Chemical and biological agent incident response and decision process for civilian and public sector facilities.

In the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophic release involving potential chemical and/or biological warfare agents, decisionmakers will need to make timely and informed choices about whether, or how, to respond. The objective of this article is to provide a decision framework to specify initial and follow-up actions, including possible decontamination, and to address long-term health and environmental issues. This decision framework consists of four phases, beginning with the identification of an incident and ending with verification that cleanup and remediation criteria have been met. The flowchart takes into account both differences and similarities among potential agents or toxins at key points in the decision-making process. Risk evaluation and communication of information to the public must be done throughout the process to ensure a successful effort.     

Risk Analysis of Chemical, Biological, or Radionuclear Threats: Implications for Food Security

If the food sector is attacked, the likely agents will be chemical, biological, or radionuclear (CBRN). We compiled a database of international terrorist/criminal activity involving such agents. Based on these data, we calculate the likelihood of a catastrophic event using extreme value methods. At the present, the probability of an event leading to 5,000 casualties (fatalities and injuries) is between 0.1 and 0.3. However, pronounced, nonstationary patterns within our data suggest that the "reoccurrence period" for such attacks is decreasing every year. Similarly, disturbing trends are evident in a broader data set, which is nonspecific as to the methods or means of attack. While at the present the likelihood of CBRN events is quite low, given an attack, the probability that it involves CBRN agents increases with the number of casualties. This is consistent with evidence of "heavy tails" in the distribution of casualties arising from CBRN events.     

Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

A quantitative probabilistic/systems analysis model is described which is useful for allocating resources to safeguard valuable documents or materials in either a fixed-site facility or a moving convoy against an overt terrorist attack. The model is also useful for ranking the sensitive areas at a site according to their survivability of a given hypothesized terrorist attempt. To compare various defense strategies and security configurations, the probability of a successful terrorist activity is computed based on event tree models of the site/security configuration. This calculation incorporates a realistic engagement model (in the event a guard force engages the terrorists prior to completion of their objective) and information on barrier penetration times (for example, distribution of the time to defeat a chain link fence or vault door, traverse an open area, and so forth). Two security analyses are described to illustrate the methodology. One example considers a terrorist attack on a convoy transporting a missile from a storage to a launch facility. The second example involves an attack on a munitions storage facility.     

Relative Risk Perception for Terrorism: Implications for Preparedness and Risk Communication

Terrorism presents a significant risk that is often approached at public policy, infrastructure, or emergency management level. Public perceptions of the likelihood of terrorist events, and how this may relate to individual preparedness, are not always extensively examined. The tendency to think that negative events are less likely to happen to oneself than to the average person is known as optimism bias. Optimism bias is relevant to perceptions of terrorism, because it is thought to be related to a reduction in precaution use. Using an online survey of 164 participants, this study aimed to determine whether Sydney residents thought they had a lower likelihood of experiencing terrorist events than other Australians. Significant optimism bias was observed for witnessing terrorist events, but not for personally experiencing terrorist events. In addition, Sydney residents tended to think that terrorist attacks were more likely to occur in Sydney than another major Australian city in the next five years. At the same time, household and workplace preparedness for terrorism was quite low, as was awareness of emergency strategies in the central business district. Perceptions of high likelihood of terrorism happening in one's own city, yet low preparedness present a challenge for risk communication and emergency management strategies. The diversity of possible terrorist targets, and the simple plans that can moderate the effects of a disaster may need to be emphasized in future anti‐terrorism initiatives.     

Communicating with the Public About Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attacks: Results from a Survey Experiment on Factors Influencing Intention to “Run,Hide, Tell” in the United Kingdom and Denmark

Effective risk communication is an integral part of responding to terrorism, but until recently, there has been very little pre‐event communication in a European context to provide advice to the public on how to protect themselves during an attack. Following terrorist attacks involving mass shootings in Paris, France, in November 2015, the U.K. National Police Chiefs’ Council released a Stay Safe film and leaflet that advises the public to “run,” “hide,” and “tell” in the event of a firearms or weapons attack. However, other countries, including Denmark, do not provide preparedness information of this kind, in large part because of concern about scaring the public. In this survey experiment, 3,003 U.K. and Danish participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no information, a leaflet intervention, and a film intervention to examine the impact of “Run, Hide, Tell” advice on perceptions about terrorism, the security services, and intended responses to a hypothetical terrorist firearms attack. Results demonstrate important benefits of pre‐event communication in relation to enhancing trust, encouraging protective health behaviors, and discouraging potentially dangerous actions. However, these findings also suggest that future communications should address perceived response costs and target specific problem behaviors. Cross‐national similarities in response suggest this advice is suitable for adaptation in other countries.     

Informing Ex Ante Event Studies with Macro‐Econometric Evidence on the Structural and Policy Impacts of Terrorism

Economic consequence analysis is one of many inputs to terrorism contingency planning. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are being used more frequently in these analyses, in part because of their capacity to accommodate high levels of event‐specific detail. In modeling the potential economic effects of a hypothetical terrorist event, two broad sets of shocks are required: (1) physical impacts on observable variables (e.g., asset damage); (2) behavioral impacts on unobservable variables (e.g., investor uncertainty). Assembling shocks describing the physical impacts of a terrorist incident is relatively straightforward, since estimates are either readily available or plausibly inferred. However, assembling shocks describing behavioral impacts is more difficult. Values for behavioral variables (e.g., required rates of return) are typically inferred or estimated by indirect means. Generally, this has been achieved via reference to extraneous literature or ex ante surveys. This article explores a new method. We elucidate the magnitude of CGE‐relevant structural shifts implicit in econometric evidence on terrorist incidents, with a view to informing future ex ante event assessments. Ex post econometric studies of terrorism by Blomberg et al . yield macro econometric equations that describe the response of observable economic variables (e.g., GDP growth) to terrorist incidents. We use these equations to determine estimates for relevant (unobservable) structural and policy variables impacted by terrorist incidents, using a CGE model of the United States. This allows us to: (i) compare values for these shifts with input assumptions in earlier ex ante CGE studies; and (ii) discuss how future ex ante studies can be informed by our analysis.     

Flu,Risks, and Videotape: Escalating Fear and Avoidance

While extensive risk perception research has focused on emotions, cognitions, and behavior at static points in time, less attention has been paid to how these variables might change over time. This study assesses how negative affect, threat beliefs, perceived risk, and intended avoidance behavior change over the course of an escalating biological disaster. A scenario simulation methodology was used that presents respondents with a video simulation of a 15‐day series of local news reports to immerse respondents in the developing details of the disaster. Systemic manipulation of the virus's causal origin (terrorist attack, medical lab accident, unknown) and the respondent's proximity to the virus (local vs. opposite coast) allowed us to investigate the dynamics of public response. The unfolding scenario was presented in discrete episodes, allowing responses to be tracked over the episodes. The sample includes 600 respondents equally split by sex and by location, with half in the Washington, DC area, and half in the Los Angeles area. The results showed respondents’ reactions to the flu epidemic increased as the disaster escalated. More importantly, there was considerable consistency across respondents’ emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses to the epidemic over the episodes. In addition, the reactions of respondents proximally closer to the epidemic increased more rapidly and with greater intensity than their distant counterparts. Finally, as the flu epidemic escalated, both terrorist and accidental flu releases were perceived as being less risky and were less likely to lead to avoidance behavior compared to the unknown flu release.     

Near‐Misses and Future Disaster Preparedness

Disasters garner attention when they occur, and organizations commonly extract valuable lessons from visible failures, adopting new behaviors in response. For example, the United States saw numerous security policy changes following the September 11 terrorist attacks and emergency management and shelter policy changes following Hurricane Katrina. But what about those events that occur that fall short of disaster? Research that examines prior hazard experience shows that this experience can be a mixed blessing. Prior experience can stimulate protective measures, but sometimes prior experience can deceive people into feeling an unwarranted sense of safety. This research focuses on how people interpret near‐miss experiences. We demonstrate that when near‐misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur and thus provide the perception that the system is resilient to the hazard, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions. On the other hand, if near‐misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened and thus provide the perception that the system is vulnerable to the hazard, this will counter the basic “near‐miss” effect and encourage mitigation. In this article, we use these distinctions between resilient and vulnerable near‐misses to examine how people come to define an event as either a resilient or vulnerable near‐miss, as well as how this interpretation influences their perceptions of risk and their future preparedness behavior. Our contribution is in highlighting the critical role that people's interpretation of the prior experience has on their subsequent behavior and in measuring what shapes this interpretation.     

Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents

We describe a quantitative methodology to characterize the vulnerability of U.S. urban centers to terrorist attack, using a place-based vulnerability index and a database of terrorist incidents and related human casualties. Via generalized linear statistical models, we study the relationships between vulnerability and terrorist events, and find that our place-based vulnerability metric significantly describes both terrorist incidence and occurrence of human casualties from terrorist events in these urban centers. We also introduce benchmark analytic technologies from applications in toxicological risk assessment to this social risk/vulnerability paradigm, and use these to distinguish levels of high and low urban vulnerability to terrorism. It is seen that the benchmark approach translates quite flexibly from its biological roots to this social scientific archetype.     

Does exposure to a traumatic event make organizations resilient?

Why do some organizations bounce-back from traumatic events more quickly than others? While the research on organizations offers extensive insights on recovery from economic or technological shocks, there is limited understanding of how organizations recover from life-threatening events such as terrorist attacks. In this study, we build on the research on resilience and argue that organizational recovery from a traumatic event is informed by the perception of threat. Higher perception of threat increases inter-organizational collaboration and the care associated with the deployment of slack as well as to learning. We tested our arguments with a sample of US and non-US firms before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and found that, due to spatial proximity, US firms’ higher perception of threat led to a larger increase in the frequency of inter-organizational alliances than that of non-US firms. This preference was more frequently directed towards local partners and demonstrated a distinct emphasis on slack and learning. Contrary to conventional wisdom, our findings suggest that organizational resilience in the face of a traumatic event benefits not from immunity but from spatial proximity to the threat. Proximity increases the perception of threat, and with it, the impetus for adaptation.     

Modeling the Public Health System Response to a Terrorist Event in the Food Supply

We have developed a simulation model to quantify and characterize the response of the public health system and the impact of public health advisories in the event of an intentional contamination of the food supply. The model has three components: (1) definition of individual exposure over time and the outcomes of exposure, (2) definition of the geographical dispersal of exposures, and (3) response of the public health authorities to symptomatic individuals. The model explicitly considers the variation in the multiple interrelated facets of the response system, including differences among individuals' responses to exposure, variation between health care providers, and the subsequent processing of samples and confirmation of cases. To illustrate use of the model, case studies with  Escherichia coli  O157:H7 and  Salmonella  spp. in three categories of food vehicle were compared. The level of detail required to run the public health component of the model is not trivial. While some data may not be available for hazards of particular interest in potential bioterrorism events, the application of expert judgment permits comparisons between different agents, different system reactions, and other assumptions within the system. The model provides the capacity to study the impact of system changes, to compare scenarios and to quantify the benefits of improvement in terms of averted exposures and risk reduction, and constitutes a significant aid to understanding and managing these threats. Essentially, the model provides an explicit valuation of time saved in the identification and intervention in terrorist events in the food supply.     

关键基础设施及其安全管理

关键基础设施(CI)系统是复杂的、高度相互依存的、网络化的社会-技术系统,一旦系统被中断或者被破坏,将会对国民健康、国土安全、经济稳定以及政府的正常运转等产生重大的影响.主要研究关键基础设施及其安全管理过程中的若干问题,对CI的特点进行了分析和总结,建立了网络化CI系统的体系结构,并利用视图模型来描述系统,同时还给出了灾难处理的一般过程.最后,进一步探讨了如何使用系统工程的方法来分析和模拟网络化CI系统的运行方式、潜在的薄弱环节以及改进这些薄弱环节的实施方法.     

基于线性分段恢复函数的基础设施韧性分析模型——以C县电力系统网络为例

针对近年来一系列突发事件冲击和破坏着城市关键基础设施系统的正常运行,并造成了较为严重的社会后果的现实问题,提出了如何保护关键基础设施系统的研究问题,以使基础设施系统能够对灾害情景做出迅速的响应,并迅速地处理以恢复到常态。本研究基于三种典型的恢复函数提出了线性分段恢复函数,构建了关键基础设施系统韧性分析模型,并用蒙特卡洛模拟的方法应用到C县的电力系统网络加以验证,得到了该韧性分析模型不仅可以帮助决策者在灾害情境下权衡预算成本和韧性的关系,也可以识别关键基础设施系统网络中需要保护的关键节点,从而实现对关键基础设施系统的针对性保护的结论。本研究构建的韧性分析模型有为灾害情境下对电力系统采取针对性保护的现实价值,和开拓了对基础设施系统进行保护研究的分析模型的理论价值。     

Economics of Disaster Risk,Social Vulnerability,and Mental Health Resilience

We investigate the relationship between exposure to Hurricanes Katrina and/or Rita and mental health resilience by vulnerability status, with particular focus on the mental health outcomes of single mothers versus the general public. We advance a measurable notion of mental health resilience to disaster events. We also calculate the economic costs of poor mental health days added by natural disaster exposure. Negative binomial analyses show that hurricane exposure increases the expected count of poor mental health days for all persons by 18.7% (95% confidence interval [CI], 7.44–31.14%), and by 71.88% (95% CI, 39.48–211.82%) for single females with children. Monthly time‐series show that single mothers have lower event resilience, experiencing higher added mental stress. Results also show that the count of poor mental health days is sensitive to hurricane intensity, increasing by a factor of 1.06 (95% CI, 1.02–1.10) for every billion (U.S.$) dollars of damage added for all exposed persons, and by a factor of 1.08 (95% CI, 1.03–1.14) for single mothers. We estimate that single mothers, as a group, suffered over $130 million in productivity loss from added postdisaster stress and disability. Results illustrate the measurability of mental health resilience as a two‐dimensional concept of resistance capacity and recovery time. Overall, we show that natural disasters regressively tax disadvantaged population strata.     

Terrorist Population Dynamics Model

A system that includes a number of terrorist cells is considered. The cells can consist of one or more terrorists. The current number of terrorist cells is further denoted by N(t), where t is a current time counted from any appropriate origin. The objective is to find the evolution of the system in terms of N(t) and some interpretable parameters, such as the initial number of the terrorist cells N0=N(0), the cell disabling rate constant lambda (or the cell half-life t1/2), and the rate of formation of new cells P. The cost-effectiveness analysis, performed in the framework of the model, reveals that the effectiveness of disabling a terrorist cell is getting worse after 2-3 half-lives of a cell, which shows that if the anti-terrorist actions have not reached their goal during that time, the respective policy should be considered for revision, using the risk assessment consideration. Another important issue raised concerns balancing the efforts related to counterterrorism actions inside the system and the efforts protecting its borders. The respective data analysis is suggested and illustrated using simulated data.     

Preventive planning for disasters

The authors have analysed the available data on disaster occurence and conclude that disasters are on the increase, especially in underdeveloped countries. They argue that a new approach to disaster is needed, one which emphasizes the continuing man-environment relationship. Within this approach, planning to prevent disaster should concentrate on long-term precautionary planning integrated into development planning utilizing, as far as possible, local awareness of the disaster problem. This long-term approach to disaster planning is a more effective way of offsetting disaster than a heavy emphasis on each individual disaster event and the relief measures which accompany it.     

Recollection Bias and Its Underpinnings: Lessons from Terrorism Risk Assessments

Recollection bias is the phenomenon whereby people who observe a highly unexpected event hold current risk beliefs about a similar event that are no higher than their recollection of their prior beliefs. This article replicates and extends the authors’ previous study of recollection bias in relation to individuals’ perceptions of the risks of terrorism attacks. Over 60% of respondents in a national U.S. sample of over 900 adults believe that the current risk of a future terrorist attack by either an airplane or in a public setting is no higher than they recall having believed, respectively, before the 9/11 attack and before the Boston Marathon bombing. By contrast, a rational Bayesian model would update to a higher currently assessed risk of these previously uncontemplated events. Recollection bias is a persistent trait: individuals who exhibited this bias for the 9/11 attack exhibited it for the Boston Marathon bombing. Only one‐fifth of respondents are free of any type of recollection bias. Recollection bias is negatively correlated with absolute levels of risk belief. Recollection bias in relation to highly unexpected terrorist events—the belief that perceived risks did not increase after the surprise occurrence—dampens support for a variety of anti‐terrorism measures, controlling for the level of risk beliefs and demographic factors. Persistent recollection bias for both 9/11 and the Boston Marathon bombing is especially influential in diminishing support for protective policy measures, such as surveillance cameras in public places. Given that public attitudes influence policy, educating the public about risk is critical.     

Adaptive Management: A Paradigm for Remediation of Public Facilities Following a Terrorist Attack

Terrorist actions are aimed at maximizing harm (health, psychological, economical, and political) through the combined physical impacts of the act and fear. Immediate and effective response to a terrorist act is critical to limit human and environmental harm, effectively restore facility function, and maintain public confidence. Though there have been terrorist attacks in public facilities that we have learned from, overall our experiences in restoration of public facilities following a terrorist attack are limited. Restoration of public facilities following a release of a hazardous material is inherently far more complex than in industrial settings and has many unique technical, economic, social, and political challenges. For example, there may be a great need to quickly restore the facility to full operation and allow public access even though it was not designed for easy or rapid restoration, and critical information is needed for quantitative risk assessment and effective restoration must be anticipated to be incomplete and uncertain. Whereas present planning documents have substantial linearity in their organization, the “adaptive management” paradigm provides a constructive parallel paradigm for restoration of public facilities that anticipates and plans for uncertainty, inefficiencies, and stakeholder participation. Adaptive management grew out of the need to manage and restore natural resources in highly complex and changing environments with limited knowledge about causal relationships and responses to restoration actions. Similarities between natural resource management and restoration of a public facility after a terrorist attack suggest that integration of adaptive management principles explicitly into restoration processes will result in substantially enhanced and flexible responses necessary to meet the uncertainties of potential terrorist attacks.     

Major Chemical Accidents in Industrializing Countries: The Socio-Political Amplification of Risk

Accidents in the chemical industry, such as those that took place in Seveso (1976) and Bhopal (1984), may kill or injure thousands of people, cause serious health hazards and irreversible environmental damage. The aim of this paper is to examine the ever-increasing risk of similar accidents becoming a frequent ocurrence in the so-called industrializing countries. Using figures from some of the worst chemical accidents in the last decades, data on the Bhopal disaster, and Brazil's social and institutional characteristics, we put forward the hypothesis that present social, political and economic structures in industrializing countries make these countries much more vulnerable to such accidents and create the type of setting where–if and when these accidents occur–they will have even more catastrophic consequences. The authors argue that only the transformation of local structures, and stronger technical cooperation between international organizations, industrialized and industrializing countries could reduce this vulnerability.