Irregular Workers or Ethnic Kin? Post‐1990s Labour Migration from Bulgaria to Turkey

This paper addresses the invisibility of the post‐1990s irregular migration flows from Bulgaria to Turkey in the literature despite the increasingly significant number of such migrants. I suggest that this invisibility stems partially from a problem of classification that has to do with implicit suppositions about ethnicity and migration. The post‐1990s Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria are not specified in accounts of irregular migrant flows directed towards Turkey since they are assumed to belong to the category of ethnic “return” migrants: Because of their ethnic identity as Turkish, all Turkish migrants from Bulgaria tend to get considered as part of the intermittent “return” migration waves from Bulgaria, the most notable and well‐known of these being the fight of more than 300,000 Turks in 1989. However, while the ethnic affiliation of the post‐1990s migrants from Bulgaria renders them invisible as irregular migrants within scholarly migrant typologies, the same ethnic affiliation does not necessarily work to their advantage when it comes to their legal and social reception in Turkey. Based on ethnographic fieldwork that prioritizes micro‐level analysis from below, the paper demonstrates that the self designated ethnic affiliation of these migrants, counterpoised against their social marginalization as “the Bulgarian” domestics, heightens the paradoxes of belonging and affects migration strategies. The paper thus underscores the significance of ethnic affiliation as a factor that needs to be adequately taken into account in describing the present and in assessing the future of this particular migratory pattern.     

The Turks of Bulgaria: An Outlier Case of Forced Migration and Voluntary Return

The Turks of Bulgaria have a particular place in displacement scholarship. As the largest minority group in the country, they were subjected to ethnic cleansing in the 1980s. Anti‐Turkish sentiments culminated in state‐led systematic exclusion and more than 340,000 Turks were forcefully migrated to Turkey in 1989. After the collapse of Communism and the transition to democracy, almost 40 per cent of them voluntarily returned to Bulgaria, making it an outlier case in displacement literature. Drawing on 46 semi‐structured interviews, this study contributes to the literature by offering a grounded conceptual framework which explains the macro‐dynamics of voluntary and sustainable return through an in‐depth study of the Bulgarian case. The findings suggest that three‐factors account for the voluntary return: (i) the peaceful transition to inclusive democracy and power‐sharing; (ii) the dual moderation between majority and minority representatives; and (iii) the enabling role of international actors, primarily the EU‐anchor.     

Refugee movements and Turkey

There has been a long tradition in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic of receiving refugees. There were Jewish refugees from the Spanish Inquisition, Hungarians and Poles fleeing revolts in 1848-9, and those of Turkish descent and usually from the Balkans. Concurrent with this trend is the history of refugees and immigrants leaving Turkey, such as many Armenians, Greeks and Jews leaving at the turn of the century, and after 1923 and the Treaty of Lausanne. Little is currently published on the topic. This article defines a refugee; provides an overview of the refugee problems of the 1980's due to Bulgarian, Kurdish, and Turkish refugees; and the legal and political aspects. As a country of origin, there is discussion of the political and economic aspects of Turkish asylum seekers in Europe. The potential refugee flows to and from Turkey are also examined. I) For this study, refugees are victims of political violence and are persecuted for political or religious beliefs, ethnic or racial background, or war. In Turkey, there are national refugees, international refugees outside the Convention, and UNHCR Convention refugees. During the 1980's all 3 groups were arriving: from eastern Europe, Iranian Kurds, Iraqis, and ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and Afghanistan. The Turkish restricted acceptance of the 1951 Convention on Refugees creates serious humanitarian and security consequences for refugees other than those from eastern Europe and of Turkish ethnicity. Political considerations play an important role in treatment where security threats outweigh humanitarian need. The case is given for Kurdish refugees. II) Asylum seekers from Turkey in Western Europe was determined between 1986-90 to be 185,000 from applications. These figures have risen steadily due to the political instability and military activity of areas bordering Iraq and Syria, the Emergency Region. In addition there are economic and employment problems, and there has been a suspension of human rights. Europe in return has tightened legislation and procedures to differentiate economically motivated refugees from authentic political asylum seekers. Further research is needed to investigate refugee problems. Further refugees may come due to the promotion of a Black Sea Cooperation Region and easier crossings of borders to the former Soviet Republics. Ethnic Turks in Moldavia or Romania or Bulgaria may leave due to unrest. Factors affecting asylum seekers are improvements in Turkey's human rights record, repeal of bans of the Kurdish language, completion of the South Eastern Development Project, and the European government policy on asylum.     

Transnational Turkish–German community in limbo. Consequences of political tensions between migrant receiving and sending countries

A profound political tension between Turkey and Germany has gained an overall dimension on the political agenda of the intra-European migration discussion since 2016. As close trade partners, Turkey and Germany became gradually political adversaries on different issues. 2016 and the following years marked a turnover in the already worsened mutual relations. A series of political issues such as recognising the Armenian genocide in 1915, open allegations and critical views against the Turkish President and prohibition of election campaigns for Turkish government politicians in Germany had driven political relations between the two countries to nadir. This obscure situation led the Turks of Germany (The phrases “Turks of Germany” or “Turkish migrants” are persons with migration background from Turkey who still bear Turkish citizenship or formerly were Turkish citizens. This group's ethnic or confessional identity is not recognised; their legal status and country of origin are preponderant.), who have close ties to their ancestors’ homeland and consider Germany as the centre of their lives, nolens volens into a limbo situation. Within the “guest-worker program” framework in the second part of the 20th century, highly industrialised countries of Western Europe recruited migrant workers from different countries. This workforce should perform mostly blue-collar labour in the receiving countries. After six decades of Turkish presence in Germany, the grandsons and granddaughters of the former guest workers are well-represented in almost every sector of the society. However, their loyalty and integrability to the receiving country are challenged by German politics, especially by the governments of conservative chancellor Angela Merkel (2005–2021). If Turks of Germany feel closely connected to Turkey and Turkish culture (Workers from Turkey brought with them to the country of immigration their own “cultural assets”. Those are, language, religious and customary beliefs, social habits, dress, music, literature, social codes and manners, shared history, food, etc. However, migrants in the receiving country undergo a process of hybridity under the influence of the new cultural environment. (Please see: Bhabha [The location of culture, New York, NY: Routledge, 1994]) Culture within the framework of post-colonialism has also been discussed in Edward W. Said's book “Culture and Imperialism” (Said [Kültür ve Emperyalizm. Kapsamlı Bir Düşünsel ve Siyasal Sorgulama Çalışması. Hil Yayın: İstanbul, 1998]). If Turks of Germany feel closely connected to Turkey and Turkish culture, they are not recognised as integrable members of the society. Identity-based and culture-oriented policies inexorably influence the willingness of migrants to feel like equal members in the host society, and it applies even to the new generations with migration backgrounds. The question of migrant integration is the most emotionally debated issue in Germany and seems to be the greatest challenge in the political agenda. Beyond the bilateral Turkish–German issues, the growing xenophobic sentiments, islamophobia and Europe-wide political populism may cause a persistent bilateral tension in the medium term between the countries and among the transnational and native communities. Anti-Turkish rhetoric in the media alienates the Turkish community and has a value to jeopardise integration efforts more and more.     

The International Migration System Between Turkey and Russia: Project‐Tied Migrant Workers in Moscow

The last 50 years of emigration history in Turkey indicate that the migratory flows of Turkish citizens have consecutively become a part of various migratory systems. In this essay, our main aims are twofold. First, we attempt to document the dynamics and mechanism of project‐tied migration from Turkey to the Russian Federation, focusing in particular on the case of project‐tied workers migrating from Turkey to Moscow. Second, this effort intends to elaborate on the research on migratory systems between Turkey and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central and Northern Asian countries, mainly referring to macro‐, micro‐ and meso‐level factors affecting the relevant migration systems. In this paper, in which we tackle the various migration systems with which Turkey is involved, we conclude by arguing that parallel to the new migration patterns that have been experienced throughout the post‐Soviet geographies, the internalization process of Turkish constructors within the changing dynamics of Turkish foreign policy has widened the direction of the migration flows from Turkey by introducing new migrant worker profiles to different regions. In this sense, short‐term labour migrants, shuttle traders and in particular project‐tied migrant workers show not only the important role that migrants may play in the shift towards a market‐based economy in the Russian Federation, but also how they have become crucial actors of the migration system between Turkey and Russia.     

Best Practice Options: Turkey

At the ninth Migration Dialogue seminar, held 29–31 March 2001 in Istanbul, Turkey, opinion leaders discussed the major immigration and integration issues facing emigration, transit, and immigration countries. Several major issues regarding Turkey were discussed. 1 This report was prepared after the seminar for participants and others interested in migration and development issues. It has not been approved by participants, and thus should not be considered a consensus document.
First, the effect of the Turkish Government’s modernization effort, which began in the 1920s. In the 1960s the government began to promote the export of surplus labour, with the hope that sending workers abroad from less– developed parts of the country would bring remittances and returned workers with skills needed for modernization. Among the governments of labour–exporting countries, Turkey’s has been unique in its high hopes for recruitment, remittances, and returns. They were expected to bring about a transformation of the country. These high expectations help explain the widespread frustration with migration’s actual effects. Second, the Turkish Government’s current goal of gaining full membership in the European Union (EU). Ankara stresses that the EU should embrace full Turkish membership for a variety of reasons, including the country’s strategic position between Europe and Asia, and to send a signal to other Muslim societies, such as those of North Africa, that the EU will include Muslim societies that are secular and democratic. Third, Turkey’s fear that EU membership would lead to another wave of migration. Many Europeans fear that Turkish EU membership would lead to another wave of migration. Turkey hopes that admission to the EU will bring EU assistance and foreign direct investment (FDI) that creates jobs and pushes up wages, thus making migration insignificant. Finally, Turkey’s position as an emigration, transit, and immigration country. There are 3 to 4 million Turks abroad, 3 to 4 million foreigners living in Turkey (perhaps half Iranians), and tens of thousands who move through Turkey to Europe. Turkey is revising its asylum law in a manner that will allow persons fleeing persecution outside Europe to be considered refugees in Turkey, to establish for the first time a support system for refugees.     

East-west vs. south-north migration: effects upon the recruitment areas of the 1960s

"This article is focused on Turkey and Turkish emigration abroad. It examines integration of second generation immigrants in Western Europe and various forces fostering Islamic identity. It then compares political discourse on immigration in France and Germany. It concludes that the resurgence of ethnic identity as the basis for effective political action in widely divergent societies is a key feature of the post-Cold War period."     

Young People of Migrant Origin in Sweden

This article surveys immigration during the second part of the twentieth century with the aim of determining the origins of the immigrant population and the socioeconomic position of the second generation. It focuses on migration from Turkey from the 1960s onward. Originally, migration from Turkey was within the framework of labor recruitment. These migrants were predominantly ethnic Turks of rural origin. A second wave of migrants from Turkey was composed of Syriani/Assyrians, a Christian minority from eastern Turkey seeking asylum in the 1970s on the grounds of religious persecution. Since the 1980s, the main intake of migrants from Turkey has been Kurds seeking protection on the grounds of political persecution. Immigration of ethnic Turks and Syriani/Assyrians is restricted to family reunification and family formation; the numbers are low. Kurds, on the other hand, are accepted both on the grounds of refugee claims and family reunification/family formation. The article looks at conditions of growing up in Sweden, with a particular focus on education, mother‐tongue classes and instruction in Swedish. Second‐generation youth distinguish themselves by an overrepresentation among dropouts from school, but also by an overrepresentation among those who do well academically in comparison with native Swedes. This applies to second‐generation youth with family roots in Turkey. Though very few under the age of 18 hold regular employment, the article also discusses the prospects of entering the labor market, based on information from the regular labor market surveys. Unemployment rates are consistently higher for second‐generation migrants than for native‐born Swedish youth. The article closes with a discussion about the developing multicultural society in Sweden and the niches that second‐generation youth tend to occupy.     

Migration experiences of Turkish women: notes from a researcher's diary

The article reviews the migration experiences of Turkish women who were either involved in external migration or were exposed to migration by being left behind upon the emigration of their husbands. It includes notes on statements made by some returning women and women whose husbands returned home.
The statements were encountered during a comprehensive field survey conducted in Turkey. Since the literature on women and external migration is, in general, blinded by a view of migrant women as "traditional" regardless of their ethnic, regional, religious and other background variables, it is expected that their exposure to the "modern" western culture will automatically pave the way to their emancipation.
The diary entries of statements made by migrant women portrayed in this article question such an axiomatic proposition by pointing to the significance of background variables and certain features of household structures.     

Migration and Development: Mexico and Turkey

Mexico and Turkey are among the world's leading labor‐sending nations, with about 11 million Mexican‐born and 3.5 million Turkish‐born persons abroad in 2006. After two decades of uneven growth and job creation as well as persisting poverty and inequality, there are debates within both countries asking whether economic reforms have gone far enough to put the economy on a stable footing for sustained and equitable growth, or whether emigration (pressure) will continue. Some Mexicans are seeking to deepen North American Free Trade Agreement, while most Turks support entry into the European Union as a way of speeding economic growth.     

Thailand's responses to transnational migration during economic growth and economic downturn

This paper gives an historical overview of immigration to Thailand since the 1970s and emigration since the 1960s. It describes migration policies since the 1930s. Final discussion focuses on the impact of economic contraction on migration. Immigration to Thailand dates back to the 1760s when a huge wave of Chinese emigrated to Thailand. The flow continued until about 1850 and resumed during 1905-17. The next big waves of immigrants were after 1975, when refugees fled Indochina, and in the 1990s, when migrants flocked from neighboring countries drawn to the booming economy. Thai professionals left in the 1960s for the USA. During the 1980s, many left for work in the Middle East. During the 1990s, Thai migrants moved within the East and Southeastern Asian countries and the USA or Europe, and they included many women and illegal migrants. Emigrants leave as arranged by the government, by employers, by recruitment agencies, and as trainees. The first official act was in 1950 and revised in 1979. Many work permits were approved in the 1990s, especially for unskilled labor. There are supports for Thai migrants abroad, but little is offered to foreigners at home. By 1997, the country's recession led to nonrenewal of many work permits. The 1998 economic crisis led to a new labor policy that deported illegal and unskilled migrant workers in order to create jobs for Thais. Policy encouraged Thais to seek work overseas.     

Changing the Status Quo of Migration and Asylum Policies in Turkey: A Narrative Inquiry

Abstract

Turkey has been experiencing a migration policy transformation in the wake of a new ruling entitled the ‘Foreigners and International Protection Law’ (FIPL). This qualitative inquiry investigates this major change process by focusing on the planned reorganisation which is a result of the legislation process, with the aim of connecting the change process to a change model. The researcher interviewed twenty-seven middle and upper-level managers and experts from the Foreigners, Border, and Asylum Department (FBAD) and Asylum and Migration Bureau (AMB) of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior. Both their implementation of the change process and perceptions on such a transformation period were investigated. The study also examined the change process of the irregular migration and asylum regime within Turkey’s bid for full European Union membership as well as implementation of the draft FIPL. This study provides an example of a policy change process by analysing how governmental practice and legislation have evolved with regard to irregular migration, asylum seekers, and refugees in Turkey. The results noticeably reveal that, instead of seeing irregular migration and asylum as merely a threat to national security or a welfare issue, Turkey has chosen a way of developing a humanitarian approach in both the legislative and administrative fields. This is the first study which attempts to analyse a particular policy change process in the migration and asylum regime in Turkey. The results could influence policy dynamics and set priorities by suggesting policy solutions.     

Alienation of the outsider: the plight of migrants

This paper compares the plight of international migrants with those from rural to urban areas, examining specifically the migration of Turks into Europe and into Turkish metropolitan centers. This allows comparison of migrant groups with the same point of origin in terms of national, ethnic, cultural, religious, and social characteristics, as well as the same traditional family culture. Economic factors are the main reasons for immigration into Europe. The migrant worker and his family often become marginal to both the country of origin and the country of sojourn. The migrant family must be flexible in dividing or reconstructing itself in various ways to accommodate time, space, and money requirements and to protect ties with the home country requiring intensive geographical mobility, resulting in structural instability and even fragmentation. For the 2nd generation, poor school performance decreases self-esteem and hinders the development of cultural identity; the higher the aspirations for the future and the perception of marginality, the greater is the child's orientation toward the home country. In Turkey, rapid change in traditional agricultural production and rapid population growth caused the movement of population from rural to urban areas. Through rural-urban migration and international migration millions become uprooted populations and become "outsiders." The distinction between 1st and 2nd generation is one of degree, based on the retention of the traditional culture and identity. Factors which interfere with the integration of the migrant population into the dominant society include 1) the unicultural nature of the dominant society and 2) the degree of similarity (or dissimilarity) between the 2. In Turkey, as well as in many other developing countries, the "traditional" family interaction pattern is characterized by relatedness and interdependence among individuals and between generations. Turkish rural to urban migrants are in a more favorable situation than immigrants to Europe to utilize the informal affiliations of family, kin, and community. Extended communal networks are recreated through congested slum living conditions and through friendship sometimes replacing family and kin; traditional identities are reaffirmed through strengthened religious and national sentiments and informal groupings.     

Humbling Turkishness: Undoing the Strategies of Exclusion and Inclusion of Turkish Modernity

Kurds make up about a fifth of Turkey's population. Turkey has taken steps – albeit slowly and reluctantly – towards increased recognition of Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights. However, within Turkey there is also a steeply rising tide of Turkish nationalism, prejudice and intolerance towards Kurds, and increasing anti-Kurdish sentiment. This article brings studies of Kurdishness and Turkishness into a single conversation and traces the relationship between Turkish modernity, Orientalized Kurdishness and the construction of Turkishness as the efendi (master) identity. It does this by drawing attention to “strategies of exclusion and inclusion” in the construction of official Turkish history, and relates these to the way in which the tense borders between Kurds and Turks are maintained and currently reproduced. It also presents a normative argument in favour of “humbling Turkishness” and “solidarity trading zones”.     

The Turkish alevis

The Alevi comprise a specific ethnic group in Turkey of especial interest. In presenting a case study of an Alevi community in Ankara that arose out of internal urban migration, the present paper delineates the way in which the Alevis have moved away from constituting a counterculture during the period of the Ottoman period to comprising a working class subculture of great organizational and political potential in contemporary Turkey. The paper also describes the ethnic markedness of the Alevi community and the problems that arise out of this markedness.     

The impact of migration on gender roles: findings of field research in Turkey

Findings are based on a sample of four types of Turkish women affected by migration: 1) pioneer women who emigrated on their own (33 persons); 2) followers with wage work experience, who joined or left with husbands (44 persons); 3) followers without wage work experience (39 persons); and 4) women left behind when husbands migrated (45 persons). These women are compared to a non-migrant control group (54 persons). Sample surveys were conducted in three sites, which varied in levels of industrial development, economic diversification, and urbanization (Ankara, Kisehir, and eight rural villages in the province of Kisehir). The sample includes returnees registered with the Social Insurance Institute and persons located by the chain inquiry method. Prior research supports the importance of including typologies based on family types, marriage types, levels of education, and experience with wage work. This study confirms that pioneer women were more likely to have romantic marriages, to have nuclear families, to have higher educational levels, and to have prior wage work. Analysis of the 116 women with migration experience shows that 75% migrated during 1968-74. 22% migrated after 1980. 51% were returnees during 1983-85, and many received retirement benefits. Almost 65% spent 10 or more years abroad. 56% were aged under 24 years. 85% were married at the time of emigration. 61% viewed their migration experiences as improving their maturity and ability to handle affairs compared to nonmigrant women. 88% became housewives after returning. 27% of return migrants and 82% of nonmigrants had never had their own bank accounts. 69% of return migrants and only 22% of nonmigrants reported movement outside the home without permission. 63% of migrants and 39% of nonmigrants would cast political votes independently of their husbands. Migrating women exercised more independent behavior but retained traditional responsibility for housework. The greatest differences were between women with wage work and women without or with migrating husbands. Followers without wage work were the most disadvantaged. Migration is viewed as a significant factor in determining gender roles among Turkish women.     

‘Nation‐state’ and ‘minority’ types of discourse ‐problems of communication between the majority and the islamic minorities in contemporary bulgaria

Ethnic problems may be investigated via either or both of two types of discourse — ‘nation‐state discourse’ and ‘minority discourse’. The first type constitutes a declarative, dia‐chronic‐oriented type of discourse, centred around easily perceivable semiotic codes (language, history, tradition, religion). These codes are invested with qualities which relate to the existence and sustainability of the nation‐state. As a consequence the defence of such codes is experienced as a defence of the nation‐state. By contrast a ‘minority type’ of discourse does not, in principle, centre on nation‐state semiotic codes. In Bulgaria, the discourse of the Islamic communities of the country (Turks, Pomaks, Turkish Gypsies) revolves, by and large, around issues of integration and accommodation, especially of either a demographic and/or economic character. The paper surveys domains that display a close interaction between the nation‐state institutions and the Bulgarian minority communities, namely the mass media, national holidays, educational bodies, army and police. It is argued that a careful and critical appraisal of existing attitudes with respect to these domains is necessary if ethnic conflicts, most likely to emerge during the present atmosphere of post‐totalitarian changes, are to be avoided.

The study of ethnic relations relies on two types of discourse: ‘nation‐state discourse’ and ‘minority discourse’. In the present paper, the minorities under investigation are the Islamic minorities of the Bulgarian Turks and the Pomaks, and the Gypsy minority.     

Competitive victimhood and reconciliation: the case of Turkish–Armenian relations

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that conflicts tend to be intractable if collective victimhood has become a component of national identity, and when conflicting communities claim to be the ‘real’ or ‘only’ victims, and that their suffering justifies crimes past and present. Turkish and Armenian narratives of competitive victimhood are analysed drawing on public opinion polls from Turkey and Armenia, and personal interviews with Turks and Armenians. The study corroborates past theory and research that competitive victimhood prevents reconciliation, particularly if it has become an essential part of national identity. The paper also shows that Turkish–Armenian relations remain at the bottom stage of the reconciliation ladder. Yet, some of our empirical observations suggest that when grass-roots level interaction between Turks and Armenians is facilitated (which has been prevented not least because of the closed border), there is room for the abandonment of competitive victimhood at least on an interpersonal level, if not on a general societal or political level.     

Reconsidering identity: the ethnic and political dimensions of hybridity among majority and Turkish youth in Germany and England1

Sociological research has hitherto largely focused on majority ² and minority ethnic identities or citizenship identities. However, the social connections between youth are not simply ethnic dynamics but also political dynamics involving citizenship categories. This article argues that in postmodern societies, it is important to reconsider the ways we think about youth identities. Drawing upon qualitative data from a study into the political identities of majority (German and British) youth and Turkish youth, educated in two Stuttgart and two London secondary schools, the research found that fifteen‐year‐olds had no singular identity but hybrid ethno‐national, ethno‐local and national‐European identities as a result of governmental policies, their schooling and community experience, social class positioning, ethnicity and migration history. In working‐class educational contexts, many majority and Turkish youth privileged the ethnic dimension of hybridity whereas majority and Turkish youth in the two middle‐class dominated schools emphasized the political dimension of hybridity. The article demonstrates that social class and schooling (e.g. ethos and peer cultures) have a considerable role to play in who can afford to take on the more hybridized cosmopolitan identities on offer.