The influence of fear in decisions: Experimental evidence

This article studies decisions made under conditions of fear, when a catastrophic outcome is introduced in a lottery. It reports on experimental results and seeks to compare the predictions of the expected utility (EU) framework with those of a new axiomatic treatment of choice under uncertainty that takes explicit account of emotions such as fear (Chichilnisky 1996, 2000, 2002, 2009). Results provide evidence that fear influences the cognitive process of decision-making by leading some subjects to focus excessively on catastrophic events. Such heterogeneity in subjects’ behavior, while not consistent with EU-based functions, is fully consistent with the new type of utility function implied by the new axioms.     

Recall searching with and without recall

We revisit the sequential search problem by Hey (J Econ Behav Organ 8:137–144, 1987). In a 2 \(\times \) 2 factorial design, varying fixed and random cost treatments with and without recall, we address open research questions that were originally stated by Hey (1987). Our results provide clear evidence for Hey’s (1987) conjecture that recall negatively affects performance in sequential search. With experience, however, search behavior with and without recall converges toward the optimal reservation rule. We further find that the utilization of optimal reservation rules is independent from the stochastic nature of the search cost.     

Randomized dictatorship and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solution

“Randomized dictatorship,” one of the simplest ways to solve bargaining situations, works as follows: a fair coin toss determines the “dictator”—the player to be given his first-best payoff. The two major bargaining solutions, that of Nash (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) and that of Kalai and Smorodinsky (Econometrica, 43:513–518, 1975), Pareto-dominate this process (in the ex ante sense). However, whereas the existing literature offers axiomatizations of the Nash solution in which this ex ante domination plays a central role (Moulin, Le choix social utilitariste, Ecole Polytechnique Discussion Paper, 1983 ; de Clippel, Social Choice and Welfare, 29:201–210, 2007), it does not provide an analogous result for Kalai–Smorodinsky. This paper fills in this gap: a characterization of the latter is obtained by combining the aforementioned domination with three additional axioms: Pareto optimality, individual monotonicity, and a weakened version of the Perles–Maschler (International Journal of Game Theory, 10:163–193, 1981) super additivity axiom.     

Intertemporal utility smoothing under uncertainty

This paper axiomatizes a recursive utility model that captures both intertemporal utility smoothing defined across time and ambiguity aversion defined over states. The resulting representation adapts Wakai (Econometrica 76:137–153, 2008) model of intertemporal utility smoothing as an aggregator function, where the utility of the certainty equivalent of future uncertainty is computed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (J Math Econ 18:141–153, 1989) multiple-priors utility. The model also permits the separation of intertemporal utility smoothing from ambiguity aversion.     

Stability of risk preference measures: results from a field experiment on French farmers

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644?C1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281?C295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1?C7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can be related to non-expected utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability.     

Prospect theory and the “forgotten” fourfold pattern of risk preferences

Markowitz (Journal of Political Economy 60:151–158, 1952) identified a fourfold pattern of risk preferences in outcome magnitude: When outcomes are large, people are risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses, but risk preferences reverse when the outcomes are small, with people exhibiting risk seeking in gains and risk aversion in losses. This fourfold pattern was not addressed by either version of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky Econometrica 47:363–391, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5:297–323, 1992). We show how prospect theory can accommodate the pattern by combining an overweighting of low probabilities with a decreasingly elastic value function. We then examine the performance of prospect theory with two decreasingly elastic value functions: Prospect theory performs better, both quantitatively and qualitatively, with a normalized logarithmic value function than with a normalized exponential value function. We discuss several issues, and speculate about why Tversky and Kahneman did not address Markowitz’s fourfold pattern.     

Hyperbolic discount curves: a reply to Ainslie

Ainslie (Theory and Decision, 73, 3–34, 2012) challenges our interpretation of the properties of hyperbolic discount curves in an iterated prisoners’ dilemma (IPD) model. In this reply, we discuss the emergence of hyperbolic discount functions in the behavioral economics literature and evaluate their properties. Furthermore, we present a summarized version of our IPD model and evaluate Ainslie’s points of contention.     

Market failure in light of non-expected utility

This paper merges the non-expected utility approach (Tversky and Kahneman, J Risk Uncertain 5:297–323, 1992 and Quiggin, J Econ Behav Organ 3:323–343, 1982) into Akerlof’s (Quart J Econ 84:488–500, 1970) model of Market for Lemons. We derive the results for different probability weighting functions and analyze the phenomenon of market failure in light of non-expected utility maximization. Our main finding suggests that when the proportion of traded lemons is high (low), the problem of market failure is mitigated (enhanced). In addition, for the case of Cumulative Prospect Theory, we show that (a) the higher the loss aversion is, the more pronounced is the market failure; (b) gain-domain elevation is negatively related to the extent of market failure; and (c) the value function is (i) negatively monotonic in the gain-domain diminishing sensitivity parameter when the market is characterized by a high proportion of “peaches,” and (ii) positively monotonic in the loss-domain diminishing sensitivity parameter when the market is characterized by a high proportion of “lemons.”     

Moment characterization of higher-order risk preferences

This article presents a characterization of higher-order risk preferences such as prudence or temperance in terms of statistical moments. Our results, which are generalizations of Roger (Theory Decis, 70(1):27–44, 2011) and Ekern (Econ Lett, 6(4), 329–333, 1980), give a better understanding of how higher-order risk preferences relate to skewness preference and kurtosis aversion. While they are not based on expected utility theory, an implication within that theory is that all commonly used utility functions exhibit skewness preference and kurtosis aversion.     

Risk behavior for gain,loss, and mixed prospects

This study extends experimental tests of (cumulative) prospect theory (PT) over prospects with more than three outcomes and tests second-order stochastic dominance principles (Levy and Levy, Management Science 48:1334–1349, 2002; Baucells and Heukamp, Management Science 52:1409–1423, 2006). It considers choice behavior of people facing prospects of three different types: gain prospects (losing is not possible), loss prospects (gaining is not possible), and mixed prospects (both gaining and losing are possible). The data supports the distinction of risk behavior into these three categories of prospects, Further, probability weighting and diminishing sensitivity of utility as predicted by PT are observed. Loss aversion is, however, less pronounced, except for choices where one prospect is degenerate. The data suggests that the probability of losing may be relevant for loss aversion.     

Changes in multiplicative background risk and risk-taking behavior

This article analyzes the conditions under which any change in a multiplicative background risk induces a more cautious behavior. We give necessary and sufficient conditions under which any change in the multiplicative background risk with respect to the Nth-degree stochastic dominance raises local risk aversion. Surprisingly, decreasing relative risk aversion of any order up to N in the sense of Pratt (Econometrica 32:122–136, 1964) coupled with decreasing relative risk aversion in the sense of Ross (Econometrica 49:631–638, 1981) are sufficient to guarantee an increase in local risk aversion after any deterioration of the multiplicative background risk thanks to the Nth-degree stochastic dominance. We link our results concerning second-order stochastic dominance with the concept of multiplicative risk vulnerability.     

Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games

Since the seminal paper of Nash (Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 36:48–49, 1950) game theoretic literature has focused mostly on equilibrium and not on maximin (minimax) strategies. In a recent paper of Pruzhansky (Int J Game Theory 40:351–365, 2011) it was shown that under fairy general conditions maximin strategies in completely mixed games can guarantee the same expected payoff as completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies. Based on this finding, the current paper argues that maximin strategies have important properties. For instance, maximin strategies may refine Nash equilibria in subjective mixed strategies. Further, Bayesian rationality of the players may favor maximin strategies more often than Nash equilibrium strategies. The paper concludes with several suggestions for further experimental research that may shed more light on whether maximin behavior can explain reality better than Nash equilibrium.     

Products of non-additive measures: a Fubini-like theorem

For non-additive set functions, the independent product, in general, is not unique and the Fubini theorem is restricted to slice-comonotonic functions. In this paper, we use the representation theorem of Gilboa and Schmeidler (Math Oper Res 20:197?C212, 1995) to extend the M?bius product for non-additive set functions to non-finite spaces. We extend the uniqueness result of Ghirardato (J Econ Theory 73:261?C291, 1997) for products of two belief functions and weaken the requirements on the marginals necessary to obtain the Fubini property in the product. More importantly, we show that for the M?bius product one side of the Fubini theorem holds for all integrable functions if one of the marginals either is a probability or a convex combination of a chain of unanimity games, i.e., we relax the requirement of slice-comonotonicity and enrich the set of possible applications.     

Axiomatizing bounded rationality: the priority heuristic

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized version of the heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory.     

Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, 1982) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size.     

Measuring risk aversion with lists: a new bias

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (Am Econ Rev 92(5):1644–1655, 2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a systematic decrease in risk aversion and scrambles the ranking of individuals by risk aversion. This bias, that we call embedding bias, is quite distinct from other confounds that have been previously observed in the use of the HL method. It may be related to empirical phenomena and theoretical developments where better prospects increase risk aversion. Nevertheless, we also find that the more recent elicitation method due to Abdellaoui et al. (Theory Decis 71:63–80, 2011), also based on lists but using only one and the same probability in the list, does not display any statistically significant bias when the corresponding items of the list are removed. Our results suggest that methods other than the popular HL one may be preferable for the measurement of risk aversion.     

Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products

Let \(\mathcal{X }\) be a set of outcomes, and let \(\mathcal{I }\) be an infinite indexing set. This paper shows that any separable, permutation-invariant preference order \((\succcurlyeq )\) on \(\mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) admits an additive representation. That is: there exists a linearly ordered abelian group \(\mathcal{R }\) and a ‘utility function’ \(u:\mathcal{X }{{\longrightarrow }}\mathcal{R }\) such that, for any \(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) which differ in only finitely many coordinates, we have \(\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}\) if and only if \(\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} \left[u(x_i)-u(y_i)\right]\ge 0\) . Importantly, and unlike almost all previous work on additive representations, this result does not require any Archimedean or continuity condition. If \((\succcurlyeq )\) also satisfies a weak continuity condition, then the paper shows that, for any \(\mathbf{x},\mathbf{y}\in \mathcal{X }^\mathcal{I }\) , we have \(\mathbf{x}\succcurlyeq \mathbf{y}\) if and only if \({}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u(x_i)\ge {}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }}u(y_i)\) . Here, \({}^*\!\sum _{i\in \mathcal{I }} u(x_i)\) represents a nonstandard sum, taking values in a linearly ordered abelian group \({}^*\!\mathcal{R }\) , which is an ultrapower extension of \(\mathcal{R }\) . The paper also discusses several applications of these results, including infinite-horizon intertemporal choice, choice under uncertainty, variable-population social choice and games with infinite strategy spaces.     

A simple framework for the axiomatization of exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting

The main goal of this paper is to investigate which normative requirements, or axioms, lead to exponential and quasi-hyperbolic forms of discounting. Exponential discounting has a well-established axiomatic foundation originally developed by Koopmans (Econometrica 28(2):287–309, 1960, 1972) and Koopmans et al. (Econometrica 32(1/2):82–100, 1964) with subsequent contributions by several other authors, including Bleichrodt et al. (J Math Psychol 52(6):341–347, 2008). The papers by Hayashi (J Econ Theory 112(2):343–352, 2003) and Olea and Strzalecki (Q J Econ 129(3):1449–1499, 2014) axiomatize quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The main contribution of this paper is to provide an alternative foundation for exponential and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, with simple, transparent axioms and relatively straightforward proofs. Using techniques by Fishburn (The foundations of expected utility. Reidel Publishing Co, Dordrecht, 1982) and Harvey (Manag Sci 32(9):1123–1139, 1986), we show that Anscombe and Aumann’s (Ann Math Stat 34(1):199–205, 1963) version of Subjective Expected Utility theory can be readily adapted to axiomatize the aforementioned types of discounting, in both finite and infinite horizon settings.     

Common consequence effects in pricing and choice

This paper presents an experimental study of common consequence effects in binary choice, willingness-to-pay (WTP) elicitation, and willingness-to-accept (WTA) elicitation. We find strong evidence in favor of the fanning out hypothesis (Machina, Econometrica 50:277–323, 1982) for both WTP and WTA. In contrast, the choice data do not show a clear pattern of violations in the absence of certainty effects. Our results underline the relevance of differences between pricing and choice tasks, and their implications for models of decision making under risk.     

The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts

This paper studies the influence of agency conflicts on the irreversibility effect. Using a dynamic variant of the static Baron and Myerson (Econometrica 50(4):911–930, 1982) adverse selection model, we characterize under which circumstances the irreversibility effect arises in the presence and absence of an agency conflict. In particular, we find that in the presence of an agency conflict the irreversibility effect arises in more circumstances than in the standard first-best analysis that abstracts from agency problems.