When trustors compete for the favour of a trustee – A laboratory experiment

We experimentally compare standard two-player trust games to three-player trust games, where two trustors compete for one trustee. We argue that a competitive environment could affect how the trustors’ behaviour is perceived by the trustee. If two trustors compete for the favour of a trustee, the trustee might find it difficult to interpret the trustors’ investments as kind since they could as well be the outcome of a competitive race; this could negatively affect the trustee’s returned amount. We allow for heterogeneous effects of competition for strangers and artificially induced partners. The results of our one-shot trust games show that introducing competition among trustors reduces return ratios of the trustee. We do not find any evidence for statistically different effects of competition for partners and strangers.     

Spontaneous evolution of social exchange—An experimental study

Each of several exchange partners owns a specific commodity which she can share with others. Unlike in other social dilemma scenarios like prisoners’ dilemma, public goods games, etc., voluntary cooperation relies on bilateral exchanges whose profitabilities are interdependent. How will mutual sharing evolve? Will it include all group members or will smaller groups be more efficient? Our experimental data shed partly new light on older topics: cooperation is now relation specific, allowing for discrimination; group size effects are explored dynamically rather than in one-shot interaction; and, finally, we have weakened demand effects for voluntary cooperation by realistic efficiency gains.     

Theory‐Testing, Generalization, and the Problem of External Validity

External validity refers to the generalization of research findings, either from a sample to a larger population or to settings and populations other than those studied. While definitions vary, discussions generally agree that experiments are lower in external validity than other methodological approaches. Further, external validity is widely treated as an issue to be addressed through methodological procedures. When testing theories, all measures are indirect indicators of theoretical constructs, and no methodological procedures taken alone can produce external validity. External validity can be assessed through determining (1) the extent to which empirical measures accurately reflect theoretical constructs, (2) whether the research setting conforms to the scope of the theory under test, (3) our confidence that findings will repeat under identical conditions, (4) whether findings support the theory being tested, and (5) the confirmatory status of the theory under test. In these ways, external validity is foremost a theoretical issue and can only be addressed by an examination of the interplay between theory and methods.     

In quest of the banks set in spatial voting games

The Banks set (1(4):295–306, 1985) is one of the more important concepts in voting theory since it tells us about the sophisticated outcomes of standard amendment voting procedures commonly in use throughout the English speaking world (and elsewhere as well). While the properties of the Banks set for finite voting games have been extensively studied, little is known about how to find members of this set for majority rule spatial voting games involving possibly infinite agendas. We look at this question for two-dimensional games where voters have Euclidean preferences, and offer a variety of new results that delimit areas of the space that can be shown to lie within the Banks set, such as the Schattschneider set, the tri-median set, and the Banks line set—geometric constructs which we show to be nested within one another.     

Probabilistic cheap talk

We consider a model in which there is uncertainty over when a one-shot game will be played. We show how a mechanism designer can implement desirable outcomes in certain economic games by manipulating only the probability that the game is played in a given round while leaving all other aspects of the game unchanged. We also show that if there is no discounting, this uncertainty imparts a sequential structure that is almost mathematically equivalent to a repeated version of the game with discounting. In particular, a folk theorem applies to such games. Thus, games of probabilistic cheap provide a third interpretation of the repeated game framework with the additional feature that expected payoff is invariant to the probability of the game ending. Received: 10 May 1999/Accepted: 16 October 2000     

Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?

This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with rational social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined “state of the world” with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine whether individuals exert effort in a manner that is consistent with their revealed preferences. The analysis of controlled laboratory experiments suggest that while individuals’ effort provisions are generally consistent with the theory, those who reveal relatively pro-social preferences fail to procure their “preferred” outcomes too frequently when the state of the world is highly inequitable in their favor. Consideration is given to alternative theories, namely ego depletion and cognitive dissonance, as potential explanations of social outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that dictators, on average, experience ego depletion which leads to a reduction in pro-social behavior through time.     

BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY

Laboratory experiments have generally supported the theorem that, in classical property rights environments, noncooperative behavior in markets yields efficient social outcomes. Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of noncooperative behavior in small-group strategic interaction and in large-group public good environments. In these two types of experiments subjects frequently achieve more efficient social outcomes–they collect more money from the experimenter–than noncooperative game theory predicts. Many subjects in these experiments exhibit reciprocity even in single-play games. Evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that humans have evolved mental algorithms for identifying and punishing cheaters in social exchange. ( JEL A11, A12, B41, C70, C72, C92)     

UNDERSTANDING COMPUTER GAME CULTURES A situated approach

This article uses data and theory from psychological and sociological sources in order to examine computer gamers engagement with computer games. The article employs data from studies of gender difference in computer game interactions in order to theoretically open up the rich diversity of gamers interactions with games. The theoretical discussion employs a mix of psychological ideas, especially those of affordances, effectivities and attunement, with ideas from cultural studies, especially those of subject positions and preferred readings. The article argues that gaming needs to be viewed as an activity taking place in cultural niches that arise in the complex interaction between games, gamers and gaming cultures.     

Different least square values,different rankings

The semivalues (as well as the least square values) propose different linear solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. As a byproduct, they also induce a ranking of the players. So far, no systematic analysis has studied to which extent these rankings could vary for different semivalues. The aim of this paper is to compare the rankings given by different semivalues or least square values for several classes of games. Our main result states that there exist games, possibly superadditive or convex, such that the rankings of the players given by several semivalues are completely different. These results are similar to the ones D. Saari discovered in voting theory: There exist profiles of preferences such that there is no relationship among the rankings of the candidates given by different voting rules. Received: 5 November 2000/Accepted: 12 February 2001     

Negative reciprocity and its relation to anger-like emotions in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups

Several studies have shown that social identity fosters the provision of public goods and enhances the willingness to reciprocate the cooperative behavior of group members. Nonetheless, the question of how social identity affects negative reciprocity in identity-homogeneous and -heterogeneous groups has only received little attention. Consequently, we seek to fill this gap by examining whether social identity affects individuals’ willingness to sanction deviating group members in a public good context. Moreover, we devote particular attention to the role of anger-like emotions in negative reciprocity. To test our hypotheses, we employ one-shot public good games in a strategy method with punishment opportunity and induced social identity. Our results indicate that members of identity-homogeneous groups are prone to reveal less negative reciprocity than identity-heterogeneous groups when they face contributions smaller than their own. We also find that anger-like emotions much more strongly influence punishment behavior when individuals are matched with members of different identities than in identity-homogenous groups. These findings contribute to an increased understanding of the nature of social identity and its impact on reciprocity, improving economists’ ability to predict behavior while taking emotions into consideration.     

Vertrauen und Reputationseffekte bei Internet-Auktionen

In internet auctions the exchange between two anonymous actors corresponds to a one-shot prisoner’s-dilemma-like situation. In such a situation there is a high risk that both actors will cheat and that the market will collapse. The solution to attaining mutual cooperation is the simple and very efficient institution of a public rating system. By this institution sellers have an incentive to invest in reputation in order to enhance future chances of business. Using data from about 200 auctions of mobile phones we analyse the effects of the reputation system by empirical methods. In general the analysis of non-obtrusive data from auctions may help to gain a deeper understanding of basic social processes of exchange, reputation, trust, and cooperation and of the impact of institutions on the efficiency of markets. In this study we report empirical estimations of the effects of reputation on characteristics of transactions like the probability of a successful deal, the mode of payment, and the largest bid or auction price. Particularly, we ask whether sellers receive a “premium” for reputation. Results show that buyers are ready to pay higher prices for reputation to diminish the risk of exploitation. On the other hand, sellers protect themselves against cheating by choosing of a proper mode of payment. Simple institutional settings lead to cooperation, relatively rare events of fraud, and efficient markets despite the risk of mutual opportunistic behavior.     

On the core of characteristic function games associated with exchange networks

An exchange network is a social system in which the actors gain valued resources from bilateral transactions, but an opportunity to negotiate a deal is given only to those pairs of actors whose positions are tied with each other in a fixed communication network. A transaction consists in a mutually agreed-on division of a resource pool assigned to a network line. An additional constraint imposed on such a network restricts the range of transaction sets which may happen in a single negotiation round to those consistent with a given “exchange regime.” Under the one-exchange regime every actor is permitted to make no more than one deal per round. Bienenstock and Bonacich [Bienenstock, E.J., Bonacich, P., 1992. The core as a solution to exclusionary networks. Social Networks 14, 231–243] proposed to represent a one-exchange network with an n-person game in characteristic function form. The aim of this paper is to develop a mathematical theory of games associated with homogenous one-exchange networks (network homogeneity means that all lines are assigned resource pools of the same size). The focus is on the core, the type of solution considered most important in game theory. In particular, all earlier results obtained by Bonacich are re-examined and there is given a new graph-theoretic necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of nonempty core for the game representing a homogenous one-exchange network.     

A Postmodern Turn for Social Media Research: Theory and Research Directions for Public Relations Scholarship

The public relations literature on social media has focused primarily on how social media platforms can be leveraged to the advantage of organizations for relationship building and so-called dialogue with publics. Yet most research has positioned relationships in social media merely as opportunities for information exchange, perpetuating models of public relations grounded in systems theory that ignore power imbalances. Consequently, this article offers insights from postmodernist theories to first deconstruct existing research and then offer suggestions for future social media scholarship. The article argues that social media scholars have privileged dominant rational models of social engagement. Dissensus and disorder, according to Lyotard, may be as legitimate and more liberatory states of discourse for marginalized publics. Postmodern theories of language games and differential consciousness are also positioned as ways in which social media theory and practice may be advanced. The article thus complicates how relationships are theorized in contemporary scholarship and challenges both scholars and practitioners to rethink approaches to social media practice through a postmodern lens.     

The impact of negotiated exchange on trust and trustworthiness

Negotiated exchanges and trust problems can be regarded as two different forms of exchange, the former representing exchanges with negotiation and binding contracts, the latter representing asymmetric transactions in which one actor has the opportunity to deceive the other. Both forms of exchange have been extensively studied, but the two respective research traditions exhibit very little overlap. In this paper, we investigate the effects of negotiated exchanges in different network structures on the development of mutual trust. We derive hypotheses from various theories and test them by means of an experiment in which subjects first undertake a series of negotiated exchanges under different power conditions, and then face a trust problem with one of the actors that have been involved in the previous exchanges. The trust problem is operationalized by means of the Investment Game which allows us to look separately at trust and trustworthiness. Our results demonstrate that negotiated exchanges increase mutual trust, but not trustworthiness.     

MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS

We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry deterrence. In a sequential game with entry deterrence, an incumbent decides whether to incur a cost to deter potential entrants. We show that the model with sequential games with strategic deterrence provides the best fit to the data. We conclude that the results reject the hypothesis of a static model and support the hypothesis of the existence of strategic entry deterrence. (JEL L1)     

Fairness as a constraint on reciprocity: Playing simultaneously as dictator and trustee

The dictator and trust games are two common games used to identify the existence of social preferences. However, in many social interactions, individuals face the environments in both games simultaneously: for example we are often engaged in charitable donations to strangers, as well as reciprocal exchange with family members and colleagues. As giving in one game could be prioritised over giving in the other, it is important to have participants play both as a dictator in the dictator game and as a trustee in a trust game simultaneously. The results indicate that when the recipient in the dictator game is significantly poorer relative to the dictator, the dictator tends to return an amount to the trustor such that the trustor neither makes a loss nor profit from trusting. This suggests that the presence of a sufficiently strong incentive to make transfers as a dictator may completely crowd-out any monetary returns to trust.     

Problem Gambling Among International and Domestic University Students in Australia: Who is at Risk?

Young people are a high risk group for gambling problems and university (college) students fall into that category. Given the high accessibility of gambling in Australia and its association with entertainment, students from overseas countries, particularly those where gambling is restricted or illegal, may be particularly vulnerable. This study examines problem gambling and its correlates among international and domestic university students using a sample of 836 domestic students (286 males; 546 females); and 764 international students (369 males; 396 females) at three Australian universities. Our findings indicate that although most students gamble infrequently, around 5 % of students are problem gamblers, a proportion higher than that in the general adult population. Popular gambling choices include games known to be associated with risk (cards, horse races, sports betting, casino games, and gaming machines) as well as lotto/scratch tickets. Males are more likely to be problem gamblers than females, and almost 10 % of male international students could be classified as problem gamblers. Hierarchical regression analysis showed that male gender, international student status, financial stress, negative affect and frequency of gambling on sports, horses/dogs, table games, casino gaming machines, internet casino games and bingo all significantly predicted problem gambling. Results from this study could inform gambling-education programs in universities as they indicate which groups are more vulnerable and specify which games pose more risk of problem gambling.     

Scoring rule voting games and dominance solvability

This article studies the dominance solvability (by iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies) of general scoring rule voting games when there are three alternatives. The scoring rules we study include Plurality rule, Approval voting, Borda rule, and Relative Utilitarianism. We provide sufficient conditions for dominance solvability of general scoring rule voting games. The sufficient conditions that we provide for dominance solvability are in terms of one statistic of the game: sufficient agreement on the best alternative or on the worst alternative. We also show that the solutions coincide with the set of Condorcet Winners whenever the sufficient conditions for dominance solvability are satisfied. Approval Voting performs the best in terms of our criteria.     

What are Relevant Work Incentive Models? Shirking Model, Gift Exchange Model, or Reciprocity Model

This empirical study examines the relevance of different work incentive models by distinguishing reciprocity induced by pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors. Although the literature does not present an examination of different models all together but rather specifically examines each model mainly through experimental laboratory games, we study which models are suitable to explain work incentives in real labor markets. Our analyses reveal that overall reciprocity induced by non-pecuniary factors motivates employees well. The shirking model induces effort only if employees face a high level of vulnerability to firing. However, the high level of vulnerability to dismissal invalidates the gift exchange and reciprocity models. These results can complement controlled laboratory experiments, whose results are often restricted in applying to the reality.