even lower without these families. They contributed more than one-half child per woman to the total fertility rate during most of the 1980s. Total fertility rates computed from the period parity progression ratios indicate a substantially higher level of fertility than the conventional total fertility rate; they remained above or at replacement level through 1988. A formal demographic analysis suggests that the conventional total fertility rate has been depressed by shifts in age at childbearing.     

Reassessing the Insurance Effect: A Qualitative Analysis of Fertility Behavior in Senegal and Zimbabwe

A number of prominent demographers have recently reiterated the argument that a lasting mortality decline is a key determinant of the fertility transition. Of the main hypothesized pathways linking fertility to mortality, the one least studied is the insurance hypothesis: the notion that, in high‐mortality contexts, people decide to have more children in order to anticipate possible future child deaths and lessen the risks of having too few surviving offspring. In‐depth interviews and focus groups from Zimbabwe and Senegal are used to examine this hypothesis and to extend it into a broader theory of reproductive decision making under uncertainty. Whereas insurance strategies are frequent in Zimbabwe and occur in urban Senegal, in the higher‐mortality settings—the rural Senegalese site and the recent past described by respondents in Zimbabwe and urban Senegal—deliberate fertility‐limitation strategies are rare. The data depict fundamental changes in attitudes, strategies, and behaviors concerning family size over time and, in Senegal, over space. Important reproductive goals and risks extend far beyond numbers of children and mortality. Parents seek to have healthy, successful children for many reasons including companionship, descendants, and old‐age support. Diverse investments in child quality (their education, health, etc.) and quantity (numbers of births) are the main means to attain these goals and, less recognized by demographers, are also important ways for parents to manage uncertainty in family‐building outcomes; the “classic” insurance mechanism is only one, often minor, aspect of the quantity option.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

The child survival hypothesis

Summary Because of current interest in the child survival hypothesis, we have reviewed available evidence bearing upon the relationships of infant and child mortality to fertility and contraceptive behaviour. The evidence is drawn from time series data for local and national vital events, from special in-depth studies of the infant mortality-fertility relationships in family formation, and from service statistics from health and family planning programmes. As a result of this review, we suggest five clarifications which should be made in redefining the child survival hypothesis and assessing its potential programme implications. The child survival hypothesis states that improved child survival will contribute to increased family planning motivation and consequent fertility decline. The evidence presented here suggests that the effect is not automatic and probably not a necessary pre-condition for fertility decline. There is certainly not a reflexive one-to-one replacement, but a partial effect may still be important. In the clearly demonstrated reduction in inter-pregnancy intervals after a child death, the major component is undoubtedly the removal of the biological protection of lactational amenorrhoea. A separate but somewhat smaller effect has been demonstrated in situations where lactation did not seem to have been the explanation. It is expected that increased child survival will contribute to fertility decline mainly in countries experiencing rapid mortality decline and population growth. The replacement of children who die is probably not so much 'volitional' as a result of alterations in sub-conscious expectations. It is apparent that in traditional agrarian populations, few direct and manipulable means of influencing motivation for fertility limitation are available, and, therefore, it must be stressed that integrated health and family planning programmes do provide opportunities for immediate programme development. By making parents aware of improved changes of survival through health services in which they develop confidence, the spontaneous linkages between mortality and fertility can presumably be reinforced. Family planning services must be provided as an essential initial step in programme development, but they can be made more effective, as well as politically more acceptable if appropriately integrated with maternal and child health and nutrition services.