Abstracts

The concept of ‘tacit knowledge’ as the means by which individuals interpret the ‘rules’ of social interaction occupies a central role in all the major contemporary theories of action and social structure. The major reference point for social theorists is Wittgenstein's celebrated discussion of rule-following in the Philosophical Investigations. Focusing on Giddens' incorporation of tacit knowledge and rules into his ‘theory of structuration’, I argue that Wittgenstein's later work is steadfastly set against the ‘latent cognitivism’ inherent in the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules. I also argue that the idea of tacit knowledge and tacit rules is either incoherent or explanatorily vacuous. Scholars of the emotions maintain that all anger requires an object of blame. In order to be angry, many writers argue, one must believe than an actor has done serious damage to something that one values. Yet an individual may be angered without blaming another. This kind of emotion, called situational anger, does not entail a corresponding object of blame. Situational anger can be a useful force in public life, enabling citizens to draw attention to the seriousness of social or political problems, without necessarily vilifying political officials. In the first half of this paper I show how H. L. A. Hart's theory of rules can resolve, or at least clarify, a central methodological problem in legal anthropology that was first posed in Llewellyn and Egebel's The Cheyenñe Way In the second half I explore and develop Hart's theory (a) of rules, and apply it to problems of agency and behaviourism in legal anthropology, and (b) of legal development, and apply it to the problem of rule-scepticism in legal anthropology as it is posed in Roberts and Comaroffs Rules and Processes and elsewhere. As human beings, we share many historically developed, language-game interwoven, public forms of life. Due to the joint, dialogically responsive nature of all social life within such forms, we cannot as individuals just act as we please; our forms of life exert a normative influence on what we can say and do. They act as a backdrop against which all our claims to knowledge are judged as acceptable or not. As a result, it is not easy to articulate their inadequacies in a clear and forceful manner. However, within most of our forms of life, we have a first-person right to express how our individual circumstances seem to us. And by the use of special forms of poetic, gestural talk—talk that can originate new language-games—we can offer to make our own ‘inner lives’ public. In this paper, I want to claim that this is just what Wittgenstein is attempting to do in his later philosophy: by use of the self-same methods that anyone might use to express aspects of their own world picture, he is offering us his attempts to make the background ‘landscape’ of our lives more visible to us. These methods are explored below. Proponents of the view that social structures are ontologically distinct from the people in whose actions they are immanent have assumed that structures can stand in causal relations to individual practices. Were causality to be no more than Humean concomitance correlations between structure and practices would be unproblematic. But two prominent advocates of the ontological account of structures, Bhaskar and Giddens, have also espoused a powers theory of causality. According to that theory causation is brought about by the activity of particulars, in the social psychological case, individuals of some sort. Consistence would demand that structure be those individuals. But neither Giddens nor Bhaskar wish to reify structure to the extent that would fit it for a role as a powerful particular. If only human beings can be powerful particulars in these contexts, the only way that structures can be real must be as properties of conversational (symbolic) interactions. Human action is social just in so far as people direct themselves to engage well in joint activities with others.     

Making the Tacit Explicit

Tacit knowledge is both a ubiquitous and puzzling notion, related to the idea of hidden assumptions. The puzzle is partly a result of the conflict between the idea that assumptions are in the mind and the apparent audience‐relativity of the "fact" of possessing an assumption or of the tacit knowledge that is articulated. If we think of making the tacit explicit as constructing a certain kind of inference repairing explanation for a particular audience "on the fly" we come closer to an explanation of what happens when we "make our tacit knowledge explicit." We can account for our capacity to construct such statements for particular audiences by reference to our non‐conceptual capacities to understand others. This approach avoids problematic assumptions about shared representations that are common in cognitive science, and the equally problematic notion that tacit knowledge is sentence‐like content that we retrieve when we articulate something based on our tacit knowledge.     

Social ontology,practical reasonableness,and collective reasons for action

I argue that the ontology of human social institutions and collective intentionality could be anchored in the normative notion of ‘practical reasonableness’ as collective reason for action. This involves the deontic idea of mutuality, accepted rules, and shared attitudes of other‐regardedness. I examine John Searle's three primitive notions of social ontology: collective intentionality, assignment of social functions, and constitutive rules and procedures. I use these notions to provide a plausible basis for understanding how people reason, in order to arrive at practically reasonable decisions and collective agency. Searle argues that social reality, institutions, processes, and facts are grounded in collective intentionality and the acceptance of social rules, procedures, and functions. I argue that collective intentionality and socially accepted rules are anchored in the need for human interdependence that engenders the social rules and norms or attitudes of ‘practical reasonableness’. I analyze the concept of ‘practical reasonableness’ as a representation of human mode of reasoning that involves collective intentionality.     

Wittgenstein, Pretend Play and the Transferred Use of Language

This essay sketches the potential implications of Wittgensteinian thought for conceptualizations of socalled fictive mental states, e.g. mental calculating, imagination, pretend play, as they are currently discussed in developmental psychology and philosophy of mind. In developmental psychology the young child's pretend play and make-belief are seen as a manifestation of the command of an underlying individualistic "theory of mind". When saying "This banana is a telephone" the child's mind entertains simultaneously two mental representations, a primary or veridical representation about the real properties of banana's and a pretend representation. It is the task of psychology to explain how this "double knowledge" does not result in conceptual chaos. Various sorts of internal mechanisms are postulated. In this essay it is argued that the threat of chaos is misconceived, and that the solutions are irrelevant. Following Wittgenstein's sparse remarks about the secondary sense of words, I argue that pretend language does not refer to underlying individual mental representations but to the child's creative transference of words used in one, primary, domain of application to another, secondary domain. The command and use of the secondary domain logically presupposes the command and use of the primary domain. Since the latter domain is necessarily public and social, fictive mental states cannot be dealt with purely individualistically as current mentalism assumes.     

What can Social Psychologists Learn from Architecture? The Asylum as Example

In this paper I argue for a stronger consideration of the possible relationship between social psychology and architecture and architectural history. After a brief review of some of the ways in which other social psychologists have sought to develop links between social psychology and history, I consider the utility of architecture in more depth, especially to the social psychologist interested in the development of knowledge and understanding. I argue that, especially when knowledge is institutionalised, the design and use of buildings might have a particular contribution to make to the way we can understand how phenomena have been understood and approached in the past. Although many examples are relevant, I consider the case of the psychiatric hospital (or “asylum”) in more detail.     

The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus

This paper aims to balance the conceptual reception of Bourdieu's sociology in the United States through a conceptual re-examination of the concept of Habitus. I retrace the intellectual lineage of the Habitus idea, showing it to have roots in Claude Levi-Strauss structural anthropology and in the developmental psychology of Jean Piaget, especially the latter's generalization of the idea of operations from mathematics to the study of practical, bodily-mediated cognition. One important payoff of this exercise is that the common misinterpretation of the Habitus as an objectivist and reductionist element in Bourdieu's thought is dispelled. The Habitus is shown to be instead a useful and flexible way to concep-tualize agency and the ability to transform social structure. Thus ultimately one of Bourdieu's major contributions to social theory consists of his development of a new radical form of cognitive sociology, along with an innovative variety of multilevel sociological explanation in which the interplay of different structural orders is highlighted. In keeping with the usual view, the goal of sociology is to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the "mechanisms" that tend to ensure their reproduction or transformation. Merging with psychology, though with a kind of psychology undoubtedly quite different from the most widely accepted image of this science, such an exploration of the cognitive structures that agents bring to bear in their practical knowledge of the social worlds thus structured. Indeed there exists a correspondence between social structures and mental structures, between the objective divisions of the social world . . . and the principles of vision and division that agents apply to them (Bourdieu, 1996b[1989], p. 1).     

Social Objects, Causality and Contingent Realism

This paper is a realist argument for the existence of "social objects". Social objects, I argue, are the outcome states of a contingent causal process and in turn posses causal properties. This argument has consequences for what we can mean by realism and consequences for the development of a realist methodology. Realism should abandon the notion of natural necessity in favour of a view that the "real" nature of the social world is contingent and necessity is only revealed in outcome states. This, I argue, has both theoretical and methodological implications and I develop my argument through two case studies, of homelessness and ethnicity.     

试论企业隐性知识管理

隐性知识在企业知识中占绝大部分比例 ,隐性知识不易编码和传播 ,不易被其他企业仿制或窃取 ,是形成企业核心竞争能力的基础。企业隐性知识分为四个层次 ,各个层次的隐性知识可以流动和转移。我国企业隐性知识有效管理的主要措施是 :建立促进隐性知识共享的高效机制 ,自上而下的企业文化渗透 ,形成自下而上的知识拉动型流动 ,采取相关技术促进隐性知识创造和共享。     

Sustainable social work: Modelling knowledge production,transfer, and evidence‐based practice

Gray M, Schubert L. Sustainable social work: modelling knowledge production, transfer, and evidence‐based social work This article is a first attempt to present a model of knowledge production and transfer in social work, drawing on the expanding literature on knowledge production. It highlights features of knowledge production in social work, such as the diverse contexts in which knowledge is developed and applied. It argues that knowledge production by itself is not enough. Equally important is knowledge transfer and implementation. The literature on knowledge production highlights problems with the implementation of actually existing knowledge and the potential resistance to this implementation as highly important issues for social work research. It leads to a greater awareness of the context in which knowledge is produced and applied and creates a bridge between traditional informal and tacit ways of knowing in social work and the demands of evidence‐based practice.     

Trust and confidence: possibilities for social work in 'high modernity'

Summary Those who argue that social work has become 'postmodern' alsosuggest that the demise of foundational knowledge must introduceuncertainty and ambiguity into social worker-service user interactions.Furthermore, if the basis for probability calculations is fatallyflawed, then a dependence on risk assessment and risk managementcan no longer be tenable. Under these conditions Parton (1998)suggests that social work must re-discover trust between Government,managers and social workers and between social workers and serviceusers. In this paper I argue that Parton's analysis of trustis radically incomplete and that a more detailed understandingof the relationship between trust and confidence indicates thevery limited possibilities for trust to re-emerge or to surviveunder current conditions. While I attempt to persuade the readerthat trust is necessary for social work, it is evident thatGovernment prefers confidence to trust. This means that trustcan only be practised at the margins of social work, where itis relatively invisible and does not pose a threat to the pre-eminentconcern with confidence.     

论维特根斯坦语言哲学的影响力--语言哲学与日常语言

后期维特根斯坦的哲学观点发生了重大转变,他对哲学的重新理解可以说是哲学史上和哲学观点上的一次重大转折。其核心思想就是“语言游戏”。语言在使用中才有意义,词语的意义就是它的用法。维特根斯坦对语言的分析,从语言与日常生活的关系来加以论述,对语言哲学,尤其是日常语言哲学产生了重大影响。维特根斯坦语言哲学思想不仅影响了日常语言哲学,而且对语言学也有很深的影响。他后期的语言观直接导致了日常语言学派的产生。     

How to combine pareto optimality with liberty considerations

I argue that the liberty condition of Sen's important impossibility of a Paretian liberal result is not a condition that liberals (or libertarians) would accept. The problem is that an appropriate liberty condition must be formulated in terms of consent - not in terms of preference. To formulate an adequate condition the framework needs to expand from collective choice rules (which only take information about preferences as input) to rights-based social choice rules (which also take as input information about which options have been consented to and which would violate someone's rights). I formulate a more adequate liberty condition based on the notion of consent that is acceptable to liberals, and then show that Pareto optimality is incompatible even with that condition. I then show how the liberty condition can be weakened in a plausible manner, and describe an interesting class of theories - rights-based Paretian theories - that satisfy the Pareto optimality requirement while being sensitive to liberty considerations.     

Narrating Love and Abuse in Intimate Relationships

via email: heather.fraser{at}rmit.edu.au Summary In this article, I use discourse analysis to explore the relationshipbetween love and abuse. I argue that Anglo-American social workhas been reticent to theorize love; and that when it does, theborders separating love from abuse are usually assumed to berelatively stable and readily apparent. After nominating someof the reasons for and repercussions of dichotomizing love andabuse, I suggest that knowledge about intimate abuse will expandif more attention is given to the study of love. I promote theuse of feminist discourses because they provide valuable insightsabout the operations of power in love relationships. Drawingideas from both structural feminism and post-structural feminism,I encourage social workers to move their analytical attentionback and forth between the micro-politics of intimate relationshipsto the wider cultural contexts within which they are staged.I conclude with the assertion that social workers will be betterplaced to understand the dilemmas that many ‘ordinary’women confront in their everyday lives, if they critically analysethe intersections of love and abuse.     

The Knowledge Spectrum: A Framework for Teaching Knowledge and its Use in Social Work Practice

For students, educators play a pivotal role in identifying andexplaining the knowledge that can guide social work practice.Yet there is an absence of educational tools that can assistthe educator with this objective. The knowledge spectrum frameworkis an innovative tool that was developed to explain the possibilitiesof what can inform social work practice. As a tool, it can beutilized to show that knowledge use in practice is a dynamicprocess, illustrating that knowledge can be created, modifiedand discarded by practitioners. The framework can also be utilizedto capture the complexity of knowledge used by recognizing boththe tacit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) domains, therebyidentifying different knowledge use possibilities. Strengtheningstudents’ and/or practitioners’ ability to recognizeand identify the basis of their professional behaviour is criticalfor clear, knowledge-guided practice.     

Practitioners as Rule Using Analysts: A Further Development of Process Knowledge in Social Work

Correspondence to Professor Michael Sheppard, Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth PL4 8AA, UK. E-mail M.Sheppard{at}plymouth.ac.uk Summary A new paradigm of ‘process knowledge’ has emergedin recent years, distinct from the dominant ‘product knowledge’paradigm in social work. While the latter refers to existentknowledge, which may be applied, the former refers to the developmentof knowledge about the ‘methodology of practice decisionmaking’, focusing on the processes by which judgementsare made. At its heart is the emerging idea of a reflexivityfor practice, but studies have been, until recently, theoretical.A very small number of empirical studies have begun to identifysome key elements of process knowledge. These have developeda range of concepts relating to critical appraisal, hypothesisdevelopment and hypothesis testing which characterize socialwork process knowledge. These include, for example, focusedattention, querying information, causal inferences, partialcase, procedural, and speculative hypotheses. A process of quasitriangulation is characteristic of social work practice methodology,together with a combination of inductive and deductive thinking.This paper seeks to develop our understanding by focusing onhow social workers develop and appraise hypotheses, and in particularhow the substantive content of hypotheses emerges (these enablesocial workers to make sense of, define, and respond to, situations).To understand this, the notion of rules is used, and socialworkers emerge as analysts employing three types of rules: substantive,application, and practice rules. A significant link betweenprocess knowledge and the content of product knowledge is identifiedin the form of technical language. The concept of ‘probabilisticcausation’ is identified as a key epistemological dimensionin the conduct of rigorous practice.     

The implications of dialogicality for ‘giving voice’ in social representations research

Social representations research is often undertaken by scholars who seek to ‘give voice’ to knowledge(s) that are held by socially disenfranchised individuals and groups. However, this endeavour poses a number of problems in practice, not least because it assumes that the ‘voices’ voiced by individuals and/or groups in social research will be unambiguous and uniform, and unchanged by the research encounter. Despite the growth of attention to the critical potential of social representations theory, there remains a lack of scholarship on the relationship between the theory's emphasis on the relational, or dialogical, nature of social life (the Ego‐Alter‐Object relation) and the implications of this for critical research. In this article, I argue that the dialogical epistemology from which social representations research must depart incites reflection upon (i) the design of empirical studies, which must equally attend to both ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, and (ii) the researcher‐researched relationship, which may itself be best viewed as an Ego‐Alter interaction. I make the case for adopting dialogical epistemology in critical social psychology, and argue that this is essential to undertaking ethical social research. I conclude by suggesting that claims to ‘giving voice’ have little place in critical social psychology in general, and social representations scholarship in particular.     

Bodies of Knowledge: Beyond Cartesian Views of Persons, Selves and Mind

In this piece, I argue against the Cartesian trend of seeing persons, selves and mind as something distinct from the body. It is claimed that Descartes realized the importance of the link between body and mind, but never pursued this connection, and this then becomes the aim of the paper. Another effect of Cartesian modes of thinking is to divorce human knowledge from its material contexts, driving a wedge between mind and matter. Some forms of social constructionism appear to fall into this latter trap and instead I argue for a view of persons as embodied beings whose selves are intimately connected to the body. Using the work of Bourdieu, Elias, Merleau-Ponty, and Ilyenkov, I also suggest that thought cannot be disengaged from a human body active in its world and that knowledge not only partly separates us from the materiality of existence, but connects us to it in deeper ways, as another dimension of human existence. Human beings can then be regarded as bodies of knowledge – active thinkers and persons engaged with the multi-dimensional world around them and capable of producing change.     

Probabilities and beliefs

Choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities originated with the work of Ramsey and de Finetti and attained their definitive form in the work of Savage. These probabilities are intended to provide a numerical representation of a decision maker's beliefs regarding the likely realization of alternative events. In this article, I argue that the choice-theoretic definitions of subjective probabilities involve a tacit convention—namely, state-independent utility functions—that is not implied by the axioms, and, as a consequence, choice-theoretic subjective probabilities, even when they exist, do not necessarily represent the decision makers' beliefs.