Varying Risk Comparison Elements: Effects on Public Reactions

Expanding a limited empirical base on effects of risk comparisons, a pilot experiment explored how varying elements of such comparisons might influence public response. The scenario used was a hypothetical trial of an asbestos-installing firm for putting students and staff at a junior high school at "unreasonable risk," first used by Slovic et al. (1990). Study participants played the role of jurors in the trial, asked to rate the risk, the firm's guilt, whether it should be made liable for future health effects, whether the school should be occupied in its current condition, and whether the asbestos should be removed at a cost of 3 million dollars. Opportunity samples of New Jersey residents (n= 309) received information intended to vary four comparison attributes: number of dimensions of comparison; single versus multiple ways of expressing mortality; a narrative to explain and justify the risk comparison; and the hypothetical role of the participant (juror vs. parent). The dependent variable was a hazard scale constructed from four of the five postcomparison judgments. ANOVA found format variations swamped in their effect by concern about asbestos, with the absence of a narrative and the parental role being the only attributes that increased negative risk reactions. Multiple regression analyses found that multidimensionality, narrative, role, and the presence of any risk comparison at all had significant effects when these (plus death formats) were the only independent variables. However, only multidimensionality (which increased negative reactions) retained significance when asbestos concern, risk beliefs (no safe level of exposure to a carcinogen; any exposure leads to cancer), and demographic variables were added to the analysis. Concern and risk beliefs alone explained 33% of variance in hazard scores; adding demographics and risk comparison variables only raised explained variance to 36% (having children at home and being exposed to multidimensional risk comparisons raised scores; age and income lowered them). The results underline the potentially small effect of risk comparison information on risk views (at least between subjects), but offer some insight into aspects of message design left unexplored in empirical literature to date.     

Risk Comparisons, Conflict, and Risk Acceptability Claims

Despite many claims for and against the use of risk comparisons in risk communication, few empirical studies have explored their effect. Even fewer have examined the public's relative preferences among different kinds of risk comparisons. Two studies, published in this journal in 1990 and 2003, used seven measures of "acceptability" to examine public reaction to 14 examples of risk comparisons, as used by a hypothetical factory manager to explain risks of his ethylene oxide plant. This study examined the effect on preferences of scenarios involving low or high conflict between the factory manager and residents of the hypothetical town (as had the 2003 study), and inclusion of a claim that the comparison demonstrated the risks' acceptability. It also tested the Finucane et al. (2000) affect hypothesis that information emphasizing low risks-as in these risk comparisons-would raise benefits estimates without changing risk estimates. Using similar but revised scenarios, risk comparison examples (10 instead of 14), and evaluation measures, an opportunity sample of 303 New Jersey residents rated the comparisons, and the risks and benefits of the factory. On average, all comparisons received positive ratings on all evaluation measures in all conditions. Direct and indirect measures showed that the conflict manipulation worked; overall, No-Conflict and Conflict scenarios evoked scores that were not significantly different. The attachment to each risk comparison of a risk acceptability claim ("So our factory's risks should be acceptable to you.") did not worsen ratings relative to conditions lacking this claim. Readers who did or did not see this claim were equally likely to infer an attempt to persuade them to accept the risk from the comparison. As in the 2003 article, there was great individual variability in inferred rankings of the risk comparisons. However, exposure to the risk comparisons did not reduce risk estimates significantly (while raising benefit estimates), and Conflict-Claim respondents found the risk of the hypothetical factory less acceptable than No-Conflict respondents. Results suggest that neither risk comparisons nor risk acceptability claims are automatically anathema to audiences, but they may have tiny or unintended effects on audience judgments about risky situations.     

Exploring the "Psychometric Paradigm": Comparisons Between Aggregate and Individual Analyses

The "psychometric paradigm" developed by Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein was a landmark in research about public attitudes toward risks. One problem with this work, however, was that (at least initially) it did not attempt to distinguish between individuals or groups of people, except "experts" vs. "lay people." This paradigm produced a "cognitive map" of hazards, and the assumption seemed to be that the characteristics identified were inherent attributes of risk. This paper examines the validity of this assumption. A questionnaire survey similar to those designed by Slovic et al. was conducted, but the data were analyzed at both the aggregate level, using mean scores, and at the level of individuals ( N = 131 Norwich residents). The results reported here demonstrate that (1) individuals vary in their perception of the same risk issue; (2) individuals vary in their rating of the same risk characteristics on the same risk issue; and (3) some of the strong intercorrelations observed between risk characteristics at the aggregate level are not supported when the same data are analysed at the level of individuals. Despite these findings, the relationship between risk characteristics and risk perceptions inferred by the psychometric paradigm did hold true at the level of individuals, for most—but not all—of the characteristics. In particular, the relationship between "lack of knowledge to those exposed" and risk perceptions appears to be a complex one, a finding which has important implications for risk communication strategies.     

Testing and Expanding a Model of Cognitive Processing of Risk Information

Scholars have begun to explore the role of modes of information processing and related audience characteristics in reactions to risky situations and risk information.((11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20))"Information processing" concerns how people attend to and consider available information: systematic processors analyze messages and situations carefully, while heuristic processors skim and use cues (e.g., opinions of trusted reference groups) for quick judgments. This article uses scenarios about a semi-hypothetical industrial facility, in particular risk comparisons being considered by its manager for inclusion in a talk to the community, to explore the impact of information processing. Information insufficiency, self-assessed capacity to understand information, and information-seeking propensities are tested for potential effects on information processing about industrial risks by people living near industry. As well as testing established models, this article explores the additional explanatory value of involvement, relevance, and ability (Earle et al., 1990) and objective knowledge. Both existing model variables and new ones have significant effects on information seeking and information processing in this case, and partly confirm earlier results. Trumbo((17,18)) found that heuristic processors saw lower risk and systematic processors higher risk from suspected cancer clusters. In this study, reporting knowledge about local industrial risks as insufficient for one's purposes and self-reported avoidance of such information both raised ratings of the facility's risk and lowered ratings of its acceptability. Neither type of information processing significantly affected risk or acceptability judgments, but both increased risk ratings and heuristic processing had more effect than systematic processing. Positive ratings of risk comparisons' clarity and meaningfulness decreased risk and increased acceptability ratings, dominated other information variables in predictive power, and exceeded risk, benefit, and trust in contribution to acceptability judgments. Despite differences across studies in designs and variables, and the embryonic development of appropriate (self-reported) measures for use in field surveys, these results confirm the potential value of further research in how information seeking and processing affect risk beliefs and reactions to risk communications.     

Are Some Risk Comparisons More Effective Under Conflict?: A Replication and Extension of Roth et al.

Despite many claims for and against the use of risk comparisons in risk communication, few empirical studies have explored their effect. Only one study, published by Roth et al. in this journal in 1990, has tested the 1988 predictions by Covello et al. as to the public's relative preferences for 14 kinds of risk comparisons as they might be used by a factory manager to explain risks of his ethylene oxide plant. That study found no correlations between the Covello predictions and seven different measures of "acceptability" of Covello's examples of each type of comparison. However, two critics of the Roth study, as well as its own authors, suggested that a scenario involving local risks, a conflict-ridden situation, and a plant manager unknown to the townspeople might better evoke Covello-like preferences than the distant, calm, friends-involving scenario used by Roth. The research reported here replicated the Roth study using the same scenario, risk comparison examples, and evaluation measures, and added a second scenario intended to replicate the conditions suggested by critics. Over 200 New Jersey residents answered the study questionnaire. The replication scenario reproduced Roth's results, and the conflict scenario also evoked no rankings correlated with Covello's predictions. Furthermore, neither agreement nor disagreement with five statements representing "conflict"--respondents' reports that the industrial-plant scenario made them angry, they lived near industry, they were concerned about industrial risks, people in their home town were angry about industrial pollution, and they worried "frequently" about long-term effects of pollution--correlated with Covello's predictions. Over half of all ratings ascribed to the comparisons in aggregate were positive, and most detailed comments offered by respondents also were positive, despite many criticisms and suggestions for their improvement. The wide variability in individuals' rankings also undermines the notion of any single ranking of preferred comparisons. These findings have implications for use of risk comparisons, but also reveal the inaccuracy of the field's assumptions about public reaction to industrial risk information, including risk comparison.     

What Do We Know About Making Risk Comparisons?

The risks of unfamiliar technologies are often evaluated by comparing them with the risks of more familiar ones. Such risk comparisons have been criticized for neglecting critical dimensions of risky decisions. In a guide written for the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Covello et al. (¹) have summarized these critiques and developed a taxonomy that characterizes possible risk comparisons in terms of their acceptability (or objectionableness). We asked four diverse groups of subjects to judge the acceptability of 14 statements produced by Covello et al. as examples of their categories. We found no correlation between the judgments of acceptability produced by our subjects and those predicted by Covello et al. .     

Gender and Race in Beliefs about Outdoor Air Pollution

Universal need for, or reactions to, risk communications should not be assumed; potential differences across demographic groups in environmental risk beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors could affect risk levels or opportunities for risk reduction. This article reports relevant findings from a survey experiment involving 1,100 potential jurors in Philadelphia concerning public responses to outdoor air pollution and air quality information. Flynn et al. (1994) and Finucane et al. (2000) found significant differences in risk ratings for multiple hazards, and in generic risk beliefs, between white men (or a subset) and all others (white women, nonwhite men, and nonwhite women). This study examined whether white men had significantly different responses to air pollution and air pollution information. An opportunity sample of volunteers from those awaiting potential jury duty in city courts (matching census estimates for white versus nonwhite proportions, but more female than the city's adult population and more likely to have children) filled out questionnaires distributed quasi-randomly. On most measures there were no statistically significant differences among white men (N = 192), white women (N = 269), nonwhite men (N = 165), and nonwhite women (N = 272). Nonwhites overall (particularly women) reported more concern about and sensitivity to air pollution than whites, and were more concerned by (even overly sensitive to) air pollution information provided as part of the experiment. Nonwhites also were more likely (within-gender comparisons) to report being active outdoors for at least four hours a day, a measure of potential exposure to air pollution, and to report intentions to reduce such outdoor activity after reading air pollution information. Differences between men and women were less frequent than between whites and nonwhites; the most distinctive group was nonwhite women, followed by white men. Flynn et al. (1994) and Finucane et al. (2000) found a far larger proportion of significant differences, with white men as most distinctive, probably due to use of different measures, study design, and population samples. However, all three studies broadly confirm the existence of gender and race interactions in risk beliefs and attitudes (particularly for white men and nonwhite women) that deserve more attention from researchers.     

Dimensions of Risk Perception for Financial and Health Risks

This study of 29 MBA students compares two models of risk perception for both financial and health risk stimuli. The first, inspired by Luce and Weber's Conjoint Expected Risk (CER) model, uses five dimensions: probability of gain, loss and status quo, and expected benefit and harm. The second, inspired by the Sovic et al. psychometric model, employs seven dimensions: voluntariness, dread, control, knowledge, catastrophic potential, novelty, and equity. The CER-type model provided a better fit for most subjects and stimuli. Adding the psychological risk dimensions from the Slovic et al. model explained only modestly more variance. Relationships between the dimensions of the two models are described and the construction of a hybrid model explored.     

An Empirical Test of the Relative Validity of Expert and Lay Judgments of Risk

This article investigates how accurately experts (underwriters) and lay persons (university students) judge the risks posed by life-threatening events Only one prior study (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1985) has previously investigated the veracity of expert versus lay judgments of the magnitude of risk. In that study, a heterogeneous grouping of 15 experts was found to judge, using marginal estimations, a variety of risks as closer to the true annual frequencies of death than convenience samples of the lay population. In this study, we use a larger, homogenous sample of experts performing an ecologically valid task. We also ask our respondents to assess frequencies and relative frequencies directly, rather than ask for a "risk" estimate--a response mode subject to possible qualitative attributions-as was done in the Slovic et al. study. Although we find that the experts outperformed lay persons on a number of measures, the differences are small, and both groups showed similar global biases in terms of: (1) overestimating the likelihood of dying from a condition (marginal probability) and of dying from a condition given that it happens to you (conditional probability), and (2) underestimating the ratios of marginal and conditional likelihoods between pairs of potentially lethal events. In spite of these scaling problems, both groups showed quite good performance in ordering the lethal events in terms of marginal and conditional likelihoods. We discuss the nature of expertise using a framework developed by Bolger and Wright (1994), and consider whether the commonsense assumption of the superiority of expert risk assessors in making magnitude judgments of risk is, in fact, sensible.     

Implications of Excessive Precision for Risk Comparisons: Lessons from the Past Four Decades

This article reviews five published "second-order" risk comparisons from the past four decades that implied precise understanding, and hence clear relationships or orderings, of the underlying risks. "Second order" here refers to efforts that extract information from original sources with the goal of relating diverse findings. All five of these publications have frequently been cited in the peer-reviewed literature and/or in risk regulatory debate in the United States. Each is associated with at least one contemporaneous critique that the findings were excessively precise. None of these critiques suggested that an alternative relationship or ordering of the risks evaluated was more appropriate. Instead, each critique concluded that alternative, contradictory relationships were at least as plausible given data and/or analytical limitations. In one case, the critique led to the withdrawal of the original publication. The original findings have been propagated or used uncritically in subsequent literature, including political support for cost-effectiveness analysis. In other cases, the critiques have been used to discredit quantitative risk analysis in general, especially in the cases of nuclear power and cost-benefit analysis. Both of these outcomes are undesirable. Future risk comparisons should avoid excessive precision, include explicit discussion of uncertainty, and differentiate between plausible estimates and expected values.     

The Risks of "Putting the Numbers in Context": A Cautionary Tale

Despite the warnings of risk communication specialists, members of the technical community often urge that technological risks should be "put in context" by comparisons against risks that are more familiar. Little quantitative evidence is available on the actual behavioral consequences of such risk comparison efforts. In the present study, subjects were presented with two types of information about a hazardous waste incinerator–a simplified statistical summary and a comparison of incinerator risks against the risks of smoking. Statistical information led to a modest increase in the reported willingness to vote in favor of the incinerator in a community referendum, but the comparison against cigarettes led to a slight decrease in support; the difference between the two messages is statistically significant ( p <.001). In combination with other results, this study's findings suggest that an implicit assumption of risk comparisons is in error: Opposition to controversial technologies may have little to do with citizens' levels of information about technology, having more to do with citizens' levels of trust in governmental and industrial actors.     

Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices

Shortly after the 2002 terrorist attacks in Bali, readers of Conde Nast Traveler magazine were surveyed regarding their views on the risks of travel to various destinations. Their risk estimates were highest for Israel, and lowest for Canada. Estimates for the different destinations correlated positively with (1) one another, (2) concern over aspects of travel that can make one feel at risk (e.g., sticking out as an American), (3) worries about other travel problems (e.g., contracting an infectious disease), and (4) attitudes toward risk. Respondents' willingness to travel to a destination was predicted well by whether their estimate of its risk was above or below their general threshold for the acceptability of travel risks. Overall, the responses suggest orderly choices, based on highly uncertain judgments of risks. Worry played a significant role in these choices, even after controlling for cognitive considerations, thereby supporting the recently proposed "risk as feelings" hypothesis. Thus, even among people who have generally consistent and defensible beliefs, emotions may affect choices. These results emerged with people selected for their interest in and experience with the decision domain (travel), but challenged to incorporate a new concern (terror).     

Applying a Health Behavior Theory to Explore the Influence of Information and Experience on Arsenic Risk Representations, Policy Beliefs, and Protective Behavior

The common sense model (CSM) shows how people process information to construct representations, or mental models, that guide responses to health threats. We applied the CSM to understand how people responded to information about arsenic-contaminated well water. Constructs included external information (arsenic level and information use), experience (perceived water quality and arsenic-related health effects), representations, safety judgments, opinions about policies to mitigate environmental arsenic, and protective behavior. Of 649 surveys mailed to private well users with arsenic levels exceeding the maximum contaminant level, 545 (84%) were analyzed. Structural equation modeling quantified CSM relationships. Both external information and experience had substantial effects on behavior. Participants who identified a water problem were more likely to reduce exposure to arsenic. However, about 60% perceived good water quality and 60% safe water. Participants with higher arsenic levels selected higher personal safety thresholds and 20% reported a lower arsenic level than indicated by their well test. These beliefs would support judgments of safe water. A variety of psychological and contextual factors may explain judgments of safe water when information suggested otherwise. Information use had an indirect effect on policy beliefs through understanding environmental causes of arsenic. People need concrete information about environmental risk at both personal and environmental-systems levels to promote a comprehensive understanding and response. The CSM explained responses to arsenic information and may have application to other environmental risks.     

Perception of Ecological Risk to Water Environments

This paper examines lay and expert perceptions of the ecological risks associated with a range of human activities that could adversely affect water resource environments. It employs the psychometric paradigm pioneered in characterizing perceptions of human health risks, which involves surveys to obtain judgments from subjects about risk items in terms of several important characteristics of the risks. The paper builds on a previous study that introduced ecological risk perception. This second study employs a larger, more diverse sample, a more focused topic area, and comparisons between lay and expert judgments. The results confirm that a small set of underlying factors explain a great deal of variability in lay judgments about ecological risks. These have been termed Ecological Impact, Human Benefits, Controllability , and Knowledge. The results are useful in explaining subjects' judgments of the general riskiness of, and need for regulation of, various risk items. The results also indicate several differences and areas of agreement among the lay and expert samples that point to potential key issues in future ecological risk management efforts for water resources.     

The Roles of Group Membership, Beliefs, and Norms in Ecological Risk Perception

Variability in ecological risk perceptions was investigated by surveying members of four stakeholder groups commonly involved in environmental policy debates. Fifty-six individuals from government, industry, environmental, and general-public groups completed a risk-perception survey in which they evaluated 34 environmental hazards on 17 attributes and also evaluated the riskiness and acceptability of each hazard. In addition, participants reported their environmental beliefs and norms using Dunlap et al.'s revised New Ecological Paradigm Scale and modified versions of Schwartz's Awareness of Consequences and Personal Norms Scales. Group membership was predictive of participants' scores on the belief and norm scales. Factor analysis of attribute ratings (averaged across participants) revealed the anticipated three oblique factors: ecological impacts, scientific understanding, and aesthetic impacts. Factor patterns were very similar for the four stakeholder groups. Factors from the aggregate analysis were predictive of individuals' riskiness judgments, but these relationships were moderated by participants' group membership, beliefs, and norms. Compared to members of other groups, members of the general public placed less emphasis on ecological impacts and more emphasis on the other two factors when judging the ecological riskiness of hazards. To our knowledge, these results represent the first formal tests of interactions between hazard characteristics and participant characteristics in determining riskiness judgments, and illustrate how traditional psychometric analyses can be successfully coupled with individual-difference measures to improve the understanding of risk perception.     

Asbestos lung cancer risks: comparison of animal and human extrapolations

Using the most comprehensive inhalation study available, (Wagner, et al., 1974), the dose-response effects of the four major types of asbestos fibers (amosite, anthophyllite, crocidolite, and chrysotile: Canadian, Rhodesian) for lung cancer have been determined. From linear regression analysis of the animal data and five human epidemiology studies giving a wide range of risk estimates, slopes of the curves have been determined and lifetime risk estimates made. Projected risks for rats are presented with and without surface area (s.a.) conversion factors. On the basis of cumulative exposure, the geometric mean of the point estimates for the human studies (0.0146) is quite close to the geometric mean of the animal data (0.0179 without s.a.; 0.0122 with s.a. calculations). These values also match quite well if one of the studies (McDonald, et al.) is eliminated (geometric mean = 0.031) due to qualitatively different exposure considerations (mining and milling vs. industrial environments). Animal risks based on a concentration per day basis (assuming an average 70-year lifespan for humans) are below the lowest human estimate but within 5-6 fold (less) of the projected risk from nonsmoking asbestos workers (2.2 X 10(-3) using the Hammond et al. study.     

The Effect of Risk Beliefs on Property Values: A Case Study of a Hazardous Waste Site1

Health risk beliefs of homeowners near a landfill site were assessed in a survey and compared to expert judgments of the health risks of living near the site. A bimodal distribution of health risk beliefs suggested sharp disagreement between the experts and at least some of the residents. Correlates of high risk beliefs included perception of odor from the site, exposure to media coverage of the problem, having children living at home, age (younger respondents more concerned), and gender (females more concerned). An aggregated neighborhood health risk belief predicted reductions in home prices even after controlling for home physical characteristics, such as size and other disamenities such as proximity to a freeway. In the 4100 homes near the site, the estimated depression in property values was estimated to total about $40.2 million before the site was closed and to be about $19.7 million after closure. Implications of these results for community conflict and for benefit-cost analysis of hazard site remediation are discussed.     

Further Notes on Public Response to Uncertainty in Risks and Science

Given the prevalence of uncertainty and variability in estimates of environmental health risks, it is important to know how citizens interpret information representing uncertainty in risk estimates. Ranges of risk estimates from a hypothetical industry source elicited divergent evaluations of risk assessors' honesty and competence among New Jersey residents within one mile of one or more factories. A plurality saw ranges of risk estimates as both honest and competent, but with most judging such ranges as deficient on one or both dimensions. They wanted definitive conclusions about safety, tended to believe the high end of the range was more likely to be an accurate estimate of the risk, and believed that institutions only discuss risks when they are "high." Acknowledgment of scientific, as opposed to self-interested, reasons for uncertainty and disputes among experts was low. Attitude toward local industry seemed associated with, if not a cause of, attitudes about ranges of risk estimates. These reactions by industry neighbors appear to replicate the findings of Johnson and Slovic (1995, 1998), despite the hypothetical producer of risk estimates being industry instead of government. Respondents were older and less educated on average than were the earlier samples, but more diverse. Regression analyses suggested attitude toward industry was a major factor in these reactions, although other explanations (e.g., level of scientific understanding independent of general education) were not tested in this study.     

Effects of Context and Feelings on Perceptions of Genetically Modified Food

Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the role of feelings in framing perceptions and decisions about risk, yet no study has specifically examined the impact of feelings on perceptions/judgments about biotechnology. This exploratory study investigated current perceptions of genetically modified (GM) food to examine (1) the effects of context (making judgments about GM food at the same time as rating other current areas of concern), and (2) the effect of feelings of dread (integral affect) and background feelings of stress (negative incidental affect) on risk judgments about GM food. An established psychometric method (semantic differential task) used with a sample of 126 adults (recruited "topic-blind," mostly from a student population) showed that, when rated in the context of other current concerns such as human cloning and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), there was less concern about GM food than might have been anticipated. Participants were recruited "topic-blind" in order to ensure that they were unaware that the focus of the research was on GM food specifically (and thus preventing biased recruitment to the study). Relative to 19 other current concerns GM food was "not dreaded," not viewed as "unethical," was judged as "controllable," and was seen as the least "risky" of all the issues studied. GM food was viewed as a "hot topic," a new risk, and as relatively unnatural (although it was not the highest rated concern on this scale). Ratings of risks across concerns by individuals experiencing high levels of negative incidental affect (stress) did not differ significantly from those reporting low stress.     

Reconciling Scientists' Beliefs about Radiation Risks and Social Norms: Explaining Preferred Radiation Protection Standards

Social scientists have argued about the role of political beliefs in highly charged policy debates among scientific experts. In debates about environmental hazards, the focus of contention is likely to rest on the appropriate scientific assumptions to inform safety standards. When scientific communities are polarized, one would expect to find systematic differences among combatants in the choice of appropriate assumptions, and variation in the application of "precaution" in standard setting. We test this proposition using an experiment applied in a mail survey format to groups of scientists from opposing sides of the nuclear policy debate. Questions were asked about the role of political, social, and epistemological beliefs in reaching scientific and policy judgments about the relationship between radiation dose and cancer incidence in human populations. We find that the precautionary tendency is pervasive regardless of whether the scientist is associated with a putatively pro- or anti-nuclear group. Using a multinomial logit model, we explain a modest percentage of the variation in the choice of preferred judgments about safety standards, but find that distinct sets of political and social values are significantly associated with policy positions among scientists. Implications for scientific advice to policymakers are discussed.