Revealing consumers' willingness-to-pay: A comparison of the BDM mechanism and the Vickrey auction

We compare the capability of the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism and the Vickrey auction to reveal willingness-to-pay information for a sample of French consumers. We measure the bias and dispersion of bids relative to valuations. We find that the Vickrey auction, for the particular training procedure we employ, is more effective as a willingness-to-pay elicitation device than the BDM process. We conjecture that differences in the shape of the payoff function account for some of the differences.     

Payoff Effects in Information Cascade Experiments

Error rates are estimated using data from "information cascade" experiments. The econometric estimation assumes a logistic error structure and error rates are compared across three experimental treatments that differ only with respect to payoff structure. In a "no payoff" treatment subjects receive a fixed payment for participating in the experiment and earnings do not vary with decisions. In "payoff" and "double payoff" treatments earnings depend on each subject's decisions. The results indicate that rewarding correct decisions reduces the amount of decision error. However, increasing the payment for a correct decision does not reduce errors over the range of payoffs considered.     

On price data elicitation: A laboratory investigation

There is abundant literature in experimental research on decision making under risk, which compares, and ranks subjects’ preferences on the basis of some elicitation method. The present paper performs a similar analysis in order to compare them. Since pricing data lead in many cases to some anomalies (i.e. status quo bias, endowment effect) we examine three mechanisms to elicit price preferences: willingness-to-pay in a second-price auction, willingness-to-accept in a second-price auction, and certainty equivalent elicited with BDM. A Bayesian interpretation of our results suggests that it is not possible to state ex ante the more appropriate elicitation method for a particular subject: for 1/3 of our sample WTP is preferred, for 1/3 of our sample WTA is preferred, and for the remaining 1/3 BDM is preferred.     

ON THE NATURE OF RECIPROCAL MOTIVES

Data from 692 subjects in 11 experimental treatments provide a systematic exploration of the existence and nature of reciprocal behavior in two-person games. The experimental design discriminates between motivations of reciprocity and (nonreciprocal) other-regarding preferences. The existence of positive reciprocity is found to be dependent on the level of social distance but not the level of monetary payoff. The larger context in which a decision is made is found to have a significant effect on negative reciprocity. These findings on payoff levels, social distance, decision context, and reciprocity have implications for both theoretical modeling and experimental design. (JEL C70 , C91 , D63 , D64 )     

NETWORK STRUCTURE IN A LINK FORMATION GAME: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In this article, we use an experiment to evaluate the performance of alternative refinements in a Myersonian link formation game with a supermodular payoff function. Our results show that a non‐cooperative refinement, the global games (GG) approach, outperforms alternative cooperative refinements (strong Nash equilibrium, coalition‐proof Nash equilibrium, and pairwise stable Nash equilibrium) in explaining the observed experimental behavior in the static game of complete information with three players. The results are robust to some comparative statics and the GG approach shows a high predictive power under incomplete information. However, under repeated interaction or with a greater number of players, the GG approach loses predictive power, but so do the cooperative refinements. The results illustrate the importance of coordination failure in practice and the need to design mechanisms to reduce this effect in practical decision‐making problems. (JEL C70, C92, D20, D44, D82)     

Conditionality of adaptiveness: Investigating the relationship between numeracy and adaptive behavior

Recent studies have illustrated that individuals with higher numeracy are more likely to make adaptive choices than individuals with lower numeracy. Highly numerate individuals can consistently make normatively superior choices by maximizing expected value (EV) in meaningful choice problems (high-payoff condition). However, in trivial problems (low-payoff condition), they can also adaptively change their strategy to make good enough choices and not follow a normatively superior strategy. Upon inspection of choice problems used in earlier studies, it was revealed that payoff was not the only varying factor between the two payoff conditions. Therefore, it is unclear whether payoff conditions alone can provide sufficient context for adaptive modulation in decision strategy. In two pre-registered studies (N = 343), we tested numerate individuals’ adaptiveness under high- and low-payoff conditions addressing the limitations of earlier studies. Results revealed that the presence of two payoff conditions together did not initiate adaptive strategy selection, regardless of participants’ numeracy. Instead, numerate individuals, compared to less numerate individuals, consistently made more EV-consistent choices in both payoff conditions. We identified that the change in EV consistency across payoff conditions was influenced more by the absolute difference than the relative difference in the expected reward.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST ON RETIREMENT DECISIONS

As part of the current debate on the reform of pension systems, this paper presents an original experimental test where subjects face three different payoff sequences with identical expected value. Two central questions are analyzed. First, whether the distribution of retirement benefits across time influences the retirement decision. And second, whether actuarially fair pension systems distort the retirement decision. The results indicate both that a lump-sum payment rather than annuity benefits is far more effective in delaying the retirement decision and that recent reforms that encourage the link between lifetime contributions and pension benefits to delay the retirement decision should take into account timing considerations. ( JEL C91, H55, J26)     

Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

In Nachbar [20] and, more definitively, Nachbar [22], I argued that, for a large class of discounted infinitely repeated games of complete information (i.e. stage game payoff functions are common knowledge), it is impossible to construct a Bayesian learning theory in which player beliefs are simultaneously weakly cautious, symmetric, and consistent. The present paper establishes a similar impossibility theorem for repeated games of incomplete information, that is, for repeated games in which stage game payoff functions are private information. Received: 15 October 1997/Accepted: 17 March 1999     

Non-expected utility maximizers behave as if expected utility maximizers: An experimental test

We investigate the behaviors of subjects who either do or do not adhere to the expected utility theory using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak (BDM) method. We directly examine the validity of the expected utility theory in order to distinguish subjects into two groups: those who adhere to the expected utility theory (expected utility maximizers) and those who do not adhere to it (non-expected utility maximizers), and then execute the BDM experiment in the both groups. We find that the differences in the stated prices between the expected and non-expected utility maximizers are not significant. This result implies practical usefulness for the BDM method.     

Welfare, freedom of choice and composite utility in the logit model

Discrete choice models characterize the alternatives in the choice set by utilities/attributes. The decision making is described by a probability distribution over the choice set. In this paper we introduce a welfare measure based on expected payoff and expected freedom of choice for the simple one parameter logit model. In this case the welfare measure turns out to be the so called composite utility. This means that the composite utility can be interpreted as the combined benefit of expected payoff and expected freedom of choice. The proposed welfare measure can be extended to the linear-in-parameters logit model and nested logit models and others. The proposed welfare measure is formulated in terms of the choice probability distribution. It depends on the form of the probabilities, but not on any particular derivation of the distribution.     

LAWYERS IN VENTURE CAPITAL CONTRACTING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Real‐world financial contracts are sometimes so complex that it can be difficult to understand their exact payoff consequences. We develop and test a theoretical model of a venture capitalist (VC) negotiating with an entrepreneur who may overweigh or underweigh the payoff consequences of contractual downside protection (DP). A lawyer with expertise in venture capital can inform the entrepreneur about these consequences, but less expert (but otherwise high quality) lawyers cannot. We determine how a VC's decision to include DP is affected by the expected quality of the entrepreneur's project, the entrepreneur's experience, and the VC expertise of his/her legal counsel. We show that the VC's incentive to include unnecessary DP declines in expected project quality. Indeed, for inexperienced entrepreneurs involved with high‐quality projects, VCs prefer that the entrepreneur's counsel has VC expertise. This implies that, when negotiating with inexperienced entrepreneurs, VCs who invest in high‐quality companies should be more likely to negotiate with entrepreneurs who employ lawyers with VC expertise. We document broad empirical support for the model, and provide evidence against competing explanations. (JEL L24, G24, K12, L14, L24)     

NEW EVIDENCE ON CREDIT CARD BORROWING AND REPAYMENT PATTERNS

A new dataset allows researchers to examine patterns of credit card use for both borrowing and payoff. This article addresses changes in these behaviors for different birth cohorts by estimating cohort‐adjusted age profiles for debt and payoff rates based on a time series of cross sections. Younger consumers are found to be borrowing more heavily and repaying at lower rates than older generations. The accumulation of credit card debt is found to continue over the lifecycle. This has implications for recent changes in laws governing the credit card industry. Increases in minimum required payment rates are examined and are found to increase actual payoff rates more than proportionately. (JEL D12)     

REWARDS, EXPERIENCE AND DECISION COSTS IN FIRST PRICE AUCTIONS

Consistent with a model of asymmetric risk aversion, subjects in first price auctions consistently bid above the risk neutral Nash prediction. It has been argued that this is due to low opportunity cost of deviating from the risk neutral bid. We increase opportunity cost (and payoff levels) by factors of 0, 1, 5, 10, and 20, from the normal levels generating payoffs up to $250 for risk neutral subjects and observe an insignificant increase in the slope of individual bid functions. The RMSE of bids declines significantly. This is consistent with a reward/decision cost model of bidding behavior.     

Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study

Theoretical analysis suggests that enlargement of a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule remain constant. Some of the existing voters may actually gain, a phenomenon known as the paradox of new members. We test for this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting power across voting bodies of varying size, we find empirical support for the paradox of new members.     

GAME THEORY FOR PLAYING GAMES: SOPHISTICATION IN A NEGATIVE-EXTERNALITY EXPERIMENT

We explore the extent to which the lack of Nash payoff maximization in experimental games is attributable to the "sophistication" of participants (i.e., their understanding of strategic decision making and profit-maximizing decisions). To this end, we compare the behaviors of sophisticated participants (i.e., those who have been exposed to the concepts of game theory) against those of a more standard subject pool in a moral hazard environment. Results suggest that sophisticated subjects are significantly more likely to adopt strategies predicted by standard theory and arrive at a Nash equilibrium. ( JEL C72, C91, C92, D63, D64)     

From Bricolage to Collage: The Making of Decisions at a Weather Forecast Office

This article elaborates the process of decision making in organizational environments characterized by disciplined improvisation. Building on an ethnography of forecasting operations at the National Weather Service, it introduces “collage” as a mediating concept between information bricolage and the forging of a decision. The concept of collage serves to (1) heuristically frame decision making as a process of assembling, appropriating, superimposing, juxtaposing, and blurring of information; and (2) externalize into digital practices of screenwork the cognitive labor of merging and distilling complex data into a provisionally coherent decision.     

Information efficiency and majority decisions

The analysis is concerned with the characterization of equilibria of a two-stage voting game involving private information acquisition. Rational ignorance and information efficiency are identified. It turns out that information efficiency is not always desirable. By restricting the payoff domain, we are able to characterize completely the set of equilibria. In this case, information acquisition by few voters benefits a majority, or even the whole community. Economic Literature Classification Number D70, D71, D80.The author would like to thank Peter Bernholz, MartinHellwig, Tilman Börgers, Harald Nedwed and a referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences

This article considers a legislative bargaining model in which the rejecter in the previous round becomes the proposer in the current round. We allow the time and risk preferences to differ across players and the voting quota to be a supermajority or submajority. We show that there exists a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium and that each player’s equilibrium payoff conditional on being a proposer is unique, and we explicitly derive the equilibria and equilibrium payoff. We compare a proposer’s equilibrium payoff when the time interval between two consecutive rounds tends to zero with respect to the protocols of the selection of proposers and the voting quota: we show that a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can be greater in this article’s rejecter-proposer model than in the Baron–Ferejohn random-proposer model; even though the voting quota increases, a proposer’s equilibrium payoff can increase.     

Resilience and Decision‐Making Strategies as Predictors of Career Decision Difficulties

The purpose of this study was to examine resilience and decision‐making strategies as predictors of difficulties experienced during the career decision‐making process. College students (N = 364) responded to measures of resilience, career decision‐making strategies, and career decision difficulties. Results indicated that resilience and decision‐making strategies accounted for 46% of the variance in career decision difficulties. Resilience had a greater influence on problems encountered during decision making than on problems encountered at the outset of the process. Different decision‐making strategies appeared to be related to difficulties encountered at different stages of the decision‐making process. For example, aspiration for an ideal occupation was positively associated only with lack of readiness. Procrastination was the only strategy related to all three decision difficulties: lack of readiness, lack of information, and inconsistent information. The results indicated the importance of decreasing procrastination at all stages of decision making and the need to promote resilience to deal with decision difficulties.     

Modeling resource flow asymmetries using condensation networks

This paper examines strict Nash networks in the noncooperative directed flow model of Bala and Goyal (Econometrica 68(5):1181–1230, 2000) with partner heterogeneity (payoff of a player in a link depends on the identity of her link partner). We focus on the asymmetries with regard to the resources obtained by players. Using the notion of condensation networks, we partition the population into groups of players who obtain the same resources and order these groups according to the resources they obtain. We show that the partner heterogeneity assumption impacts the strict Nash networks asymmetries in a different way than Galeotti (Econ Theory 29(1):163–179, 2006) player heterogeneity assumption (the payoff of a player in a link depends on her own identity).