THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION

Two questions are addressed in this paper. (A) Why do labor unions and certain employer organizations respectively promote and impede minimum wage legislation? (B) Do these groups have significant impacts on minimum wages? Question (A) is examined in the context of models that identify the economic self-interest of unionized skilled workers and capitalists in legal wage floors. Question (B) is approached by a median legislator utility maximization model that leads to Tobit estimation of the relationship between state minimum wage rates and measures of statewide organized labor and capital and average hourly earnings.     

Minimum Wages in a Segmented Labor Market: Evidence from South Africa

The segmented labor market model describes the impacts of minimum wages on covered and uncovered sectors. This paper examines the impacts of an industry-specific minimum wage in South Africa, a state characterized by high unemployment, a robust union movement, and the presence of a large informal sector. Under the industry-specific wage law, formal agricultural and household workers are covered, while workers in other sectors are not. The unique aspect of this paper lies in the ability to compare the impacts of minimum wage legislation on formal covered, informal covered, formal uncovered, and informal uncovered workers. This natural experiment allows us to test whether industry-specific minimum wage legislation leads to higher wages, whether wage increases are restricted solely to covered formal sectors or if there are spillover effects, and whether such legislation manifests in disemployment effects. We find evidence of higher wages yet disemployment among black workers in formal markets. In informal markets we find no employment effects, but higher wages in formal markets appear to have spilled over into informal markets in covered sectors.     

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND WAGE INEQUALITY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

We argue that financial market development contributed to the rise in the skill premium and residual wage inequality in the United States since the 1980s. We present an endogenous growth model with imperfect credit markets and establish how improving the efficiency of these markets affects modes of production, innovation, and wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers. The experience of U.S. states following banking deregulation provides empirical support for our hypothesis. We find that wages of skilled workers increased by between 0.5% and 6.3% following deregulation while those of unskilled workers fell by between 3.5% and 8.7%. Similarly, residual (or within‐group) inequality increased; the 90–50 percentile ratio of residuals from a Mincerian wage regression and their standard deviation increased by 4.2% and 1.7%, respectively. (JEL E25, J31, G24)     

Workers, Unions, and Takeovers

How do takeovers affect workers?? wages and job security in the short-run? What role does the labor union play in mitigating these effects? I answer these two questions by analyzing wage and employment outcomes of over 4,000 public firms that were acquired between 1981 and 2002, using establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau. I find that target establishments exhibit a net contraction in wages and employment, relative to comparable establishments after takeovers. Targets?? establishments in more unionized industries experience worse wage and employment outcomes after takeovers. These adverse effects are exacerbated when the establishment is located in a state with Right-to-work laws where unions face a less favorable bargaining environment. These findings indicate that target firms?? employees are negatively affected by takeovers and that their labor unions do not mitigate these negative effects.     

Sexual Orientation and Wage Discrimination in France: The Hidden Side of the Rainbow

This article is the first study to present an econometric evaluation of wage discrimination based on sexual orientation in the French labor market. Having identified same-sex couples using the French Employment Survey, we estimate the wage gap related to sexual orientation in the private and public sectors, in order to analyze whether or not lesbians and gays suffer a wage penalty. The results obtained show the existence of a wage penalty for homosexual male workers, as compared with their heterosexual counterparts, in both the private and public sectors; the magnitude of this discrimination varies from about ?6.5?% in the private sector, to ?5.5?% in the public sector. In the private sector, the wage penalty suffered by gay employees is higher for skilled workers than for the unskilled, and??in both sectors??the wage penalty is higher for older workers than for younger ones. As with many other countries, we do not find any evidence of the existence of a wage discrimination against lesbians.     

LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS WITH SEARCH FRICTIONS AND FAIR WAGE CONSIDERATIONS

Fairness considerations in wage setting can improve the ability of the Diamond‐Mortensen‐Pissarides search and matching model to account for U.S. labor market dynamics. Firms' production is influenced by workers' effort input, which depends on whether workers consider the employment relation as fair. A typical worker's effort is determined in a comparison of individual current wage with wage norms, including the outside option, the individual past wage, and the wage level in the steady state. The fairness considerations in the search framework give rise to endogenous real wage rigidity, and realistic volatilities of unemployment, vacancies, and labor market tightness. (JEL E24, E32, J64)     

Political support for minimum wage legislation

Conclusion Even if minimum wage laws reduce employment opportunities for some workers, other individuals may benefit from their enactment. In particular, union members and residents of states with high wage levels would be expected to encourage their senators to vote in favor of minimum wage legislation. Examination of senators’ votes on the 1966 and 1974 minimum wage bills indicates that senators favoring passage of these bills are likely to come from states with high union membership and, to a lesser extent, high wage levels. The equations explaining senators’ votes on these bills were disaggregated by political party affiliation and length of membership in the Senate. Democrats were more likely than Republicans to support minimum wage bills. Virtually no difference was observed between senators who voted on both the 1966 and 1974 measures and those who voted on only one. Perhaps the most encouraging result reported is the similarity of coefficients generally observed for corresponding 1966 and 1974 equations. This similarity suggests that the equations reported herein could be used to predict votes on future minimum wage bills. The results suggest also that the general mode of analysis can be fruitfully applied to other economic legislation.     

The level and growth of union/nonunion relative wage effects, 1967–1977

This paper pools cross-section data to obtain an estimate of the overall effects of unions on relative wages for the period 1967 through 1977. We found the average union wage premium for all workers to be roughly 24 percent, but that this premium varies substantially between subgroups of workers. Our analysis showed that real wage rates increased faster in the union sector than in the nonunion sector between 1967 through 1977. However, we found that this relative growth pattern in wages was caused by economic conditions rather than in any fundamental shift in the power of unions. We wish to thank James S. Cunningham, H. Gregg Lewis, and John Pencavel for helpful comments.     

THE LABOR RESERVE AND THE SKILL DEBATE

Competing assertions abound about changes in the skill structure of wage labor. One claims that workplace changes do not necessarily lead to a general deskilling, but enhance skill levels for certain categories of wage labor; another, that such changes contribute to a general deskilling of the paid workforce. Despite having been the focus of much research, these competing assertions remain unresolved. Braverman's discussion of the labor reserve and its pattern of inclusion into the paid workforce promises one possible resolution. Incorporation of a sizable proportion of female workers from the latent labor reserve negated a trend towards an increased proportion of skilled workers in the U.S. paid workforce from 1950 to 1987. Implications of the particular pattern of inclusion and exclusion of this labor reserve are discussed in terms of the debate surrounding the deskilling and reskilling of wage labor in general.     

The minimum wage and poverty among full-time workers

V. Conclusions The empirical evidence is strong that minimum wages have had little or no effect on poverty in the U.S. Indeed, the evidence is stronger that minimum wages occasionally increase poverty. It also suggests that the minimum wage does not even lower poverty for the one group that, almost by definition, one would expect to be helped: full-time, year-round workers. While the empirical results suggest minimum wages do not achieve what is ostensibly their primary goal — relieving poverty among the working poor — minimum wages do seem to impose a real cost on society in terms of lost income and output. The empirical evidence on work hours suggests that a $1 increase in the minimum wage, far from being almost costless, could conceivably impose income losses to American workers in the $12-15 billion range per year — an amount equal to the “income deficit” of millions of persons counted as poor by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.     

SKILLED‐UNSKILLED WAGE INEQUALITY AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT

The impact of trade liberalization on the labor market in the North has drawn tremendous attention in the face of the growing skilled‐unskilled wage gap but in the South it has been somewhat neglected. One of the key structural differences between the North and the South is that the South experiences a pronounced rural‐urban migration in the presence of urban unemployment. We introduce this feature in the structure of a simple general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of trade liberalization and fragmentation on employment and the skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the South. In particular, we show that while fragmentation necessarily improves the unskilled wage and the skilled wage, more lucrative global opportunities for the skilled final product, in the absence of fragmentation, can reduce the rural wage and increase urban unemployment. The effect of fragmentation, ceteris paribus, on the skilled‐unskilled wage gap is sensitive to the degree of substitutability between land and unskilled labor. As such, fragmentation can magnify the increase in the skilled‐unskilled wage gap resulting from an improvement in the terms of trade. It is also shown that a technological progress in the intermediate goods sector increases the skilled‐unskilled wage gap and raises urban unemployment. (JEL F1, O1, F11, F12)     

The labor market effects of minimum wage laws: A new perspective

Economists almost uniformly argue that minimum wage laws benefit some workers at the expense of other workers. This argument is implicitly founded on the assumption that money wages are the only form of labor compensation. Based on the more realistic assumption that labor is paid in many different ways, the analysis of this paper demonstrates that all laborers within a perfectly competitive labor market are adversely affected by minimum wages. Although employment opportunities are reduced by such laws, affected labor markets clear. Conventional analysis of the effect of minimum wages on monopsony markets is also upset by the model developed. The author is indebted to Rex Cottle, Benjamin Hawkins, Hugh Macaulay, Michael Maloney, Thomas Schaap, Gordon Tullock, Gene Uselton, and Karen Vaughn for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

A DUAL DEFINITION FOR THE FACTOR CONTENT OF TRADE AND ITS EFFECT ON FACTOR REWARDS IN US MANUFACTURING SECTOR

We introduce a dual definition of the Factor Content of Trade (FCT) using the concept of the Equivalent Autarky Equilibrium. Estimating a symmetric normalized quadratic revenue function for the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1965 and 1991, we find that the FCT for capital is positive, while the FCT for skilled and unskilled labor is negative, suggesting that the Leontief Paradox is not present. Then the growth rate of the factor rewards is decomposed to the FCT, endowments, and technological change effects. We find that technological change is the most important determinant in explaining wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labor. (JEL F11, F16, J31)     

The minimum wage and productivity differentials

A firm’s ability to adjust its production process to economize on low-skilled labor when faced with a minimum wage increase will differ greatly depending on industry or occupation. For example, more capital-intensive means of cleaning hotel rooms or serving customers at restaurants may not be readily available without degrading service quality. In such situations, the productivity of labor is essentially capped, and firms have few options when the minimum wage increases. This simple observation has implications for studies that rely on microdata to examine the effects of minimum wage increases. If firms only increase prices in response to a minimum wage increase, employment effects are likely small. If the goal of the minimum wage is to redistribute income from firms and consumers to workers, minimum-wage increases targeted at industries and occupations where such rigidities result in an inelastic demand for labor may achieve the desired goal at a lower cost than across-the-board increases. However, such a scheme causes an inefficient allocation of labor and would be subjected to substantial political pressures that may lead to anomalous results. Additionally, it is unreasonable to conclude that policy makers have the necessary information to skillfully set the minimum wage. I thank Brian E. Chezum and Jeff Waddoups for helpful comments. All mistakes, of course, are my own.     

Employment-based retirement plan participation: geographic differences and trends, 2010

LATEST DATA: This Issue Brief examines the level of participation by workers in public- and private-sector employment-based pension or retirement plans, based on the U.S. Census Bureau's March 2011 Current Population Survey (CPS), the most recent data currently available (for year-end 2010). SPONSORSHIP RATE: Among all working-age (21-64) wage and salary employees, 54.2 percent worked for an employer or union that sponsored a retirement plan in 2010. Among full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages 21-64 (those with the strongest connection to the work force), 61.6 percent worked for an employer or union that sponsors a plan. PARTICIPATION LEVEL: Among full-time, full-year wage and salary workers ages 21-64, 54.5 percent participated in a retirement plan. TREND: This is virtually unchanged from 54.4 percent in 2009. Participation trends increased significantly in the late 1990s, and decreased in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 and 2004, the participation trend flattened out. The retirement plan participation level subsequently declined in 2005 and 2006, before a significant increase in 2007. Slight declines occurred in 2008 and 2009, followed by a flattening out of the trend in 2010. AGE: Participation increased with age (61.4 percent for wage and salary workers ages 55-64, compared with 29.2 percent for those ages 21-24). GENDER: Among wage and salary workers ages 21-64, men had a higher participation level than women, but among full-time, full-year workers, women had a higher percentage participating than men (55.5 percent for women, compared with 53.8 percent for men). Female workers' lower probability of participation among wage and salary workers results from their overall lower earnings and lower rates of full-time work in comparison with males. RACE: Hispanic wage and salary workers were significantly less likely than both white and black workers to participate in a retirement plan. The gap between the percentages of black and white plan participants that exists overall narrows when compared across earnings levels. GEOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES: Wage and salary workers in the South and West had the lowest participation levels (Florida had the lowest percentage, at 43.7 percent) while the upper Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and Northeast had the highest levels (West Virginia had the highest participation level, at 64.2 percent). OTHER FACTORS: White, more highly educated, higher-income, and married workers are more likely to participate than their counterparts.     

The minimum wage and tipped employees

Using data from theCensus of Retail Trade, I estimate that allowing restaurants to use servers’ tipped income to satisfy minimum wage requirements would create at least 360,000 new high-paying jobs and increase total income for tipped workers by at least 8 percent. Conversely, if the minimum wage were increased 10 percent, tipped workers would experience a 4 percent decrease in employment and a 6 percent reduction in hours worked, and all servers (tipped and non-tipped) would experience a 3 to 5 percent decrease in total income because the tipped jobs lost paid more than the minimum wage. By not allowing employers to use all of a worker’s tipped income to meet the minimum wage, state and federal minimum wage laws inhibit the creation of hundreds of thousands of new jobs paying well above the minimum wage. Total elimination of this credit would decrease employment at least 10 percent.     

LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES

Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand elasticity is large, lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology. However, the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business‐friendly government to increase the minimum wage. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. The real minimum wage decreases in skill‐adjusted union density and political ideology, while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. (JEL J38, D72, D78)     

Is there any merit to the merit-based immigration system? What Sub-Saharan African immigrant labor and housing market outcomes tell us about U.S. economic and immigration systems

For decades, U.S. immigration policy debates have centered on creating a merit-based system limiting entry to high-skilled immigrants. Yet the emphasis on merit-based immigration ignores the fact that high-skilled immigrants already enter the United States in merit-based immigration assume high-skilled immigrants benefit the U.S. economy because they are better able than low-skilled immigrants to translate skills into economic success. Using Sub-Saharan (Black) African immigrants' labor and housing market outcomes, I show that meritocracy only partially explains U.S. labor and housing outcomes, leaving a merit-based system unlikely to address America's economic needs. The majority of immigrants to the U.S. are non-White, and racial discrimination in the labor market results in occupational and wage disadvantages in the U.S. Due to the public charge rule, high skilled immigrants may be less likely to get their visas renewed or green card applications approved because of these labor market disadvantages. Without stable visa status, high-skilled immigrants will be less likely to make long-term economic investments in the United States—an important way of contributing to the U.S. economy. Together, research indicates that U.S. immigration reform will not work without first enacting policy addressing racial disparities in economic systems.     

Can a minimum wage increase have an adverse impact on inequality? Evidence from two Latin American economies

This paper uses a semiparametric model to analyze the impact of an increase in the real minimum wage on inequality in Colombia between 1995 and 1999 and in Paraguay between 1993 and 2000–2001. Simulations suggest that if the employment effects of the minimum wage increase are ignored, the underlying policies would contribute to reduce earnings inequality in Colombia and would be inequality neutral in Paraguay. By considering the drop in wages of those who lost their jobs, simulations suggest that in both countries the policy in question would increase earnings inequality under some assumptions about the employment elasticity of the minimum wage and the new level of earnings unemployed workers rely upon. While these findings do not mean that minimum wage increases in LDCs (Less Developed Countries) necessarily have adverse distributional affects, they suggest that minimum wage policy should be implemented with care depending on how sensitive employment is to wage increases. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Does the Minimum Wage Bite into Fast-Food Prices?

We study the effect of increases in effective minimum wages on the prices of several fast-food items using quarterly city-level data from 1993–2014, a period during much of which the federal minimum wage declined in real value while state-level legislation flourished. For one product, a burger, we find a robust price elasticity of 9 % with respect to the minimum wage. This estimate indicates substantial cost pass-through when contextualized by the effect of minimum-wage increases on restaurant wage bills. Our estimate for pizza is suggestive of a similarly large pass-through rate but is less precisely estimated, and our estimate for fried chicken is near zero, but estimated even less precisely. Taken as a whole, our estimates point toward sizable cost pass-through of minimum wage increases to consumer prices. These results contribute to a mixed literature on the consumer burden of minimum wage increases.