THE OPTIMAL TAXATION OF ASSET INCOME WHEN GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION IS ENDOGENOUS: THEORY,ESTIMATION AND WELFARE

This paper derives the Ramsey optimal fiscal policy for taxing asset income in a model where government expenditure is a function of net output or the inputs that produce it. Extending work by Kenneth L. Judd, I demonstrate that the canonical result that the optimal tax on capital income is zero in the medium to long term is a special case of a more general model. Employing a vector error correction model to estimate the relationship between government consumption and net output or the factor inputs that generate it for the United States between 1948Q1 and 2015Q4, I demonstrate that this special case is empirically implausible, and show how a cointegrating vector can be used to determine the optimal tax schedule. I simulate a version of the model using the empirical estimates to measure the welfare implications of changing the tax rate on asset income, and contrast these results with those generated in a version of the model where government consumption is purely exogenous. The shifting pattern of welfare measurements confirms the theoretical results. I calculate that the prevailing effective tax rate on net asset income in the United States between 1970 and 2014 averaged 0.449. Hence abolishing the tax completely does generate welfare improvements, though only by the equivalent of between 1.103% and 1.616% permanent increase in consumption—well under half the implied welfare benefit when the endogeneity of the government consumption is ignored. The maximum welfare improvement from shifting part of the burden of tax from capital to labor is the equivalent of a permanent increase in consumption of between only 1.491% and 1.858%, and is attained when the tax rate on asset income is lowered to between 0.148 and 0.186. Allowing the tax rate to vary over time raises the maximum welfare benefit to 1.865%. All the results are very robust to a wide range of elasticities of labor supply. (JEL E62, H21, H50)     

THE CREDIT‐CHANNEL TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND THE NONLINEAR GROWTH AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF INFLATION AND TAXES

With the credit‐channel effect driven by the central bank's open market operations, this paper's model easily gives rise to the nonlinear inflation‐growth nexus, which is evidenced by a number of cross‐country empirical studies. The threshold level of the inflation rate is found to be lower when tax rates are higher. The presence of the credit‐channel effect also provides the rationale for setting positive (and smaller than 1) tax rates on consumption, labor income, and capital income. The optimal tax rates rise as the inflation target declines. Under a fiscal policy rule where labor and capital income taxes move proportionally to each other, the optimal capital income tax rate could be higher than the optimal labor income tax rate. Under a sufficiently large central bank balance sheet, the credit‐channel effect will be so weak that inflation and all kinds of taxes are growth and welfare repressing. This provides a rationale for central banks that have implemented quantitative easing policies to shrink their balance sheets. (JEL E58, E62, O42)     

Decision heuristics and tax perception – An analysis of a tax-cut-cum-base-broadening policy

In this paper, both a conjoint analysis and a lab experiment are conducted to analyze the influence of changes in the tax rate and the tax base on the perceived tax burden. Our results show that the majority of individuals do not make rational tax decisions based on the actual tax burden but rather use simple decision heuristics. This leads to an irrationally high impact of changes in nominal tax rates on the perceived tax burden. Taxpayers favor tax options that apply a lower tax rate on their gross income over a higher tax rate applied on their net income despite the lower actual tax burden of the latter option. This result suggests that politicians could combine increasing fiscal revenues and decreasing subjects’ tax perception. Furthermore, overestimation of tax rate changes increases considerably when information on tax rate is considered first (framing effect).     

GROWTH, WELFARE, AND THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT

Using an endogenous growth model in which government purchases directly affect aggregate productivity and utility, fiscal policy experiments conducted here indicate that the macroeconomic effects of changes in fiscal policy are at least as sensitive to the mix of spending cuts as they are to the mix of tax cuts. In fact, reducing the size of the government actually reduces growth and welfare freductions in government expenditures are heavily weighted towards reductions in public capital or if the proceeds are not used to reduce capital taxation. In addition, across-the-board spending cuts are not likely to significantly improve growth and welfare. ( JEL E62, 041)     

Economic and fiscal implications of aging for subnational American governments.

This article begins with a brief review of the extensive literature dealing with the macroeconomic consequences of population aging in industrialized societies and places the question in the context of the political and economic framework of the United States. Next, we move to the fiscal ramifications of population aging for subnational units of government. The varying demographic sources of aging are then introduced and their economic implications are reviewed. The role of population aging within the context of subnational fiscal impacts is first examined by reviewing patterns of change in demand for state-government-provided public goods and services associated with an older population. These include primarily health care and income security. These considerations on the expenditure side are then extended to substate government, where primary and secondary education are easily the largest component of public budgets. Finally, the implications of demographic change on the revenue side of state and local public finances are considered, including potential impacts on sales, property, and income tax receipts.     

Regulatory fit effects on perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance

Paying taxes can be considered a contribution to the welfare of a society. But even though tax payments are redistributed to citizens in the form of public goods and services, taxpayers often do not perceive many benefits from paying taxes. Information campaigns about the use of taxes for financing public goods and services could increase taxpayers’ understanding of the importance of taxes, strengthen their perception of fiscal exchange and consequently also increase tax compliance. Two studies examined how fit between framing of information and taxpayers’ regulatory focus affects perceived fiscal exchange and tax compliance. Taxpayers should perceive the exchange between tax payments and provision of public goods and services as higher if information framing suits their regulatory focus. Study 1 supported this hypothesis for induced regulatory focus. Study 2 replicated the findings for chronic regulatory focus and further demonstrated that regulatory fit also affects tax compliance. The results provide further evidence for findings from previous studies concerning regulatory fit effects on tax attitudes and extend these findings to a context with low tax morale.     

Income tax schedule and redistribution in direct democracies – the Swiss case

This study examines redistribution policy through personal income taxes in Swiss cantons over the period 1995–2011. In a first step, redistribution measures are estimated with the help of exhaustive administrative data. Redistribution is decomposed into average tax rate and tax progression. In a second step, we investigate the impact of direct democratic institutions and their usage on tax policy and redistribution. The results suggest that the effect of direct democracy on income tax redistribution is a multilayered process. First, the theoretical availability of direct democracy tools does not seem to have the same impact as the effective use of them. Second, fiscal referendums may – in the short term –reduce redistribution through lower tax rates and lead to less tax progression. Third, an increasing number of ballots on initiatives leads to more tax progression and more redistribution in the long run. It seems that the short-term dampening effects of fiscal referendums on redistribution may be overridden in the long run by the expansive effect of popular initiatives.     

TAXATION, GOVERNMENT SPENDING, AND LABOR SUPPLY A DIAGRAMMATIC EXPOSITION

The effects of a change in the level of taxation on labor supply are examined under the assumption that the government budget balances. The government spends tax revenues either on redistributions (which are assumed to have an income effect on labor supply) or on other government goods (which are assumed not to influence labor supply). In order for a rise in the tax rate to increase the quantity of labor supplied, it must be that (i) the labor-supply function bends backward, and (ii) sufficiently little of the increased tax revenues are redistributed. The quantity of labor supplied must fall if all marginal tax revenues are redistributed.     

BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: INCOME DISTRIBUTION,CONSUMER CREDIT,AND BUSINESS CYCLES

We introduce a macroeconomic model with heterogeneous households and an aggregate banking sector in order to analyze the impact of rising income inequality under different credit scenarios. Growing inequality produces debt‐led consumption boom dynamics when the banking sector is characterized by a lower capital requirement and a higher willingness to lend. Instead, when inequality rises but the banking sector is highly regulated, aggregate demand and output fall. Our results also yield new insights on the appropriate fiscal policy reaction to stabilize the economy: acting on the progressivity of the tax system seems more effective than a proactive countercyclical fiscal policy. (JEL C63, D31, E62, G01)     

NONLINEARITIES AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT

We analyze the sustainability of the government's intertemporal budget constraint and the corresponding fiscal reaction function within a nonlinear error‐correction framework. Our empirical analysis, based on Italy, provides some evidence that the Italian government is meeting its intertemporal budget constraint. Nevertheless, we show that the burden of correcting budgetary disequilibria is entirely carried out by changes in the average tax rate, with a weakly exogenous government spending, possibly determined by the political process. We also document some rigidities of the tax instrument, in terms of downward inflexibility of the average tax rate with respect to its long‐run level. Finally, we provide some evidence in favor of a nonlinear adjustment toward a sustainable long‐run equilibrium, as the average tax rate adjusts faster the further away it gets from the equilibrium. By considering the behavior of taxes across the economic cycle, we also provide some evidence of inflexibility of the tax instrument during bad times. (JEL C32, C51, C52, H20, H50)     

The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer Relationship

This article offers an example of a national constitution, that of the Confederate States of America, which effectively constrained its fiscal authorities to tax rates on the lower end of the Laffer relationship. The taxes were Confederate import tariffs. Drawing on primary sources, the paper documents the role that this de facto capping of tariff rates played in the history of the drafting of the Confederate Constitution. That the Laffer relationship found constitutional expression for an important tax suggests that the "tariff" might have played a more significant role in the North–South conflict than is currently acknowledged.     

DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A PROPERTY TAX REVOLT

Voters who support tax limitations measures such as California's Proposition 13 seem to feel that their expected gains more than compensate for whatever costs may follow from a successful tax revolt. Costs can arise from a decline in government services or from an increase in some replacement tax if service levels are maintained. This paper estimates the perceived and actual incidence of a property tax revolt under alternative assumptions about voter perceptions and eventual outcomes. Our results suggest that the most visible benefits of a tax cut favor low-income homeowners. In the event of government budget cutbacks, it is possible that the distribution of services is sufficiently skewed toward low-income groups to reverse the incidence of a property tax revolt.     

Psychological taxing in Flemish municipalities

We analyse whether the psychological pricing in the private sector has a public sector counterpart in tax policy. Analysing the main theoretical arguments for the existence of price points, and applying them to the public sector, suggests that psychological taxing reveals itself by the use of non-0 ending tax rates. The tax rate endings of the local income taxes, which are set by 308 Flemish municipalities in the fiscal year 1998, suggests the presence of psychological taxing. Non-0 endings occur more frequently in municipalities where demand for public policy is more elastic (and where, therefore, the benefits to the politicians from setting a tax just below a tax point is higher). The pre-tax income inequality and the level of the tax rate positively affect psychological taxing. The latter effect is reinforced in those municipalities where the existing tax rate is above the average tax rate in neighbouring municipalities and below their neighbours’ minimum, although this effect has a limited effect and is offset the further below the minimum the tax is set.     

Fiscal management in government-funded nonprofit organizations: An exploratory study

Nonprofit human services organizations are playing an increasingly important role in the implementation of government programs. Yet little is known about how the fiscal affairs of these organizations are managed. This article explores the fiscal and budget practices of a group of affiliated nonprofit human services organizations in the western United States in an effort to provide a preliminary assessment of the capacities of these organizations, which have become so critical to the execution of public policy. The findings demonstrate that the organizations surveyed are making widespread use of many sophisticated management tools and methods in their budget processes.     

Optimal income taxation with Kalai wage bargaining and endogenous participation

This paper characterizes the optimal redistributive tax schedule in a search–matching framework where (voluntary) nonparticipation and (involuntary) unemployment are endogenous and wages are determined by proportional bargaining à la Kalai. The optimal employment tax rate is given by an inverse elasticity rule. This rule depends on the global response of the employment rate, which depends not only on the participation (labor supply) responses, but also on the vacancy posting (labor demand) responses and on the product of these two responses. For plausible values of the parameters, our matching environment induces much lower employment tax rates than the usual competitive model with endogenous participation only. However, optimal employment tax rates are larger (in absolute value) when a given level of the global elasticity of employment is more due to search frictions and less due to participation responses.     

THE CULTURE OF CORRUPTION,TAX EVASION,AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross‐country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)     

RULES AND DISCRETION WITH NONCOORDINATED MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICIES

The time inconsistency of optimal monetary policy is due to the effects of tax distortions. Thus the issue of how to improve upon the time-consistent suboptimal monetary policy is related to that of the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy. We present a model with three players (the central bark, the fiscal authority, and wage setters) in which distortionary taxes are explicitly modelled. We show that binding commitments to monetary rules are not necessarily welfare improving if monetary and fiscal policy are not coordinated. We also examine the effects of different degrees of independence of the central bank.     

Taxation and tax resistance

In recent years social and behavioral sciences have extended their interest to topics not normally thought to be within their province. One of these topics of current interest is tax resistance, an old problem indeed that continues to plague the modern welfare state. People are perfectly willing to benefit from government services but increasingly restive about paying for them. How to cope with this tax-welfare backlash is a crucial problem for all democratic governments. Growing government deficits, for example, may in part be due to the erosion of the tax base which results from a shift to unobserved activities. The main purpose of this article is to offer a theoretical framework for the definition and explanation of tax resistance. To this end, research findings about tax compliance and tax mentality as well as theoretical work on free-riding, exchanging and gift-giving will be presented and discussed.     

PRODUCTION COSTS, TRANSACTION COSTS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR CHOICE

Local governments that choose to externally produce a service can contract with other governments, for-profit firms, or nonprofit organizations. This contractor choice is modeled as one in which the local government decision maker minimizes service delivery costs, both production and transaction costs, subject to political and fiscal constraints. The model is estimated using data on three frequently contracted health services obtained from a national survey of local government service delivery arrangements. The empirical analysis reveals the importance of both production and transaction costs, as well as the choice set of available suppliers, to contractor choice.     

上海房产税改革的优化路径选择

上海房产税改革试点运行3年有余,取得了先行先试的改革示范效应,但房产税在财政收入筹集和房地产市场调节上发挥的作用并不显著,其原因主要在于房产税税制要素设计不尽合理、房产税功能定位有偏差.进一步改革的优化路径是：完善税收结构,合理税负分布,稳定和优化房地产宏观税负;合理设计房产税税制要素,实现房产税向存量房逐步过渡;清理不合理的行政事业性收费,设立配套税,打包征收;逐步把房产税培育为地方主体税种,以降低财政对土地出让金的依赖.通过以上改革,实现房地产税收体系的整合和房地产税制的重塑,为我国房地产市场稳健运行建立税收制度基础.