Kenya's record population growth: a dilemma of development

The causes and implications of Kenya's 4% rate of natural increase and fertility rate of 8.1 births per woman were examined. Attention was directed to the following: pronatalist pressures; inadvertent pronatalist impact of development; women's education and employment and fertility; population growth and pressures; mortality decline and population growth; fertility levels and differentials; fertility desires; the family planning program; and family planning knowledge, attitudes, and practice. Kenya's development success has worked to push up the population growth rate. Improved health care and nutrition halved infant mortality from 160 to 87 deaths/1000 live births between 1958 and 1977 and a marked increase in primary school enrollment may be factors in the birthrate increase to 53/1000 population. At this time fertility is highest among women with 1-4 years of education. The 1977-1978 Kenya Fertility Survey showed that only 5.8% of married women were using modern contraception, indicating that the national family planning program, established in 1967, has made little progress. Program difficulties have included shortages of staff, supplies and easily accessible clinic as well as an almost universal desire on the part of Kenyans for families of at least 7 children. Children are viewed as essential to survival and status to the rural population.     

A cohort analysis of the fertility of the July 1 People's Commune in Shanghai, County]

The survey was conducted in February-March 1981. The population of this commune at the end of 1980 was 18,608. The cultural and educational levels, economic condition, and work in family planning of this commune form a typical example among numerous similar communes in Shanghai County. The birthrate, natural growth rate, and average fertility rate began to decline in the later half of 1950s and reached the lowest level in 1974. The survey shows a delay in the marriage age. The fertility rate also dropped by 21.31% from 1963 to 1980. The average fertility rate dropped by 162.73% from 1963 to 1980. Among the women of childbearing age, 99% of them have a knowledge of birth control measures, 95% of them have used them before, and 78% are currently using them. All these figures show that the work in family planning in the commune has reached a high level by world standards. 3 factors which have a strong impact on fertility are: the economic and educational level, formation of population elements, and family planning work. A rise in the standard of living and improvement in education normally leads to late marriage and a decline in fertility. An increase in the number of women of childbearing age causes a rise in fertility. The population growth after 1974 is a reflection of this situation. The survey shows that the decline in fertility before 1973 was caused mainly by family planning work.     

Population growth,economic development and family planning

This report discusses research conducted to determine whether reduction in population growth rates contributed to the rapid economic growth of Indonesia, South Korea, Japan and Thailand. The 5-year research projects, jointly sponsored by the UN Fund for Population Activities, the Nihon University Population Research Institute, and the East-West Population Institute, concluded that development and family planning programs contributed substantially to fertility decline in these countries. The project examined 3 factors that influence the long-term productive capacity and growth of the 4 Asian economies: savings, the size of the labor force, and the quality of labor (measured by educational attainment). Available evidence indicates a strong positive contribution of population decline toward growth of savings, a growth in labor force concurrent with a decline in fertility rates which enables per capita income to rise, and an increase in 2ndary education enrollment ratios as fertility is lowered. Development factors by themselves explain no more than 1/2 of the decline in fertility observed, suggesting that family planning programs particularly in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia since 1976 have had an important impact on fertility and economic development.     

Effects of education on reproductive behavior: lessons from Pakistan

Evidence from the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 1990/91 (PDHS) and a 1987 study by Zeba A. Sathar and Karen Oppenheim on women's fertility in Karachi and the impact of educational status, corroborates the correlation between improved education for women and fertility decline. PDHS revealed that current fertility is 5.4 children/ever married woman by the end of the reproductive period. 12% currently use a contraceptive method compared to 49% in India, 40% in Bangladesh, and 62% in Sri Lanka. The social environment of high illiteracy, low educational attainment, poverty, high infant and child and maternal mortality, son preference, and low status of women leads to high fertility. Fertility rates vary by educational status; i.e., women with no formal education have 2 more children than women with at least some secondary education. Education also affects infant and child mortality and morbidity. Literacy is 31% for women and 43% for men. 30% of all males and 20% of all females have attended primary school. Although most women know at least 1 contraceptive method, it is the urban educated woman who is twice as likely to know a source of supply and 5 times more likely to be a user. The Karachi study found that lower fertility among better educated urban women is an unintended consequence of women's schooling and deliberate effort to limit the number of children they have. Education-related fertility differentials could not be explained by the length of time women are at risk of becoming pregnant (late marriage age). Fertility limitation may be motivated by the predominant involvement in the formal work force and higher income. The policy implications are the increasing female schooling is a good investment in lowering fertility; broader improvements also need to be made in economic opportunities for women, particularly in the formal sector. Other needs are for increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing availability and accessibility of contraceptive and family planning services and increasing knowledge of contraception. The investment will impact development and demography and is an adjunct to child health an survival.     

A look at Philippine population in the year 2000

The major subject areas explored by the University of the Population Institute were fertility, mortality, the Filipino family and nuptiality, migration and urbanization, and the structure and growth of the labor force. Data were extracted primarily from the Philippine Censuses (1903-1970) the National Demographic Surveys of 1968 and 1973, and special surveys conducted by the Institute research team. On the basis of the findings, a range of alternative population futures is projected for the year 2000, with their respective policy implications. The estimate of the crude birthrate for 1970 placed the range at between 39.3 and 42.7. The crude birthrate may have declined by 21-23% in the last 70 years, and by almost 13% in 1960-1970 alone. On the national level, fertility rates will continue to decline if the trend of delayed marriages continues. Fertility was found to decrease with the introduction of the positive socioeconomic factors that make some regions more developed than others. The present low levels of mortality have decreased its importance in relation to fertility. Mortality prospects can be improved by several policy actions which are presented here in the order of priority. Current evidence points strongly to an increase in the proportion of single individuals who delay marriage and those not planning to marry at all. The record of internal migration in the Philippines during the 20th century has been dominated by the phenomenon of urbanization, which increased from 13% in 1903 to 33% in 1970. An effort needs to be made to achieve greater rural-urban balance. The country's high population growth has increased the number of job seekers in recent years; the expansion of the regional labor force in the 1960-1970 decade was highly correlated with the growth of regional populations. Fertility, mortality, nuptiality, migration, and urbanization are the major factors determining the growth and structure of Philippine population. Alternative projections for each of these factors were combined in different ways and 3 alternative scenarios for population in the year 2000 are presented.     

Economic development and fertility decline: lessons from Asia's newly industrialized countries

The general thesis that economic development and fertility decline are interrelated is substantiated in literature that discusses the successes of the newly industrialized countries of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. When countries are developing rapidly, family planning accelerates the rate of fertility change, particularly among the poor uneducated rural population. Relying on economic and social development is not enough. National policy in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan recognized that population growth drains resources and the family planning programs operating since the 1960s contributed to a drop from 5 children/woman to 2 by 1988, and 70% of married couples used contraception. Coupled with this, age at marriage rose, contraception became more available, and educational and employment opportunities increased. Economically, the growth rate in the 1980's was 6-10% annually, with growth in the manufacturing and service sectors and export trade. Close economic ties evolved between governments and private sectors. Social development programs had been fully funded and gains evident in education, living standards, health care and nutrition, and life expectancy. The success of family planning is attributed to encouraging contraceptive awareness and use. Fertility reduction may occur with social and economic development, but no developing countries have reduced fertility without family planning. The relative importance of family planning may change over time, and reducing the cost through government sponsored family planning programs and encouraging the acceptability of contraceptive usage.     

Gender inequalities and demographic behavior

A summary was provided of the central findings about gender inequalities in Egypt, India, Ghana, and Kenya published by the Population Council in 1994. These countries exhibited gender inequalities in different ways: the legal, economic, and educational systems; family planning and reproductive health services; and the health care system. All countries had in common a high incidence of widowhood. Widowhood was linked with high levels of insecurity, which were linked with high fertility. Children thus became insurance in old age. In Ghana, women's insecurity was threatened through high levels of marital instability and polygyny. In Egypt, insecurity was translated into economic vulnerability because of legal discrimination against women when family systems were disrupted. In India and all four countries, insecurity was reflective of limited access to education, an impediment to economic autonomy. In all four countries, women's status was inferior due to limited control over reproductive decision making about childbearing limits and contraception. In India, the cultural devaluation of girls contributed to higher fertility to satisfy the desire for sons. In India and Egypt, family planning programs were dominated by male-run organizations that were more concerned about demographic objectives than reproductive health. The universal inequality was the burden women carry for contraception. Family planning programs have ignored the local realities of reproductive behavior, family structures, and gender relations. The assumption that husbands and wives have similar fertility goals or that fathers fully share the costs of children is mistaken in countries such as Ghana. Consequently, fertility has declined less than 13% in Ghana, but fertility has declined by over 30% in Kenya. Family planning programs must be aware of gender issues.     

Womens education and diffusion of the fertility transition: The case of Egypt 1960–1996 in 4905 administrative subdivisions

Egypt comprises thousands of small geographic units. Total fertility rates are reconstructed for the 4905qism, qarya, medina, markaz andshiyakhat covering non-desert Egypt at the 1960, 1976, 1986 and 1996 censuses. This fine spatial scale reveals that heterogeneity across subdivisions increased during the fertility transition, illustrating the rapidity of change. Spatial patterns appear in the fertility upsurge of 1974–85, which is accompanied by a large but temporary reduction in heterogeneity. Fertility varies greatly between subdivisions and geographic differentials underlie the expected and observed association between fertility, literacy, family transfers and industrialization. Cairo led the decline of fertility, but that decline is counterbalanced by rapid economic growth and persistently high levels of illiteracy. A similar pattern of fertility change is observed for the chief city of the Muhafaza and its surrounding area. Egypt presents an archetype of demographic transition as improved economic and educational status diffuses across the country, moderated by its specific geography.     

Social change,population policies,and fertility decline in Colombia and Venezuela

This paper takes a comparative case-study approach to examine the social and policy correlates of fertility decline. The analysis compares fertility behavior across a mature and young cohort of women in Colombia and Venezuela, two countries that experienced rapid demographic change under dissimilar socioeconomic and population policy conditions. Based on the distinction between birth-spacing and birth-stopping behavior the analysis tests several propositions derived from the adaptation and innovation explanations of fertility decline. Results show that fertility regulation at low parities was largely absent among mature women in both countries, representing an innovative behavior among younger women. The introduction of fertility control, however, was highly dependent on women's socioeconomic position, particularly their educational and occupational characteristics. The strong family planning programs in Colombia resulted in a more rapid extension of contraceptive use, particularly female sterilization, and stopping behavior after two children relative to Venezuela. Results highlight the diversity of conditions under which fertility can decline in developing countries and the importance of family planning and other policy initiatives to understanding the different pathways towards lower fertility.     

India's population: second and growing

Attention in this discussion of the population of India is directed to the following: international comparisons, population pressures, trends in population growth (interstate variations), sex ratio and literacy, urban-rural distribution, migration (interstate migration, international migration), fertility and mortality levels, fertility trends (birth rate decline, interstate fertility differentials, rural-urban fertility decline, fertility differentials by education and religion, marriage and fertility), mortality trends (mortality differentials, health care services), population pressures on socioeconomic development (per capita income and poverty, unemployment and employment, increasing foodgrain production, school enrollment shortfalls), the family planning program, implementing population policy statements, what actions would be effective, and goals and prospects for the future. India's population, a total of 684 million persons as of March 1, 1981, is 2nd only to the population of China. The 1981 population was up by 136 million persons, or 24.75%, over the 548 million enumerated in the 1971 census. For 1978, India's birth and death rates were estimated at 33.3 and 14.2/1000 population, down from about 41.1 and 18.9 during the mid-1960s. India's current 5-year plan has set a goal of a birth rate of 30/1000 population by 1985 and "replacement-level" fertility--about 2.3 births per woman--by 1996. The acceleration in India's population growth has come mainly in the past 3 decades and is due primarily to a decline in mortality that has markedly outstripped the fertility decline. The Janata Party which assumed government leadership in March 1977 did not dismantle the family planning program, but emphasis was shifted to promote family planning "without any compulsion, coercion or pressures of any sort." The policy statement stressed that efforts were to be directed towards those currently underserved, mainly in rural areas. Hard targets were rejected. Over the 1978-1981 period the family planning program slowly recovered. By March 1981, 33.4 million sterilizations had been performed since 1956 when statistics were 1st compiled. Another 3 million couples were estimated to be using IUDs and conventional contraceptives.     

Adolescent sexuality in Asia: new focus for population policy

As the age at marriage continues to rise in East and Southeast Asia, the fertility behavior of unmarried teenagers is receiving more attention from population policymakers. In addition to fertility reduction through family planning, Asian societies today consider population planning strategies in relation to national needs and social goals, including such matters as the population's growth rate, age structure, educational quality and skills. The number of single youth in Asia is growing much more rapidly than the total youth population. By the year 2010, for example, India is projected to have nearly 70 million single teenagers, aged 15-19, 188% more than in 1980. In many developing countries today, such as the Philippines and Korea, the rising age at marriage has combined with rapid urbanization, improved status for women, and more educational opportunity to alter both the behavioral norms of young people and the traditional means of social control over youth. Studies of contemporary adolescent sexuality have been conducted in 4 Asian countries. In the Philippines an overt independent youth homosexual culture was found to exist in urban and to some extent rural areas. In Thailand research revealed little conservative resistance to family planning or to contraceptives for young unmarried people. Surveys in Taiwan indicate that behavior related to dating and choice of spouse has become more liberal, and a survey in Hong Kong revealed a higher level of premarital sex and use of prostitutes among Chinese men than expected. Population policy perspectives that need to be considered in these changing times include: 1) issues of access to family planning services by unmarried people below the legal age of maturity; 2) the development of social institutions, such as exist in Thailand and the Philippines, to guide adolescents' behavior; 3) more extensive study of adolescent sexuality; 4) establishment of the scope of family policy.     

The Future Composition of the Canadian Labor Force: A Microsimulation Projection

This article charts the future transformations of the Canadian labor force population using a microsimulation projection model. The model takes into account differentials in demographic behavior and labor force participation of individuals according to their ethnocultural and educational characteristics. As a result of a rapid fall in fertility, the Canadian population is expected to age rapidly as baby boomers start to retire from the labor market in large numbers. In response to declining fertility, Canada raised its immigration intake at the end of the 1980s, and immigration is now the main driver of Canadian population growth. At the same time, immigrants to Canada are becoming more culturally diversified. Over the last half century, the main source regions have shifted from Europe to Asia. Results of the microsimulation show that Canada's labor force population will continue to increase, but at a slower rate than in the recent past. By 2031, almost one third of the country's total labor force could be foreign‐born, and almost all its future increase is expected to be among university graduates, while the less‐educated labor force is projected to decline.     

Theoretical explanation of rapid decline in China's fertility]

China's fertility decline is widely acknowledged. The 1982 census and a random survey of 1/1,000th of the nation's population set the total fertility rate at 2.6%. Bureau of statistics data collected in 1984 showed the nation's birth rate as 1.7% and total fertility rate 1.94%. Friendly observers call this a miracle; others blame the decline on forced government family planning policy. Scientific pursuit of the causes for the decline is an issue of practical and realistic value. First, favorable conditions for fertility decline have been fostered by the socialist system and are deeply rooted in the country's economic development. China's industrialization and urbanization have brought new lifestyles and liberated individuals and families from the constraints of traditional family life. Couples have chosen to limit the number of children, to enhance the quality of life and education potential of their children, thus altering the traditional high fertility in China. Education of women has played a role in raising women's consciousness; a 1982 census placed the fertility rate of women with high-school level education or above, lower than that for less or uneducated women. Neonatal mortality rate decline is also related to the spontaneous decline in fertility rate, as high fertility has historically been intended to compensate for high child mortality rates. Welfare and social security systems for the elderly have also helped change the traditional mentality of having many children as assurance of life support in old age. Social organizations have accelerated knowledge and methods of planned fertility. Later marriages are also a factor: in 1970 the average marriage age was 19 - 20 and had increased by 1976 to 22 - 23. Other favorable social factors include free birth control and the view of population planning as an essential part of national welfare.     

Adolescent fertility: worldwide concerns

There is growing concern over the adverse health, social, economic, and demographic effects of adolescent fertility. Morbidity and mortality rates ar significantly higher for teenage mothers and their infants, and early initiation of childbearing generally means truncated education, lower future family income, and larger completed family size. Adolescent fertility rates, which largely reflect marriage patterns, range from 4/1000 in Mauritania; in sub-Saharan Africa, virtually all rates are over 100. In most countries, adolescent fertility rates are declining due to rising age at marriage, increased educational and economic opportunities for young women, changes in social customs, increased use of contraception, and access to abortion. However, even if fertility rates were to decline dramatically among adolescent women in developing countries, their sheer numbers imply that their fertility will have a major impact on world population growth in the years ahead. The number of women in the world ages 15-19 years is expected to increase from 245 million in 1985 to over 320 million in the years 2020; 82% of these women live in developing countries. As a result of more and earlier premarital sexual activity, fostered by the lengthening gap between puberty and marriage, diminished parental and social controls, and increasing peer and media pressure to be sexually active, abortion and out-of-wedlock childbearing are increasing among teenagers in many developed and rapidly urbanizing developing countries. Laws and policies regarding sex education in the schools and access to family planning services by adolescents can either inhibit or support efforts to reduce adolescent fertility. Since contraceptive use is often sporadic and ineffective among adolescents, family planning services are crucial. Such programs should aim to reduce adolescents' dependence on abortion through preventive measures and increase awareness of the benefits of delayed sexual activity. Similarly, sex education should seek to provide a basis for intelligent, informed decision making. Programs tailored to reach teenagers in schools, recreational centers, and the workplace have particular potential.     

How Do Education and Family Planning Accelerate Fertility Decline?

Education and family planning can both be influenced by policy and are thought to accelerate fertility decline. However, questions remain about the nature of these effects. Does the effect of education operate through increasing educational attainment of women or educational enrollment of children? At which educational level is the effect strongest? Does the effect of family planning operate through increasing contraceptive prevalence or reducing unmet need? Is education or family planning more important? We assessed the quantitative impact of education and family planning in high-fertility settings using a regression framework inspired by Granger causality. We found that women's attainment of lower secondary education is key to accelerating fertility decline and found an accelerating effect of contraceptive prevalence for modern methods. We found the impact of contraceptive prevalence to be substantially larger than that of education. These accelerating effects hold in sub-Saharan Africa, but with smaller effect sizes there than elsewhere.     

论生育文化和生育文明

生育文明中表现了生育文化的种种现象和活动,生育文化也体现了生育文明的历史轨迹、进程和内容。生育文化的发展表现了不同时期人类生育文明的进步与发展,不体现生育文化内涵的生育文明显然是不存在的。然而,严格说来,生育文化和生育文明是既有密切联系,又有一定区别的两个不完全等同的概念。正确认识和理解生育文化和生育文明的概念、内涵、功能及其相互关系,对于推动新时期人口计生工作的深入发展,进一步开展人口和计划生育的理论研究,具有十分重要的意义和作用。     

Family planning achievements as suggested by changes of total fertility and party birth rate]

The dynamic characteristics of China's 5 distinct stages of population development since the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, namely, 1950-1958, 1959-1963, 1964-1970, 1971-1981, and 1982-present, are outlined and discussed. By tracing both the overall rate of population growth and age-specific fertility rates for women aged 15-45 (5-year groups), a clear pattern emerges which indicates that the rates of early and late fertility (ages groups 15-19 and 30-45) are significantly declining. This is interpreted as a key factor in the overall decline in fertility rate. Annual statistics showing the number of children per woman of childbearing age and interval between 1st marriage and 1st birth are compared and discussed. It is concluded that the overall decline in birth rate and fertility rate since the 1970's is attributable to China's successful family planning campaign.     

Impact of low fertility and early age at sterilisation on women’s formal education and skill development in South India

This paper examines the impact of low fertility and early age at sterilisation on women’s formal education and skill development in South India. Multilevel ordered-logit modelling of pseudo-cohort data re-organised from the three rounds of National Family Health Survey, and thematic analysis of qualitative data collected from Tamil Nadu and Kerala states showed no evidence of women’s resumption of formal education or uptake of skill development training in the post-sterilisation and post-childcare period. While resuming formal education in the post-sterilisation and post-childcare period is harder to achieve for various individual, household, community and policy reasons, there is greater preparedness and support for women to undertake skill development training. As low fertility and early age at sterilisation are widely regarded as the emerging reproductive norm in India, post-sterilisation and -childcare women will be a significant population group both in number and in proportional terms. No government policies or programs have so far recognised this group. India’s new government should consider targeted skill development programs for post-sterilisation and -childcare women appropriate to their social, economic and educational levels. An important contribution of the family planning program, particularly female sterilisation, for the economic and social development of the family and the wider society will otherwise be lost.     

Fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition: Testing three theories with cross-national data

This study uses aggregate data on a large number of the world's societies to test three theories of fertility decline in the modern world and in the original demographic transition. One prominent theory relates fertility decline to the changing economic value of children. With industrialization and overall modernization the economic value of children's labor shifts from positive to negative. This interpretation has been challenged by those who claim that the flow of wealth in preindustrial societies is always from parent to child rather than from child to parent. An alternative interpretation is that fertility levels reflect people's efforts to promote their reproductive success, and that this requires the careful tracking of infant and child mortality. Fertility rates are adjusted to the rate of infant and child survival, and will be high when survival rates are low and low when survival rates are high. A third theory emphasizes female empowerment. Fertility will be high when women are highly subordinated to men, but as women gain more autonomy and control over their own lives they reduce their fertility levels because, among other possibilities, higher levels of fertility present them with serious burdens. We tested all three theories through multiple regression analyses performed on two samples of societies, the first a large sample of the world's nation-states during the period between 1960 and 1990, and the second a sample of now-developed societies between 1880 and 1940. Our findings showed that infant mortality was an excellent predictor of fertility, and that female empowerment was a good predictor. However, there was only weak support for the argument that the economic value of children's labor plays an important role in fertility decisions. The findings were discussed in the context of a broader interpretation of fertility behavior in societies with high levels of industrialization and modernization.     

A look at Asia's changing youth population

This report summarizes findings from a recent East-West Center study on demographic and social changes among young people aged 15-24 years in 17 countries in East, Southeast, and South Asia. Nearly every country in Asia has experienced fertility decline. Decline began in Japan and Singapore during the 1950s, followed by declines in Hong Kong, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and China during the 1960s. Declines occurred during the 1970s in Indonesia, India, and Myanmar. A "youth bulge" occurred about 20 years later due to declines in infant and child mortality. This bulge varies by country with the timing and magnitude of population growth and subsequent fertility decline. The proportion of youth population rises from 16% to 18% about 20 years after the beginning of fertility decline and declines to a much lower stable level after several decades. The bulge is large in countries with rapid fertility decline, such as China. Governments can minimize the effects of bulge on population growth by raising the legal age at marriage, lengthening the interval between first marriage and first birth, and increasing birth intervals. School enrollments among adolescents are rising. In South Korea, the population aged 15-24 years increased from 3.8 to 8.8 million during 1950-90, a rise of 132% compared to a rise of 653% among school enrollments. It is expected that the number of out-of-school youths will decline from 5.1 to 3.6 million during 1990-2025. Youth employment varies by gender. Policies/programs in family planning and reproductive health will need to address the changing needs of youth population.