World and regional labour force trends and prospects

Changes in fertility during 1970-1985 will not have any effect on the composition of the world work force until 1985 because the people who will be of working age at that time have already been born. However, fertility for this period will directly influence the size of the age group 15-30 in the year 2000. Moreover, fertility trends for this period will have an indirect effect on participation of women in the labor force. The number of people in the labor force has proportionately followed total population. Just as total population is projected to increase in the single decade 1970-1980 by an amount equal to its size in 1750, so the labor force will increase by 360 million during the 1980's (its original size in 1750). By the end of the present century the world labor force may well number some 2,6000 million, reaching 3,000 million by the year 2010; 4,000 million by 2030; 5,000 million by 2070; and stabilizing at about 5,200 million by the end of the 21st century. There will be great regional variations. Increases will range from 20-35% in Europe and the U.S.S.R. to 100-120% in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For East Asia and North America the increases may amount to 60% by the year 2000 and 100% by 2050. In 1970 less developed regions had 2/3 the world's labor force; by 2000 they will have 3/4. In 1970 about 20% of the labor force in more developed regions were working in agriculture while in less developed regions 2/3 were so engaged. In other terms, in more developed regions 10 farmers supported 108 persons while in less developed regions 10 farmers supported only 38. According to Food and Agriculture Organization projections, by 2000 only 3.5% of the labor force in developed regions and 43.5% in less developed regions will be in agriculture. Differences in gross national product between regions is striking. In 1970 the less developed regions contained 70% of world population, 67% of the world labor force, 87% of the world agricultural labor, and produced 15% of its wealth. There are also sharp contrasts in participation in the labor force. In less developed countries more youths and older persons are in the labor force while in developed countries more women work. By the year 2000 female activity rates in more developed regions will increase for ages 20-64 and decrease for those under 20 and over 64. This will raise female participation in the labor force to 35%. In less developed regions female participation is expected to decline. The proportion of young workers is expected to increase in less developed and decline in more developed regions; the same will be true for older workers. The dependency burden will be concentrated among the young in less developed nations; in more devel oped regions there will be larger numbers of older dependents.     

World population trends in 1960-70

The rapid rise in world population for the 4 periods 1950-1955, 1955 -1960, 1960-1965, and 1965-1970 is mainly due to a decline in the crude death rate from 24/1000 in 1950-1955 to 16.1/1000 in 1965-1970. 1950 was a turning-point in mortality rates because for the first time public health measures became widely available in less developed regions. These less developed regions contained 63.4% of the world population in 1930, 65.5% in 1950, and 70.0% in 1970. World population increased by 22% in 1960-1970, compared to 20% in 1950-1960, which was twice as much as the 20% registered for the 20 years 1930-1950. Developed regions contributed a 14% increase between 1950-1960 and 12% between 1960-1970; in less developed regions the increases were 23% and 27% respectively. Demographic conferences have begun to neglect mortality, but this is still a vital part of total population growth. Evidence is that the mortality decline in less developed countries is beginning to level off so that previous population projections may not be reached. What decline has been seen in crude birth rates in less developed countries is largely attributable to declines in East Asia, notably in the People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, and other Chinese or Chinese culture-related populations, as well as some of the smaller Latin American countries and some small islands off Africa. Such demographic giants as India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and sub-Saharan Africa have shown little change. In areas with high fertility there are more mothers under age 20 and more births to women over age 35 while in low-fertility areas births are concentrated in the 20-35 year groups. An interesting example is Japan which has 50% of its births to mothers 25-29 years of age. Less developed countries have a larger proportion o f the population under age 14 while developed countries which have had lower fertility for a number of years have larger numbers in the older age groups. In less developed areas the greatest burdens are associated with child-rearing while welfare for the aged is the great concern in the more developed areas of the world. The great trend toward urbanization in all parts of the world means that the population problems commanding greatest attention are those associated with large and fast-growing cities.     

Does Europe need immigrants? Population and work force projections

European countries defined as all Northern and Western Europe including the former East Germany had a population of 498.4 million in 1990. In 1990 Western Europe had 374.4 million people. The European Community (EC) makes u 92% of the total population. Projections forecast a peak of the EC population (excluding the former East Germany) in 2005 at 334.2 million compared with 327 million in 1989, then declining to 332.5 million in 2010, 329.0 million min 2015 and 324.5 million in 2020. In Europe outside the East, the 20-24 year old work force entrance age group will drop from 29,860,000 in 1990 to 26,400,000 in 1005 and 23,480,000 in 2000: decreasing by 6,380,000 or 21.3%. Fertility rose by 22% in Sweden between 1985 and 1990, the rise of negligible in France and Belgium, but 2% in the UK and Switzerland, 4% in the Netherlands, 13% in Norway, 16% in Denmark, and even 6% in Germany and Luxembourg. The Ec labor force was 145 million in 1990 (excluding East Germany); it is projected to peak at 146.9 million in 2000, decline slowly until 2010 and decline faster up to 2025 with the steepest decline occurring in Germany and Italy. Unemployment rates would change from the 1990 estimate of 15.7 million to 15.5 million in 1995. Net migration into the 12 EC countries was on average -4,800 from 1965 to 1969; 357,000 from 1970 to 1974; 164,400 from 1980 to 1984; and 533,000/year from 1985 to 1989 as a result of the rise of asylum applicants and migration of ethnic Germans into Germany. Increased immigration is not needed to satisfy work force shortages for the next 10-20 years in Western Europe or in the EC. Other issues addressed are the economic activity forecast, the hidden labor supply, skill shortages, Eastern Europe, and teenage shortage. High-level manpower movements, immigration of asylum seekers, and illegal immigration will continue, but in the long run the conditions of employment and welfare support have to be improved for the women of Europe.     

Aging in Asia: A cultural,socio-economical and historical perspective

Asia has about 60% of the world population and population aging is occurring more rapidly in Asia than in Western countries. The group aged 65 years and above will increase from 207 million in 2000 to 857 million in 2050, a staggering increase of 314%. The diversity in economic, demographic, religious, cultural and geo-political factors in Asia is unparalleled by any other continent, and is, in part, contributory to the rapid rise in population aging. By 2050, those under 15 years old will have shrunk from 30% in 2000 to 19%, while those aged 65 years and above will increase from 6% to 18%. In addition, the gender divide still persists with 100 elderly women to 70 elderly men. These projected demographic changes pose three major challenges: 1) how best to address the rising population of the group aged 65 years and above, 2) how to address the shrinking population of the young as well as the working adults, and 3) how to address the problems arising from the disproportionate increase in older women than men. From now to 2050, it will be expeditious for each country in Asia to look into ways of reversing the decline in total fertility rates (TFRs) and restore to replacement levels. If not, at least introduce measures to halt its free fall. Due to the complexity of factors that have influenced the fall in TFRs in Asia, it will be a daunting task to reverse this fall. There is no “single size fits all” solution to this complex problem. Research work in this short-term strategy in addressing the aging population is urgent. In the longer term, the East-West Centre have suggested four modalities, 1) establish policies and programmes that enhance traditional Asian systems of family support for the elderly; 2) introduce policy reform that encourages the elderly who are still capable of remaining in the work force; 3) create institutions and systems that support high levels of personal saving; and 4) formulate public programmes, including pension schemes and national healthcare systems. We need to work while there is time.     

Economic implications of Japan's aging population: a macro-economic demographic modeling approach

This paper utilizes a macroeconomic demographic model to analyze the probable impact of population aging on various public programs in Japan. Rapid fertility decline aided by mortality decline has caused the proportion of the Japanese population aged 65 and over to increase from 4.9% in 1950 to 9.0% in 1980. A population projection based on the 1975 population census assumes a recovery of fertility from a total fertility rate (TFR) of 1.9 in 1976 to 2.16 in 1980 and a gradual decline to 2.1 by 1987, while an alternative projection assumes a continuing fertility decline to a TFR of 1.65 in 2025. According to these assumptions, in 2025 18.12% to 21.29% of the total population would be aged 65 or over and 38.66% to 43.80% of the working age population would be aged 45-64. A macroeconomic neoclassical growth model with some Keynesian features was formulated to evaluate the future impact of population aging on social security programs. Population changes are transmitted to economic variables in the model through the supply of labor, level of savings, public health care plans, and old-age pension schemes. The simulation experiments included the 2 population projections and 2 alternative production functions, 1 with the quality of labor incorporated and 1 without. The results indicated that, regardless of the population projection and production function used, the growth of the economy is likely to slow to 1 or 0% in the beginning of the next century due to decreased growth of the labor force and a change in its quality due to age-compositional variations. Public health insurance schemes and pension plans will require increasing financial resources as a result of accelerated population aging; depending on the choice of benefit levels, the proportion of national income allocated to them is expected to range from 14%-40% in the year 2010. Per capita gross national product will continue to grow despite decreased economic growth, but savings might be adversely affected if the provision of social insurance benefits continued to increase monotonically. Possible palliative measures would be to change present employment practices or to upgrade the quality of the labor force through vocational training programs for older workers.     

Research on international migration and census data co-operation in Latin America

Population censuses in Latin America have generally recorded the place of birth of all persons enumerated. The use of those data for the study of international migration has been less common because international movements were judged to be a relatively weak factor determining demographic change in the majority of Latin American countries and because the data gathered were generally not tabulated with sufficient detail. During the 1970s, the UN Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) realized that international migration was not necessarily a minor factor in their evolution and launched a program to improve the quality and availability of census information on the foreign-born population enumerated by each country. The program on International Migration in Latin America (IMILA) has therefore been in operation for more than 10 years and has been successful in eliciting the in-depth tabulation and exploitation of census information in the majority of Latin American countries and in the 2 main receivers in the Americas: Canada and the US. As part of the IMILA project, CELADE has become the depository of magnetic tapes with census information on the foreign-born population, thus gaining greater flexibility in the exploitation of the data available. On the basis of the information gathered, CELADE has published twice in the past decade a compilation of tabulations of the foreign-born population by country of enumeration, country of birth, age, and sex. Although census data on place of birth are not free from problems, particularly in countries where illegal migrants may not be adequately enumerated by a census, they are a valuable source of reasonably comparable information on the overall impact of migration in receiving countries and are often the only source of information on emigration from the sending countries.     

The 1988 Nigerian population policy

The population of Nigeria is one of the fastest growing rates in the world at 2.5-3.5%/ year. The estimated population was 101.11 million in 1987 and by 2015 is projected to be 280 million. Nigeria was the 10th most populous country in 1985 and by 2025 it would be 4th. The average number of children for each woman is 6-7 and the death rate is 16/1000. A recent government policy has restricted women to 4 children. 47% of the population is under 15 years of age. Goals of the government include reducing the growth rate, improving the standard of living, and balancing the population distribution between urban and rural areas. To do this they will need to promote awareness of their population situation to all citizens, educate young people on family planning, and to enhance development in rural and urban areas by slowing the migration to the cities. Most Nigerians view this policy as discriminatory against women, and ineffective in curbing present growth in population. Religions including Catholicism, Islam and some Christian groups do not promote birth control. Although many groups oppose this policy, most realize that the country is over populated and that with the present economic situation, a reduction in growth is needed. A more acceptable policy would restrict Christians, who marry only 1 wife, to 4 children and Moslems, who can have up to 4 wives, could have only 1 child/wife or 4 children for the man, in each family. A better method would be to encourage 3 children/family because of the young age structure in the population. Even if the fertility would decline to 2 children/family there would be substantial growth for many years to come.     

Chinese Communist Party Central Committee calls on Party and Youth League members to take the lead in having only one child (per couple), [open letter,September 25, 1980

This open letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerns the question of controlling China's population growth. To limit the total population of China to 1.2 billion by the end of this century, the State Council has advocated 1 couple giving birth to only 1 child. China's total population will reach 1.3 billion after 20 years and will exceed 1.5 billion after 40 years. Besides the family needing to increase the cost of upbringing, increasing population also requires the state, in order to solve their education, employment, and otheer problem, to raise education expenditures, investments of equipment, and outlays for social and public utilities. The phenomenon of population "aging" will not occur within this century because at present 1/2 of the total national population is below the age of 21, while elderly people above age 65 consist of less than 5%. After 40 years of the practice of 1 child per couple, some families may experience the problem where the elderly lack people to care for them. In the future when production is developed and the people's lives are improved, social welfare and social security will certainly increase and improve continuously. To control population growth, the Party and government have already adopted a series of concrete policies; considerations and allowances are to be given to single children and their families with respect to admission to childcare centers and primar schools. Young comrades must begin with themselves, while old comrades must educate and supervise their own sons and daughters.     

Demographic and employment shifts: implications for benefits and economic security

This Issue Brief examines factors affecting the population's age distribution and composition, such as mortality rates, fertility rates, and immigration. In addition, it examines factors affecting labor force composition, such as immigration, increased labor force participation of women, and retirement trends, and discusses the potential impact of these changes on publicly financed programs: Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and federal employee retirement systems. The discussion also highlights the implications of these population and labor force changes on employers, employees, and retirees. The elderly population--now 31.8 million, representing 12.6 percent of the population--is projected to experience tremendous growth between 2010 and 2030, when the baby boom generation reaches age 65, rising from 39.7 million, or 13.3 percent of the population, to 69.8 million, or 20.2 percent of the population. Growth in the elderly population has implications for retirement and health care systems. Population projections suggest that the traditionally pyramid-shaped work force, with a proportionately greater number of younger workers than older workers, will be replaced with a more even age distribution. Consequently, significant and continued modifications to benefit packages, such as changes in compensation structures in which earnings automatically rise with age, are likely to occur. Women's labor force participation began to accelerate in the mid-1950s, rising 75 percent among women aged 25-44 in 1991, although there is some indication that this growth may be flattening. With women comprising a greater part of the labor force, employers will be encouraged to develop and implement programs to better accommodate their needs. Increased life expectancy, a decreased percentage of entry level workers, changes in Social Security's normal retirement age from 65 to 67, and employer plans to raise the normal age of retirement or provide incentives to delay retirement, could raise the average age of retirement. However, other factors, such as poor health, other sources of retirement income, and individual preferences for retirement, could still dominate the retirement decision. The combination of increased average life expectancy guaranteeing more years of retirement to finance and rising dependency ratios increases the future cost of Social Security financing. Medicare financing is also an important policy issue because the program is projected to experience financial difficulties in the short term, resulting from explosive health care costs. In addition, Medicaid expenditures are consuming increasing amount of shrinking state budget resources--a large portion of which is used to finance nursing home care for a growing elderly population.     

BANKING SPREADS IN LATIN AMERICA

Intermediation spreads in Latin America are high by international standards. This paper examines the determinants of bank interest margins in that region using bank- and country-level data from 85 countries, including 14 Latin American economies. The results suggest that Latin America has higher interest rates, less efficient banks, and larger reserve requirements than other regions and that these factors have a significant impact on spreads. However, Latin American countries do not differ markedly from their peers in other aspects that are found important in determining the cost of financial intermediation, such as inflation and bank profit taxation . ( JEL E43, E44, G21, O54)     

Learning from your neighbor: tax-benefit systems swaps in Latin America

Over the last decades, Latin American countries have experienced a noticeable decrease in income inequality. While this trend is mainly associated with a decline in wage inequality, progressive reforms of the tax-benefit systems of the region may have played a role. While redistributive systems in Latin America are still in their infancy, they are constantly expanding and do so at different pace in the region. To investigate this point in a comparative way, the present study exploits newly developed tax-benefit microsimulation models for Ecuador and Colombia. These two neighboring countries show contrasted situations in terms of income distribution and we characterize the extent to which this difference is explained by different tax-benefit systems. The comparative nature of our microsimulation models allows us to swap tax-benefit systems between countries to produce counterfactual simulations whereby the system of a country is applied to the population of the other. In this way, we can decompose the total country difference in income distribution to extract the role of different tax-benefit policies. We confirm that the Ecuadorean system is more redistributive and quantify the difference: if the Ecuadorean system was applied to the Colombian population, the Gini coefficient would be reduced by 1.7 points in Colombia. Headcount poverty would decrease by around 10% and the intensity of poverty by up to 14.7%. This analysis contributes to the recent literature on the redistributive role of tax-benefit systems in Latin America and highlights the role of microsimulation techniques to show how countries in the region can learn from each other in order to improve social protection and reduce income inequality.     

Demography of Indian aging, 2001-2051

India is the second largest country in the world, with 72 million elderly persons above 60 years of age as of 2001, compared to China's 127 million. One of the objectives of this paper is to assess the emerging scenario of elderly for the first half of the 21st century. According to projections, the elderly in the age group 60 and above is expected to increase from 71 million in 2001 to 179 million in 2031, and further to 301 million in 2051; in the case of those 70 years and older, they are projected to increase from 27 million in 2001 to 132 million in 2051. Among the elderly persons 80 and above, they are likely to improve their numbers from 5.4 million in 2021 to 32.0 million in 2051. The increasing number and proportion of elderly will have a direct impact on the demand for health services and pension and social security payments. Mobilizing resources for geriatric care and providing sufficient maintenance for the elderly will emerge as a major responsibility for heath-care providers and pension economists.     

失能老年人长期护理的需求规模评估、费用测算与经济效应预测

伴随着失能风险的增加,老年人长期护理问题成为人口老龄化研究的新课题.基于CHARLS等相关数据,改进Markov模型,测算2020—2060年失能老年人长期护理需求规模及费用,并预测经济效应,结果表明:(1)老年人数量呈倒"U"形增长趋势,并于2048年左右达到顶峰,约为4.34亿人;失能老年人呈逐年上升趋势,于2060年达到1.84亿人.(2)失能老年人长期护理费用由2020年的3906.57亿元增长到2060年的44973.16亿元,增长11.51倍,其中轻度、中度和重度失能老年人长期护理费用分别增长8.92倍、15.55倍和21.17倍.(3)老年护理劳动力需求量预测显示,由90.33万人上升到228.98万人,增长2.54倍;机构养老护理型床位需求量预测显示,由241.03万张增长到553.11万张,增长2.29倍;老年护理市场直接经济增量预测显示,由3906.57亿元增长到44973.16亿元,增长11.51倍.基于此,本文提出包括坚持"以制度为基础、以服务为核心、以救助为兜底、以法律为准绳"的基本原则,建立失能动态监控机制,完善养老服务财政补贴制度等政策建议.     

Communique on the one-in-one thousand sample survey of birthrate of China's population

To analyze the history of the marriage and birth of Chinese women and to inspect the results of family planning work, to do well the jobs of demographic forecasting and formulating demographic plans, to provide a reliable basis for strengthening the scientific management of family planning work, the state Family Planning Commission organized and carried out a nationwide 1-person-in-1-thousand survey of birthrates in 28 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions. The following are survey results: 1) 24.77% of the total survey population were women between 15 and 49 years of age; 2) among the women of childbearing age, 31.46% were unmarried, 64.53% were in 1st marriages, 2.89% were remarried; .19% were divorced but not remarried, and .94% were widows; 3) the average age of first marriage was 18.4 in the 1940s, 19 in the 1950s, 19.8 in the 1960s, 21.6 in the 1970s, and 23 in the late 1970s; and 4) the average number of births was 5.44 in the 1940s, 5.87 in the 1950s, 5.8 in the 1960s, and 4.01 in the 1970s. The survey reveals that education level and occupation have a strong relation to childbearing among Chinese women. The survey found that China and 170 million married childbearing aged women and that 118 million or 69.46% used birth control measures. 33 million couples had 1 child only, among them 42.3% has officially committed themselves to maintaining a 1 child family. The data reveal that major achievements in family planning work have been obtained, but the mission ahead is still arduous.     

Urban policy,economic policy,and the growth of large cities in China

It is argued that despite a Chinese national urban policy large cities are still growing rapidly. Policy implementation is considered weak. It is suggested that a better strategy for increased urbanization in large Chinese cities would include integrating urban with economic policy, improving urban facilities, and planning and managing large cities. A short review is given of theories on city size and development in developing countries. Chinese economic reforms and their impact on urban growth are described. During 1978-90 the level of urbanization rose from 17.9% to 26.4%. Five periods during 1949 to present are identified as exhibiting distinct development profiles. Over the 40 year period, policies pertaining to cities of a particular population size changed constantly. During the early 1950s, development focused on major coastal cities and newly expanding industrial centers. After the 1950s and the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), rural areas and small urban places were the focus of Maoist development. Large cities were de-emphasized. The early 1970s emphasized the development of rural industries and small urban places in order to reduce rural-urban inequalities. A national urban policy was prepared in the early 1980s. The aim was to control the size of large cities, to develop medium sized cities, and to develop small cities. This policy was amended later and is now China's Urban Planning Law. However, the percentage of the nonagricultural population (NAP) living in cities of a million or more persons increased from 37.5% in 1978 to 41.6% in 1990. The share of NAP living in small cities increased to 21.5% in 1990. Temporary migrants were an estimated 5-15% of large city populations. Most cities were beyond their population control limit. Large cities had served important roles in development: greater efficiency in the industrial labor force and more profits; centers for culture, education, politics, and transportation; and links to foreign countries. Economic reforms fueled growth. At present controlled growth is an obstacle to economic development in large cities. Improvement is needed in urban management.     

Demography of Indian Aging, 2001-2051

Summary

India is the second largest country in the world, with 72 million elderly persons above 60 years of age as of 2001, compared to China's 127 million. One of the objectives of this paper is to assess the emerging scenario of elderly for the first half of the 21st century. According to projections, the elderly in the age group 60 and above is expected to increase from 71 million in 2001 to 179 million in 2031, and further to 301 million in 2051; in the case of those 70 years and older, they are projected to increase from 27 million in 2001 to 132 million in 2051. Among the elderly persons 80 and above, they are likely to improve their numbers from 5.4 million in 2021 to 32.0 million in 2051. The increasing number and proportion of elderly will have a direct impact on the demand for health services and pension and social security payments. Mobilizing resources for geriatric care and providing sufficient maintenance for the elderly will emerge as a major responsibility for heath-care providers and pension economists.     

International Conference on Population Aging. Keynote address

This is the keynote address of H.E.Dr. Vincent Tabone, President of Malta, at the International Conference on Aging, which was held in San Diego in September 1992. He states that the conference celebrates the tenth anniversary of the Vienna International Plan of Action, and provides an opportunity to evaluate progress and plan future direction. Dr. Tabone, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, first introduced the question of aging at the UN General Assembly over twenty years ago; the United Nations Secretariat established its first program in the field of aging in 1970. At the World Assembly on Aging in 1982, all members adopted the International Plan of Action, which defined guidelines for policies and programs in support of the aging populations. As a direct result of this, and in support of the needs of developing countries, the UN signed an agreement with the government of Malta that established the International Institute on Aging as an autonomous body under the auspices of the UN; it is the major expression of the Vienna Plan of Action. Concern for aging populations has developed enough maturity and momentum to oversee its own progress. Although current events may relegate the social and economic implications of the aged to the sphere of rhetoric, they demand thinking in terms of generations and transcend all political boundaries. This conference will evaluate progress toward deflecting a situation where the elderly constitute an increasing proportion of the population, without adequate and appropriate provision for their livelihood, and could have direct bearing on encouraging and ensuring the continuity of the family's vital and traditional role in preserving the dignity, status, and well-being of its aging members. A nation which begrudges its dues to the elderly, the successful products of society and triumphs of life, denies its past. This conference is a reaffirmation of commitment to the United Nations Principles for Older Persons, an omen of the review of the Global Targets on Aging for the year 2001 by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session in October, and a stepping stone in the path toward integrating the elderly more fully into the mainstream of society. The year 1992 is a year for solidarity between the generations.     

The Conundrum of Low Saving Rates in Latin America

Despite extensive economic reforms during the late 1980s/early 1990s, Latin America's saving rates remain low. This article examines the saving behaviour of 18 Latin American countries in the 1976‐2000 period and compares it with that of 25 other developing countries. It finds that lower inflation, income growth and increased real interest rates on deposits have not had the expected effects on saving rates in Latin America. Instead, the determinants of saving behaviour appear to differ between the two groups of countries, and saving rates are affected by a degree of inertia. Although more research is needed, this indicates that the focus of the neoliberal economic reforms of the 1980s was misplaced.     

Have cash transfers succeeded in reaching the poor in Latin America and the Caribbean?

We present original estimates of the quality of targeting of conditional cash transfer (CCT) and non‐contributory pension (NCP) programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our contribution is novel because we use both national and international poverty lines; provide differentiated estimates for urban and rural areas; and compare the CCT and NCP programmes. We show that leakage to the non‐poor coexists with pervasive under‐coverage of all poor, including the extreme poor. On average, the CCTs cover only 50.5% of the extreme poor in households with children under 18 years of age. Similarly, the NCPs cover only 50.9% of the extreme poor in households with elderly members who do not receive a contributory pension. At the same time, 40.4% of CCT beneficiaries and 50.1% of NCP beneficiaries are not poor, highlighting the potential need for re‐targeting and re‐certification. In most countries, re‐targeting could produce a substantial double benefit in terms of poverty reduction and fiscal savings.     

Comparative analysis of aging policy reforms in Argentina,Chile, Costa Rica,and Mexico

This investigation uses case studies and comparative analysis to review and analyze aging policy in Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Mexico and uncovers similarities and relevant trends in the substance of historical and current aging policy across countries. Initial charity-based approaches to poverty and illness have been gradually replaced by a rights-based approach considering broader notions of well-being, and recent reforms emphasize the need for national, intersectoral, evidence-based policy. The results of this study have implications for understanding aging policy in Latin America from a welfare regime and policy makers’ perspective, identifying priorities for intervention and informing policy reforms in developing countries worldwide.