An investigation into E-business service in the UK telecommunication manufacturing industry

Nowadays, suppliers’ product and service quality has risen in importance with a manufacturer’s push to develop core competencies and capitalise on global operations and markets. However, due to the complex features of business service, suppliers are facing significant challenges in providing service effectively and developing business collaboration. This is further complicated by the development of information and communication technologies (ICTs). This paper thus attempts to investigate the factors influencing buyers’ e-service (EBS) requirements and the impact of these requirements on business collaboration. Based on a questionnaire survey with 500 UK telecommunication manufacturers, this research identifies buyers’ different EBS requirements for different types of suppliers and the impact of ICTs on EBS requirements. While for suppliers our findings provide insights into buyers’ EBS requirements, they can help buyers to develop appropriate supplier selection criteria. The findings also contribute to a better understanding of the development of buyer and supplier business collaboration.     

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price‐based and buyer‐determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price‐based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer‐determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer‐determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer‐determined auction over the price‐based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.     

B2B电子中介买方用户忠诚形成机理实证研究——基于转移成本的调节作用

以提供买卖双方支持服务的B2B电子中介为研究对象,探索了买方用户忠诚的形成机理以及转移成本的关键维度,建立了基于转移成本调节作用的买方用户忠诚概念模型,然后采集数据,运用结构方程建模技术对买方用户忠诚的形成机理以及转移成本对买方用户忠诚形成机理的调节作用进行了检验,得出了买方用户忠诚的影响因素、影响程度以及转移成本的具体调节范围等。     

COUNTERVAILING POWER AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY

This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier’s incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers’ incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier “more on his toes” and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers’ alternative options.     

Opportunism in buyer–supplier exchange: a critical examination of the concept and its implications for theory and practice

Abstract

Claims that opportunism is widespread in the process of buyer–supplier exchange are commonplace, but direct supporting evidence for such claims is largely absent from the relevant literature. This article offers a critique of the treatment of opportunism in supply chains by re-establishing the importance of guile in the concept and investigates existing published, empirical measures of buyer and supplier opportunistic behaviour. This article offers evidence that, despite the frequency with which the concept is discussed in the literature and applied in research and the emphasis given to the risks it generates for management, opportunism with guile between buyers and suppliers appears to be rare in practice. This article is the first critical assessment of the concept’s treatment in the Operations Management field, and it argues that practitioners are currently being poorly advised with respect to the phenomenon, as well as drawing conclusions for both practitioners and researchers that differ radically from the prevailing consensus on the subject.     

The Purchasing Performance of Organizations Using e-Marketplaces

We apply transaction cost economic theory and perspectives in an empirical test regarding purchasing performance using electronic marketplaces. Basically, buyers can purchase products either by hopping across multiple electronic marketplaces or maintaining close relationships with a particular electronic marketplace. We investigate which is more beneficial for a buyer organization's purchasing performance in terms of price reduction and purchasing efficiency. We undertake this task by developing hypotheses and a research model and subjecting them to testing and analysis using the purchase of maintenance, repair and operations products in a large and important market, South Korea.     

Complexity as a Contract Design Factor: A Human‐to‐Human Experimental Study

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.     

On the Same Page? How Asymmetric Buyer–Supplier Relationships Affect Opportunism and Performance

Research on buyer–supplier relationships (BSRs) has often focused on only one side of the relationship and, thus, has tended to overlook asymmetries. Yet, a buyer (supplier) may often deal with a bigger supplier (buyer) or one that has higher levels of trust, respect, and reciprocity. Therefore, we examined how two types of asymmetries—size and relational capital—affect perceived opportunism and performance. We used dyadic data from 106 buyers and their matched suppliers gathered from a survey and an archival database. The results demonstrate that the degree and direction of both asymmetries affect the BSR. Our results also reveal that an imbalance of relational capital in a firm's favor may have the opposite effect from that intended. In other words, the firm's counterpart perceives more, rather than less, firm opportunism. The results also suggest that a buyer observes lower benefits in the presence of size asymmetry, whereas the supplier's perception of benefits is unaffected. Thus, our research represents a significant step forward in understanding BSRs and asymmetries by (i) bringing attention to two key asymmetries inherent in BSRs and (ii) showing that these asymmetries are not unidirectional in their influence on perceived opportunism and performance.     

Drivers and Enablers That Foster Environmental Management Capabilities in Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Suppliers in Supply Chains

The limited capabilities and resources available within many small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises frequently hamper an effective response to environmental pressures, which in turn hurts large buying firms (i.e., customers). Using a case study method with multiple suppliers of two large buying firms, we mapped factors that initiated and improved environmental capabilities in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises over time. Through several specific mechanisms, buyers' green supply chain management initiated and then enabled the improvement of suppliers' environmental capabilities. Independent of buyers, internal championing of environmental concerns also provided an impetus for small‐ and medium‐sized enterprise suppliers to acquire resources outside the supply chain. Thus, synergistic linkages emerged in supportive buyer‐supplier relationships, resource acquisition, and capability development. When these findings are combined with earlier research on larger suppliers, an integrative framework emerges that provides direction for suppliers, buyers, and public agencies seeking to improve environmental performance.     

Transparency in Buyer‐Determined Auctions: Should Quality be Private or Public?

We study buyer‐determined procurement auctions where both price and non‐price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. Although, in scoring auctions bidders perfectly know how price and non‐price attributes determine the awarding of the contract, this remains uncertain in buyer‐determined auctions where the buyer is free to choose once all bids have been submitted. We analyze the impact of information bidders have with respect to the buyer's awarding decision. As we show theoretically whether it is in the buyer's interest to conceal the impact of non‐price characteristics depends on how important the quality aspects of the procured good are to the buyer: The more important quality aspects are, the more interesting concealment becomes. In a counterfactual analysis using data from a large European procurement platform, we analyze the reduction of non‐price information available to the bidders. Confirming our hypothesis, for auction categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics strongly influence buyers’ decisions concealment of non‐price information leads to an increase in buyers’ surplus of up to 15% due to higher competitive pressure and lower bids. Conversely, for categories where bidders’ non‐price characteristics are of little importance concealment of non‐price information leads to a decrease in buyers’ surplus of up to 6%.     

Organizational Learning in Global Purchasing: A Model and Test of Internal Users and Corporate Buyers*

This research examines a model centered on organizational learning in purchasing. Two different studies are conducted to test the hypotheses among purchasing users (Study 1) and buyers (Study 2). The user sample consists of users representing 355 strategic business units of a Fortune 500 multinational corporation. The buyer sample consists of corporate buyers of 200 multinational corporations drawn from the membership directory of the National Association of Purchasing Management (NAPM). In each study, the focus is on the learning relationships between corporate buyers and internal users in the purchasing organization. Based on the two studies, the results suggest that organizational learning in the purchasing process is influenced by the organizational culture factors of localness, transformational leadership, and openness. Organizational learning has a positive effect on information processing in the purchasing system, which, in turn, has a positive influence on the cycle time of the purchasing process.     

TRADE QUOTAS AND BUYER POWER,WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE E.U. NATURAL GAS MARKET

We consider a market in which domestic buyers negotiate contracts with foreign sellers, and explore how trade quotas can help to increase the buyers' countervailing power. We use the Shapley value to describe bargaining power and the distribution of the trade surplus in such a bilateral oligopoly. By exploiting strategic externalities among the buyers, bilateral trade quotas can improve the buyers' bargaining positions. In contrast, aggregate trade restrictions on all buyers' trade never improve buyer surplus. Minimum quotas on imports from fringe suppliers can benefit nonaffected buyers, as these enjoy positive externalities. We apply these insights to the E.U. market for natural gas and show that the effects of trade quotas on E.U. gas importers' power can be significant.     

一类供应链的Stackelberg主从对策问题研究

本文研究了供应链中的一般订货模式和协调模式,提出了一类供应链Stackelberg主从对策问题,卖方作为主方给出最小补充期策略,买方作为从方以最优库存策略响应。考虑一致价格折扣弥补买方的库存成本增加,以及买方的库存成本合理化,建立买方需求确定下的卖方成本优化模型。最后,应用遗传算法对石油分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题离线仿真计算,得出Stackelberg主从对策均衡解。     

Supply Management Under High Goal Incongruence: An Empirical Examination of Disintermediation in the Aerospace Supply Chain

Aftermarket sales and profits are becoming an increasingly important part of an original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) business model. Because replacement parts often do not require further manufacturing, OEMs act as intermediaries in the aftermarket. As with any intermediary, the OEM must concern itself with suppliers disintermediating its supply chain selling replacement parts directly to the OEM's customers. We frame supply chain disintermediation (SCD) as a principal–agent contracting problem between an OEM buyer and a supplier. Hypotheses relate contract conditions, goal incongruence, supplier capabilities and contract enforcement to SCD. The data are collected from the aerospace industry using a multimethod study, combining an Internet‐based survey with archival data. Causal modeling with structural equation modeling (SEM) shows general support for the hypotheses. Particularly, SCD is positively related to buyer–supplier goal incongruence. The agency model offers insights that differ from previous transaction‐cost‐based models of buyer–supplier relationships. OEM buyers with a lucrative aftermarket should consider aligning goals through incentives rather than relying entirely on economic hostages associated with specific assets.     

Feedback Mechanisms,Judgment Bias,and Trust Formation in Online Auctions*

Online markets, like eBay, Amazon, and others rely on electronic reputation or feedback systems to curtail adverse selection and moral hazard risks and promote trust among participants in the marketplace. These systems are based on the idea that providing information about a trader's past behavior (performance on previous market transactions) allows market participants to form judgments regarding the trustworthiness of potential interlocutors in the marketplace. It is often assumed, however, that traders correctly process the data presented by these systems when updating their initial beliefs. In this article, we demonstrate that this assumption does not hold. Using a controlled laboratory experiment simulating an online auction site with 127 participants acting as buyers, we find that participants interpret seller feedback information in a biased (non‐Bayesian) fashion, overemphasizing the compositional strength (i.e., the proportion of positive ratings) of the reputational information and underemphasizing the weight (predictive validity) of the evidence as represented by the total number of transactions rated. Significantly, we also find that the degree to which buyers misweigh seller feedback information is moderated by the presentation format of the feedback system as well as attitudinal and psychological attributes of the buyer. Specifically, we find that buyers process feedback data presented in an Amazon‐like format—a format that more prominently emphasizes the strength dimension of feedback information—in a more biased (less‐Bayesian) manner than identical ratings data presented using an eBay‐like format. We further find that participants with greater institution‐based trust (i.e., structural assurance) and prior online shopping experience interpreted feedback data in a more biased (less‐Bayesian) manner. The implications of these findings for both research and practice are discussed.     

Governance Choice,Sourcing Relationship Characteristics,and Relationship Performance

Past work on exchange relationships has debated the efficacy of partnership versus arm's‐length governance on performance of a buyer–supplier relationship. However, how these governance approaches leverage key supplier specific relationship characteristics has not been examined. In this study, we examine the moderating role of governance choice (arm's‐length versus partnership governance) in leveraging key supplier specific characteristics to achieve superior performance for the buyer in a relationship. Specifically, drawing from residual rights theory, we argue that the governance choice buyers make moderates the impact of supplier flexibility, supplier human capital and relationship dependency on performance. Our findings suggest that, for a buyer, the benefits of supplier flexibility and relationship dependency are better realized in partnership governance as opposed to arm's‐length governance. Further, our findings suggest that although buyers choose a specific governance approach consistent with their outsourcing motivation, the choice of governance is critical to leveraging the impact of supplier characteristics due to the moderation effects studied. We elaborate on these effects and discuss the implications of our findings.     

Dynamic Matching,Two‐Sided Incomplete Information,and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon and participation costs in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and, each unit of time, continuums of new buyers and sellers consider entry. Traders whose expected utility is negative choose not to enter. Within a period each buyer is matched anonymously with a seller and each seller is matched with zero, one, or more buyers. Every seller runs a first price auction with a reservation price and, if trade occurs, both the seller and the winning buyer exit the market with their realized utility. Traders who fail to trade continue in the market to be rematched. We characterize the steady‐state equilibria that are perfect Bayesian. We show that, as δ converges to zero, equilibrium prices at which trades occur converge to the Walrasian price and the realized allocations converge to the competitive allocation. We also show the existence of equilibria for δ sufficiently small, provided the discount rate is small relative to the participation costs.     

Managing Disruptions in Decentralized Supply Chains with Endogenous Supply Process Reliability

Supply disruptions are all too common in supply chains. To mitigate delivery risk, buyers may either source from multiple suppliers or offer incentives to their preferred supplier to improve its process reliability. These incentives can be either direct (investment subsidy) or indirect (inflated order quantity). In this study, we present a series of models to highlight buyers’ and suppliers’ optimal parameter choices. Our base‐case model has deterministic buyer demand and two possibilities for the supplier yield outcomes: all‐or‐nothing supply or partial disruption. For the all‐or‐nothing model, we show that the buyer prefers to only use the subsidy option, which obviates the need to inflate order quantity. However, in the partial disruption model, both incentives—subsidy and order inflation—may be used at the same time. Although single sourcing provides greater indirect incentive to the selected supplier because that avoids order splitting, we show that the buyer may prefer the diversification strategy under certain circumstances. We also quantify the amount by which the wholesale price needs to be discounted (if at all) to ensure that dual sourcing strategy dominates sole sourcing. Finally, we extend the model to the case of stochastic demand. Structural properties of ordering/subsidy decisions are derived for the all‐or‐nothing model, and in contrast to the deterministic demand case, we establish that the buyer may increase use of subsidy and order quantity at the same time.