Japan’s changing fertility mechanisms and its policy responses

This paper discusses Japan’s decline in fertility over the past 50 years. The change in Japan’s postwar fertility is analysed using formal demographic tools such as parity progression ratios and decomposition methods. The analytical results show that before the oil crisis of 1973, the reduction in marital fertility played a dominant role, while the delayed timing of marriage has been a principal factor since the mid-1970s. The delayed timing of first and second births has also played a relatively important role in determining actual fertility levels in the 1990s. The paper examines various socio-economic factors contributing to these demographic shifts over time in postwar Japan. A number of policies and programs implemented over the past decade by the Japanese government to boost fertility are briefly described, together with their limitations.     

Links Between Demographic and Kinship Transitions

The demographic transition is also a kinship transition. This insight is obvious for certain types of kin—as fertility falls, parents have fewer children, for instance—but its broader implications for communities remain unexplored. Prior work on this topic has focused on how the demographic transition reshapes the availability of living kin within a society over time to the neglect of how differences in the demographic transition lead to differences in kinship networks between communities. In this article, I examine survey data (for rural Thailand) and use microsimulation methods to test how different pathways through the demographic transition affect kinship networks in communities. My results show that different routes through the demographic transition can substantially alter kinship network size and, entirely through the mechanism of demographic change, have indirect effects on community integration. These effects persist long after the demographic transition has ended. I theorize reasons that community‐level differentiation in kinship networks owing to the demographic transition are an important mechanism linking the demographic transition to modernity.     

A Cohort Model of Fertility Postponement

We introduce a new formal model in which demographic behavior such as fertility is postponed by differing amounts depending only on cohort membership. The cohort-based model shows the effects of cohort shifts on period fertility measures and provides an accompanying tempo adjustment to determine the period fertility that would have occurred without postponement. Cohort-based postponement spans multiple periods and produces “fertility momentum,” with implications for future fertility rates. We illustrate several methods for model estimation and apply the model to fertility in several countries. We also compare the fit of period-based and cohort-based shift models to the recent Dutch fertility surface, showing how cohort- and period-based postponement can occur simultaneously.     

Fertility and PAYG pensions in the overlapping generations model

This article analyses how long-run pay-as-you-go public pensions react to a change in fertility in the Diamond overlapping generations model. While it might seem well established both in academic and political debates that the decline in fertility represents a “demographic time bomb” for the sustainability of public pensions, it is shown that a falling birth rate need not necessarily cause the fall of pensions in the long run.     

Women,Demography, and Politics: How Lower Fertility Rates Lead to Democracy

Where connections between demography and politics are examined in the literature, it is largely in the context of the effects of male aspects of demography on phenomena such as political violence. This project aims to place the study of demographic variables’ influence on politics, particularly on democracy, squarely within the scope of political and social sciences, and to focus on the effects of woman-related demographics—namely, fertility rate. I test the hypothesis that demographic variables—female-related predictors, in particular—have an independent effect on political structure. Comparing countries over time, this study finds a growth in democracy when fertility rates decline. In the theoretical framework developed, it is family structure as well as the economic and political status of women that account for this change at the macro and micro levels. Findings based on data for more than 140 countries over three decades are robust when controlling not only for alternative effects but also for reverse causality and data limitations.     

Determined to stop? Longitudinal analysis of the desire to have no more children in rural Mozambique

Classic demographic theories conceptualize desired family size as a fixed goal that guides fertility intentions over the childbearing years. However, a growing body of research shows that fertility plans, even nominally long-term plans for completed childbearing, change in response to short-term conditions. Because of data limitations, much of this research has focused on low-fertility contexts, but short-term conditions are likely to be even more important in high-fertility contexts. This paper uses three waves of survey data collected in rural Mozambique to study predictors of the desire to stop childbearing in a context of relatively high fertility and high individual and social instability. We use fixed effects models to assess how women’s desires to stop childbearing are shaped by demographic factors, household economic conditions, and health status, controlling for constant individual characteristics. Results provide evidence that fertility desires both reflect stable underlying goals and evolve in response to individual and social circumstances.     

Demographers’ Involvement in Twentieth-Century Population Policy: Continuity or Discontinuity?

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the development of a crusading spirit and massive technical aid aimed at reducing fertility levels and rates of population growth in developing countries, and also the involvement of demographers in these events. The demographers at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research, Frank Notestein and his colleagues, have been singled out by recent authors as playing a unique role in bringing about these changes, and they have been criticized for encouraging demographers to become involved, so eroding their scientific objectivity. This paper examines the development of relevant population thought and theory in the English-language literature over the first half of the twentieth century. It concludes that in the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, it was inevitable that developed countries and their demographers would become involved in controlling fertility levels in developing countries. The OPR story should be seen largely in terms of how the world’s leading demographic center and its demographic transition theory were swept along by global changes. As those developments started, attitudes to population change in densely settled Asia became Malthusian, even as population growth accompanied by mortality decline in Asia demonstrated that, at least in the short term, the positive checks were disappearing.     

Mortality–fertility synergies during the demographic transition in the developed world

The classic theory used to explain the demographic transition assumes that mortality is the key explanatory variable influencing the decline in fertility. However, the empirical results obtained in what is known as the Princeton European Fertility Project have led many specialists to question this assumption. Using both national and provincial aggregated data for 25 countries over a long time span, the analysis reported in this paper found that mortality does indeed play a fundamental role in accounting for the main demographic changes that occurred both before and during the transitional period. Others’ research based on individual data has shown clearly that the number of surviving children was indeed an important factor for reproductive decisions. My analysis, using aggregated data, reached largely similar conclusions regarding the role of mortality in changing reproductive trends, via its impact on nuptiality and marital fertility at different stages of the demographic transition.     

Effects of child mortality on subsequent fertility of women in some rural and semi-urban areas of certain Latin American countries

Abstract With the rapid decline in child mortality in developing countries there is considerable interest in understanding its effects on fertility. According to the theory of demographic transition, mortality declines are accompanied by fertility declines after a time lag, as countries go through the process of economic development. However, the immediate effects of a mortality decline on fertility have not been uniform as in many countries fertility has actually increased. For example, in many Latin American countries where mortality declines have been very rapid there have not been any appreciable changes in fertility. Only in recent years has there been a noticeable decline in the urban areas of some nations. While it is possible to examine the effects of various socio-economic factors on mortality and fertility at the macro-level, any real understanding of how mortality itself influences fertility would require information at the micro-level on couples who have experienced child mortality and who are also exposed to the risk of childbearing.     

Poverty,Inequality, and Fertility: The Contribution of Demographic Change to Global Poverty Reduction

Global poverty has fallen dramatically over the past decades. In many developing countries, this transformation was accompanied by rapid improvements in demographic outcomes, such as falling child mortality and fertility. Yet, recent theorizing and empirical research into the causes of global poverty reduction has mostly omitted demographic factors. This paper aims to fill this gap by testing for effects of demographic variables on poverty. Using time series data for 140 countries, we document a strong effect of lagged fertility on country-specific poverty rates. This effect is robust across several specifications and data sets. It appears to be stronger in countries with larger fertility differentials, in the early transition stages. The proposed mechanism behind this result is a “Kuznets curve-type” expansion of fertility inequality at the onset of the demographic transition. We conclude by calling for a stronger inclusion of demographic variables in the distribution-sensitive analysis of global poverty.     

An Evaluation of Persons per Household (PPH) Estimates Generated by the American Community Survey: A Demographic Perspective

The American Community Survey (ACS) is a U.S. Census Bureau product designed to provide accurate and timely demographic and economic indicators on an annual basis for both large and small geographic areas within the United States. Operational plans call for ACS to serve not only as a substitute for the decennial census long-form, but as a means of providing annual data at the national, state, county, and subcounty levels. In addition to being highly ambitious, this approach represents a major change in how data are collected and interpreted. Two of the major questions facing the ACS are its functionality and usability. This paper explores the latter of these two questions by examining “persons per household (PPH),” a variable of high interest to demographers and others preparing regular post-censal population estimates. The data used in this exploration are taken from 18 of the counties that formed the set of 1999 ACS test sites. The examination proceeds by first comparing 1-year ACS PPH estimates to Census 2010 PPH values along with extrapolated estimates generated using a geometric model based on PPH change between the 1990 and 2000 census counts. Both sets of estimates are then compared to annual 2001–2009 PPH interpolated estimates generated by a geometric model based on PPH from the 2000 census to the 2010 census. The ACS PPH estimates represent what could be called the “statistical perspective” because variations in the estimates of specific variables over time and space are viewed largely by statisticians with an eye toward sample error. The model-based PPH estimates represent a “demographic perspective” because PPH estimates are largely viewed by demographers as varying systematically and changing relatively slowly over time, an orientation stemming from theory and empirical evidence that PPH estimates respond to demographic and related determinants. The comparisons suggest that the ACS PPH estimates exhibit too much “noisy” variation for a given area over time to be usable by demographers and others preparing post-censal population estimates. These findings should be confirmed through further analysis and suggestions are provided for the directions this research could take. We conclude by noting that the statistical and demographic perspectives are not incompatible and that one of the aims of our paper is to encourage the U.S. Census Bureau to consider ways to improve the usability of the 1-year ACS PPH estimates.     

Age structure,growth, attrition and accession: A new synthesis

This paper shows that each equation describing relationships among demographic parameters in a stable population is a special case of a similar and equally simple equation that applies to any closed population and demonstrates some implications of these new equations for demographic theory and practice. Much of formal demography deals with functions that pertain to individuals passing through life, or to a stationary population in which births of individuals are evenly distributed over time. These functions include life expectancy, probabilities of survival, net and gross reproduction rates, expected years spent in various states and the probability that certain events will occur in the course of life. The stable population model permits the translation of population structure or processes in a more general type of population, with constant growth rates, back into equivalent populations for a stationary population. The method for translation developed in this paper, requiring only a set of age-specific growth rates is even more general, applying to any population. Age specific growth rates may also be useful for performing reverse translations, between a population's life table and its birth rate or its age distribution. Tables of numbers of females by single years of age in Sweden are used to illustrate applications. Tables summarize the basic relations among certain functions in a stationary population, a stable population and any population. Applications of new equations, particularly to demographic estimation of mortality, fertility and migration, from incomplete data, are described. Some other applications include; the 2 sex problem, increment decrement tables, convergence of population to its stable form, and cyclical changes in vital rates. Stable population models will continue to demonstrate long term implications of changes in mortality and fertility. However, in demographic estimation and measurement, new procedures will support most of those based on stable assumptions.     

Demographic Theory: A Long View

This essay argues that demographic theory over the last half‐century has substituted short‐term explanations, often focusing on single demographic events, for long‐term theory. This means not only that the explanations cannot be employed to forecast the situation in the more distant future, but they are inadequate even for short‐term analysis. A basis for a longer‐term theory of fertility transition is proposed, employing the concept of social structure and demographic behavior adjusting, slowly and after a considerable lag, to each of three modes of production. The focus is on the transition from agricultural to industrial production, especially as this is occurring in the most advanced industrial societies. Three major conclusions are drawn. (1) Unanticipated fertility changes over the last 50 years can be incorporated within a single demographic transition theory. (2) Societal and demographic changes are still at an early stage of their transition to full adjustment to industrialization. (3) The trend, associated with women's participation in the work force, toward below‐replacement fertility will continue, but at some stage most governments will probably attempt to raise fertility to replacement level even if the effort is extremely expensive and slows economic growth.     

The Effect of Urbanization on China’s Fertility

The relationship between urbanization and fertility decline is known to be inverse in developed countries. However, the nature of this relationship in developing countries that already have relatively low fertilities is not well-understood. This study aims to illustrate how much urbanization contributed to China’s fertility decline between 1982 and 2008 and forecasts how much it can contribute to future reductions in fertility. The study examines changes in the total fertility rate (TFR) at both the national and provincial levels, given regional differences in the urbanization rate. The results show that changes in rural fertility behavior accounted for most of the decline in the national TFR between 1982 and 2008. This finding suggests that official birth control policies were instrumental in curbing China’s population growth. However, urbanization was responsible for about 22% of the decrease in TFR during this period, and its effect was especially important during the latter years (2001–2008). In most provinces, urbanization associated with a decline in provincial-level fertility. The forecasts indicate that urbanization will become the primary factor behind future declines in national fertility. Given the negative effect of urbanization on the TFR, it is possible to relax the one-child policy without having adverse implications for population growth.     

Wages and Fertility in Australia

This paper applies a simple economic model to explain short run movements in Australian fertility, abstracting from social and cultural conditions. It shows that Australian fertility can be modelled with some success using only wages and employment data, once we allow for the different effects of changes in men’s and women’s wages for the period 1966–90. The elasticity of the total fertility rate over this period is found to be negative with respect to women’s wages and positive with respect to men’s wages. As well as having the expected sign, the estimated elasticities are similar in magnitude to those for the United States over the period 1948–75.     

Impact of population changes on education cost

This paper has two principal aims: (1) to analyze and measure how the demographic variables—mortality, fertility, and im migration — affect the cost of education; (2) to evaluate what possibilities developing countries, such as those of Latin America, have for a rapid educational improvement. The paper relates demographic and educational variables of three different populations: Sweden, 1840–1965; the United States, 1850–1960; and Latin America, 1930–2000. Three educational variables are also considered: (a) school attendance rates by sex and age; (b) distribution of students of same age by grade; and (c) cost of student by grade. Demographic changes in countries such as Sweden and the United States were favorable for the development of education. For the future, unless an increase of fertility occurs, mortality and fertility changes will not have a significant effect on the cost of education in these countries. In current less developed countries the demographic changes during the past were less favorable to educational development. A future reduction of fertility will significantly help them to achieve a higher educational level.     

Population dynamics in Germany: the role of immigration and population momentum

The effects of changes in rates of mortality, fertility, and migration depend not only on the age-specific patterns and levels of these rates, but on the age structure of the population. In order to remove the influences of the age structure and concentrate on the effects of the demographic rates themselves, a common practice is to analyze the influences of the rates for a standard age structure. This paper analyzes current and future population changes in Germany, using a stationary population equivalent model (SPE) that shows long-term effects of current fertility, mortality, and international migration patterns. Results indicate that the German population will eventually decline because of below replacement fertility, if net immigration does not counteract this decrease. This means, for instance, that the long-term stationary population levels for Germany will decrease by approximately 6.5 million during a decade in which current fertility, mortality, and international migration levels prevail. The paper also reports how various other assumptions for mortality, fertility, and international migration affect the SPE model for Germany.     

Variance effects in the bongaarts-feeney formula

Bongaarts and Feeney have recently proposed an adjusted total fertility rate to disentangle tempo effects from changes in the quantum of fertility. We propose an extension to the Bongaarts and Feeney formula that includes variance effects: that is, changes in the variance of the fertility schedule over time. If these variance effects are ignored, the mean age at birth and the adjusted total fertility rate are biased. We provide approximations for these biases, and we extend the TFR adjustment to fertility schedules with changing variance. We apply our method to the Swedish baby boom and bust, and show that variance effects are important for evaluating the relative contributions of tempo and quantum effects to the fertility change from 1985 to 1995.     

Fraught with Ambivalence: Reproductive Intentions and Contraceptive Choices in a Sub-Saharan Fertility Transition

Demographic studies that search for signs of fertility transition in sub-Saharan Africa rarely examine the complex gamut of individual aspirations and misgivings, hopes and frustrations, failures and triumphs that accompany the emerging declines of fertility rates in the subcontinent. This study draws upon qualitative data collected in peri-urban areas of Maputo, Mozambique’s capital and largest metropolis, to explore contradictory meanings and feelings surrounding changes in fertility intentions and contraceptive choices. It argues that although changes in these two aspects of reproductive life are interrelated, they are predicated on distinct types and configurations of external pressures and psychological apparatus, which is often manifested as a puzzling disjunction between fertility preferences and contraceptive use. This disjunction can be further reinforced by persistent gender divisions in reproductive views and strategies. Informal social interaction plays an important role in building societal consensus over fertility matters, but because such interaction deals with reproductive intentions and contraceptive use through largely different mechanisms, it may also help accentuate the intentions-contraception disjunction. This study’s findings therefore call upon both researchers and policymakers to attend more closely to the multidimensionality of fertility transitions in sub-Saharan societies and specifically to the complexities underlying such popular notions as “unmet need for family planning,” “spacing” versus “limiting” births, or “spousal communication” on reproductive matters.     

Aiming at a moving target: Period fertility and changing reproductive goals

Summary Common sense suggests that changes over time in aggregate period fertility rates should be closely, related to changes in desired completed fertility after controlling for contraceptive failure, and desired spacing and timing; the nature of the relationship is, however, far from clear. This paper shows that when desired completed fertility undergoes swings, like those in the United States in recent decades, the turning points in period fertility will precede those in desired completed fertility by as much as five years and the amplitude of the swings in period fertility will be more than twice as great. Cumulated fertility, on the other hand, will lag behind reproductive goals. Period fertility rates will exceed desired completed fertility when desires are increasing and fall below it when desires are decreasing. These theoretical results help to explain some salient features of the American baby boom and bust. It is also shown that during a demographic transition, period fertility will fall more rapidly than desired completed fertility, and that towards the end of the transition, period fertility will increase.