The question of mathematical social theory revisited: Some methodological considerations

Methodologically, the most advanced social science discipline is considered economics, especially its neoclassical version. A number of practitioners in the other social sciences, especially sociology and political science, perceive economics as a scientific exemplar in methodological (and theoretical) terms. This methodological exemplar has been, particularly in the last decades, attempted to emulate by some of these social scientists. The outcome of this emulation, by adopting and extending its methods, of neoclassical economics in parts (but not all) of sociology, political science, and elsewhere has been rational choice theory as a general social paradigm. This paper tries to show that many misapplications of the methodology of neoclassical economics in rational choice theory have ensued from such methodological emulation. That neoclassical economics does not necessarily contain or lead to a mathematical rational choice model is the core argument of this paper. The paper fills in a gap created by the current literature’s focus on the methodological bases of mathematical rational choice theory in neoclassical economics.     

Spencer is dead, long live Spencer: individualism, holism, and the problem of norms

The debate between the advocates of sociological individualism and those of holism has been pervasive in the development of social theory. This debate is often situated in the false problems of sociology, since it is seen as a particular form of the perennial and irresolvable dilemma between social nominalism and realism, as well as between freedom and determinism. Nevertheless, the debate is far from over within contemporary sociology and other social science, as indicated by the resurgence of individualism in rational action theory and its repudiation by holistic social theories. The aim of this paper is to identify some modern variations on this theme as well as to discern certain common tendencies of two seemingly opposite theoretical perspectives, viz. the convergence upon a normative solution to the problem of social order. This convergence is therefore denoted normative convergence between sociological individualism and holistic sociology.     

Socio-economics and rational choice theory: Specification of their relations

In this paper an attempt is made to put the relationship between socio-economics and rational choice theory into proper perspective. The attempt is motivated by some recent confusions between the two. In particular, there is a tendency among the adherents of rational choice theory to subsume socio-economics and, for that matter, social science as a whole under their theory. On the other hand, many socio-economists or economic sociologists evince some degree of lenience vis-à-vis rational choice theory as if the latter were fully compatible with their discipline. We show that the rational choice reduction of socio-economics and sister disciplines (e.g., economic sociology) to the “economic approach to human behavior” or to a utilitarian paradigm of socio-economic life, is theoretically and methodologically untenable, and thus that many socio-economists' generous attitude to rational choice theory is not entirely justified.     

Economics as a Multi-Paradigmatic Science: the ‘Best Kept Secret’ of Irrational Choice

The article reexamines the prevailing perception of traditional economics as the science of rational choice among contemporary economists and sociologists, especially rational choice theorists. It proposes that conventional economics is not exclusively the theory of rational choice but also one of irrational choices in the economy. The article aims to contribute toward a fuller understanding and appreciation of classical and neoclassical economics, especially among sociologists, as composite rational choice-irrational choice theory and in that sense a multi- rather than single-paradigm science, thus no different from sociology and other social (and physical) sciences. This may be relevant or interesting to sociologists given that their rational choice colleagues, like economists, extol the “virtues" of conventional and modern economics as a single-paradigm, theoretically unified science around “rational choice” and criticize the “vices” of sociology as plagued by competing paradigms and theoretical disunity. The article supports many economic sociologists’ view or intuition of conventional economics as complex rational-irrational choice theory and multi-paradigm science, and disconfirms rational choice theorists’ interpretation and generalization of it as “rational choice theory” only and single-paradigm unified science.     

Max weber's vision of economic sociology

Max Weber's economic sociology is usually associated with The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–1905), but in this paper I show that what Weber himself called his “Wirtschaftssoziologie”, or economic sociology, looked quite different and was something that he developed during the last year of his life, 1919–1920. I present and outline Weber's (later) economic sociology and pay particular attention to his ideas of “economic (social) action” and of the three different forms of capitalism (rational capitalism, political capitalism and traditional capitalism). I also show that to Weber, economic sociology was part of a more general science of economics that he often referred to as “social economics” (“Sozialökonomik”). The paper ends with a comparison between the paradigm of economic sociology, which can be found in the work of Max Weber, and the paradigm of what is known as New Economic Sociology.     

The discovery of participatory research as a new scientific paradigm: Personal and intellectual accounts

The article presents considerations for the placing of participatory research in the practice of sociology. The changing conditions in contemporary society have compelled social scientists to rethink the way social theory has been conceptualized and has been practiced in relation to social change. Modernist social theory, of which sociology is a prime example, has been imbued with the biases of the Enlightenment that privilege the essentialized male rational actor set above the ordinary people. As a consequence it has produced narratives and practices that are not in the interest of the people, especially those who have been dominated and oppressed. In order to live up to the potential of sociology as a vehicle for the improvement of social conditions, it must include the interest and the wisdom of the people in its researching and theorizing activities. It is argued that participatory research provides an opportunity to follow this course in sociology. Participatory research, it is contended, will lead to a paradigm shift in the social sciences because it is based on an expanded conception of knowledge and because it changes the relationship between the researcher and the researched and between theory and practice. Arguments are drawn from the history of science, critical theory, and postmodernist and feminist critiques. Peter Park is currently on the faculty of the Fielding Institute.     

Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation

As rational choice theory has moved from economics into political science and sociology, it has been dramatically transformed. The intellectual diffusion of agency theory illustrates this process. Agency theory is a general model of social relations involving the delegation of authority, and generally resulting in problems of control, which has been applied to a broad range of substantive contexts. This paper analyzes applications of agency theory to state policy implementation in economics, political science, and sociology. After documenting variations in the theory across disciplinary contexts, the strengths and weaknesses of these different varieties of agency theory are assessed. Sociological versions of agency theory, incorporating both broader microfoundations and richer models of social structure, are in many respects the most promising. This type of agency theory illustrates the potential of an emerging sociological version of rational choice theory.     

Alfred Schütz — Ökonom und/oder Soziologe?

In 1996, Hartmut Esser published a rational choice model of the “Definition of the Situation” in this journal (KZfSS 48, 1996: 1–34). This work is based on his economic interpretation of the theory of Alfred Schutz, a co-founder of interpretative sociology. This paper analyses Hartmut Esser’s attempt to reconstruct the sociological concept of the definition of the situation by means of economic theory. It shows that Esser’s misinterpretations and abridgements of the theory of Alfred Schutz (this is especially true of the interactive aspects) lead to considerable discrepancies between Esser and Schutz in modelling the definition of the situation. In his economic modelling of the definition of the situation Esser fails to conceive the sociological essence of this concept (the construction of sense structures) because he formulates a model of rational behavior in accordance with the economic tradition. Schutz, however, advocates the construction of rational models of human behavior, which also includes “irrational” (not utility-maximizing) or “sense”-directed behavior.     

Emergenz und Reduktion

The micro-macro-link is a common problem in nearly every scientific field. In contemporary philosophy of mind a new concept of emergence has been developed which could also be useful for sociology. After a brief overview of the debate in the field of philosophy of mind, three different answers to the micro-macro problem are being distinguished and then transferred to sociology: an eliminative (e.g. R. Collins), a reductionist (e.g. rational choice theories) and a non-reductive answer based on the concept of emergence (e.g. Emile Durkheim, and, partly, N. Luhmann). Using the argument of “multiple realization” the article argues for a “conceptual dualism”.     

Reexamining economic sociology: Beyond rational choice reductionism

The article aims at reexamining the origins and character of economic sociology by comparison with rational choice within the history of economic and social ideas, particularly neoclassical economic and classical sociological theory. Some suggestions for a rational choice approach to economic sociology are particularly curious in that they tend to conflate the distinct characters and origins of these two disciplines throughout this history and have in turn provided an impetus for this reexamination. Modern rational choice theorists display a predilection for reducing economic (and, all) sociology into an economic approach to human behavior, with many economic sociologists evincing some degree of lenience or benevolence vis-à-vis such tendencies. Both tendencies do not seem justified in light of the different nature and origin of economic sociology and rational choice in the history of social and economic ideas. Since the current literature lacks coherent attempts at specifying the nature and historical roots of economic sociology versus those of rational choice, the article contributes toward filling in this hole.     

Social Theory Across Disciplinary Boundaries: Cultural Studies and Sociology

This essay proposes that sociology can learn from social theory developed in the humanities. In the face of recent challenges to sociological explanations of social outcomes (from rational choice and economic theory, cognitive psychological theories of intelligence, and communitarian social philosophy), social theory should specify the constitutive force of social signification. After identifying a key weakness in theoretical approaches currently available in sociology, the inadequacy of various conceptions of the social, I analyze three significant new works in cultural studies in order to sketch out alternative ways of defining and measuring the force of social signification. The essay concludes with an attempt to establish the basis of a dialogue between cultural studies and sociology.     

Partial Paradigm Shifts in the Social Sciences: Twenty Years of Research in Rural Sociology3

Abstract Falk and Zhao (1989) have recently suggested that increased theoretical diversity characterizes the last decade of published research in Rural Sociology. We suggest that this claim is premature, given paradigmatic trends in the larger discipline of sociology. From a reanalysis of data sources and the use of an analytical framework based on the partial paradigm concept, we conclude that rural sociology is attempting to further integrate theory, methodology, and image of the subject matter within a positivistic partial paradigm framework. We further suggest that rural sociologists continue their pursuit of a reflexive understanding of the practice of social science as an integral part of their research agenda.     

Two main problems in the sociology of morality

Sociologists often ask why particular groups of people have the moral views that they do. I argue that sociology’s empirical research on morality relies, implicitly or explicitly, on unsophisticated and even obsolete ethical theories, and thus is based on inadequate conceptions of the ontology, epistemology, and semantics of morality. In this article I address the two main problems in the sociology of morality: (1) the problem of moral truth, and (2) the problem of value freedom. I identify two ideal–typical approaches. While the Weberian paradigm rejects the concept of moral truth, the Durkheimian paradigm accepts it. By contrast, I argue that sociology should be metaphysically agnostic, yet in practice it should proceed as though there were no moral truths. The Weberians claim that the sociology of morality can and should be value free; the Durkheimians claim that it cannot and it should not. My argument is that, while it is true that factual statements presuppose value judgments, it does not follow that sociologists are moral philosophers in disguise. Finally, I contend that in order for sociology to improve its understanding of morality, better conceptual, epistemological, and methodological foundations are needed.

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Science, Religion and Secularization

The persistence of religion among scientists is the background question from which is derived a number of theoretical questions previously explored only tentatively in the sociology of religion and less by the sociology of science. The examination, organized around the differences in style and subject of these two sociological specialties, argues that the social study of science could benefit from and supplement theoretical concepts recently developed in the sociology of religion. Propositions are developed on the idea of scientism as a general ideology functioning as a substitute religion, and the proposition that modern consciousness is more able to sustain normative dissonance, including dissonance between religious and scientific norms. The discussion is theoretical and programmatic rather than empirical.     

Die Wahl der Soziologie als Studienfach

Sociology is one of the fields of study with the highest dropout rates. How can this be explained? Using data on students of sociology at the University of Bamberg, the authors examine three aspects of the decision making process for this subject: (1) the information gathering strategy of prospective studens, (2) the timing aspect of the decision process, and (3) the consideration of labour market issues. Based on rational choice theory, it is shown that on the one hand the problems erst upon the subject itself, since sociology is not enough professionalized and still not clear-cut enough towards specific occupational fields. On the other hand, the information gathering process of prospective students is often insufficient and there is too little consideration of the labour market aspects of the subject. Finally, the decision is often hastily made, which is also caused by the fact that for many students of sociology this subjectwas not their “first choice”.     

Is rational choice humanity’s most distinctive trait?

The Greeks and the thinkers of the Enlightenment regarded reason as the defining quality of humankind. The Utilitarians limited it to the selection of means to any given end for action excluding the determination of moral values and social institutions. This became a postulate of classical and neoclassical economics borrowed by rational choice theory in sociology. James Coleman accepted as rational any action based on the actor's belief in its rationality, which would not rule out the delusions of psychotics. Despite this and other concessions that treat almost any explicable action as rational, sociologists have correctly criticized rational choice theory for ignoring the pervasive effects of socialization in achieving the internalization of norms and values. Rational choice theory also fails to illuminate human emotions and motivations, pictured in their full complexity in great literature.     

Rational Choice Theory or Pretense? The Claims,Equivalences, and Analogies of the “Economic Approach to Human Behavior”

The article argues and demonstrates that classical–neoclassical economics generally does not pretend or claim that its principles apply to domains beyond the economy, specifically wealth, and does not equate the economic and the noneconomic, and the rational and the nonrational. By contrast, the “economic approach to human behavior” or “rational choice theory” precisely does this to legitimize itself by invoking classical–neoclassical economics as supreme authority and its representatives as venerable precursors. The article reveals the economic approach to human behavior as a set of grand theoretical and methodological claims, equivalences, and analogies from the standpoint of conventional economics itself, as well as sociology and other social sciences. It identifies and examines certain indicative instances of such tendencies. The article aims to contribute to understanding better the relations—or rather lack thereof—between conventional economics and contemporary economic and sociological rational choice theory. The economic approach to human behavior is not new, even outside the market sector. The rational choice model provides the most promising basis presently available for a unified approach to the analysis of the social world by scholars from different social sciences. — Gary Becker With respect to those parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even the principal object, to these political economy does not pretend that its conclusions are applicable. — John S. Mill But economy does not treat of all human motives. There are motives nearly always present with us, arising from conscience, compassion, or from some moral or religious source, which economy cannot and does not pretend to treat. These will remain to us as outstanding and disturbing forces; they must be treated, if at all, by other appropriate branches of knowledge. — William Jevons A science, therefore, based on the hypothesis (of universal rationality) would yield a general form of the social phenomenon having little or no contact with reality … — Vilfredo Pareto     

Organization theory in administrative law: A proposal for a design science

A design science for administrative law is proposed. Organization-controlling law should be designed in terms of sociological competence. Architecture and engineering offer a model based on (1) good fit, (2) multi-disciplinary perspectives, (3) analysis and feedback of failures, and (4) a paradigm. The science would begin with characteristics of regulated organizations and categories of law-organization relationships and lead to better design of compliance machineries. However, methodological strictures within mainstream sociology reduce the prospects for this science. Lawrence B. Radine received his Ph.D. in sociology from Washington University in St. Louis in 1973. He is the author ofThe Taming of the Troops (1977) and is associate professor of sociology and director of the Master’s of Public Administration Program at the University of Michigan-Dearborn.     

Critique as justification – and beyond

The article discusses the predicament of contemporary critique by focusing on a theoretical case, the ‘sociology of critique’ as it is formulated by Boltanski and Thévenot ( 2006 ) and developed by Boltanski and Chiapello ( 2007 ). This sociology is critical of critical theory and endeavours to supplement critical theory with a ‘theory of critique’, with a pragmatic analysis of the normative values that inspire intentional action. In order to be critical, it insists, one must first understand what critique is. However, the sociology of critique delimits critique to justification on the basis of (only) existing values and indexes all critique to the governmental idea of reform. The article elaborates on this by juxtaposing radical critique and pragmatic critique in the light of recent debate.     

Is sociology the science of the irrational? Conceptions of rationality in sociological theory

This paper explores the role of the concept of rationality in (especially classical) sociological theory. This exploration is prompted by widely held views, especially among economists and rational choice theorists, that classical sociology is the science of the irrational lacking a conception of rationality. By using pertinent examples (mostly) from classical and post-classical (or early contemporary) sociological theory, the paper casts serious doubt on such claims. Specifically, classical sociological theory is characterized by the following features in analyzing rationality: conceptual and methodological pluralism, theoretical and empirical richness, treating rationality as a complex social phenomenon, differentiating economic and noneconomic rationality, acknowledging the social character and foundation of (economic) rationality, and contrasting epistemological or scientific rationality and ontological or reallife irrationality, including the revelation of the irrationality of extreme (economic) rationality.