我国民事诉讼再审程序若干问题分析

再审程序是我国民事诉讼的重要组成部分,随着审判方式的改革,民事诉讼各项制度和程序暴露出许多问题并亟待解决,这其中也包括我国的民事再审程序,比如受前苏联影响导致职权主义色彩浓厚,指导思想与民事诉讼规律不相符,过于追求个案公正,忽视程序价值,本文详细论述了再审程序存在的问题,并分析了问题存在的根源,并指出重塑的思路,旨在维护司法公正和权威、保障当事人的诉讼权利,使再审程序真正成为一种特殊的纠错和补救程序。     

To be fair,generous, or selfish: The effect of relationship on Chinese children’s distributive allocation and procedural application

Previous research has found that children’s sharing with others relies on fairness norms, but also varies according to their social relationships. The current study focuses on the conflict between fairness and relationship, exploring their impacts across two resource allocation contexts. We used a parallel work task to explore the effect of relationship with different recipients (friend, stranger, or disliked peer) on three allocation patterns (generous, fair, or selfish), when children directly allocated resources (distributive allocation), or applied different procedures to recipients (procedural application). Participants consisted of 123 Chinese children between the ages of 6 and 12. We found that in the distributive allocation context, in which participants directly decided the outcome, children primarily considered their relationship with recipients when dividing resources, not fairness. However, in the procedural application context, in which children could choose different allocation procedures for recipients, children primarily preferred fairness, regardless of social relationship. Moreover, when making distributive allocations, 6‐ to 8‐year‐olds were more selfish toward their disliked peers, whereas 9‐ to 12‐year‐olds tended to be more fair and generous toward their friends and strangers. These findings shed light on the link between social relationship and fairness within different allocation contexts among children of Chinese cultural background.     

Effects of fixed costs in two-person sequential bargaining

Rubinstein (1982) considered the problem of dividing a given surplus between two players sequentially, and then proposed a model in which the two players alternately make and respond to each other's offers through time. He further characterized the perfect equilibrium outcomes, which depend on the players time preferences and order of moves. Using both equal and unequal bargaining cost conditions and an unlimited number of rounds, two experiments were designed to compare the perfect equilibrium model to alternative models based on norms of fairness. We report analyses of final agreements, first offers, and number of bargaining rounds, which provide limited support to the perfect equilibrium model, and then conclude by recommending a shift in focus from model testing to specification of the conditions favoring one model over another.     

Of Practicalities and Perspective: What Is Fair in Group Decision Making?

Establishing fair procedures to regulate intragroup disagreements should engender cooperation while inhibiting conflict . Yet what is a "fair" procedure might vary for members of different factions . To understand perceptions of fairness in group decision making , the present research developed and utilized the Fair Group Procedures Scale (FGPS). Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a four-factor structure along two dimensions: the means of distributing decision-making power (proportionality to equality) and the normative value of the approach (desirable to undesirable) . Data suggest that deeming a particular decision-making procedure "fair" is predicted by one's majority/minority position within a group . Furthermore , experimental data suggest that social change (i . e ., reversals of majority/minority positions) reduces the discrepancies between factions . Results support the socially constructed nature of fairness and its potential role in intragroup conflict .     

Best Practice to Order Authors in Multi/Interdisciplinary Health Sciences Research Publications

Misunderstanding and disputes about authorship are commonplace among members of multi/interdisciplinary health research teams. If left unmanaged and unresolved, these conflicts can undermine knowledge sharing and collaboration, obscure accountability for research, and contribute to the incorrect attribution of credit. To mitigate these issues, certain researchers suggest quantitative authorship distributions schemes (e.g., point systems), while others wish to replace or minimize the importance of authorship by using “contributorship”—a system based on authors’ self-reporting contributions. While both methods have advantages, we argue that authorship and contributorship will most likely continue to coexist for multiple ethical and practical reasons. In this article, we develop a five-step “best practice” that incorporates the distribution of both contributorship and authorship for multi/interdisciplinary research. This procedure involves continuous dialogue and the use of a detailed contributorship taxonomy ending with a declaration explaining contributorship, which is used to justify authorship order. Institutions can introduce this approach in responsible conduct of research training as it promotes greater fairness, trust, and collegiality among team members and ultimately reduces confusion and facilitates resolution of time-consuming disagreements.     

税收质量的界定、制度比较与借鉴

税收质量是指税收效率、税收公平及两者均衡的状态,主要体现在税收结构、税收分权体制以及税收征收管理机制三个方面上。不同经济发展水平国家的税收质量存在着较大差异性。税收质量要注重长远利益与现实利益的兼顾,在利益导向和控制导向基础上平衡各级政府的税权划分,不断强化以税收服务和监督保障为核心的税收征收管理运行机制。从短期看,我国税收质量仍旧要以税收效率作为主要目标,兼顾税收公平作用的发挥;随着生产力水平的不断提高,要逐步强化税收公平,以税收公平促进税收效率。     

Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict

Conditions are defined under the majority voting procedure under which manipulation does no harm to a majority, and when a majority benefit. The effect of introducing interpersonal comparability on the desirability of manipulation is discussed under Rawlsian justice and with preference intensities.     

Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

This paper discusses the relationship between coalitional stability and the robustness of bargaining outcomes to the bargaining procedure. We consider a class of bargaining procedures described by extensive form games, where payoff opportunities are given by a characteristic function (cooperative) game. The extensive form games differ on the probability distribution assigned to chance moves which determine the order in which players take actions. One way to define mechanism robustness is in terms of the property of no first mover advantage. An equilibrium is mechanism robust if for each member the expected payoff before and after being called to propose is the same. Alternatively one can define mechanism robustness as a property of equilibrium outcomes. An outcome is said to be mechanism robust if it is supported by some equilibrium in all the extensive form games (mechanisms) within our class. We show that both definitions of mechanism robustness provide an interesting characterization of the core of the underlying cooperative game.     

Divide the Dollar: Three solutions and extensions

Divide the Dollar (DD) is a game in which two players independently bid up to 100 cents for a dollar. Each player receives his or her bid if the sum of the bids does not exceed a dollar; otherwise they receive nothing. This game has multiple Nash equilibria, including the egalitarian division of (50, 50), but this division is not compelling except for its symmetry and presumed fairness.This division is easy to induce, however, by punishing — more severely than does DD — deviations from it, but these solutions are not reasonable. By altering the rules of DD, however, one can induce an egalitarian division (by successive elimination of weakly dominated strategies), but no reasonable payoff scheme produces this division with egalitarian bids of 50.Three alternatives to DD are analyzed. DD1, which rewards lowest bidders first, shows how an egalitarian outcome can be induced with equal but nonegalitarian bids. DD2, which adds a second stage that provides the players with new information yet restricts their choices at the same time, is used to introduce dominance inducibility. DD3 combines the features of DD1 and DD2, is reasonable (like DD1), makes calculations transparent (like DD2), and induces egalitarian bids as well as the egalitarian outcome. The possible application of the different procedures to a real-world allocation problem (setting of salaries by a team), in which there may be entitlements, is described.     

Process fairness,outcome fairness,and dynamic consistency: Experimental evidence for risk and ambiguity

Literature on fairness preferences distinguishes between outcome fairness, concerning the final allocation of payoffs, and process fairness, concerning the expected allocation of payoffs. It is not obvious, however, whether process fairness can consistently be implemented. Once uncertainty is resolved and outcomes are determined, the ex-ante procedurally fair decision maker may become consequentialist ex-post, and reconsider her choice on the basis of the observed outcomes. We present experimental evidence on dynamic consistency of social preferences under both known risk and ambiguity. A significant share of people subscribe to process fairness both before and after the resolution of uncertainty.     

A differential approach to the repeated prisoner's dilemma

The repeated prisoner's dilemma game is converted into a differential game by assuming that the players, instead of making decisions individually for each repetition of the prisoner's dilemma game, make decisions on the ratio of cooperative and noncooperative games that they wish to play over the next few moves, and that the actual plays are then determined using this ratio and a randomizing procedure. Although it sounds like a significant departure, this assumption is probably not too different from reality.Since each player can always obtain by his own action at least the payoff which he would receive from the noncooperative-noncooperative pair of strategies, that part of the differential game which is dominated by such a dual noncooperative strategy for either player is an unlikely outcome. This dominated area can be readily computed for any game, including those with more than two players.Formal testing with empirical data was impossible because of uncertainty about the proper null hypothesis. Nevertheless, experimental results reported by Rapoport are consistent with the theory.The authors are, respectively, Graduate Research Asistant in Economics and Professor of Economics and Public Choice at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.     

Metapreferences and the reasons for stability in social choice: Thoughts on broadening and clarifying the debate

The standard model of collective choice looks at aggregation procedures which take individual preferences as existing for a specified set of alternatives. In this paper we propose that actors also have preferences for rules of choice or characteristics of choice processes (e.g., the perceived fairness of procedures or the popularity of outcomes) rather than simply for alternatives (outcomes) themselves. We argue that the positing of the existence of meta-preferences can illuminate a number of areas of choice theory. Here we focus on one such area: the problem of “too much” stability in majority rule decision making - a stability which belies the standard theoretical results on the generic instability of majority rule processes. We also show that discussion of the prevalence of stability in collective decision making needs to be clarified because there are at least six distinct types of stability which are sometimes confounded in the literature.     

Measuring risk aversion with lists: a new bias

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655, 2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a systematic decrease in risk aversion and scrambles the ranking of individuals by risk aversion. This bias, that we call embedding bias, is quite distinct from other confounds that have been previously observed in the use of the HL method. It may be related to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospects increase risk aversion. Nevertheless, we also find that the more recent elicitation method due to Abdellaoui et al. (Theory Decis 71:63–80, 2011), also based on lists but using only one and the same probability in the list, does not display any statistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Our results suggest that methods other than the popular HL one may be preferable for the measurement of risk aversion.     

诉讼程序的"压缩"与"跳跃"——刑事简易程序改革的新思路

中国刑事简易程序虽历经改革而渐成体系,但诉讼程序简化的效果却不甚理想,这与立法部门忽视审前程序简易化有直接关联.案件流转机制冗长、审批机制复杂,是耗费审前程序期限的主要因素.尽管中国已通过缩短程序期限、简化诉讼环节的方式对简易程序改革进行探索,却未能达到应有功效.而三阶段的诉讼程序划分标准,审前程序的实体化,程序倒流的频繁发生,则是降低简易程序运行效率的深层原因.为简化审前程序,西方用于改革审前程序的权利放弃模式与事由预设模式可为中国提供制度借鉴.中国可通过压缩审前程序期限、跳跃审前诉讼环节,并在审前司法实践中综合适用这两种简化方式达致诉讼程序压缩与跳跃的效果.相较于以往,这是一种新的改革思路.     

Who gains from information asymmetry?

This article considers an asymmetric contest with incomplete information. There are two types of players: informed and uninformed. Each player has a different ability to translate effort into performance in terms of the contest success function. While one player’s type is known to both players, the other is private information and known only to the player himself. We compare the Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome of a one-sided private information contest to the Nash equilibrium with no private information, in which both players know the type of the other player. We show conditions under which uncertainty increases the investment of the uninformed player and the rent dissipation of the contest, while decreasing the expected net payoff of the informed player. In addition, we consider conditions under which the informed player—before knowing his own type—prefers that the uninformed player knows his type. Moreover, we show conditions for the existence/non-existence of equilibrium in a two-stage contest in which the informed player declares his type (or does not declare) in the first stage and in the second stage the two players play according to the information available to them.     

Mind the Covid-19 crisis: An evidence-based implementation of Next Generation EU

This paper develops an evidence-based approach to the selection and prioritisation of Next Generation EU (NGEU) projects for timely implementation and impact of the Recovery Plan for Europe. The analysis of a large sample of projects, currently funded by the European Union (EU) with the same priorities and objectives of NGEU, suggests that a timely implementation should be driven – within the EU Commission coordination framework – by national governments liaising directly with their citizens through participatory procedures, involving relevant stakeholders. Simplified implementation procedures with clear spatial targeting and limited involvement of regional authorities are necessary conditions for the avoidance of implementation delays.     

Sequential strategies in dual control problems

Sequential decision problems are studied in which there are two decision-makers, or players, who are trying to control the same stochastic system in order to minimize their own individual expected losses. The standard linear model for the stochastic control process and standard quadratic loss functions are assumed. The players take turns choosing the value of the control variable, and each player has his own sequence of targets and his own loss function. Optimal pure competitive strategies are derived by backward induction, and limiting strategies and equilibria are determined. Myopic strategies are introduced and shown to yield smaller losses for each player than the pure competitive strategies. Coefficients of cooperation are then defined, and various cooperative sequential strategies based on them are shown to be mutually beneficial to both players.     

The Psychology of Enfranchisement: Engaging and Fostering Inclusion of Members through Voting and Decision-Making Procedures

Democratic systems have many advantages. They elicit perceptions of appropriateness and legitimacy, they engage the psychological investment and commitment of those participating in the system and invite the voluntary cooperation of these persons. We argue that these advantages are conferred in large part through two features of democratic institutions and societies: the participative nature of procedures used to elect leaders, and the fairness of decision-making procedures used by these leaders once in power. In particular, we emphasize the capacity of these procedures to engage community members and foster their inclusion, because they convey that members' concerns are taken seriously and that they are valued by the group that developed and employed those procedures, as well as by the leaders that utilize them. Implications for creating a sense of social inclusion in members of the population, and for encouraging public confidence among those who feel marginalized, in climates of distrust, and during times of crisis are discussed.     

Endogenizing the order of moves in matrix games

Players often have flexibility in when they move and thus whether a game is played simultaneously or sequentially may be endogenously determined. For 2 × 2 games, we analyze this using an extended game. In a stage prior to actual play, players choose in which of two periods to move. A player moving at the first opportunity knows when his opponent will move. A player moving at the second turn learns the first mover's action. If both select the same turn, they play a simultaneous move subgame.If both players have dominant strategies in the basic game, equilibrium payoffs in the basic and extended games are identical. If only one player has a dominant strategy or if the unique equilibrium in the basic game is in mixed strategies, then the extended game equilibrium payoffs differ if and only if some pair of pure strategies Pareto dominates the basic game simultaneous play payoffs. If so, sequential play attains the Pareto dominating payoffs. The mixed strategy equilibrium occurs only when it is not Pareto dominated by some pair of pure strategies.In an alternative extended game, players cannot observe delay by opponents at the first turn. Results for 2×2 games are essentially the same as with observable delay, differing only when only one player has a dominant strategy.